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Abstract
The thesis examines the responses, as articulated in language, of the trade union 
movement in the UK (especially, the TUC) to changes in labour legislation introduced by 
the Conservative Government between 1979 and 1990. The research attempts to identify 
and interpret key words, themes and repertoires within union discourse by analysis of 
TUC pamphlets, 'campaign' literature, policy documents and speeches at the annual 
Congress, supplemented by information obtained from informal interviews with several 
union figures involved in constructing a response to the legislation. The nature and extent 
of changes in patterns of union language are explored through consideration of the 
materials over two distinct time periods - 1979-1983 and 1986-1990 - thus allowing 
examination of the rhetorical responses of the TUC/unions throughout the duration of the 
Thatcher Government.
In order to place such responses in context, and to examine the extent to which the 
vocabulary of the unions was both shared with and shaped by other participants in the 
policy process, consideration has also been given to the language of Government in 
documents such as Green Papers and in Parliamentary debates, in addition to that of *New 
Right' commentators who may have influenced the making of policy on labour legislation. 
Particular attention is paid to the way in which the characterisation of union immunities 
from legal liability as 'privileges' shaped the linguistic response of the unions and their 
strategy towards the presence of law in industrial relations.
Union language during the period 1979-1990 is found to exhibit characteristics both of 
change and continuity. Those alterations which occured are considered in the light of 
theories of Thatcherism as a hegemonic project and in the context of wider changes in the 
discourse of the Left. The problem of isolating causative factors is also addressed.
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction
This thesis examines the responses of the trade union movement in Britain 
(particularly, the Trades Union Congress) to the labour legislation policies of the 
Conservative Government from 1979 to 1990. Its emphasis is upon the way in which these 
responses were articulated in language - the key words, narratives, themes and rhetoric 
which were used in the explanation and projection of policies and programmes of action, 
in justification of campaigns of opposition to the legislation, and as a means of creating 
and mobilising constituencies of support. However, while the central focus is upon the 
union reaction to legislation, I have also considered, albeit in rather less detail, the 
language of the Government and the various important 'New Right' theorists who 
influenced policy-making in order to locate the union movement and its language within 
the 'terms of debate' on reform of the law relating to trade unions.
Objectives and contribution of the thesis
My work can be seen as part of an ongoing debate about the nature, extent and 
causes of change (and possible decline) in British trade unionism in recent years. A 
considerable number of attempts have been made to analyse the changes undergone by 
unions during the 1980s (for summaries, see Kelly 1990; McDroy 1995: Chapter 10). 
These have examined, inter alia, the changing role of the law in industrial relations 
(Moher 1995), union access to political and economic decision-making (Mitchell 1987; 
Marsh 1992: 111-19), alterations in the pattern of union membership and density (Metcalf 
1991) and workplace behaviour and responses to management strategies (Bassett 1986; 
Guest 1989; Bacon and Storey 1996). Some have concluded that continuity, rather than 
change, has been the characteristic feature of trade unionism over this period (Machines
1987).
However, only limited efforts have been made to examine the changing responses 
of the TUC to the Government's legislative policies - the strategies and campaigns of 
opposition to the various measures and the materials which set out the TUC's views; 
moreover, those accounts which do exist (notably Mcllroy 1991: passim; 1995: 208-22, 
254-61) are primarily descriptive of events rather than analytical or interpretive in nature.
None of the existing literature upon union change sets out to discuss union
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responses to the Thatcher legislation from the particular standpoint of language - that is, 
the ways in which the trade unions used rhetoric, themes and vocabularies to construct 
a position of opposition to the legislation, to mobilise support among union members and 
the public, to voice their wish to be 're-integrated' into the British political community, and 
to define a particular audience.1 To this extent the present study represents an original 
contribution to the existing portrayals of union responses to the Thatcher legislation in 
that it focuses upon the specific question of how those responses were articulated in 
language, and the extent to which there may have been shifts in the vocabulary which was 
used.
There is also a considerable body of existing literature dealing with the labour 
legislative policies of the Thatcher Governments and their possible impact upon trade 
unions {eg Brown and Wadwhani 1990; Elgar and Simpson 1993; Dunn and Metcalf 
1994; Undy et al 1996). The question of the importance of political language in putting 
forward and explaining these policies has, however, only been touched upon by a few 
commentators, in the course of broader discussions of the legislative measures or their 
ideological underpinnings {eg Auerbach 1990; Fosh et al 1993; von Prondzynski 1985; 
Davies and Freedland 1993 - for further references see Chapter 3). Perhaps the closest to 
a full exposition of the political language of Govemment/'New Right' has been offered by 
Fredman (see p.34), who analyses the way in which the Thatcher Governments used the 
'open-textured' concepts of 'democracy', 'rights' and 'freedom' to mobilise support for 
measures which were restrictive of trade unionism (1992: 24); however, the article deals 
only with these three themes and considerable portions of it represent a critique of the 
usage of the terms and proposals for the future of labour law reform.
The analysis contained in Chapter 3 and the first part of Chapter 4 contributes to 
existing studies in that it represents a structured attempt to extract and interpret the key 
vocabularies and rhetorical arguments of Government and *New Right' discourse, albeit 
not in the depth of the analysis of union language which forms my central project. 
Moreover, the question of the impact of ConservativeANew Right' forms of discourse 
upon union language - the extent to which unions adopted the themes and vocabulary of 
their political opponents - remains unexplored. This issue runs through my analysis of
1 Although the issue of language is addressed tangentially by some writers in the 
context of changes in workplace behaviour and attitudes {eg Ackers, Smith and Smith 
1996: 5,26; Bacon and Storey 1996: 43, 57), rather than responses to legislative policy.
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union language in this thesis (see further p. 12) and is addressed at greater length in 
Chapter 7. In this respect, the current work can be viewed as part of the debate on the 
effect upon trade unions of the legislative changes of the 1980s.
But why study political language at all? What is the importance of language in 
formulating and projecting programmes of political action? This question has been 
considered by an increasing number of scholars in recent years. Influenced, in particular, 
by French linguistic theorists, historians have stressed the way in which language does not 
merely reflect a pre-existing and objectively knowable 'reality', but rather functions to 
structure and create it. Arguably the most influential attempt to apply this approach was 
that of Gareth Stedman Jones, whose Languages o f Class sought to argue that appeals 
to 'class' could not be understood as mere expressions of an a  priori 'experience', but 
rather served to constitute and mobilise 'interest, identification, grievance and aspiration' 
(1983: 22) amongst those to whom they were addressed. Accordingly, if one wished to 
define and understand a political movement such as Chartism, it was necessary to study 
the language which was used by its proponents, since it was this which created and 
orchestrated needs and demands and altered behaviour and self-identification {ibid. 24):
'A political movement is not simply a manifestation of distress and pain, its 
existence is distinguished by a shared conviction articulating a political solution 
to distress and a political diagnosis of its causes. To be successful, that is, to 
embed itself in the assumptions of masses of people, a particular political 
vocabulary must convey a practicable hope of a general alternative and a 
believable means of realising it, such that potential recruits can think within its 
terms. It must be sufficiently broad and appropriate to enable its adherents to 
inhabit its language in confronting day to day problems of political and social 
experience, to elaborate tactics and slogans upon its basis, and to resist the 
attempts of opposing movements to encroach upon, reinterpret or replace it' {ibid. 
96).
Similar analyses of nineteenth-century radicalism have been offered by Joyce (1991) and 
Belchem (1996), while others, such as Wahrmann (1995) and Epstein (1994), have 
focused on language in other historical contexts.
The significance of language has also been emphasised by those working in 
political science. On a theoretical level, Michael Shapiro has argued that language is 
'constitutive of political phenomena rather than merely about political phenomena' (1981: 
5 - emphasis in original), while Murray Edelman (1964; 1971; 1977; 1988) has written 
extensively on the role played by language in politics, stating that 'it is language about
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political events, not the events in any other sense, that people experience; even 
developments that are close by take their meaning from the language that depicts them... 
it is not 'reality' in any testable or observable sense that matters in shaping political 
consciousness and behaviour, but rather the beliefs that language helps evoke' (1988: 104- 
5). For Edelman, therefore, language i s 1performative, that is, political action in [itself]' 
(Merelman 1992: 2 - emphasis in original) and thus a central constituent in establishing 
the identity and justifying the programmes of any political grouping, a fact which has often 
been obscured by a tendency to depict language as an entity separate from the 'real' world 
(Edelman ibid. 107): 'The failure to attribute much significance to language in the study 
of politics has its roots in certain attitudes to language. As befits our trade and practice, 
one of the stubborn convictions of commonsense academic culture is the view of language 
as essentially a descriptive instrument, an unfortunately clumsy way of making 
prepositional statements about the facts of the world' (Brenneis and Myers 1991: 5).
This approach, which sees language as a crucial tool for the formulation and 
justification of programmes of political action and the creation and mobilisation of 
constituencies of support, rather than as a relatively neutral means of describing a pre­
existing 'reality', remains relatively undeveloped at a more practical level in analysis of 
contemporary (or recent) political developments in Britain in general,2 and of the trade 
union movement in particular.3 In this respect the analysis offered in this thesis, which may 
be seen as having a similar agenda to the works on language discussed above, represents 
an original contribution to the issue of the ways in which trade unions responded to the 
Thatcher legislation and the question of the extent of change which they underwent during 
that period.
Nevertheless, while a focus upon language may be regarded as a crucial means of 
comprehending and analysing a political movement, it may still be queried why I have 
chosen to apply such principles of interpretation to the particular case of the trade unions 
in the 1980s.
2 An exception is Gaffiiey (1990); however his work is based upon a close reading 
of specific speeches in order to illustrate the rhetorical styles of political leaders - as such 
it differs from the broader nature of the discussion in this thesis which attempts to offer 
a nuanced interpretation of themes and issues of significance in union discourse.
3 This is not to argue that the question of language has been totally ignored by 
those discussing developments in labour legislation generally; see references quoted on 
p.6 and the discussion of Wedderbum's work which follows.
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I believe that there are a number of reasons why it may be particularly relevant to 
consider the role of language in this particular case. Firstly, a number of commentators, 
particularly Lords Wedderbum and McCarthy, have drawn attention to the importance of 
language in labour relations law. Wedderbum comments that:
'it is essential to look closely at the meanings of the words offered by those in 
charge of the debate... In such inquiries it is also to be noted that the agenda for 
argument is often set by those who have power which they are unwilling to share. 
Control of the agenda often implies control over the language of the debate and 
the meaning given to events. This is of great importance in British labour law 
where the terms employed are often unusually technical... Of course the very 
language in which we speak of... social objectives is itself a weapon of change or 
resistance... Labour law is a well known crucible for the fusing of the ideology and 
semantics inherent in arguments that claim to rest on 'facts' or 'principle'. Many 
have written, for example, about the ambiguities of'freedom' in labour relations' 
(1995: 354).
The most potent example of the power of language in the debate on labour 
relations law during the 1980s was the representation of union immunities from liability 
as 'privileges', which enabled those 'controlling the agenda' to draw the conclusion that 
unions were 'above the law1 and thus that the immunities needed to be curtailed. For their 
part, the unions needed to refute the claims of 'privilege' and to construct an effective 
vocabulary of their own to counter such arguments and thus mobilise support. I will 
discuss these issues in detail in Chapter 4. However, the significance of language extended 
further than legal terminology, as Wedderbum's comment about 'freedom' (discussed in 
Chapters 3,5 and 6) implies. Stephen Dunn (1990) has drawn attention to the role played 
by metaphor in academic analyses of industrial relations, and I argue in Chapter 5 that this 
analysis applies equally to union descriptions of their situation. Moreover, the lengthy 
history of the British labour movement offered a powerful repository of symbolism and 
myth (see pp. 131-6) with which the unions could justify opposition to the legislation. 
Responses to the measures were in this sense strongly shaped by the way in which the 
unions Viewed the world' through these - and other - forms of language.
A second reason for investigating the language of trade unions relates to 
Wedderbum's point about control of the terms of debate. The Government, as the 
instigator of the measures, was in a position to put across its message first and strongest, 
and this enabled it to transmit its understandings and vocabulary to the public as a whole,
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an issue dealt with at greater length in Chapter 7. In this respect, it was assisted by media4 
which were largely supportive of its policies and which themselves used language to 
mobilise support for the legislation. The unions were deeply conscious of the significance 
of the language used to portray them by both Government and media: 'the BBC and ITV 
still refuse to acknowledge the in-bom bias against trade unions, and they even refuse to 
debate in real terms the magnificent research carried out by the Glasgow Media Group' 
(Sapper, A. TUC 1982: 427); 'The presentation of much of the present Government's 
trade union legislation has been consciously designed to foster and exploit anti-union 
prejudice' (TUC 1986a: 4). They consequently emphasised the need to formulate an 
effective response to counteract this adverse representation: 'These are just some of the 
myths you can see almost every day in the press and hear from Government speakers. 
Propagating these ideas has been a major part of the preparation for anti-union legislation. 
Active trade unionists must think clearly how to counter these myths as part of the 
campaign against anti-union law. Putting forward a positive image of trade unionism is a 
key element in rebuilding morale and strengthening membership awareness of the essential 
role of trade unions' (TUC 1982c: 7). Focusing upon the language of the unions thus 
enables us to examine how this response was constructed and underscores the relevance 
of presentation, described by the former head of the TUC's Press and Information 
Department as a 'continuing theme' (Smith, interview), in coordinating opposition to the 
policies.
It will be noted that I have referred, both in the title of this thesis and in the above 
discussion, to union 'responses' to Government policies. I believe this to be a justifiable 
description for two reasons. Firstly, as previously argued, the Government (in conjunction 
with certain 'New Right' think-tanks discussed in Chapter 3) was the initiating force 
behind the legislation and thus union language was formulated in reaction to the 
proposals. Secondly, trade unions tend by nature to be reactive bodies: 'trade unions, it 
is generally agreed, have been much more passive actors than the state or employers' 
(Edwards 1995: 608), with a relatively conservative outlook (Flanders 1968: 10; Famham 
and Pimlott 1994: 105). The consequence was that the agenda and terms of debate tended
4 The issue of media representation of trade unions is too broad a topic to be 
discussed in the present work; nevertheless, the work of the Glasgow Media Group 
(collected, 1995) is instructive here in that it demonstrates how media language, much of 
it anti-union, functioned to construct and shape public perceptions of union behaviour, as 
acknowledged by Sapper (below).
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to be shaped by the Conservatives, a fact often acknowledged by those within the unions 
(see pp. 130, 237).
The third rationale for examining union language is related to the second, but 
somewhat broader. Theorists writing for Marxism Today, particularly Stuart Hall (1983,
1988) argued that 'for any successful response to Thatcherism there must first be a 
reconstitution of language and culture that will enable wider social forces to reorganise 
their experience' (Foster 1985: 37). Although this can be viewed as part of a political 
programme for defeating Thatcherism and as reflecting Marxist principles, factors which 
might make the analysis less valuable for academic purposes, the emphasis upon language 
as a central feature of Thatcherism and of the construction of an appropriate and effective 
response to it resembles my concerns in this thesis. Moreover, this approach sees 
Thatcherism as a hegemonic project which, inter alia, achieved a dominance over British 
political vocabulary in the 1980s (and which arguably still exists). It is possible, therefore, 
that the language of the unions came to resemble that of 'Thatcherism' or the *New Right', 
and this would suggest the validity of the view that the Conservative Government 
achieved intellectual hegemony during the 1980s since it can be argued that 'in politics, 
real intellectual victory is achieved not by transmitting one's language to supporters but 
by transmitting it to critics. A person who adopts the usage employed by a particular side, 
though he remains critical, nonetheless adopts the definition of the situation espoused by 
that side' (Green 1987: 29). I discuss this interpretation at greater length in Chapter 7.
Clearly, however, it would be impossible to reach even a tentative conclusion on 
such an issue without examining the vocabulary used by Government and the TSfew Right' 
in justification of legislative action against unions. Accordingly, Chapter 3 below discusses 
such language in order to assess how far themes and terms were shared across the political 
spectrum. This will indicate the extent to which certain discursive forms became 
standardised within the industrial relations debate, or more strongly, whether the 
employment of particular patterns of language by the Government and other policy 
contributors closed off certain forms of union language while opening up other 
possibilities. Analysis of such language thus enables consideration of how far the 
responses of the unions were shaped by the vocabulary of Government and allied actors.
It can also be argued that there were fundamental changes in the language of the 
Labour Party and the Left in wider terms, perhaps as a result of a shift in the terms of the 
debate brought about by Thatcherite hegemony - an issue to which I shall return briefly
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in the concluding chapter. Inquiry into the language of trade unions, therefore, contributes 
towards an assessment of the extent of the 'reconstitution' of the language of the broader 
Left in Britain.
Overall, therefore, my work seeks to make a contribution to the debate on trade 
union change in the light of the legislative developments of the 1980s. Although I will not 
be offering a definitive answer to the question of whether legislative changes or other 
developments (such as the decline in traditional manufacturing industries) had a greater 
effect upon patterns of trade union behaviour and activity (see further pp.238-40), I 
believe that a focus upon language as a means of constructing and justifying union 
opposition to the legislation can offer a valuable insight into the question of the nature and 
extent of transformation in the union movement. Since language can be seen as a 
fundamental element of political action - indeed, one cannot divorce such action from its 
mode of articulation - the terms, themes and ideas which were emphasised by unions are 
as significant as the frequency of industrial disputes or membership density in indicating 
the way in which they responded to the environment of the 1980s. The language used 
functioned to orchestrate and shape union demands, grievances and objectives. 
Consequently, shifts in vocabulary may be viewed as attempts to reconstitute such claims 
and interests; the goal being to create a less 'inapposite' (Jones 1983: 22) political 
language so as to mobilise support for the union position since 'the success of political 
movements and parties may be said in large part to turn upon the elaboration of effective 
political languages' (Joyce 1991: 27).
A word of caution is perhaps necessary at this point. Edelman argues that 
'language use is strategic. It is always part of a course of action to enable people to live 
with themselves and with what they do and to marshall support for causes' (1988: 108). 
This might be taken to imply that the trade unions devoted considerable attention to the 
precise form of words which they used, perhaps deliberately selecting from a range of 
available options those which were most appropriate. In practice, the use of language 
seems to have been rather less structured than this. Past and present TUC General 
Secretaries remarked to me that there was relatively little in the way of coherent design 
underpinning the vocabulary: 1 suspect we never thought our approach through... I don't 
think we ever sat down and thought 'this is our strategy" (Murray, interview); 'Our 
response to events was always very much what seemed right at the time, without a great 
deal of consideration being given to changing patterns' (Monks, unpublished).
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However, I do not believe that this invalidates the objectives of the thesis. It seems 
implausible to argue that no consideration whatsoever went into the choice of language, 
given that conference speeches and official publications were political acts aimed, in large 
part, at the mobilisation of support for particular courses of action; consequently words 
would have been used which would not only have been credible to the intended audience, 
but which would elicit a response - indeed, Len Murray spoke of 'standard phrases' which 
might 'achieve a reaction against Government' (interview) - see p. 138. This was especially 
so in view of the attention which the TUC/unions began to show towards presentation 
around the end of the decade (see pp.219-23). It would thus be more accurate to say, as 
Monks implies, that language was chosen for its appropriateness at a particular point in 
time, rather than with a view to a longer-term programme of action - thus there would 
seem to have been, at least in the short term, a deliberate selection of valid and effective 
political language, even if this was not sufficiently coherent to amount to an overarching 
'strategy1. But even in the absence of this level of intent, analysis of patterns of vocabulary 
may still demonstrate the way in which the speaker/institution perceives the world at a 
specific moment, given that: 'language about politics is a clue to the speaker's view of 
reality at the time' (Edelman 1988: 104),5 and in this respect alterations in the words used 
or themes emphasised demonstrate changing views of the political environment and of the 
appropriate responses to it.
A further related difficulty does, however, arise from the above discussion. While 
one may examine patterns of language in order to extract important themes and concepts, 
and to point out any change in the nature of the issues addressed, it is difficult (if not 
impossible) to prove any causal relationship between the language used and specific 
political consequences such as an increase in support for the trade unions among the 
public, or the mobilisation of union membership in a specific campaign against a piece of 
legislation (see pp.98-101). This is particularly so given that the interpretation of political 
language by the recipient may differ from that of the speaker (Edelman: ibid). One can
5 The argument here is similar to that of the Glasgow Media Group on the 
vocabulary of news in relation to industrial action: 'it may be claimed that the vocabulary 
of the news is not the outcome of deliberate choice from among a number of alternatives 
but merely reproduces the vocabulary of the wider society... [however] there are 
significant absences in the vocabulary of industrial news reporting which, along with the 
vocabulary which is used, reveal selectivity and value preference for a particular view of 
the causes of industrial conflict' (Vol I: 1995: 192).
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plausibly conjecture that the use of language may have had certain effects, but the 
interpretation still remains open to argument. I am aware of this problem, but as it appears 
ultimately unsolvable I have not attempted to resolve it; rather I have referred throughout 
to the motivations and intentions which underpin particular forms of words, and the 
effects that these may have caused, while recognising that such an analysis represents only 
one possible inference from the evidence available.
One other point needs to be made in respect of the terminology I have used in this 
thesis. I have referred throughout to 'language', 'vocabulary' and 'discourse' without 
seeking to draw any particular distinction between these terms. It might be objected that 
'discourse' has taken on a specific meaning in recent work on linguistics, with the 
discipline of 'discourse analysis' which seeks to analyse the rules, conventions and 
relationships underpinning verbal or written statements {eg Coulthard 1985). However, 
the word has a wide range of definitions - following Foucault, some argue that it refers 
to 'systematically-organised sets of statements which give expression to the meanings and 
values of an institution' (Kress, quoted in Fowler 1991: 42), while others adopt a still 
broader approach which sees discourse as 'the verbal equivalent of political action: the set 
of all political verbalisations, and expressible forms adopted by political organisations and 
political individuals' (GafiBiey 1988: 26). As this thesis is not an exercise in discourse 
analysis, my usage of the term most closely resembles that of Gaffiiey; nevertheless, in so 
far as I focus upon the way in which the understandings, beliefs and a 'world view' of the 
trade union movement were articulated in language, it can also be seen as reflecting the 
idea that certain forms of language are expressive of the values and meanings of that 
'institution' or 'social grouping'.
Source materials and methodology
The analysis in this thesis is based on an investigation of public political language 
- that is, words and statements made in a relatively formal, open manner in forms of public 
communication 'geared towards interventions in the political process and towards 
audiences interested in such interventions' (Wahrmann 1995: 10; see also Joyce 1991: 17; 
Belchem 1996: 11). This reflects my concern with union language as a political event in 
itself - such language can be seen as a 'tool' for putting forward union policies and for 
creating and mobilising support for them and was thus designed for consumption by trade
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union members and the wider public.
As such, my source materials for the discussion of union language fall into three 
categories. Firstly, I have considered pamphlets and 'campaign' materials produced by the 
TUC which discuss the legislative measures and possible responses to them. These took 
the form of leaflets or longer booklets, 'workbooks' designed for union activists, posters 
and speaking notes (particularly for the campaign against the 1982 Employment Bill), 
policy statements, reports of the TUC General Council to the annual Congress, and 
consultative/'strategic' documents (notably that on Industrial Relations Legislation (1986) 
and the two reports of the SRB (1988,1989)). I have also considered the important joint 
statement of the TUC/Labour Party Liaison Committee, People at Work: New Rights, 
New Responsibilities (1986) and the monthly TUC Bulletin, published between 1986 and 
1990 as a means of disseminating information about the work of the TUC, in so far as its 
contents related to legislative measures. Various commentaries upon the legislation and 
union responses have drawn (highly selectively) upon some of these materials (eg 
Auerbach 1990, McDroy 1991), but there has been no extended analysis of the documents 
and the language which they use.
Secondly, I have considered speeches made by TUC officials and other union 
leaders and composite motions put to the annual Congress (including the Conference of 
Special Executives held at Wembley in 1982) in debates upon industrial relations 
legislation.61 have had to be somewhat selective here - clearly debates upon other issues 
(eg those on Europe, workers' rights etc) will have contained statements relating to union 
responses to the industrial relations legislation; nevertheless, I have not examined these 
in order to reduce to manageable levels the material for analysis. Once again, such 
speeches have been used (particularly by McDroy (1991)) to illustrate the actions taken 
by the TUC and unions in response to the legislation; but they have not been the subject 
of a detailed examination which seeks to identify the key themes, vocabulary and rhetoric 
which were deployed to justify opposition and mobilise support.
These source materials have been selected to enable me to concentrate primarily 
upon the language and responses of the TUC - 1 have accordingly not considered the 
annual conferences or publications of individual unions. In part this represents, once again, 
a pragmatic decision to diminish the range of material examined, but I believe it is
6 I have also considered Presidential addresses to Congress as these invariably 
included discussion of responses to the legislation.
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justifiable on other grounds. While commentators have stressed the limited role of the 
TUC, particularly in the light of the decline of corporatist arrangements during the 1980s 
(Hyman 1995: 38; Undy et al 1996: 16), it remains the 'national coordinating centre of 
British trade unionism' (Mcllroy 1995: 45) and is comprehensive in its coverage by 
comparison with European counterparts (Waddington and Whitston 1995: 174). As such, 
it acts as the principal 'think-tank' for British trade unions and as the chief'spokesperson' 
for affiliates in relations with both Government and employers (Hyman: ibid.; McDroy 
1995: 47). Accordingly, despite the growing significance of'mega-unions' such as Unison 
towards the end of the decade, the TUC can be seen as taking the lead in devising and 
orchestrating responses to the legislative measures: 'the central role of the TUC is both 
leadership and seeking to achieve things. In terms of the legislation it was a matter of 
making representations to Government. We had a coordinating role - trying to keep the 
responses that the unions gave together' (Smith, interview).
However, it is important to realise that the union movement is far from monolithic 
and that the language used by individual union leaders may have differed from the 'official' 
TUC response. Consideration of speeches made by such leaders to the annual Congress, 
together with composite motions proposed allows such distinctions to be taken into 
account while retaining a focus upon the responses of the TUC (given that Congress is 
the principal policy-making forum); and I have pointed out divergences between the 
vocabulaiy of union leaders and that of the 'official' TUC response where I consider these 
relevant.
In analysing this material I have adopted a qualitative rather than a quantitative 
approach. I have sought to extract the key words, themes, repertoires and attitudes of the 
TUC/unions which were articulated in discourse and deployed in the formulation of their 
response to the legislation; I have also considered the issue of creation and definition of 
an audience ie the 'constituency' to which a message was addressed, since 'there is an 
intimate connection between what is said and to whom' (Jones 1983: 23; also Joyce 1991: 
27). I have then attempted to offer an interpretation of such language, commenting upon 
its potential significance in mobilising support for opposition to Government policies and 
upon what it might demonstrate about changes in the union movement's view of political 
'reality'.
One obvious objection to this sort of approach is that it is considerably less 
objective than some other means of analysing language, notably content analysis, which
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can empirically demonstrate the frequency with which particular words are used (eg Holsti 
1969). However, this technique also has its disadvantages, notably that it cannot 
demonstrate the various nuances of meaning which are associated with language. I have 
accordingly decided (in common with Jones, Joyce, Wahrmann etc.) to adopt the more 
interpretive method outlined above while recognising that there are certain difficulties 
involved with it.
My discussion of the 'public' source materials discussed above has, however, been 
further supplemented by information gained from relatively informal interviews conducted 
with several individuals involved with the construction of TUC/union responses to the 
legislative policies. While a number of significant figures were interviewed (see p.250), 
responses to requests were somewhat disappointing - for example, I approached the last 
three TUC General Secretaries but secured an interview only with Lord Murray; similarly, 
attempts were made to contact the Press Officers of the six largest unions - however it 
only proved possible to talk to officials from two unions in the absence of responses to 
my requests. Nevertheless, the interviews yielded valuable material, which I have 
incorporated, where appropriate, into the discussion of the public political language which 
forms the central focus of my analysis.
The analysis of Government and New Right' language presented in Chapter 3 and 
part of Chapter 4 proceeds along similar lines. I have drawn upon three principal 'public' 
sources - the tracts and books published by New Right' think-tanks, Green and White 
Papers and Parliamentary statements made by Government ministers in debates upon the 
various Bills. The analysis has been supplemented by reference to political autobiographies 
of those involved and - very occasionally - to extraparliamentary speeches and remarks 
which seem to me to be of particular significance. Clearly this does not represent an 
exhaustive list of statements or writings on the legislative measures of the period - it 
omits, for example, comments made to the media and speeches made to the Conservative 
Party Conference7 - but my essential focus in this thesis is upon the language of the unions
7 It might be argued that there are strong similarities between this annual event and 
the TUC's Congress. However, the latter has a central role in laying down broad lines of 
policy, which the General Council interprets and applies (TUC 1970:1); accordingly 
Congress played an important part in formulating responses to the legislation. In contrast, 
the Conservative Government's policy tended to be formulated at Cabinet or ministerial 
level, the Conference's role being primarily as a 'rally for the faithful' (Ingle 1987:58 - for 
the view that Conservative conferences have been undervalued, see Kelly 1989) and it 
played at best only an indirect part in making policy.
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and I have accordingly not attempted to develop an interpretation of Govemment/'New 
Right' language which is of comparable scope.
Time periods of analysis
The chronological parameters of this study, 1979-1990, allow a consideration of 
the 'Thatcher era' in that they represent the dates of the Conservative Party's election to 
Government and the removal of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister. While any division 
of historical periods must necessarily be somewhat arbitrary, and there were continuities 
between Thatcher's policies (particularly in economics) and those of the previous Labour 
administration (McDroy 1995: 385), I believe this period to be fully justifiable, since the 
Conservative policy towards unions from 1979 represented a radical break with the post­
war consensus (Miller and Steele 1993: 224). It can be argued that 'Thatcherite* industrial 
relations policies remained in place under her successor, John Major, and consequently 
that transformation in the unions was not complete by 1990 (see p.228); however with 
Major's administration still in power at the time of writing, it is perhaps too early to fully 
assess the impact of post-Thatcher policies upon the unions.
Within these boundaries, however, I have chosen to divide my examination of 
union language into two distinct periods, 1979-83 and 1986-90. Once again, there are 
practical reasons for this decision; but the periods also reflect important developments 
both in legislative policy and union response. The earlier period, which covers the period 
up to the election of 1983, saw two Employment Acts in 1980 and 1982 and the union 
campaigns against these measures; additionally it comprises the publication of Hands Up 
fo r  Democracy, the union response to the Green Paper on Trade Unions and their 
Members, which set out proposals which were eventually given legislative effect in the 
Trade Union Act 1984. The other major statutes affecting trade unions were passed after 
the 1987 general election - between 1984 and 1987 there was something of a hiatus in 
legislative activity (see p.26); however, because two documents appeared in 1986 which 
were influential in shaping union strategy for the remainder of the decade (Industrial 
Relations Legislation and People at Work: New Rights, New Responsibilities), I have 
chosen to start my discussion of union language in the later period at the date of 
publication of the first of these, in January of that year.
Division of the analysis of union language in this manner allows for comparisons
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to be drawn between the two periods, and thus illuminates the extent of change in themes 
and patterns of language. There were, of course, a number of events which occurred in 
the years between the two periods selected for study which may have had an effect upon 
union discourse - most notably the banning of unions at GCHQ in 1984 and the miners' 
dispute of 1984-5; but although I have drawn attention to the ways in which these may 
have influenced union language in Chapter 6 ,1 have not examined these episodes in detail 
since, as discussed above, my focus is upon union language in responses to legislative 
policy.8
I have not sought to divide my examination of the language of Government and 
the 'New Right' into distinct periods in the same manner since my focus is upon changes 
in patterns of union language; however, the discussion in Chapter 3 naturally tends to 
centre around the periods of legislative activity during which Green and White Papers 
appeared and ministers attempted to justify policy proposals to Parliament - thus, with the 
exception of the writings of the 'New Right' which were of ongoing significance in 
influencing Conservative policy throughout the decade, the analysis presented there tends 
broadly to mirror the periods examined in Chapters 5 and 6.
Outline of argument
At this stage I feel that it would be valuable to summarise the approach, 
contentions and objectives of this thesis, in order to indicate more clearly the development 
of my argument in the material which follows.
It is not my intention to explore in detail the theoretical arguments about the 
relationship between language and political action. However, the work is based around 
certain working assumptions which should be clearly stated. The starting-point is that 
language functions as more than a relatively transparent means of describing 'reality' which 
in some sense exists externally of its mode of articulation. Rather, language plays a more 
creative or constitutive role than this, operating as a central part of the process by which 
individuals construct reality, by means of its classificatory role - 'segmenting reality into 
conceptual chunks' (Lee 1992: 24). As such, it carries political significance - it reveals the 
way in which an individual or institution orders, structures and understands the world.
8 Moreover, the miners' dispute has been extensively discussed elsewhere - for a 
summary of the interpretive literature, see Gibbon (1988).
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Moreover, political actors use language for purposes beyond the simple 
transmission of empirically-verifiable 'facts' to an audience. Rather, they will use language 
which they consider to be acceptable, appropriate and effective to achieve their desired 
goals. In this manner, language has a strategic purpose in constructing and maintaining 
identity, justifying programmes of action and mobilising support. Thus, the themes and 
vocabulary employed in the speeches and publications examined in the following Chapters 
were themselves public political acts - interventions in the political process which it is 
crucial to analyse and interpret in their own right.
Since a particular form of words conveys a certain view of the world, language 
becomes a focus for political ideology (Fairclough 1989: 12). This is especially significant 
in the context of the debate on the labour legislation policies of the Thatcher Government, 
because powerful ideological themes, such as individual autonomy, freedom of choice in 
free markets and anti-collectivism, underpinned many of the reforms. The extent to which 
the policies were inspired by ideas and proposals drawn from 'New Right' theorists 
(especially Hayek) is a matter of controversy among commentators - some view the 
connection as being particularly close (Wedderbum 1991); others argue that a wider range 
of ideological (and other) influences should be considered (Fredman 1992; Fosh et al 
1993); while Auerbach argues that the legislation did not follow a pre-planned Hayekian 
model, but rather tended to reflect pragmatic, short-term responses (1990: 230-6) - 
although it should be noted that even he acknowledges that the 'New Right' offered the 
Conservative Government a valuable source of ideas and rhetoric for justification of the 
measures {ibid. 232). While this thesis does not seek to pinpoint precisely the degree and 
origins of ideological influence upon Conservative policy, it is contended that insufficient 
attention has been paid to the language of the debate on the reform of labour legislation 
and the differing 'world views' (particularly of the trade union movement) embedded in 
that language, given the role of language as a key site of ideological contestation between 
political opponents (Edelman 1977: 25; Edelman 1988: 104; Fowler 1991: 4).
Consequently, an analysis of the key themes and vocabulary of the Government 
and New Right', (undertaken in Chapter 3) demonstrates the ways in which certain forms 
of discourse, evoking particular views and beliefs about the political world, functioned to 
mobilise support for measures which were restrictive of trade union activity. The linguistic 
responses of the trade union movement (taking the TUC as the most significant and 
representative voice given its role as chief spokesperson, 'think-tank' and co-ordinator of
20 (i)
a range of views - see pp. 15-18 for an explanation of the range of source materials drawn 
upon for analysis) must be viewed against this backdrop of Conservative language which, 
particularly given the reactive nature of unions (see pp. 11-12), set the terms of debate in 
this field.
Fundamental to the Conservative justification of legislative action against unions 
was invocation of the language of'privilege1, explored in Chapter 4. This discourse, which 
interlinked with arguments based around a Diceyan conception of the 'rule of law', was 
made possible by the historical formulation of protection for trade unions by means of a 
system of negative 'immunities' which could easily be portrayed as taking unions above 
the law. The theme of'privilege', which therefore sprang from the form  rather than the 
substance of the law - the manner in which legal relations were categorised - offered a 
powerful vindication for Government and 'New Right' intervention in industrial relations.
The language of'immunities' thus offered considerable presentational difficulties 
for unions in opposing the legislative changes, as they acknowledged (see pp. 83-4). 
Moreover, the structuring of the law relating to trade unions in the terms of'immunities', 
which were essentially negative in nature, can be seen to have predisposed certain 
responses within the language of the union movement which were primarily defensive 
since, as Hendy remarks (1993: 61-2), the withdrawal of labour by workers in the British 
context of 'immunities' gave the impression that they were doing something wrong. 
Further, the 'immunities' underpinned a pluralist, abstentionist system of industrial relations 
by allowing workers to combine and to apply collective sanctions against employers, 
thereby removing obstacles which the common law would otherwise have presented to 
the functioning of the institutions of bargaining and self-regulation. Classification by 
means of 'immunity' was thus closely bound up with collectivist discourses within the 
union movement such as 'class', 'struggle', 'unity' and 'solidarity', and with a view of 
industrial relations based upon the existence of differences of interest (albeit reconcilable) 
between employers and employees which was manifested in a militaristic, confrontational 
vocabulary. These forms of language, and the manner in which they operated in support 
of union campaigns of resistance to the legislation in the period 1979-83, are examined 
in detail in Chapter 5.
Complaints about 'immunities', which could easily be adapted into the language of 
'privilege', thus offered powerful justification for Conservative legislation against the 
unions; moreover, while the terms of debate on labour law remained rooted in this
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formulation, the union response tended to be negative, collectivist and confrontational.
However, in the light of political, economic and industrial developments (see 
Chapter 2 and pp. 163-5), the unions moved to a position whereby they accepted the 
involvement of law in industrial relations and attempted to turn it to advantage. This was 
manifested in adoption of the language of'rights' (see pp.90-101), which served to open 
up other strategic possibilities within union discourse during the period 1986-90 and as 
such can be seen as having more than the mere 'presentational advantages' advanced by 
McCarthy (see p.91). Firstly, as a positive formulation representing a break with past 
approaches, it interlinked with various elements of the language of'new realism' which 
stressed renewal, challenge and building for the future. Secondly, the 'moral superiority' 
of a claim labelled a 'right' (Fredman 1992: 35) lent weight to the argument that unions 
were being treated 'unfairly' by the Government. Finally, it chimed with the Conservative 
and 'New Right' invocation of the language of 'individual rights' and thus allowed the 
unions to foreground the individual in a manner which had not been open to them under 
the essentially collectivist discourse of'immunity'. These themes are explored at greater 
length in Chapter 6.
The importance of language as a focus for ideological contestation between 
political opponents is, however, evident in the debate over 'individual rights'. Although the 
language of individualism became increasingly significant in union discourse, the 
understandings involved were not identical with those of the Government/New Right' - 
the unions continued to stress the importance of individual realisation via the collective 
and used the model of the European Social Charter to call for a 'charter' of rights for 
individuals and unions; themes which were not consonant with Conservative rhetoric of 
freedom from collective oppression and participation in free markets. In this context, 
therefore, the impact of Thatcherite discourse upon union understandings of the world 
(both at an elite level and below) is questionable; however, in other areas of discourse, 
notably 'democracy', the unions moved much closer to a Thatcherite understanding, 
although even this concept was used against the Government, particularly where it 
appeared to have been subordinated to individualism in the legislative measures (see 
pp.211-5). Investigation of the changing language of trade unions thus casts light on the 
question of Thatcherite hegemony, discussed in Chapter 7, which can be seen to be 
incomplete, albeit considerably assisted by dominance of the media and the reactive nature 
of trade unions. In this respect, the analysis of Fredman (1992: 24), while stressing the
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'ideological power1 of Thatcherite discourses in justifying the legislative measures, would 
seem to overstate both the level of consensus thereby engendered in industrial relations 
and the extent to which such language (especially that of'democracy') was closed off to 
the unions (see p.235) - Thatcherite understandings were powerful, but they were not 
uncontested.
The changing patterns of union language analysed in this thesis thus reveal 
changing responses to the political, legal, economic and industrial environment and 
developments in the way in which the union movement projected its programmes of action 
and mobilised support, although the extent of change should not be overstated - there 
were also significant continuities in language, which are summarised on pp.227-8. 
Pinpointing the causes of these changes is more problematic; 'realist' explanations would 
point to the impact of long-term unemployment, changing patterns of work, the decline 
in traditional manufacturing industries or changing management strategies (Marsh 1992: 
242-4) in creating a difficult environment for trade unions. The contention of this thesis 
is that, while the precise identification of factors causative of the changes in union 
language which have been observed may be difficult (if not impossible) to achieve, the 
ideological underpinning of the anti-union measures of the Thatcher period was a highly 
significant element in the attempt to build a new consensus in industrial relations, and that 
language was central to that project. Accordingly, a proper understanding of the nature 
and extent of change within the trade union movement in response to the labour legislation 
of the 1980s needs to take account of change in its language as a political event in itself. 
On a broader level, it is possible to see shifts in trade union language as merely one 
component of significant changes which have occurred in the language of the British Left 
as a whole in the aftermath of Thatcherism, a process of reconstruction of its identity and 
redefinition of its vision of the world which continues to this day. A full discussion of this 
topic is beyond the scope of the present work; but I return briefly to this wider issue in the 
concluding Chapter (see pp.23 8-240).
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CHAPTER TWO: The legislative, political and economic context
This Chapter briefly summarises the major measures which comprised the 
Conservative Government’s programme of legislation for the reduction of trade union 
power between 1979 and 1990. The focus here, and in this thesis as a whole, is upon 
policies which altered the nature and operation of collective labour law, although it should 
be noted that legislation of the period also had an impact upon individual employment 
law, indeed Davies and Freedland suggest that restrictions upon trade unions formed part 
of a broader series of measures and policies aimed at restructuring the labour market 
(1993: 426), giving freer play to market forces in order to generate an 'enterprise 
economy'. I will outline the significant developments and provisions of the legislative 
programme1 and comment upon the political and economic background to the changes in 
law. This will form the backdrop for the analysis of the key themes and changing patterns 
of Govemment/’New Right' and union discourse which is offered in the following 
Chapters.
Employment Act 1980
Marsh argues that the Conservative Party in opposition did not have a coherent 
policy on industrial relations which it carried through into government (1992: 64). There 
were tensions between those, such as Sir Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher herself, 
who favoured monetarist, anti-corporatist policies which entailed the reduction of trade 
union power (Joseph 1979), and moderates such as James Prior who were located in a 
tradition of voluntarist collectivism. However, electoral pragmatism (in particular, the 
perceived need for the policies to have a measure of consent and likely compliance from 
the unions, in contrast to the Industrial Relations Act 1971 (Prior 1986: 158; Dorey 1995: 
160)) proved initially stronger than ideology (Marsh ibid: 58).
The 'Winter of Discontent' (1978-9) did not fundamentally transform this position, 
although it hardened Conservative attitudes towards union power and provided a focus 
for policies on union reform which appeared in the subsequent manifesto; as Mcllroy 
writes, the events of 1978-9 became amplified into a myth (1995: 195) which offered
1 For a fuller account of the legislation and policies, see Auerbach (1990), Davies 
and Freedland (1993: Chapter 9).
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justification for Conservative anti-union policies and which the unions were forced to 
attempt to refute in order to win public support (see p.61).
Consequently, the Conservative manifesto of 1979 contained a commitment to 
trade union reform, though not of a radical nature. It promised to make secondary 
picketing unlawful; that immunity for secondary action would be removed; that employees 
in closed shops be given the right of appeal and compensation if dismissed; that new 
closed shops should only be established after secret ballot; that secret ballots on various 
issues should be encouraged by the provision of public funds; and that unions should share 
the cost of supporting striking workers (CCO 1979). These proposals were 'informed by 
a voluntary collectivist ideology, rather than an individualist one' (Marsh 1992: 64), 
reflected also in the appointment of Prior to the Employment portfolio in the first Thatcher 
Cabinet.
Prior's cautious instincts and reluctance to abandon the voluntarist tradition of 
industrial relations were manifested in the genesis and development of the Employment 
Act 1980 (Dorey 1995: 158-64). The proposals were preceded by extensive consultation 
with TUC leaders (Marsh 1992: 68), and there was serious division within the Cabinet 
between those who supported a tougher approach and those who urged the need for 
caution (Prior 1986: 162-5). The consequence was that the proposals were 'ushered in, 
with an almost defensive supporting rhetoric' (Davies and Freedland 1993: 444), with 
Prior stressing their continuity with previous measures and their balanced nature (see 
pp.35-7). The statute represented a bridge between the strategies of the 1970s and the 
1980s, and although moderate in tone, foreshadowed many of the more radical measures 
of following years (Davies and Freedland ibid. 447). Its central provisions2 were 
concerned with encouraging secret ballots by the allocation of public funds; restricting the 
closed shop by providing that employees could refuse to join on grounds of conscience 
or deeply held personal conviction and by requiring that new agreements had to be 
approved by an 80% majority; restricting coercive recruitment; diminishing the scope of 
lawful picketing; and removing many of the immunities for secondary action.




Prior's circumspection inclined him to allow the provisions of the 1980 Act time 
for acceptance, although he was prepared to take certain further steps (Prior 1986: 170- 
1). However, the British Steel strike of 1980 hardened attitudes within the Conservative 
Party and forced Prior into a compromise whereby he agreed to conduct a major review 
of trade union immunities with a view to further legislation (Dorey 1995: 162). The result 
was the wide-ranging Green Paper on Trade Union Immunities (DE 1981) which 
discussed a number of proposals for change in industrial conflict law and even considered 
the possible introduction of a system of positive rights in place of immunities (see p.99). 
The fact that this was a very long-term goal reflected Prior's desire to temporise: 'whilst 
further measures in some areas might be desirable, they were at least for the time being 
either impractical or impolitic or both. The 1980 Act had gone far enough for the moment, 
and it would be unwise to push any further' (Auerbach 1990: 71).
Prior was replaced in September 1981 by Norman Tebbit, who had acquired a 
reputation as a 'union-basher' (Dorey 1995: 164); it was thus expected that he would be 
considerably less moderate than his predecessor. However, he was also concerned to 
avoid the unenforceability which had marred the 1971 Act (Tebbit 1988: 233), and 
introduced new proposals for legislation to Parliament in measured tones (see pp.3 7-8).
Despite this, the provisions of the 1982 Act were considerably more forceful than 
those of 1980. Auerbach remarks that s. 15 (which removed the immunity of trade unions 
from liability in tort and thus opened up the possibility of individuals seeking injunctions 
or claiming damages from union funds for losses caused as a result of unlawful action) 
was not only the pivotal provision of the Act, but 'arguably of the whole corpus of 
legislation' (1990: 232). The Act also further restricted the closed shop, requiring ballots 
for existing agreements and establishing a general right not to belong to a trade union, 
subject to limited exceptions. It made union membership or union recognition clauses in 
commercial contracts unlawful, tightened the definition of a 'trade dispute' and removed 
immunity from industrial action relating to matters arising overseas, unless those taking 
action were likely to be affected by the outcome of the dispute.
Davies and Freedland remark that the 1982 Act left uncertainties in several areas 
of the law (1993: 482). However, while the extent and precise direction of future 
developments in labour legislation remained somewhat unsettled, the statute would appear
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to have marked a definitive break with the voluntarist tradition - '[the Act] effectively 
signalled the abandonment of any serious hopes of maintaining a consensus around a 
largely voluntarist framework of labour law, and a move towards a framework geared to 
cope, if need be, with the prospect of a less infrequent involvement of the law in industrial 
conflict'(Auerbach 1990: 111).
Trade Union Act 1984
The Government's next step was to publish a Green Paper on Democracy in Trade 
Unions in January 1983. This reflected something of a change in strategy from the 
restriction of trade union powers to the regulation of their activities and operation (see 
pp.38, 57-8); however, the 1981 Green Paper had raised the issue of union democratic 
arrangements (DE 1981: 6) and the new proposals were justified on the basis that unions 
had refused voluntarily to reform their own internal arrangements (DE 1983: 1). The 
Green Paper argued that unions were insufficiently responsive to the views of their 
members and that their power and 'privileges' enabled them to damage economic interests 
via industrial action; accordingly, both union members and the public needed assurance 
that union affairs were properly conducted (ibid). In consequence, it advanced proposals 
on strike ballots, union elections and the political fund.
Before any legislation along these lines could be introduced, the 1983 general 
election intervened. The Conservative manifesto referred to the Green Paper's proposals - 
indeed, Tebbit argued that they had been drafted with the election in mind (Tebbit 1988: 
197-8) - and also promised that consultation would take place on restricting industrial 
action in essential services (CCO 1983: 12). Tebbit was subsequently replaced as 
Employment Secretary by Tom King, who introduced the Bill incorporating the measures 
on union democracy into Parliament in November 1983, the Act becoming law in 1984.
The Act provided for secret ballots for election to union executive committees - 
in the case of voting positions, taking place every five years. It required secret ballots to 
be held prior to union-organised industrial action and removed immunity from action if 
there had not been a vote in favour. It also required balloted support for the maintenance 
of a political fund at least every ten years and re-defined the scope of the political objects 
of trade unions to include expenditure on advertising etc for a political party or candidate. 
A proposal to replace 'contracting out' of the political levy with 'contracting in' was
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dropped (Marsh 1992: 114-9).
The 1984 Act was justified in populist terms as ’giving the unions back to their 
members' (see p. 58), the belief apparently being that 'rank and file' members would be less 
radical than union leaders (Auerbach 1993: 42; Undy et al 1996: 113). In the case of 
political funds, this view was somewhat misplaced, as ballots demonstrated widespread 
support for their continued existence (Steele, Miller and Gennard 1986: 443). However, 
the Act may still be seen as 'a carefully thought out and coherent piece of legislation, 
aimed at the new Conservative target of individualising union activity through regulation 
of decision making' (Fosh et al 1993: 28), prioritising secret ballots and seeking to 
depoliticise trade unionism (Marsh 1992: 115; Davies and Freedland 1993: 438).
1984-1988
Between 1984 and 1988, there was 'something of an interregnum in trade union 
legislation' (Dorey 1995: 165), owing to the relative disinterest which the new Secretary 
of State for Employment, Lord Young, demonstrated for trade union reform, the belief 
among certain Conservative backbenchers that no further legislation was necessary, and 
the preoccupation with the major industrial disputes of the period (ibid. 165-6; Auerbach 
1990: 157). As discussed above, this thesis is concerned with responses to the legislative 
policies of the Thatcher Government, and I have accordingly not considered the period 
between the passing of the 1984 Act and the publication of the Green Paper on Trade 
Unions and their Members in detail in the analysis which follows. Nevertheless, since the 
developments of this period had an effect upon Government and union discourse 
surrounding the later legislation, I will briefly discuss them.
The decision to ban trade unions at GCHQ in December 1983 has been seen as 
'perhaps the most spectacular and extreme anti-union measure taken by the Government' 
(Kessler and Bayliss 1995: 256); however, a policy of derecognition was not extended to 
other civil servants, and the event 'did not... effect a fundamental shift in the balance of 
power between the Government and trade unions' (Davies and Freedland 1993: 492).
In contrast, the miners' dispute of 1984-5 had considerable symbolic significance 
for the Conservative Government (Marsh 1992: 119), erasing the memory of the strike 
of 1973-4 and facilitating the portrayal of trade unions as a threat to public order (see 
pp.65-6) and the national interest. For the unions, the defeat of the miners arguably
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demonstrated the inability and unwillingness of the TUC to coordinate a campaign of 
defiance of the Government; it may also be seen as having encouraged moves towards 
'new realism' (Gibbon 1988: 169 - see Chapter 6).
The other major industrial dispute of the period was the News International 
dispute of 1985-6, during which employers made extensive use of the new legal powers 
available to them, in order to 'support a newly aggressive set of managerial strategies' 
(Davies and Freedland 1993: 499).
These disputes strongly influenced the Government's next legislative steps. In 
February 1987, a Green Paper on Trade Unions and their Members appeared, which was 
largely predicated upon the mobilisation of dissentient members to control unions from 
within (Auerbach 1990: 165), a strategy seen as influential during the miners' strike. The 
Conservative election manifesto affirmed the intention to legislate along these lines, 
stressing the importance of'people's right to choice and independence' (CCO 1987: 23).
Employment Act 1988
The ensuing Act gave union members the right to apply for a court order if the 
union had taken industrial action without the support of a ballot; made it unlawful for a 
union to apply its property to indemnify any individual for any penalty; and removed 
immunity from the post-entry closed shop. It also extended the requirement to hold an 
election ballot to non-voting members of the union executive and to the president and 
general secretary in any event; required union ballots to be postal; required industrial 
action to be supported by a majority in a separate ballot in each separate workplace; and 
empowered the Secretary of State to issue codes of practice for ballots. In addition, it 
established a Commissioner for the Rights of Trade Union Members to support members 
in complaints against unions.
The most controversial of the measures introduced by the Act was that 
establishing the right of an individual member not to be 'unjustifiably disciplined' for 
refusal to participate in industrial action even after a vote in favour. This provoked 




While the 1988 Act had centred upon the rights of individual members against 
their unions, the 1990 Act was prefaced by a debate which focused upon the economic 
benefits which would apparently accrue to the nation in the wake of improved industrial 
relations. Trade unions, and institutions such as the closed shop, were seen as obstacles 
to employment, economic efficiency and productivity in both the 1988 White Paper on 
Employment fo r the 1990s and the March 1989 Green Paper on Removing Barriers to 
Employment (see pp.45-6).
Before the proposals in the latter document were given legislative effect, there was 
a resurgence of industrial conflict during the so-called 'summer of discontent' of 1989, 
with strikes on London Underground, British Rail, in the docks, the BBC, local 
government and elsewhere (Beardwell 1990: 120-124). Several of these disputes were 
unofficial, and, pragmatically responding to these specific events (Fosh et al 1993: 29), 
the Government produced a further Green Paper on Unofficial Action and the Law in 
October 1989.
The 1990 Act thus had several objectives - abolishing the pre-entry closed shop; 
virtually outlawing secondary action; extending the powers of the Commissioner; 
widening the range of persons who could render a union liable in tort for unofficial action; 
tightening the requirements for repudiation which could enable unions to avoid liability; 
and permitting employers to dismiss selectively employees taking part in union action.
Economic and political aspects of Conservative union policy
Although the primary focus of this thesis is upon language in the debate on labour 
legislation, changes in the law are best understood as part of a wider economic and 
political strategy of which the reduction in trade union power formed a significant element 
(Miller and Steele 1993: 227; Mcllroy 1995: 265). In order to properly comprehend the 
legislative developments, therefore, it is necessary to give a brief account of this wider 
context.3
The economic policy of the early years of the Conservative Government was based
3 For the ideological background to the Conservative policies, see Chapter 3.
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around 'monetarism'. This policy, as set out in the works of Milton Friedman, centred 
around the reduction of inflation using supply-side techniques (notably, control of the 
money supply). It entailed a rejection of incomes policies as a means of controlling 
inflation and the corresponding belief that levels of pay should be determined by the free 
working of the labour market, the restriction of public expenditure and an abandonment 
of a commitment to full employment. This had important effects - 'monetarism involved 
nothing less than a complete re-alignment of the Government's perception of the trade 
union movement' (Davies and Freedland 1993: 433). There was no longer any need for 
corporatist arrangements to determine economic policy (Gilmour 1992 :97) - indeed, 
corporatism was incompatible with the notion of a labour market in which employers were 
free to settle wage rates and levels of recruitment. In consequence, the national 
political/economic role of the TUC and unions was substantially reduced. Additionally, 
the ability of unions to push for wage increases or to resist cuts in public expenditure, 
therefore encouraging inflationary pressures and interfering with the free operation of 
markets, necessitated a reduction in trade union power.
The significance of monetarist policies declined as the decade wore on (Davies and 
Freedland 1993: 435; Kessler and Bayliss 1995: 49). However, the Government remained 
committed to the wider objective of freeing the labour market and sought to deregulate 
and derigidify it with the object of creating an 'enterprise economy' (Davies and Freedland 
ibid. 526-38); this required the continued reduction of trade union power, and the virtual 
abolition of institutions such as the closed shop.
The diminution in the involvement of the unions in economic and political policy­
making which was implied by the Thatcher Government's policies was reflected both in 
institutional developments and in frequency of union access to government. Industrial 
Training Boards, tripartite bodies with full union representation, were largely abolished 
in the early 1980s; the Manpower Services Commission, 'perhaps the grandest of all post­
war tri-partite experiments' (Davies and Freedland 1993: 440) was disbanded in 1985 and 
ultimately replaced by employer-led Training and Enterprise Councils; and the NEDC was 
downgraded in significance, its meetings becoming less frequent before its final abolition 
in 1992. Other opportunities for union contact with government were also reduced and 
although the number of contacts did not decrease significantly, fewer were initiated by 
Government and there was less personal contact (Marsh 1992: 112). Prior consulted the 
unions throughout the evolution and passage of the 1980 Act and over the 1981 Green
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Paper; however, once he had been removed, they had little prospect of influencing 
legislative policy, their only success being the concession on contracting-in in the 1984 
Act (see p.26). The overall picture, therefore, was one of marginalisation - ’a general 
distancing of trade unions from the policy-making process by the Government' (Davies 
and Freedland 1993: 438-9).
The economic environment
These policies combined with longer-term and worldwide economic trends to 
create a changed environment for trade unions. Unemployment reached a level 
'unprecedented in post-war Britain' (Kessler and Bayliss 1995: 257), doubling between 
1979 and 1981 and reaching 3 million in 1986-7. Manufacturing industry declined, while 
there were important compositional changes in the British labour force, with a growth in 
the service sector, in female and part-time employment, in white collar occupations and 
in self-employment (McHroy 1995: 86-7). International competition increased throughout 
this period, resulting in increased pressure for flexibility, efficiency and the reduction of 
labour costs (Kessler and Bayliss 1995: 51); while the introduction of new technology may 
have caused new patterns of post-Fordist labour to emerge (Mcllroy 1995: 88), although 
the precise effect is unclear (Marsh 1992: 174-5).
Alongside these developments, there were significant changes in union 
organisation and activity. Union membership declined from 13.3 million in 1979 to 9.0 
million in 1992 - that of TUC-affiliated unions fell from 12.1 million to 7.3 million over 
the same period (Kessler and Bayliss 1995: 260). The coverage of collective bargaining 
diminished (Mcllroy 1995: 387-8) and managerial authority was asserted (Kessler and 
Bayliss 1995: 120-1), although the extent to which managerial strategies have changed 
remains unclear (Kelly 1990: 53). The strike rate also declined, with 521 days lost per 
thousand employees in 1980 reduced to 83 in 1990 (Kessler and Bayliss 1995: 233).
There seems little question, therefore, that the legal, economic and political 
environment in which unions were operating during the period 1979-90 was one of 
considerable change. What remains controversial is the extent to which these 
developments had a transformative effect upon the trade unions and, if they did, the 
degree to which those changes can be attributed to legislative policies as opposed to other
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factors. By analysing changing patterns of union discourse, I hope to be able to contribute 
to this debate; however, as explained above (p. 12), I turn first to the vocabulary of 
Government and the "New Right'.
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CHAPTER THREE:- The language of Government and the 'New Right1
This Chapter will focus on the language deployed by the Conservative 
Government in justification of the new legislative framework for industrial relations 
introduced between 1979 and 1990. The discourse used in the identification of problems, 
recommendations and policies for reform as set out in the various Green and White Papers 
will therefore be considered, in addition to public speeches and comments made by 
ministers and other spokespersons during debates in Parliament which, as Auerbach 
remarks, 'may easily attain the status of symbolic embodiment of the very essence of 
legislative policy' (1990: 6).
However, an exclusive concentration upon the Government's policies and 
discourse is apt to be misleading, at least in the context of reform of industrial conflict 
legislation, since it understates the role played in the formation of policy, and in the 
construction of a language with which to justify it, by the thinkers and groups which 
constituted the New Right'.1 As Gamble remarks, the Thatcher Governments' 'momentum 
was maintained by the flow of ideas and policy discussion that came from the New Right' 
(1994: 5). Accordingly, I wish also to consider the language employed by those 
individuals and organisations who sought to influence the debate on industrial relations, 
of whom the most notable were probably the IEA, the CPS, and, in particular, the 
Austrian economist, Friedrich von Hayek (see Desai 1994).
While the thinking of New Right' individuals and groups was undoubtedly of 
significance in providing a background to the debates on industrial relations and the 
legislative changes of the Thatcher years, considerable disagreement exists amongst 
academic commentators as to the precise extent to which the Conservative Government's 
labour law policies were shaped by a New Right' agenda. Some have argued that the 
measures adopted in the 1980s were modelled upon the writings of New Right' theorists, 
especially Hayek. Prominent amongst these commentators is Lord Wedderbum, who has
1 The label New Right' is in common usage, although certain commentators have 
questioned its validity, notably Barry (1987) who prefers the phrase 'neo-liberal'. The 
differences in meaning point to divisions and conflicts among those individuals and groups 
commonly associated with the phrase. For the purposes of my analysis, I shall refer to the 
ideas and policies of these individuals and groups as New Right', while acknowledging 
that *the term certainly does not signify... either a unified movement or a coherent doctrine' 
(Gamble 1994: 34). For discussions, see Gamble ibid, Kavanagh 1990: 102.
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stated that 'the character of labour legislation since 1979 can be better understood - and 
its future course probably better predicted - by reference to this framework set up by 
Hayek than to any other* (1991: 210). Although acknowledging that Hayek 'did not of 
course write the 'step-by-step' programme of labour law1, he remarks that 'one would need 
to be juridically tone deaf not to pick up the echoes of his philosophy' (1991: 209) in 
Conservative Government policies and rhetoric.
Others, notably Simon Auerbach, have been more sceptical of the existence of a 
connection. He argues that the legislative programme of the 1980s was shaped by a 
pragmatic, ad hoc response to political and industrial events, and that while the work of 
the *New Right' may have had some influence on Government policy-making (particularly 
as the decade wore on, with the rhetoric of Ministers becoming 'increasingly unequivocal 
and explicit' (1990: 230)), it is insufficient as an explanation in itself of the Government's 
policies. Consequently, he believes that 'a greater range and sophistication of influences 
and considerations must be seen as having determined the industrial-conflict laws of this 
period' (1990: 4), especially given that many elements of the Conservative programme 
were at variance with Hayekian prescription, not least the unwillingness to totally remove 
trade union immunities, for which Hayek had called (Hayek 1984: 54; Auerbach 1990: 
228).2
Recent commentaries have attempted to find a via media between these two 
viewpoints. Fredman has argued that the Conservative legislation is not the product of a 
'coherent masterplan' drawn from the *New Right' but rather draws upon its analyses in 
conjunction with other sources as justification for the legislative measures (1992: 25). 
Fosh et al view Conservative policy as shifting over time, at certain times being reflective 
of Hayekian principles, while at others owing more to other ideological strands in 
Conservative thinking (1993: 19). They emphasise, however, that ideology was an 
important element of Conservative labour law policies in the 1980s.
The debate over the extent of ideological influence upon the legislative policies of 
the Thatcher Governments in the field of industrial relations is mirrored by a wider debate 
over the existence of, and meaning of 'Thatcherism'. Some have dismissed the notion that 
there is a distinct phenomenon called Thatcherism', arguing that 'Thatcherism is essentially 
an instinct, a series of moral values and an approach to leadership rather than an ideology'
2 For a summary of this debate, see Miller and Steele 1993: 226; Fosh et al 1993:
16.
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(Riddell 1985: 7; Willets 1992: 52). Others have seen it both as a distinctive ’style' of 
government based around the powerful personality of the former Prime Minister and as 
a 'coherent set of political ideas' guiding the enactment of policies (Kavanagh 1990: 12). 
Still others have argued for the view that Thatcherism represents a political project 
designed to re-establish Conservative hegemony, involving ideological doctrines, political 
calculation and a programme of policies (Gamble 1994: 4-10; Hall 1988). These disputes 
over the nature of the concept (if it is such) surely point to the view expressed by Gamble, 
that 'there is no single uncontested meaning [of Thatcherism]. The term denotes a 
phenomenon for investigation, not a known entity' (1994: 3).
It is not my intention in this thesis to evaluate the accuracy or otherwise of any of 
the various analyses of the 'Thatcher experiment' (Kavanagh 1990: l)3; neither do I 
particularly seek to advance the debate on the extent of TSfew Right' influence on the 
Thatcher labour legislation. Instead, I propose, in this Chapter, to follow the approach 
of Fredman, who has argued that attention must be paid to the language by which the 
Conservative Government sought to justify its legislative changes in the field of labour 
law, and who demonstrates the importance of certain 'high-minded' ideals such as 
democracy, individual rights and freedom in furnishing a vocabulary by which the policy 
proposals could be legitimated (1992: 24).
In expanding upon Fredman's analysis, however, I shall identify a number of other 
significant words and themes used to justify legislative action against unions. Additional 
sources, notably the various 'New Right' publications on union reform, will also be 
considered. As discussed on p.33, certain commentators have claimed that 'the New Right 
offered a 'pool' of ideas and rhetoric' (Auerbach 1990: 232) upon which the Government 
drew and that the rhetorical denigration of trade unions was an integral part of a process 
justifying the legislative measures (Undy et al 1996: 12). However, as also stated (see 
p. 7), no extended exposition and interpretation of that language has been attempted; it has 
merely been seen as one element of a broader ideological process. This Chapter therefore 
seeks to offer a considered analysis of the discourses of Government and the 'New Right', 
which will form the essential backdrop to the discussion of changing patterns of union 
language which is the central topic of this thesis.
3 Although I shall discuss the concept of Tiegemony' at length in the concluding 
Chapter of the thesis.
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The language of 'balance*
One important feature of the language in which the industrial relations debate of 
the Thatcher period was conducted, but which was not readily explicable in terms of 
TSTew Right* theories, was the concept of 'balance'. Indeed, as I shall attempt to 
demonstrate in Chapter 6 (pp. 182-5), this theme was widely used by the unions, 
particularly towards the end of the decade.
The relative absence of the language of'balance' from the writings of'New Right' 
theorists on industrial relations is not difficult to understand. Hayek and his followers did 
not seek the restoration of an equilibrium in industrial relations, but rather the complete 
removal of all immunities from trade union action (see Chapter 4). These radical demands 
did not lend themselves to exposition in the circumspect language of'balance'. However, 
where the requests were somewhat more moderate, as in the 1980 publication of the 
CPS,4 Liberties and Liabilities: The Case fo r Trade Union Reform, (which argued that 
'abuses by union officials are best tackled qqI by a frontal assault on 'the unions' but by an 
oblique approach - by fortifying the individual worker and protecting his rights inside the 
union' (CPS 1980: 31 - emphasis in original)), the language of balance' became central: 
'the law must be invoked to restore balance and maintain freedoms... [This Report] looks 
at the difficulties of balancing trade union rights against responsibilities, the liberties of one 
group of workers against those of another, the respective rights and duties of employers 
and employees, and the liberties and liabilities of the unions against the liberties and 
liabilities of the public. The primary aim of the proposals is to produce a better balance in 
the current law* (ibid. vii).
The use of the language of 'balance' as a form of rhetoric justifying cautious 
measures against the unions is even more clearly demonstrated by an examination of the 
policies of James Prior between 1979 and 1981. Prior's central objective in introducing 
the Employment Bill 1979 was to bring about a lasting change in attitude by changing the 
law gradually, with as little resistance, and therefore as much by stealth, as was possible' 
(Prior 1986: 158). Accordingly, he was keen to deploy language which was restrained,
4 While the IEA was independent of the Conservative Party, the CPS was founded 
by radical Conservative MPs (Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher) and was thus more 
inextricably bound to the Party. See further Desai (1994); on the IEA see Cockett (1994).
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in order to avoid alienating the unions and the public: Union moderates were having a 
tough battle behind the scenes to hold the union movement to a reasonable approach. 
Strident statements by Ministers could only undermine them. I did not want my 
consultations on union reform with the TUC wrecked, nor did I want to see the creation 
of a confrontationist economic policy’ (ibid: 156-7). Debate on the Bill in Parliament was 
thus conducted in the language of moderation, the goal being restoration of an equilibrium 
in British industrial relations: 'I [approach the debate] with some humility and a desire for 
consensus... Let me reiterate that we have sought a balance. I do not believe that what we 
have witnessed in the last 20 years has been a balance' (OR HC, 5th ser., vol. 976, cols. 
58,60); ’the last administration tilted the balance too far towards the unions... The Bill tips 
the balance back towards responsible management and responsible union leadership... [the 
Bill] is firm, it is fair and it is balanced' (OR HC, 5th ser., vol. 983, col. 1538).
For Prior, then, the language of 'balance' was a key element of his consensual 
approach to industrial relations, which sought to be inclusive of all participants in the 
process: 'Mr. Prior's claim... was that all parties, employers, employees, and others 
affected by industrial action, had legitimate claims, and that his measures were designed 
to strike a balance between them' (Auerbach, 1990: 62).5 The desire for highly cautious, 
moderate reform in order to restore an equilibrium which was manifested in such 
vocabulary was perhaps given greatest expression in the 1981 Green Paper, Trade Union 
Immunities, as Prior himself acknowledged: 'It seemed to me that if Labour's legislation 
had been unbalanced in one direction, favouring the unions, we had to be wary of not 
tilting the balance too far back in the other' (Prior 1986: 169).6 The Green Paper's genesis 
and form reflected this prudent approach, in that considerable prior consultation took 
place before drafting (Prior J., HC Paper 282, 1980-81: 192), and the Paper itself was set 
out as a series of'pro' and 'con' arguments concerning each proposal. The content also 
owed a considerable amount to the language of'balance'. It was claimed that there had 
been an historical role for the law in establishing a balance of bargaining power between 
employees and employers (although this role was minimal, reflecting Prior's voluntarist
5 Note also that one of the leading contemporary commentaries on the 1980 Act 
was entitled Striking a Balance? (Lewis and Simpson 1981), and Prior's memoirs, A 
Balance o f Power (1986).
6 Indeed Auerbach (1990: 69-71) and Davies and Freedland regard the Green 
Paper as a 'manifesto against further legislation' (1993: 471).
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outlook): What the law can achieve in affecting the balance of power must not be over­
estimated, but it has always been recognised as a proper role of Parliament to intervene 
by statute to correct manifestations - whether by employers or employees - of a 
disequilibrium of bargaining power' (DE 1981: 2). The conclusion was that any future 
developments in the law must be directed to creating and maintaining balance:
•Essentially, what is involved in each case is finding a balance between the 
conflicting needs and interests of those involved: the interests of employers 
seeking to manage their business effectively as against the interests of trade unions 
in carrying out the functions of representing their members; the ability of trade 
unions to mount effective industrial action as against the need for the individual 
to be protected against the abuse of trade union power; and the interests of those 
in dispute and of the rest of the community, including employers and employees 
who have no connection with the dispute but whose business and jobs may be 
threatened' (ibid: 92).
On this view, the fundamental objective of reform in labour legislation was not to 
curb union power or severely restrict their activities, as New Right' theorists proposed, 
but rather to establish an equilibrium. In this respect, the language of'balance' was that of 
those 'moderates' such as Prior, who thought radical reform unnecessary and who 
acknowledged the continuing significance of unions in an essentially voluntarist 
framework.
A noteworthy aspect of the above passage is that the notion of 'balance' is 
deployed in several differing contexts - to describe the relationship between unions and 
employers, between unions and their individual members, and between unions and the 
community. This suggests that the vocabulary was flexible and could be used to justify a 
number of measures against the unions. Such adaptability meant that the language of 
'balance' continued to be useful even after the end of Prior's 'voluntary collectivist' era.
Hence, Norman Tebbit, in spite of a more uncompromising reputation (see p.24) 
also found the language of'balance' to be a useful rhetorical tool. He viewed the 1982 Act 
as a measure which 'simply tilted the balance of power away from the unions by chipping 
away the privileges and legal immunities which gave them their ability to ride roughshod 
over the legitimate rights of the general public' (Tebbit 1988: 186). Consequently, in 
presenting the measures to Parliament, he and the Under-Secretary of State for 
Employment, David Waddington, made widespread use of the vocabulary: 'The matters 
we are dealing with here are designed to restore a balance between the rights of the citizen 
under the common law and those that have been taken away from him... by successive
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industrial relations and employment Acts over the years’ (Tebbit, N. OR HC, 6th ser., vol. 
13, col. 632); We have tried to provide specific remedies for real abuses, to provide 
effective protection where it has been shown to be necessary, and to redress the imbalance 
of bargaining power to which the legislation of the last Government had contributed so 
significantly' (Tebbit, N. OR HC, 6th ser., vol. 17, col. 738); We have tried to create a 
balanced package. Because it is seen as a fair and balanced attempt to deal with some of 
the worst abuses it continues to attract widespread support' (Waddington, D. OR HC, 6th 
ser., vol. 17, col. 816); 'A balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper 
treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a majority and dominant position' 
(Waddington, D. OR HC, 6th ser., vol. 17, col. 820).
For Tebbit, as for Prior, the language of'balance' was reflective of a need to 
proceed with a degree of caution in trade union reform. Although there was widespread 
belief that he had been appointed to mount a full-scale attack on the unions, Tebbit's 
'ideological hostility towards trade unionism was... considerably tempered by a hard- 
headed realism about what was feasible' (Dorey 1995: 164). In particular, he was 
'determined not to enact unenforceable legislation - the memory of the collapse of the 
1972 Industrial Relations Act was very much in my mind... I had no intention of exposing 
more than one move at a time. I was determined first to form public opinion and then to 
be always just a little behind rather than ahead of it as I legislated' (Tebbit 1988:184). In 
consequence, it was important for Tebbit to present his proposals in as reasoned and 
moderate a manner as possible, in order to avoid opposition to the legislation - [the Bill] 
'was carefully designed and did not of itself compel the unions to do anything - so there 
could be no mass refusal to comply with what came to be known as 'Tebbit's Law" (ibid: 
186). The language of 'balance', as the first remark from Waddington cited above 
suggests, was an ideal means of achieving this objective.
In addition, the notion of an equilibrium in industrial relations was indicative of a 
divergence, in places, from a purely TMew Right' programme of trade union reform. While 
the *New Right' sought to remove union 'privileges' so as to expose unions to the ordinary 
common law, thereby severely restricting their activities, the Government also pursued 
a policy of regulating union activities which 'emphasised the need to accommodate the 
demands of labour: trade union action should not be outlawed but instead a more 
equitable balance should be sought between the rights of employers on the one hand and 
employees and their unions on the other' (Fosh et al 1993: 18-19). This approach, which
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linked with the authoritarian populist aspect of Thatcherism, was apparent particularly in 
the measures concerned with democracy in trade unions (see pp.57-60). The language of 
'balance' was here deployed in justification of legislative intervention in internal union 
affairs: 'unions can wield great power over the lives of their members, and the Government 
has a duty to see that union members have adequate protection against the abuse of this 
power. There must also be a proper balance between the interests of unions and the needs 
of the community; and organisations which claim and have special privileges must conduct 
their affairs in ways which attract public confidence and the confidence of their members' 
(DE 1983: 37). 'Balance' was being used in this context to imply that the Government 
would involve itself in internal union issues, but that it would only go so fa r ; certainly not 
to the lengths proposed by some of the 'New Right' theorists (Hayek 1984; Hanson and 
Mather 1988).
This regulatory strategy - predicated on the continued existence of unions and the 
accommodation of labour coupled with the need for the Government to win support (both 
from trade union members and the wider public) for its measures, which expressed itself 
in the use of the moderate and reasonable language of balance', would also seem to 
explain another important characteristic of its industrial relations discourse - namely, the 
relative absence of an explicit vocabulary of confrontation. While on the one hand the 
notion of a balance' suggested a cautious move towards a mutually acceptable 
equilibrium, the very acceptance that there was a balance' implied that conflicting interests 
existed in the industrial relations arena (as suggested above, these might be unions on the 
one hand and employers, individuals, or the 'community' on the other, depending upon 
which particular problem was being addressed). If interests were in opposition in this 
manner, the restoration of a balance' necessarily involved the Government intervening on 
a particular side (here, opposed to the unions). It might be supposed that such a bipolar 
view of industrial relations would result in the adoption of language expressive of hostility 
and antipathy towards the unions 'on the opposite side'. Certainly, this appears to have 
been true in reverse, with the unions using strident, militaristic language to portray their 
opposition to the legislation as I shall attempt to show (see pp. 104-21).
In fact, I detected relatively little overtly confrontational language in my analysis 
of the Green and White Papers and Parliamentary debates surrounding the legislation of
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the 1980s.7 This is explicable if we consider the purpose which such debates and 
documents were intended to serve, and the audience to whom they were addressed. In 
part, they were a means for the Government to put its case justifying further legislation; 
but they also served to mobilise back-bench and public support for the measures. As such, 
it was important for the Government to portray the legislative proposals in moderate 
language to avoid alienating supporters, particularly amongst those trade union members 
whose support the Government was looking to secure (Tebbit 1988: 168). The use of 
such reasonable language was less necessary at events where the primary audience 
consisted of Conservative Party members, and the tone was accordingly less measured in 
such instances.8
Nevertheless, the contrast with the TUC, which was prepared to use 
confrontational language in many of its publications designed to attract support for 
campaigns against the legislation (see Chapter 5), is interesting. Moreover, one might 
expect to find New Right’ theorists, without a need to maintain electoral or back-bench 
support, and generally opposed to a regulatory strategy, to be more explicitly hostile 
towards unions. Yet even here, the characterisation of industrial relations in the 
confrontational terms of a military campaign - central to union discourse - was relatively 
absent. Hayek referred to the unions as the 'open enemies' of freedom and to the 'licensed 
use of force' to attain wage levels (1984: 61, 62); but perhaps the most extended example 
came elsewhere, in the context of an exhortation to unions to 'conform with the rule of 
law': Unless checked by law or popular resistance, the purpose of union leadership 
becomes less and less to render service to members and more and more to dominate them. 
The members become foot-soldiers, who are largely conscripted and must obey their
7 Norman Tebbit, who later described his approach to industrial relations law 
reform as a 'mixture of menace and reasonability1 (Tebbit 1988: 186), represented a (cont.) 
(cont.) partial exception. In debate on the 1982 Employment Bill, he referred to the closed 
shop as 'trade union conscription' and to the major unions as 'the big batallions' (OR HC, 
6th ser., vol. 17, cols.739, 740), while at the 1983 Conservative Party conference, he 
spoke of industrial relations as a 'minefield' and claimed that 'the only casualties so far 
have been on the TUC side. They have been left hanging on the barbed wire of their own 
defences' (Tebbit 1988: 210). Nevertheless, in Parliamentary debate and in Green Papers, 
Tebbit's tone was generally more measured. See further n.8.
8 See for example Thatcher's 1984 speeches to various groups of Conservative 
MPs, in which she explicitly invoked militaristic imagery, below, p.65, n.24. For an 
explanation of the source material in this Chapter, see pp. 18-19.
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officers, in a way which is used for aggression against the whole of society. That is why 
unions tend conspicuously to be undemocratic bodies, even in those cases where there are 
formally democratic procedures, and even though theoretically every conscript in the 
union army may carry a marshal's baton in his knapsack' (Shenfield 1986: 42,43).
However, while there may have been comparatively little in the way of directly 
confrontational language in use by the Government and the 'New Right', this did not mean 
that their rhetoric lacked stridency. In the latter part of the decade, and particularly after 
the Conservatives' third election victory in 1987, the tone became increasingly polemical. 
The caution and open-mindedness evident in Green Papers such as Trade Union 
Immunities and, to a lesser degree, Democracy in Trade Unions had been replaced, by 
1987, by dogma and the selective use of evidence (Auerbach 1990: 159-60; Fosh et al 
1993: 23). The election victory in 1987 'encouraged the Government towards more 
extreme and ideologically driven measures even than those it had adopted in the early and 
mid-1980s, in the field of labour legislation as in other areas of government activity 
(Davies and Freedland 1993: 502), with the consequence that 'the rhetoric of ministers on 
industrial relations law became... increasingly unequivocal and explicit' (Auerbach 1990: 
230). Thus, Green and White Papers from 1987 onward showed 'few signs of hesitation 
about the road ahead' (ibid: 160).
The growing confidence with which the Conservative Government approached the 
issue of trade union reform was therefore reflected in the language used in policy 
documents. This is clearly illustrated by a consideration of the function performed by the 
language of 'balance' in the late 1980s. The vocabulary was still in use, but its role in 
Government rhetoric had changed; instead of being the language of moderate, cautious 
reform, as earlier in the decade, it now became expressive of the Government's past 
achievements in reforming industrial relations. Examples of this were numerous: 'In 1979 
the balance of power between trade unions and employers and between trade unions and 
their own members was weighted heavily in favour of the unions. The Government's step- 
by-step approach to trade union reform has helped to correct these imbalances' (DE 1988: 
16; see also ibid. 20); 'The improved record of the 1980s has been achieved at the same 
time as the Government's reform of industrial relations and trade union law. These reforms 
helped correct the imbalances of power between trade unions and employers, and between 
trade unions and their own members, which were among the fundamental causes of the 
problems in the 1970s' (DE 1989a: 10); 'The principle underlying all our legislation has
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been the need to achieve a fair balance of rights between the rights of trade unions and 
those with legitimate disputes with their employers and the rights of employers and 
employees who simply want to get on with their business and protect their jobs' (Howard, 
M. ORHC, 6th ser., vol. 166, col. 41).
The talk now was not of the cautious movement towards an equilibrium which had 
characterised the earlier part of the decade, but rather of 'imbalances' which had been 
corrected by the Conservatives' legislative policies. 'Balance' had been achieved, but this 
did not mean that future reform was unnecessary - rather, such reform was justified largely 
in the overtly ideologically-charged vocabulary of the free market and of individualism, 
instead of the moderate, essentially neutral language of balance'. It is to these discourses 
that I now turn.
Discourses of the economy and the market
In Chapter 2 ,1 commented upon the significance of the Government's economic 
strategy in the context of labour legislation, remarking that measures to control trade 
union power formed part of wider policies to restructure and free the labour market. One 
might therefore expect the language of economics and the discourse of the 'free labour 
market' (Davies and Freedland 1993: 435) to play an important role in justifying the 
various legislative measures of the 1980s. This was indeed the case, although this 
vocabulary was closely interwoven with the other discourses discussed in this Chapter, 
and its importance varied over time.
Such a vocabulary had clear links with the work of'New Right' theorists. The IEA, 
in particular, articulated a neo-liberal vision of economics inspired by the work of Hayek 
(Desai 1994: 45). He particularly stressed the disparity between free markets and the 
'privileges' of trade unions (see Chapter 4), in arguing that political wage determination 
had 'paralysed' the British price structure and that unions were 'destroying the free market 
through their legalised use of coercion' (Hayek 1984: 55). The only solution was to 
abolish trade union immunities: 'There can be no salvation for Britain until the special 
privileges granted to the trade unions three-quarters of a century ago are revoked. 
Average real wages of British workers would undoubtedly be higher, and their chances 
of finding employment better, if the wages paid in different occupations were again 
determined by the market and if all limitations on the work an individual is allowed to do
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were removed' {ibid. 58).
Hayek's theories were endorsed by Hanson and Mather, who argued that the 
solution to the problem of distortion in the labour market 'is to be found in a policy which 
enables the labour market to work more effectively. As Prof. F. Hayek has concluded, the 
essence of such a policy is the elimination (not the reduction) of the legal privileges 
initially granted to the unions by Parliament in 1906 and extended to the maximum by the 
Labour Government in 1974-79' (1988: 20). Their conclusion was equally unequivocal: 
'The repeal of all trade union immunities is not only desirable but essential if the British 
economy is to be restored to full health' {ibid. 79).
While the Government did not in fact deem it acceptable to abolish union 
immunities altogether, the language of the New Right', together with its own commitment 
to monetarist and free market principles, nevertheless offered a 'wellspring' of ideas and 
rhetoric with which to justify the legislation against the unions. However, consideration 
of the use of the language of economics and the market also bears out the validity of the 
assessment of Fosh etal (1993: 19), that the influences upon Conservative policies were 
not fixed and constant, since the significance of the economic discourses appears to have 
varied over time.
Thus, the 'defensive' rhetoric which surrounded the 1980 Act (see p.23) included 
relatively little by way of economic or free market discourse. This was scarcely surprising, 
given that Prior was not a supporter of monetarist principles and sought to portray the 
legislation in the light of a voluntarist consensual tradition. However, the measures were 
in a minor way justified by a claim that trade unions had a negative effect upon job 
creation: 'The changes we propose are limited to those where experience has shown that 
the law is not working well... where the creation of jobs is being inhibited by fear of this 
present law and what it means' (Prior, J. OR HC 5th ser., vol. 976, col. 60).9
Similarly, the 1981 Green Paper on Trade Union Immunities referred to the 
economic gains to be achieved through improved industrial relations, but this discourse 
was almost buried among a number of other arguments canvassed by the document: 'A 
nation's prosperity rests ultimately on the ability of its people to live and work in harmony
9 Prior made a similar argument in evidence to the Select Committee on 
Employment, that the purpose of changes in industrial relations was 'to see whether we 
cannot get a more effective and competitive economy which creates prosperity and creates 
jobs'(HC Paper 282 1980-1: 186).
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with each other. If its industrial relations are marked by conflict rather than cooperation 
the nation as a whole pays the price of economic stagnation. For at least a generation now 
our industrial relations have failed us because they have inhibited improvements in 
productivity, acted as a disincentive to investment and discouraged innovation' (DE 1981: 
1); 'If our industrial relations are to improve, managements and unions in industry must 
genuinely desire cooperation and must work to achieve it. That is the key in a modem 
industrial society to higher productivity, and competitiveness, greater profits and greater 
rewards for employees... We need trade unions who are able to defend their members' 
interests robustly but also recognise that job security and increased rewards can only come 
from an efficient industry competing in world markets' (DE 1981: 8).
It would be erroneous, therefore, to ignore the use of the language of the market 
and the economy as rhetoric justifying the legislative measures during the Prior period in 
Employment. It presaged the development of discourse on economics and the free market 
which, as Davies and Freedland remark, was to become of increasing significance later in 
the decade (1993: 446). However, Prior's personal resistance to monetarist principles 
meant that the vocabulary of the free market was far from fully developed at this stage.
Something of a change was, however, apparent, with the succession of Norman 
Tebbit to the Employment portfolio. A committed free marketeer, Tebbit was 
considerably more willing than Prior to justify legislative measures in the language of New 
Right' economics, as Auerbach argues: 'the accession of Mr. Tebbit signalled a clear and 
deliberate shift in the Government's rhetoric with regard to trade union immunities. The 
regulation of industrial conflict was not to be seen as simply a matter of striking an 
equitable balance between the strength of employers and employees, and of tackling the 
worst and most destructive abuses of trade-union power. It was also to be presented as 
an important arm of the Government's economic, and in particular, labour market, policy 
at a much wider level' (1990: 75).
Thus, Tebbit offered both individualistic (see p.50) and economic justifications 
for the proposals in the 1982 Employment Bill: 'our aim has been twofold: first, to 
safeguard the liberty of the individual from the abuse of industrial power; and, secondly, 
to improve the operation of the labour market by providing a balanced framework of 
industrial relations law... Unless we rid our industry of restrictive practices, gain a freer 
labour market and protect people from the abuse of power, the House will fail' (OR HC, 
6th ser., vol. 13, col. 630); 'The closed shop need not, but too often does, reinforce
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restrictive practices and inefficient working methods. It damages competitiveness, and 
therefore in the long run it destroys jobs' (OR HC, 6th ser., vol. 17, col. 741); 'The Bill 
is another step on the road to improving our industrial relations, making our work force 
more effective and our industry more successful and profitable so that they can offer more, 
better paid and more secure jobs' (ORHC, 6th ser., vol. 24, col. 401).
Similarly, economic arguments were deployed in Democracy in Trade Unions: 
'Strikes damage economic performance, reduce living standards and destroy jobs far 
beyond the ambit of the parties to the dispute' (DE 1983: 17).
However, it is notable that the discourses of the free market were combined, in 
Tebbit's approach, with a number of other discourses, such as freedom, individualism and 
democracy. While Tebbit was indeed more willing than Prior to justify his legislative 
moves in the language of the market, there were a number of other themes evident in his 
rhetoric, reflecting the fact that the 1982 Act and the 1983 Green Paper were not solely 
based upon a coherent attempt to embrace a specific economic theory (Auerbach 1990: 
111-2).
Rather, it was in the latter part of the 1980s that the language of the free market 
really came to the forefront as justification for further measures against unions. This 
coincided with the shift away from monetarism and the move towards the creation of an 
'enterprise economy', additional legislation to curb trade union power being justified on 
the grounds that unions were barriers to the effective functioning of such an economy. 
The greater vigour with which the discourses of economics and the free market were 
deployed also reflected the growing 'self-confidence' in the Government's rhetorical tone 
(see p.41).
Thus, Employment for the 1990s commented that the industrial relations problems 
of the 1970s 'were not confined to strikes and restrictive practices. Recent research shows 
that trade unions have used their power in ways which adversely affected labour costs, 
productivity and jobs' (DE 1988: 15). In an effort to avert similar problems in the future, 
further legislation might be required: 'the Government are ready to take whatever further 
legislative steps may prove necessary and will resist European Community regulation 
which would make the operation of the labour market more inflexible. Employers, trade 
unions and staff share the responsibility for making sure that our industrial relations never 
again become a barrier to employment' (ibid: 21).
The theme of industrial action being an obstruction to a free market was taken up
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again in the revealingly-titled Green Paper Removing Barriers to Employment, which 
argued that the upturn in Britain's economic position was due to the Government's policy 
on industrial relations, but that further progress required more legislation:
•Employers have been given new freedoms which have enabled them to manage 
their businesses more efficiently and productively... Removing barriers to 
economic efficiency has made an important contribution to the improvement in the 
employment scene... A combination of strong and steadily increasing output, 
improved industrial relations and a more flexible labour force has provided the 
framework within which enterprise and job and training opportunities can 
flourish... The improvements which have taken place show the value of the 
Government's policy of removing barriers to the efficient working of the labour 
market, but it is essential to continue the search for greater flexibility and to 
examine obstacles to the growth of jobs which still remain. In this context we must 
ensure that the legal framework for industrial relations is adapted to the needs of 
the 1990s' (DE 1989a: 1, 3).
This document also used the language of economics and the market to justify legislation 
on the closed shop and on secondary action: 'the closed shop, and particularly the pre- 
entry closed shop, can push up labour costs very significantly, with consequent damage 
to profitability and jobs. It also has indirect effects which reduce the flexibility of the 
labour market and adversely affect employment levels and the supply of skilled workers. 
It is a restrictive practice and a barrier to employment' (ibid: 7); 'Secondary action may 
deter employers from starting up for the first time in this country, with harmful effects on 
new investment and on jobs' (ibid: 11).
Similarly, proposals to restrict unofficial action were justified by reference to the 
language of the free market in the second Green Paper of 1989, Unofficial Action and the 
Law: 'Unofficial action costs jobs and undermines our international competitiveness... 
[unofficial strikes] can make it difficult or impossible for firms to meet deadlines, to fulfill 
their obligations to customers and to manage their businesses efficiently. This applies not 
only to the employer directly affected but also to his customers and suppliers' (DE 1989b:
V-
In Parliament, as well, the measures were defended as enhancing economic 
prosperity. During the Second Reading debate on the Employment Bill 1987/88, Norman 
Fowler was rebuked by the Speaker for prefacing his remarks with a lengthy disquisition 
on the improvement in unemployment figures (OR HC, 6th ser., vol. 121, col. 816). He 
went on to offer a somewhat self-congratulatory justification for the changes in labour 
law, in terms which nevertheless still denoted a degree of hesitancy over a direct causal
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connection between legislative change and economic prosperity: 'No one would suggest 
that Britain's economic recovery could have been achieved or, once achieved, sustained, 
by trade union reform alone. Equally, we could have achieved very little without that 
reform... The decline in the number of days lost because of strikes is a key element in 
Britain's new-found economic strength. The changes that have been made since 1979 have 
made an undoubted and real contribution to that' (OR HC, 6th ser., vol. 127, col. 817).
By 1990, however, even this trace of uncertainty had disappeared: 'Nothing did 
more to drive investment away from this country in the 1970s than our record of strikes, 
poor productivity and overmanning. Nothing has done more over the past 10 years to 
convince investors that Britain is the place in which to invest than the reduction in the 
level of strikes, the improvement in our productivity and the elimination of inefficient and 
archaic working practices' (Howard, M. ORHC, 6th ser., vol. 166, col. 39).
The language of economics, and particularly of the free market, thus afforded an 
important source of rhetoric for the Conservative Government in justification of its 
legislative measures against trade unions.10 But the degree to which these discourses were 
paramount varied over the course of the decade, in response to the broader economic 
policies being pursued by the Government and to the personal beliefs of the ministers 
involved. Moreover, economic arguments were very rarely the sole means of justifying 
action - they were almost always combined with themes drawn from 'political philosophy', 
such as the language of individualism, freedom or democracy.111 turn now to examine 
these areas.
10 In many respects this may seem an unsurprising statement. Clearly, measures to 
alter the operation of the labour market form part of broader economic policies, and one 
would therefore expect them to be justified in economic terms. But, as Davies and 
Freedland note (1993: 429), pre-Thatcher governments had tended 'to treat economic 
policies as part of the background of labour legislation; after 1979, the government put 
them in the foreground', as evidenced by the announcement of labour policies in the annual 
Budget speech from the mid-1980s onward.
11 Indeed, von Prondzynski, writing in 1985, argues (see p. 72), that the economic 
arguments tended to be 'veiled' by the discourses of 'liberty' and 'privilege' because it 
would be politically unacceptable to talk about introducing legislation to depress wage 
rates. Although the Government never went quite this far, his argument would seem to 
have greater validity for the early 1980s than later in the decade, when the language of 
economics was overtly employed and statements such as 'trade unions tended to push up 
the earnings of people they represented while blocking the improvements in productivity 
needed to pay for those higher earnings' (DE 1988: 15) were made.
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The language of individualism
An emphasis upon individual responsibility and an opposition to collectivist 
institutions were key features of the approach of the Thatcher Government, both in 
connection with its policies toward the unions and in a wider sense. Again, as with the 
language of the free market, the writings of'New Right' theorists provided a source from 
which Government spokesmen could draw when arguing in favour of the legislative 
measures against the unions. For example, Hayek argued powerfully against collective 
bodies such as trade unions. He remarked that the chief threat to the market order was not 
'the selfish action of individual firms, but the selfishness of organised groups' (1982: 
Vol.III: 89) and viewed the 'last battle ahead' as being 'for the abolition of all coercive 
power to direct individual efforts' {ibid. 152).
The elevation of the individual above the collective group was also a key feature 
of the works of Hayek's 'lesser acolytes' (Wedderbum 1991: 206) in groups such as the 
CPS and IEA. The CPS opposed the closed shop on the ground that 'It is a derogation 
from individual liberty in that it denies choice to individuals whether they wish to belong 
to a trade union or not' (1980: 29) (see further next section). Shenfield, in contrast, was 
prepared to tolerate institutions such as the closed shop and secondary action, so long as 
they arose out of a freely-negotiated contract between individual worker and employer 
(1986: 45-9). He also maintained that as the only 'right to strike' was the right of an 
individual to withdraw his labour and work elsewhere, he had no continuing right to a job 
and consequently an employer had the right to dismiss strikers without redress {ibid. 46- 
7). Hanson and Mather applauded 'the move from a collectivist to a more individualistic 
approach to employment relations' (1988: 18), but argued that further measures might be 
needed: 'the programme of trade union law reform has moved the framework of law 
reform some way from collectivism to individual freedom. But the movement can easily 
be exaggerated because of the wholeheartedly collectivist consensus from which it started' 
{ibid. 87).
But while the rhetoric of individualism and anti-collectivism was a central tenet of 
the New Right' approach, it should not be assumed that it was exclusive to these theorists. 
The promotion of individual responsibility had a lengthy history in Conservative thinking, 
dating back at least to Herbert Spencer. Moreover, it has been argued that there were also 
a number of broader societal changes which tended to reinforce the shift in the political
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climate from collectivism towards individualism: 'People are no longer seen as dependent 
on society and bound by reciprocal obligation to it: indeed, the very notion of society is 
rejected. Individuals are expected to shift for themselves and those who get into 
difficulties are thought to have only themselves to blame. Self-reliance, acquisitive 
individualism, the curtailment of public expenditure, the play of market forces instead of 
the power of trade unions, centralization of power instead of pluralism - these have 
become the principles of the eighties' (Phelps Brown 1990: 1-2).
The sources of individualist discourse may therefore have been various, but it is 
clear that anti-collectivism and 'ideological individualism' were central to Conservative 
policies during the 1980s, both in labour legislation and elsewhere (Fosh et al 1993: 14, 
Marsh 1992: 65, Hall 1988: 48).12 How did this individualist philosophy manifest itself 
in language deployed in justification of the Government's anti-union measures?
As with the theme of unions being a barrier to the efficient working of the market, 
the debates surrounding the 1980 Act offered an introduction to the Conservatives' 
discursive motifs (Davies and Freedland 1993: 446). In presenting the Bill to Parliament, 
Prior called upon the language of individual rights as justification: 'One principle is to 
ensure that the rights of the individual are respected and upheld, at the place of work as 
in every other facet of our lives. That has been our guiding principle... What we are doing 
in this Bill is to provide the individual with effective safeguards' (OR HC, 6th ser., vol. 
976, cols. 59, 62). It was characteristic, however, of Prior's cautious and traditional 
'voluntarist consensus' approach to industrial relations that this was balanced by an 
acknowledgment of the need for collective association: But the rights of the individual as 
an individual need to be balanced by the right of individuals to act together* {ibid. col. 59).
A similar combination of individualistic language and an acceptance of collectivist 
institutions is to be found in the Green Paper of 1981: The freedom of employees to 
combine and to withdraw their labour is their ultimate safeguard against the inherent 
imbalance of power between the employer and the individual employee... the 'rights' of 
trade unions and their officials have been asserted without the development of 
corresponding obligations or protection for the individual worker against union power'
12 The most well-known rhetorical manifestation of this ideology was probably 
Thatcher's remark that 'there is no such thing as society, only men, women and families' 




Norman Tebbit's period in Employment was marked by a considerably more anti­
collectivist tone of language than that of his predecessor. This was again apparent from 
Parliamentary debates on labour legislation (in this case the eventual Employment Act 
1982), the introduction of which Tebbit defended by using the vocabulary of individual 
rights as well as that of the 'free market' (see above). He invoked the experiences of the 
'Winter of Discontent', which, he argued: 'demonstrated the injustice that is bound to 
result if the rights of the individual are totally subordinated to those of the group' (OR HC, 
6th ser., vol. 17, col. 738). Similar language was used by David Waddington, in closing 
the Second Reading debate: '[The Bill] will also give better protection for the individual 
against the abuse of industrial power' (OR HC, 6th ser., vol. 17, col. 817).
The publication of Democracy in Trade Unions in 1983 represented a further 
stride towards individualism in that 'the Government... made the protection of union 
members the centre-piece of its rhetoric' (Auerbach 1990: 132). Protection of individuals 
from coercion by the majority was now fundamental to its policies and language. In large 
part this was manifest in the debate over 'democratising' trade unions, which is sufficiently 
significant to warrant separate consideration (see pp. 57-60), and which formed the 
subject-matter of the Green Paper: 'Trade union power, which springs from legal 
immunities and privileges, can be used not just against employers but against individual 
members of unions. As the law has granted these privileges, it is necessary to consider 
whether the rights of individual members of trade unions are adequately protected' (DE 
1983: 1).
However, the vocabulary of'individual rights' was employed more broadly than 
in the context of provisions for trade union ballots, and the Conservative election victory 
in 1987 marked another stage in the Government's use of the vocabulary of individual 
rights against the unions: Svith increasing boldness of language and action, ministers began 
to denounce collective bargaining and the old agenda of industrial relations... Now the 
emphasis was on the individualisation of workers as the tide of collectivism was to be 
turned back' (Taylor 1993: 303). Indeed, the Conservative election manifesto of 1987 
made powerful use of the language of individualism and of 'balance' in a declaratory 
manner (see above): 'Conservative reforms have redressed the balance between the 
individual and his union, preventing coercion of the majority by activists and militants' 
(CCO 1987: 23). This 'boldness' was perhaps best emphasised by Trade Unions and their
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Members, which, as Auerbach argues, demonstrated an 'unequivocal commitment to the 
rights of the individual as opposed to trade union and collective rights' (1990: 164), 
particularly in the context of the proposal to establish a right to work despite a strike call:
'The right of the individual to choose to go to work despite a call to industrial 
action is an essential freedom. It can often be challenged, however, by those who 
take a hard line view of the traditional philosophy of the trade union movement 
based on the concept of collective strength through solidarity... the Government 
believes that a decision to take industrial action should be a matter for the 
individual. Every union member should be free to decide for himself whether or 
not he wishes to break his contract of employment and run the risk of dismissal 
without compensation. No union member should be penalised by his trade union 
for exercising his right to cross a picket line and go to work' (DE 1987: 4, 7).
The Green Paper also argued against the closed shop on grounds of individual rights: 'The 
Government has always believed that individuals should be able to choose for themselves 
whether or not to belong to a trade union' (ibid: 17) (see next section).
Legislative measures (see Chapter 2), White Papers and Green Papers between 
1988 and 1990 continued to 'fervently avow' 'the absolute priority given to the individual 
over the collective' (Auerbach 1990: 230). Employment fo r the 1990s described the rights 
which individuals had gained against the union collective as a result of the legislation: 
'Trade union members too can make use of the rights which legislation has given them, 
to ensure that their trade unions are run in accordance with their wishes. Trade unionists 
have welcomed the opportunity to vote in a secret ballot before being called on to take 
industrial action, and there have been some notable examples of refusals by members to 
take part in unballoted action and of members voting against a call to go on strike' (DE 
1988: 16). Similarly, increases in the powers of the Commissioner for the Rights of Trade 
Union Members were justified in Removing Barriers to Employment in anti-collectivist 
terms: Members contemplating or taking proceedings against their union on the ground 
that they have been denied rights or duties owed to them under the terms of their union's 
rulebook may face considerable disadvantages. Trade unions are large organisations with 
substantial resources and expertise to call upon when legal proceedings are imminent or 
taking place. Conversely, union members considering or taking proceedings may well face 
problems... It will always be daunting for a member to contemplate taking on his union 
without assistance and support' (DE 1989a: 16).
There is no question that the language of individual rights and of anti-collectivism 
was an important strand of the Conservative Government's legislative policies against
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unions in the 1980s. The encouragement of individualistic attitudes among trade unionists 
fitted comfortably with the commitment of the Thatcher Government and 'New Right' to 
individual responsibility and 'shifting for oneself. In consequence, Government ministers 
and spokespersons were at ease in using this vocabulary to justify their labour law 
policies, particularly in the confident era following the third election victory in 1987. 
However, the 'atomisation' of union behaviour also served a practical, as well as 
ideological purpose, in that it was a means of reducing union power (and therefore 
liberating the market), by fostering patterns of behaviour which would isolate trade unions 
and workgroups from each other, and which would cause individual workers to define 
their own interests against participating in industrial action' (Davies and Freedland 1993: 
428). This was manifested in legislative policies against secondary action, picketing, the 
closed shop and on regulating democracy in trade unions. Such policies were backed by 
the powerful vocabulary of the free market and of individual rights which I have 
discussed, but also by the - perhaps more nebulous - discourses of 'freedom' and 
'democracy', which I will now consider.
The language of 'freedom'
The theme of'freedom' or liberty1 was closely related to the above discourses, as 
exemplified by the work of Milton Friedman, who claimed that there was a direct link 
between capitalism and personal freedom: 'freedom for the individual consists in making 
choices and an absence of coercion by others. Capitalism, or the voluntary interaction 
between buyers and sellers of goods and services, permits this economic freedom which, 
in turn, is essential for political freedom' (Kavanagh 1990: 80). In this sense, freedom in 
markets was a crucial means of achieving personal freedom for the individual. The focus 
upon freedom of choice reflected the neo-liberal strand of Thatcherism (Belsey 1986: 197) 
which itself derived from classical liberal thought, particularly its negative view of the role 
of the state as violating personal liberty and choice (Kavanagh 1990: 104).13
Turning to the issue of trade union reform, an explicit adoption of the language
13 Phillips argues that 'freedom' and 'choice' were two separate concepts in the 
thinking of key figures such as Friedman and Hayek, and that 'choice' was not a value in 
itself; but that the two concepts became linked in Thatcherite discourse, so that a choice 
between courses of action was in itself a form of'freedom' (unpublished 1993: 109).
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of 'freedom' is evident in the writings of 'New Right' theorists. Hayek argued against 
collectivism (and syndicalism) on the grounds that they 'require a return to coercion 
without rule. They demand personal submission to a superior to whom a man is assigned, 
or to dependence on an organised group of special interests whose pleasure determines 
whether a man is allowed to earn his living in a particular way. The two systems are bound 
to destroy... personal freedom' (1984: 41), and claimed that unions have become 'the open 
enemies of the ideal of freedom of association': Treedom of association means the 
freedom to decide whether one wants to join an association or not. Such freedom no 
longer exists for most workers. The present unions offer to a skilled worker only the 
choice between joining and starving' (ibid: 61). The absence of coercion integral to this 
philosophy of freedom was stressed in work on unions by the Adam Smith Institute: 'The 
only safe course for any democracy that is concerned with its own survival, is to organise 
its economic and political arrangements in a way that allows, and indeed encourages, non- 
coercive competition between individuals, and organisations, in all aspects of life. A 
primary social function of the competitive process is that it works continuously to de­
centralise power - in the economy, society, polity, academia and so forth - or at least to 
deter (via potential competition) the abuse of power' (Burton 1979: 67). Similarly, the 
CPS called for the voluntarist system to be reformed: 'the law must be invoked to restore 
balance and to maintain freedoms' (1980: vii) and produced a document entitled The Right 
to Strike in a Free Society (1983).
The discourse of'freedom' was therefore in wide usage. But it was particularly 
prevalent in discussions of the closed shop. Hayek's discussion of'freedom of association' 
(above) hints at discomfort over the institution, and the CPS was even more explicit in its 
adoption of the language of'freedom' to justify criticism and proposals for reform: 'It is 
a derogation from individual liberty in that it denies choice to individuals whether they 
wish to belong to a trade union or not. It interferes with liberty because it means that a 
man's ability to earn his living is dependent on his good standing with those who hold 
power in the appropriate trade union' (1980: 29).
Government pronouncements on the closed shop also drew heavily on themes of 
'freedom' and 'liberty'. The 1981 Green Paper, while presenting a balanced approach in 
other areas (see pp.36-7), was emphatic in its condemnation of the closed shop: 'The 
Government's view of the closed shop is clear: it is opposed to the principles underlying 
it. That people should be required to join a union as a condition of getting or holding a job
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runs contrary to the general tradition of personal liberty in this country... Individual 
employees should have the right to decide for themselves whether or not to join a trade 
union' (DE 1981:66). This language was reiterated in statements on the closed shop 
provisions of the 1982 Employment Bill: Tor many of us the cause of liberty requires 
more commitment than to hold hands and sing the Red Flag' once a year. For those 
concerned with freedom, the closed shop - trade union conscription14- is a matter of deep 
concern' (Tebbit, N. OR HC, 6th ser., vol. 17, col. 739); 'The principal argument against 
it [the closed shop] is that it is an affront to liberty' (Waddington, D. OR HC, 6th ser., 
vol. 17, col. 817).
The powerful use of the language of'freedom' to justify these measures contrasted 
with the relatively cautious tone adopted in 1980, when Prior commented merely that: 
'What we are doing in the Bill is to provide the individual with effective safeguards' (OR 
HC, 5th ser., vol. 976, col. 62). Nevertheless, as with other instances already discussed, 
the moderate tone of Trior's generally collectivist discourse' (Davies and Freedland 1993: 
454) foreshadowed the emergence of the more forceful development of themes in 
Government language later in the decade.
This became explicit, once again, in the period after the 1987 election. Proposals 
for further reform of the closed shop were presented in Trade Unions and their Members 
using the language of'freedom' and individualism: 'The Government has always believed 
that individuals should be able to choose for themselves whether or not to belong to a 
trade union... the closed shop is... fundamentally about individual freedom of choice 
whether or not to be a union member... in a matter as important as freedom of choice, it 
may be thought wrong for anyone at all to be forced to compromise on a question of 
principle in order to obtain or keep a job' (DE 1987: 17,20).
Employment fo r the 1990s also justified measures for legislation against the pre- 
entry closed shop (eventually enacted in the 1990 Act) in the same vocabulary: 'The 
Government believe that people should be free to choose for themselves whether or not 
they belong to a trade union. All forms of the closed shop - but particularly the pre-entry 
closed shop - put unacceptable limits on that freedom' (DE 1988: 20).
The connection between this discourse and that of individualism is readily 
apparent. The closed shop was an important target of Conservative rhetoric and policies
14 See pp.39-40.
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because it was seen as denying freedom to the individual. The issue thus represented a 
confluence between distinct, but related, Conservative strains of anti-collectivist and 
libertarian discourse.15 For example, 'freedom/liberty', individualism and anti-collectivism 
were interlinked in the following passage from the Third Reading of the Employment Bill 
1982: It is contrary to the traditions of personal liberty in this country for someone to be 
required to join a trade union in order to obtain or hold a job... what is not acceptable in 
a free society is for a trade union to enforce membership as a condition of employment by 
means of the closed shop... our first priority in considering questions about the closed 
shop should be in terms of personal freedom and the rights of the individual... We should 
not lose sight of the fact that a collective such as a trade union exists in essence and in 
origin for the sake of the individual, not the individual for the sake of the collective1 
(Alison, M. ORHC, 6th ser., vol. 24, col. 370).
But the language of'freedom' went further than the issue of individual rights to 
embrace the economic discourses discussed above - the notion of the free market. Again, 
the question of the closed shop represented a nexus for these themes, particularly in the 
post-1987 era: Turther restrictions on the closed shop would provide greater flexibility 
in the labour market and increased freedom of choice for employers when recruiting' (DE 
1987: 19);
'- the closed shop, and particularly the pre-entry closed shop, can push up labour 
costs very significantly, with consequent damage to profitability and to jobs. It 
also has indirect effects which reduce the flexibility of the labour market and 
adversely affect employment levels and the supply of skilled workers. It is a 
restrictive practice and a barrier to employment;
- the pre-entry closed shop is an infringement of the liberty of the individual. 
Where it is in operation, workers seeking employment cannot choose for 
themselves whether to join a trade union' (DE 1989a: 7).
As Davies and Freedland remark, the libertarian discourse of freedom for the individual 
worker and the economic themes of promoting growth in employment and removing 
barriers to business had, by 1990, become intertwined (1993: 509).
It should be apparent from this discussion that the language of 'freedom' and 
'liberty' could be widely deployed as justification for various forms of action against the
15 A similar argument was made for the introduction of provisions to prevent a 
union member from being disciplined by his union for refusing to obey a strike call 
contained in Trade Unions and their Members - see p. 51.
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trade unions. Indeed, it could even be used to justify a refusal to intervene to control 
certain union activities. Thus, the notion of 'freedom' was an important element of the 
argument against total individualisation of the employment relationship, even for Hayek, 
who argued in favour of'freedom of association' (see above, p. 53) - albeit that he chose 
to 'interpret this freedom with emphasis... upon the right to dissociate (Wedderbum 1991: 
211), and in favour of a 'right' to strike (1984: 51). Likewise, the CPS linked a 'right' to 
strike16 to the existence of a 'free society’ (1983), as did David Waddington in the Second 
Reading of the 1982 Bill: In a free country there has to be the right to strike' (OR HC, 6th 
ser., vol. 17, col. 816). Notions of'democracy', discussed in the next section, are clearly 
being called upon in these remarks.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the clearest exposition of the vocabulary of'freedom' in 
the context of a discussion of what trade unions should be permitted to do came in Trade 
Union Immunities: 'The freedom of employees to combine and to withdraw their labour 
is their ultimate safeguard against the inherent imbalance of power between the employer 
and the individual employee. This freedom has come to be accepted as a hallmark of a free 
society... The importance of the freedom to combine to withdraw labour in the face of 
serious grievances at work is not in question' (DE 1981: 1).
The point is that 'freedom' is an elusive concept, which could be used as a 
vocabulary justifying a number of different positions, as Hall has argued: "Freedom' is one 
of the most powerful, but slippery ideas in the political vocabulary: it is a term which can 
be inserted into several different political discourses. The language of freedom is a 
rivetingly powerful one, but it contains many contradictory ideas' (1988: 190). While 
'freedom' in the context of Government and New Right' rhetoric generally carried 
individualist and laissez-faire economic overtones, these were far from being the only 
understandings of the term, and it was perfectly legitimate for the same vocabulary to be 
used with a different meaning. In consequence, it was open to others, such as the trade 
unions, to adopt a similar vocabulary, but to place a different interpretation upon it. I 
will examine the extent to which this occurred in Chapters 5 and 6.
16 In the British context, it is more accurate to describe this as an immunity from 
legal process - see Chapter 4.
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The language of 'democracy'
Moreover Just as it was possible for the Government's political opponents in the 
union movement to contest the meaning of a discourse such as 'freedom', so it was open 
to the Government to diverge in its interpretation of the concept from the understandings 
of the 'New Right' theorists. This brings me to an analysis of the related vocabulary of 
'democracy'.
Several commentators have pointed out that the Government's policies on 
regulating democracy in trade unions did not fit happily with a Hayekian/New Right' 
approach to industrial relations (Auerbach 1990: 232; Auerbach 1993: 47; Fosh et al 
1993: 14-15; see above, p.33). There was an apparent contradiction between the principle 
of ideological individualism - that an individual should be left free to do as he/she wished, 
and the imposition of a certain structure of decision-making upon unions by means of 
mandatory balloting provisions. Moreover, there seemed to be a disparity between the 
Conservatives' objective of deregulating the labour market and the regulation of trade 
union activities in the sphere of strike ballots, election of union officials etc: 'One 
compelling argument against detailed interference with trade union rule books is that it 
runs contrary to a general thrust of deregulation and withdrawal of the state from 
intervention in the affairs of voluntary bodies' (Hanson and Mather 1988: 74). 
Additionally, union ballots were not a significant element of New Right' proposals for 
reform simply because these theorists were (at best) indifferent to the very existence of 
trade unions - a far greater concern was that their 'immunities' should be removed. Ballots 
ran the risk of legitimating trade union activities in a manner which was incompatible with 
New Right' thinking. Consequently it was claimed that the Government's strategy of 
regulating union decision-making was a 'merry-go-round' and a 'fruitless process' (Mather 
1987, quoted in Auerbach 1990: 234).
How, then, are policies which involved regulation of unions' internal affairs, 
evident from the Trade Union Act 1984 onward, to be explained? One view is offered by 
Auerbach, who argues that they demonstrate that the Government was not simply 
following a Hayekian blueprint. The policy of internal regulation (via the introduction of 
balloting requirements, the regulation of union electoral systems and the mobilisation of 
dissentient members) was designed to achieve external goals (a reduction in the number 
of industrial disputes), but 'the pursuit of those aims through the medium of the populist
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appeal to individual trade unionists can only be explained in the context of a unique 
configuration of political and economic circumstances at a particular time' (1990: 233).
This analysis, while valuable in indicating that the Government's policies were not 
solely governed by a 'New Right' agenda, arguably downplays the significance of ideology. 
The Government's actions can be understood in the light of its interpretation of the 
concept of 'freedom', which in this context may have differed from a 'New Right' 
understanding of the term. The Conservatives analysed 'freedom' as negative - 'freedom 
from' rather than 'freedom to' (Undy et al 1996: 74). For example, union members were 
to be freed from the 'tyranny of the majority' by making decisions about strikes and 
elections at home, away from the 'pressure' of open meetings, while individual members 
were not to be disciplined by their unions for a refusal to obey a strike call and could call 
on the assistance of the Commissioner for the Rights of Trade Union Members in disputes 
with their unions. Thus,"giving the unions back to their members' does not mean that the 
members can do what they like with them but means confining the members to specific 
participation patterns that emphasise the individual rather than the collectivity, a pattern 
that the Conservatives considered more ’democratic" (Fosh et al 1993: 19). All of this was 
achievable because the vocabulary of'freedom' was open to differing interpretations.
Understood in this light, the policies aimed at internal union regulation were fully 
compatible with the discourse of'individual rights'. They were essentially concerned with 
the empowerment of individual union members, and therefore formed part of the broader 
individualist philosophy of the Conservative Government, particularly its desire to 
individualise or decollectivise industrial relations (Martin et al 1991: 197). They also fitted 
with the authoritarian populist strand of Thatcherism which was particularly dominant in 
the post-Falklands era.
It followed from this that the language of'democracy1, which the Government used 
to justify many of these internal regulatory measures (particularly, of course, those on 
balloting), was closely connected with - indeed, arguably formed a subset of - the 
individualist discourse examined above. The slogan of 'giving the unions back to their 
members'17 prioritised the rights of the individual member of a trade union over and above
17 Auerbach notes that this phrase was actually first used by the SDP (1990: 123 
n.31), but 'whether or not it devised the slogan... the Government rapidly proclaimed that 
crusade as its own' (ibid. 153).
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the collective will. But 'democracy' was itself a powerful discourse - indeed, it was a 
'given' in British political life, a concept almost universally accepted. By deploying the 
language of 'democracy' against the unions, therefore, the Conservatives were implying 
that their arrangements and institutions, understood as not being properly 'democratic', 
were consequently illegitimate. This enabled them to 'marginalise' the unions, defining 
them as outside the bounds of acceptability in British political society.
This strategy could be seen at work in Democracy in Trade Unions. Certain 
arrangements were portrayed as being essential to 'proper' democracy, and the unions' 
failure to embrace these thus laid them open to the charge of illegitimacy: 'The right to 
vote in secret for the candidate of one's choice is now widely accepted as one of the 
fundamental rights in any democratic society or organisation; and those who claim to 
make decisions binding on others should establish electoral arrangements which can be 
seen to be fair and satisfactory. If electoral arrangements are evidently defective or open 
to serious challenge, the legitimacy of the organisation concerned is bound to be called 
into question and the authority of its leaders eroded' (DE 1983: 3).
The marginalisation of the unions' position which was effected by the labelling of 
their arrangements as unacceptable to democratic society was further strengthened by the 
claim that there was public disquiet over the issue: Much public concern has been voiced 
about the need for trade unions to become more democratic and responsive to the wishes 
of their members... There is undoubtedly widespread concern about the electoral 
arrangements of trade unions. This concern, felt by many trade unionists as well as the 
public, stems in part from the fact that decisions which it is claimed are reached on behalf 
of the members and in their interests can in practice be contrary to the wishes of those 
concerned' (ibid. 1, 3). The expression of public (and 'rank and file' trade unionist) 
discomfort at trade union electoral practices served not only a populist purpose in 
attracting electoral support for the proposals; it also delegitimised and marginalised the 
leadership of the unions as unacceptable to the majority of people. It therefore functioned 
in a similar fashion to the language of'privilege' discussed in Chapter 418 (and see further 
next section).
The language of 'democracy' thus performed a variety of significant functions in
18 It is notable that the Green Paper explicitly linked the 'public concern' over union 
democracy to the fact that 'unions have important legal immunities and privileges not 
afforded to other organisations' (ibid. 1).
59
Government discourse and formed a major strand of the attack on unions, despite its 
incompatibility with the thinking of the 'New Right'. However, Hall's point about the 
elusive nature of the language of'freedom' (see p. 56), is equally valid here. There was no 
single uncontested meaning of 'democracy' or of the precise institutional arrangements 
which might constitute it. As a result, it was open to the unions to argue that their 
definition of'democracy' was just as valid as that of the Conservative Government. This 
indeed formed an important element of their response to the policies on regulating unions' 
internal affairs, as I shall argue below.
Marginalisation of the unions and the language of 'community' and 'nation'
If the vocabulary of'democracy' was not fully compatible with neo-liberal thinking 
on the role of unions, the same was even more true of the language of'community' which 
played an important role in the Government's attacks on trade unions. Writers such as 
Hayek, with their emphasis upon the individual, and with a belief in a minimal role for 
government (albeit that a strong state might be needed to provide the conditions in which 
a free market might flourish) had little use for the language of 'community', with its 
attendant notions of social cohesion and collectivism.
However, as Kavanagh states, British conservatism has traditionally consisted of 
two main strands, liberal and collectivist. The latter, which has 'dominated the policy 
thinking of Conservatives in government' in the twentieth century (1990: 70), has 'stressed 
the importance of community and made a positive case for the use of public power to 
promote the general interest, which they [collectivists] see as emerging from purposive 
state action rather than the free interaction of individuals' (ibid: 189). In this sense, the - 
apparently collectivist - language of 'community' can be viewed as compatible with a 
lengthy conservative tradition. This is the view of Willets, who argues that ‘modem 
conservatism aims to reconcile free markets (which deliver freedom and prosperity) with 
a recognition of the importance of community (which sustains our values). This is not a 
new project. It is the distinctive insight of British conservative thinkers, from Hume and 
Burke through to Powell and Oakeshott, that these apparently contrasting ideas go 
together* (1992: 92).
Thatcherism, therefore, aligned itself with this tradition and sought to invoke a
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sense of community embodied by 'the nation'19 and (perhaps more controversially), 'the 
people' and 'the society' (but see above, p.49, n.12) in conjunction with strong 
government, particularly in certain social and moral areas (Willets 1992: 52; Belsey 1986: 
197). Accordingly, 'community' can be viewed as an inclusive vocabulary, defining those 
who were within it as a part of the British nation/people whose interests the Conservative 
Government represented.
In the industrial relations arena, the language of'community' was most extensively 
employed in relation to the issue of regulating strikes in essential services, which formed 
a topic for debate at various points in the Thatcher period. The basic nature of the services 
involved (health services, water, electricity, emergency services etc) made it easy to 
juxtapose the interests of'nation', 'people', 'public' or 'community1, which would inevitably 
be harmed by industrial action, against the 'narrow sectional interests' represented by the 
union movement. In this context, the spectre of the Winter of Discontent', during which 
there had been strikes among lorry drivers and public sector workers, was 'a valuable 
political and rhetorical weapon' (Auerbach 1990: 115) justifying Government action.20 
Hence, in introducing the Employment Bill in 1979, Prior invoked the lorry drivers’ strike 
and the language of'community1 as validation of measures on secondary picketing:21
'In the road haulage dispute, for example, there was secondary picketing at the 
docks to stop the movement of essential supplies, there was secondary picketing 
at the suppliers of raw materials to bring production lines to a halt, and there was 
secondary picketing at the producers of basic foodstuffs, and at food wholesalers, 
to bring about food shortages in the shops. That was not traditional picketing. Its 
aim was to bring industry to a halt, to spread and intensify disruption, and to put 
pressure on the whole community. Uncontrolled minorities put workers, who had 
no dispute with their employer, out of a job and inflicted needless hardship on the 
whole community' (OR HC, 6th ser., vol. 976, col. 65).
19 Hall argues that Thatcherism was particularly successful in achieving an 
identification with the interests of the nation: What Thatcherism as an ideology does, is 
to address the fears, the anxieties, the lost identities of a people. It invites us to think 
about politics in images. It is addressed to our collective fantasies, to Britain as a social 
imaginary. Mrs. Thatcher has totally dominated that idiom' (Hall 1988: 166).
20 It was also an important element in shaping the unions' response to Government 
policies, as in the early Thatcher years, the unions were 'still living with the legacy of the 
Winter of Discontent' (Hall, interview), which constrained their ability to appeal directly 
to the public.
21 The measures were not solely concerned with essential services, but Prior 
argued in favour of the provisions by recalling what had happened in 1978-9.
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Similar language was used by the CPS, which was also concerned about the type 
of action seen in 1978-9: 'It is essential that in industrial relations a fair balance be kept 
between the rights of the individual and the welfare of the community at large. Industrial 
action may be justified when it is directed at an employer. It cannot be tolerated when it 
threatens to blackmail the community by putting health, safety or life itself at risk' (1980: 
21); 'Now we are a totally interdependent society. No community, no industry and no 
public service lives to itself alone. We are all dependent on one another. More importantly, 
we are now so utterly reliant on some services that, without them, convenience, security, 
health and even life itself can be disastrously affected if any are disrupted or withdrawn 
from the community1; 'the paramount consideration is the welfare of the community as a 
whole. This is now under threat' (1983: 1, 11).
The problem of regulating strikes in essential services recurred at various points 
during the decade, and the language of'community' continued to be deployed in support 
of proposals for reform. Trade Union Immunities juxtaposed the interests of trade unions 
with those of the 'community1 although it characteristically argued that most trade 
unionists were responsible: Most people, for example, would accept that action which 
puts lives at risk or imperils national security constitutes an emergency... In general 
workers who are in a position to endanger life or threaten security either do not go on 
strike, or if they do so, ensure that essential services are maintained. The community has 
the right to expect nothing less' (DE 1981: 79).
The Conservative manifesto for the 1983 election again raised the issue and argued 
that 'the nation is entitled to expect that the operation of essential services should not be 
disrupted' (CCO 1983: 12),22 while the later Green Paper on Unofficial Action and the 
Law linked the problem of unofficial strikes with essential services in the context of the 
vocabulary of'community1 and of the impact on the public: Essential public services have 
also been the target of unofficial action in recent years. In some cases, this has caused 
widespread hardship to the community... The public can do nothing to bring such disputes 
to a conclusion, yet they are the main sufferers. Such action is often deliberately targeted 
on the public in order to put pressure on the employer1 (DE 1989b: 2).
In the event, it proved impossible for the Government to introduce restrictions on
22 The vocabulary of'nation' as opposed to 'community' being more appropriate 
to a national election campaign, but showing the linkage between the terms.
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the right to strike in essential services, despite the urgings of 'New Right1 theorists 
(Hanson and Mather 1988: 26; for an explanation of the difficulties facing the 
Government, see Auerbach 1990: 115-117). However, the language of'community' in 
which the proposals were presented could be used as justification for other measures 
against unions. This was most readily apparent from Trade Union Immunities, which 
employed the term in a variety of contexts: 'The freedom of employees to combine and 
to withdraw their labour... has come to be accepted as a hallmark of a free society. But 
implicit in that acceptance is the assumption that this freedom will be used responsibly, 
that industrial action will be taken only with proper regard for the interests of others and 
of the community as a whole' (DE 1981: 1); 'Sympathetic action has too often been used 
as the pretext for extending a strike or blacking to involve employees and employers who 
have no interest or connection with the original dispute. Its purpose can become simply 
to inflict maximum damage and the interests of those not involved in the dispute and the 
community as a whole can suffer severely' (ibid: 39); 'The increasing damage industrial 
action can inflict on the community has led to demands that the decision of a trade union 
to take such action should be reached only after fully consulting the wishes of its members' 
(ibid: 61);
'Recurring mention has been made in this Green Paper of the problem of 
protecting the community as a whole against the potentially damaging effects of 
industrial action... It has to be recognised that there is no absolute protection 
which can be given to the community without outlawing industrial action 
altogether... the community must be able to count on trade unions and individual 
workers to exercise their power with restraint and responsibility... The question 
considered here, however, is whether there comes a point at which the interests 
of the nation must override the freedom to take industrial action in order to 
protect the community and the national interest' (ibid: 75).
The Green Paper depicted the 'problem' of industrial conflict as being one of 
striking the appropriate *balance' between the rights of trade unions and the interests of 
the 'community/nation' (see p.3 7). In this respect, it might be argued that the language of 
'community', used so extensively in the document, was indicative of the 'generally 
collectivist discourse' (see p. 54) of the Prior period in Employment. To an extent this 
would be accurate - it is notable, for example, that restrictions on secondary picketing, 
justified by Prior in 1979 as necessary for protection of the 'community' were validated, 
a decade later, in terms of the dominant economic/market discourse of the later 1980s:
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The Government's view is that, in general, employers who are not parties to a dispute 
should no longer be exposed to the threat of industrial action - a threat which can deter 
new enterprises from setting up in this country' (DE 1989a: 3).
However, the language of'community' was not solely expressive of a collectivist 
approach to industrial relations, later discredited. As discussed above, it continued to be 
used right up until 1989 in the context of restrictions on strikes in essential services, both 
by the Government and by organisations such as the CPS. It was also used in justification 
of measures against unofficial action: Unofficial action damages jobs and businesses and, 
as we saw last summer, it can disrupt the life of the community as a whole' (Howard, M. 
OR HC, 6th ser., vol. 166, col. 47). Moreover, Tebbit and Waddington in 1982, and 
Howard in 1990, portrayed the various legislative measures as necessary to 'protect' the 
community: 'I toyed with the idea of calling it the 'workers' rights Bill', but of course it 
goes beyond the right of workers to the rights of the whole community' (Tebbit, N. OR 
HC, 6th ser., vol. 17, col. 739); It will mark more clearly than before what the community 
regards as acceptable and what is clearly not acceptable in an industrial dispute' 
(Waddington, D. OR HC, 6th ser., vol. 17, col. 817); We believe that the law should 
protect the community at large from the abuse of trade union power1 (Howard, M. OR 
HC, 6th ser., vol. 166, col. 49).
The connection between the collectivist language of Prior and the 'Thatcherite' 
discourse on industrial relations dating from Tebbit onwards is apparent in Waddington's 
usage of the word 'acceptable' and Howard's use of'abuse': the vocabulaiy of'community' 
functioned to define what was permissible. By juxtaposing the activities of trade unions 
with the interests of the 'community', the Government was able to marginalise or 
delegitimise those activities in so far as they were represented as the pursuit of narrow 
self-interest as against the interests of the majority. Trade unions were placed in 
opposition to the 'community/nation/people' and were therefore seen either as subverting 
the nation from within or as external agents23 - in any event, not properly 'one of us' (see
23 The most powerful examples of this discourse, although outside the scope of the 
source materials for this thesis, came from Thatcher herself in the context of the miners' 
strike and are worth passing notice. She drew parallels with such 'external' threats to the 
British state as the Argentine army and the IRA: We had to fight an enemy without in the 
Falklands. We always have to be aware of the enemy within, which is more difficult to 
fight and more dangerous to liberty* (Thatcher to the 1922 Committee, 19 July 1984); 'At 
one end of the spectrum are the terrorist gangs within our borders, and the terrorist states 
which finance and arm them. At the other end are the hard left operating inside our (cont.)
64
Young 1993: ix, for an account of the importance of this phrase).
This was a powerful form of rhetoric for justifying legislative attacks on the trade 
unions. If the Government could succeed in unifying the nation against the unions, 
measures restricting and regulating their activities could be introduced with considerably 
less opposition, both from the public and (potentially) from union members. The language 
of 'community' therefore fused with claims of public disapproval in documents such as 
Democracy in Trade Unions: 'There must also be a proper balance between the interests 
of unions and the needs of the community; and organisations which claim and have special 
privileges must conduct their affairs in ways which attract public confidence and the 
confidence of their members' (DE 1983: 38).
What was occurring here, as Hall observes, was the creation of a populist 
'coalition' between the Government and the British 'people' against the unions, a 
'construction of ideological cross-alliances between 'Thatcherism' and 'the people' actually 
going on in the very structure of Mrs. Thatcher's own rhetoric': 'The language of'the 
people' unified behind a reforming drive to turn the tide of'creeping collectivism', banish 
Keynesian illusions from the state apparatus and renovate the power bloc is a powerful 
one. Its radicalism connects with radical-popular sentiments, but it effectively turns them 
round, absorbs and neutralizes their popular thrust, and creates, in the place of a popular 
rupture, a populist unity. It brings into existence a new 'historic bloc' between certain 
sections of the dominant and dominated classes' (1983: 30 - emphasis in original).
This marginalisation of the unions in Thatcherite discourse was not effected solely 
by employment of the language of'community', 'nation' and 'people'. The vocabulary of 
'privilege', discussed in Chapter 4, also functioned in similar fashion to depict the unions 
as existing 'above the law1 and therefore as unique in British society. Similarly, accusations 
of the lack of democracy in the union movement served to render it politically 
unacceptable. However, marginalisation was not exclusively rhetorical. As considered in 
Chapter 2, the Conservative Government withdrew from the 'corporatist consensus' of the 
1960s and 1970s and denied the TUC and individual unions substantial access to policy­
making processes. Additionally, the banning of unions at GCHQ in 1984 was justified on
(cont.) system, conspiring to use union power and the appartus of local government to 
reak, defy and subvert the laws' (Thatcher, Second Carlton Lecture, 26 November 1984) 
(both quotes in Young 1993: 372, 373). Note the use of'we' and 'our' which functions to 
define the unions as outside the 'Thatcher nation'.
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grounds of national security, the implicit assumption being that unions were a threat to the 
safety of the state.24 The miners' strike of 1984-5 was also highly significant in 
marginalising the unions, in so far as the violence of miners allowed picketing - and on a 
wider level, unions themselves - to be equated with anti-social threats to public order such 
as inner city riots and football hooliganism (Davies and Freedland 1993: 496), and 
therefore as an illegitimate activity/institution within society, which needed to be dealt 
with by legislative action (in the first instance in the form of the Public Order Act 1986).
Maiginalisafion of the position of trade unions can be seen as a key element in the 
rhetoric and policies of the Conservative Government on labour legislation in the 1980s 
(Taylor 1993: 302; Undy eta l 1996: 29). If successfully achieved, it would render it very 
difficult for the unions to respond effectively to those policies, simply because they 
themselves (and their supporters) were regarded as 'illegitimate' and therefore 
unacceptable to Thatcherite political society. In consequence, anything said or done in 
defence of the unions would be regarded as unworthy of extended consideration by 
politicians or the public. This fact, coupled with the dominance of Government definitions 
of nebulous concepts such as 'democracy* and 'freedom' and the pervasive nature of its 
•New Right' rhetoric on the free market and individualism, made the formulation of an 
effective response to Government policies by trade unions highly problematic. In Chapters 
5 and 6 I shall examine in detail the means by which the unions attempted to find a 
solution to these difficulties, but will first consider the specific issue of the labelling of 
legal immunities as 'privileges', and the consequences this had for the unions.
24 Thatcher in fact told a TUC delegation that she saw an inherent incompatibility 
between the structure of trade unions and their loyalty to the state (Taylor 1993: 269).
CHAPTER FOUR:- The debate over union 'immunities' and 'privileges'
As an illustration of the importance of language in opening up and justifying 
legislative strategies on reform of industrial conflict law during the 1980s, and in shaping 
attitudes towards those policies and measures, one need go no further than the highly 
significant disputation over the existence and extent of trade union ’immunities' in law. 
This formed a central element of the various calls for reform throughout the Thatcher era, 
both from 'New Right' theorists and from the Government itself, in the form of Green 
Papers and ministerial statements.1 The power of the vocabulary was such that the union 
movement was forced to respond, and ultimately to change its strategy, in order to avoid 
giving the impression (however inaccurate this may have been), that it was 'above the law'.
Historical and legal background
In order to comprehend the issues involved in the debate over 'immunities', it is 
necessary to gain a basic understanding of the 'unique historical character of British labour 
law... [its] idiosyncratic nature and the odd semantics of that legal structure' (Wedderbum 
1991: 201).
It is a commonplace of the British industrial relations system that it has 
traditionally been based on the non-involvement, as far as possible, of the state. This 
system of Voluntarism' (or 'abstentionism') has its roots in developments in labour law at 
the turn of the century. As Kahn-Freund has pointed out, English common law has always 
been based around a belief in equality of individuals, rather than collective forces (Davies 
and Freedland 1983: 12). Accordingly, trade unions, as combinations conflicting with 
individual freedom, were originally regarded as criminal conspiracies (Phelps Brown 1986: 
32).
1 Indeed, the debate over 'immunities' long predated Thatcher. For the views of 
Dicey and Hayek, see below. Also of significance in this field was the 1958 publication of 
the Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society, A Giant's Strength (one of whose 
authors was Geoffrey Howe), about which Wedderbum comments that 'some lawyers had 
by now revived the language of 1901, renewing claims that 'the trade union and its 
members today occupy a privileged position under the law" (1986: 38).
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Criminal liability was removed by the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 
1875. However, civil liability on the grounds of restraint of trade remained, and was 
developed by judges in the years up to 1901. Since industrial action invariably amounted 
to a breach of contract, for union officials to instruct or encourage workers to strike 
constituted the tort of inducing breaches of their contracts of employment, while 
secondary boycotts and sympathetic strikes were viewed by the courts as civil conspiracies 
to injure. The apotheosis of these common law developments was reached in the TaffVale 
judgment of the House of Lords in 1901,2 which established that unions (as opposed to 
individual union members or officials) were liable to be sued in tort.
In response to these judicial moves, the Liberal Government enacted the Trade 
Disputes Act 1906. This gave protection to unions from action in tort for acts done 'in 
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute'. The torts of conspiracy and inducement 
to breach of contract, however, continued to exist and could be developed by creative 
judges. Thus, in a series of cases in the 1960s, the courts held union officials liable for 
inducing breaches of commercial contracts disrupted by the industrial action.3 They also 
introduced a 'new1 form of liability - the tort of 'intimidation'.4 Accordingly, further 
legislation was passed in 1974 and 1976 to protect the unions from these forms of liability.
The important point to note from this brief historical survey is that the protection 
afforded to unions and officials under the various statutes was by way of immunities - the 
exemption of unions from the common law doctrines of conspiracy, intimidation and 
inducement to breach contracts. It was a method of'insulating the unions from judicial 
law-making' (McDroy 1995: 230) and 'amounted not so much to 'abstention' by the law 
as to an exclusion of the judges' (Wedderbum 1986: 18).
If the immunities had not come into existence, trade unions would have found it 
extremely difficult to organise and operate. The individualist philosophy of the common 
law meant that unions would have automatically been acting in an illegal manner - in
2 TaffVale Railway Co. v Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants 
[1901] AC 436
3 Stratford v Lindley [1965] AC 269; Torquay Hotel Ltd. v Cousins 
[1969] 2 Ch. 106
4 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129
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restraint of trade - without the protection afforded by statute law. This was recognised by 
the Green Paper on Trade Union Immunities, which clearly outlined the negative nature 
of the exemptions:
'the present law governing collective industrial action remains based on a system 
of legal immunities. These immunities protect those who organise industrial action 
from liability for the criminal offences and civil wrongs for which the act of calling 
out on strike in breach of contract would otherwise make them liable at common 
law. The immunities do not abolish the offences and wrongs against which they 
provide protection. Rather they remove liability in the circumstances of a trade 
dispute. To the extent to which these immunities are reduced, therefore, the 
common law liabilities are immediately restored. If they were repealed altogether, 
then trade unions and individuals would be at risk of legal action every time they 
organised a strike' (DE 1981:24).
The common law itself, which provides the guiding precepts for our whole legal 
system, comprises in fact a series of fundamental rights and duties which, unless 
abrogated by legislation or sometimes by contract, govern all relationships 
including those at the workplace. As has been seen, however, these fundamental 
rights are not sufficient to guarantee the legality of trade union activity. It is 
because the common law operated to make associations of workers and concerted 
industrial action unlawful, that a system of immunities from legal processes at 
common law has developed. Indeed, simply to repeal the immunities and to return 
to the common law could make it virtually impossible for trade unions to exist and 
operate lawfully at all' (ibid: 83).
Voluntarism did not, therefore, imply a complete withdrawal of the law from 
industrial relations. Minimal state involvement, in the establishment of statutory 
immunities, was necessary in order to protect the unions from the otherwise destructive 
consequences of the common law.5 However, the deep suspicion with which unions 
viewed an apparently hostile judiciary meant that 'union leaders were inclined to steer clear 
of the law whenever they could' (Pelling 1971: 71). This antipathy towards the judiciary 
affords at least a partial explanation of the unions' continuing reluctance to establish a 
system of positive rights to take industrial action, as had been done in other European 
countries (see below). There were, however, other explanations for the creation of a
5 Taylor (1993: 7-8 and passim) observes that the British industrial relations 
system was never completely voluntarist - arbitration procedures were provided by the 
state from 1896 onwards, and there was legislation in areas such as health and safety and 
low pay (see below).
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negative system of immunities, including the absence of a written Constitution (DE 1981: 
2; Wedderbum 1991: 836), the early existence of unions in Britain, meaning that there was 
no 'model' to follow (Mcllroy 1995: 230), the absence of a working-class political party 
during the unions' formative years (Wedderbum 1991:83) and the absence of universal 
male suffrage (ibid: 83; Mcllroy 1995: 230), which led to laissez-faire compromise with, 
rather than replacement of, the common law. But, whatever the precise historical 
explanation for the unions' strategic approach to legality by means of a pattern of 
immunities, the 'social objective' (von Prondzynski 1985: 186) was the same as in other 
countries - that is, as Wedderbum observes (1986: 845; 1991: 83), to protect elementary 
'social rights'- to organise in unions, to bargain and to withhold labour.
The problem for the unions in attempting to defend these freedoms - both before 
and during the Thatcher years - lay not in the substance of the 'rights' protected by the 
statutory immunities, but in the form  which this protection took. The immunities may 
simply have been a mere 'form of drafting' (Wedderbum 1986: 845), but it was precisely 
that form which opened up the possibility of attack from those who sought to restrict 
union activity. The language of'immunities' - what Wedderbum refers to as its 'confusing 
semantics' (ibid: 847) - invited criticism both from the political Right and from the judges.
A number of legal cases in 1979-80 demonstrate how 'the language of'immunities' 
[gave] judges easy, semantic points of entry' (Wedderbum 1991: 86). In Express 
Newspapers Ltd. v McShane.7 Lord Denning MR demonstrated the endurance of the 
traditional, individualist approach of the common law, in commenting that the statutory 
provisions conferring immunity 'are not to be construed widely so as to give unlimited 
immunity to law-breakers. They are to be construed with due limitations so as to keep the 
immunity within reasonable bounds. Otherwise the freedom of ordinary individuals - to 
go about their business in peace - would be intruded upon beyond all reason'. Similarly, 
in two House of Lords cases, Duport Steels Ltd. v Sirs and Express Newspapers Ltd. v 
McShane (on appeal), Lord Diplock spoke of the immunities being 'intrinsically repugnant 
to anyone who has spent his life in the administration of justice' and tending 'to stick in
6 While Wedderbum acknowledges the 'minor1 importance of this factor, he points 
out that it does not explain why shareholders, in contrast to unions, were given rights to 
associate in limited liability companies from 1855.
7 [1979] ICR 210 at 218.
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judicial gorges'.8
At the heart of these criticisms was a Diceyan conception of the 'rule of law', that 
everyone should be ruled by one body of laws, applicable equally to all - Dicey himself 
had criticised the Trade Disputes Act 1906 on the basis that 'an enactment which frees 
trade unions from the rule of equal law stimulates among workmen the fatal delusion that 
workmen should aim at the attainment, not of equality, but of privilege... It makes a trade 
union a privileged body exempted from the ordinary law of the land. No such privileged 
body has ever before been deliberately created by an English Parliament' (Dicey 1914: 
xlvii, xlvi). For these judges, then, the language of 'immunities' enabled them to attack 
unions on the grounds that they operated above and beyond the law. It was a relatively 
small step from this position to the argument that the unions possessed 'privileges'.9
As has frequently been pointed out, this 'rhetorical leap' was not necessarily 
accurate. During the Second Reading of the Trade Disputes Bill 1906, the Solicitor 
General stated that the proposed legislation did not confer 'any exceptional immunity on 
trade unions, far from it; it was in order... to remove exceptional disabilities imposed on 
these trade unions, disabilities which are contrary to the general spirit of our law' (Robson, 
W. ORHC, 4th ser. vol. 155, col. 1483). Wedderbum comments that the work ofHayek 
and others (see below) 'manifestly misdescribes the liberties of British labour relations law, 
misusing the negative form of the immunity to prove that it has the substance of a 
'privilege' - rather as if an Act that gave slaves an immunity against recapture were 
interpreted as necessarily granting them a 'privilege'' (1991: 207); and even Trade Union 
Immunities conceded the fallaciousness of the argument: 'immunities are not simply legal 
privileges which could be abolished outright. Without some legal protection - however 
circumscribed - it would be impossible for trade unions or individuals to organise 
industrial action without risk of civil proceedings and the ultimate safeguard of a collective 
withdrawal of labour would be effectively nullified' (DE 1981: 92).
8 [1980] 1 All ER 529 at 541; [1980] 1 All ER 65 at 73.
9 Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary defines an 'immunity' as 'exemption from legal 
proceedings' and a 'privilege' as an 'exceptional right, immunity or exemption belonging 
to a person by virtue of his status or office' (Rutherford and Bone 1993).
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The Government, the 'New Right' and the language of 'privilege'
Valid or not, however, the language of'privilege' was of considerable significance 
in offering justification for legislation in the early 1980s which sought to restrain union 
activity. Auerbach remarks that 'the critique of 'privileges' no doubt forms a useful 
rhetorical plank for anyone wishing to attack the immunities' (1990: 222), while 
Wedderbum attributes an even more powerful role to the discourse: 'Of all the legal 
mystifications that have fuelled the drive against trade union power so as more easily to 
enact the recent legislation, however, none has been more extensively deployed than the 
complaints about the 'immunities'... The 'immunities' are often mystified into extravagant 
'privileges” (1986: 845).
The view that the language of'privilege' was an important rhetorical tool enabling 
the Right to mount a legislative attack upon the unions is shared by von Prondzynski, 
who, in addition, sees the language of'privilege' as playing an important role in allowing 
the Right to obscure its true rationale for moving against the unions. He regards the 
fundamental motivation for the Conservatives' labour legislation in the 1980s as having 
been economic - reducing unit costs in order to make the labour market more competitive. 
Strong unions were not seen as being compatible with this policy, and it was therefore 
necessary for the Government to justify intervening in the 'voluntarist' system in order to 
reduce union power:
'Although collective laissez-faire could not be tolerated in this scheme of things, 
it was built on a framework which could be dismantled quite easily. This was so 
because much of the labour legislation which the government moved to amend 
was not ostensibly concerned with the protection of social rights, but rather with 
the withdrawal of the law from industrial relations activity. It was therefore 
possible to talk about the unions' 'immunities', 'privileges', and so forth, as being 
indicative of a trade union status outside the law, a licence to engage in 
destructive and coercive activities apparently available to no other persons, groups 
or organisation in society... None of this, as has frequently been pointed out, is 
really true, but it provides an extraordinarily effective opportunity to obscure the 
real arguments. It would be difficult, from a public relations point of view, to pass 
legislation explicitly aimed at depressing wage rates, but it is easy to justify 
measures to combat the power of coercive organisations which restrain individual 
freedom. The economic argument tends therefore to be veiled; instead, the 
libertarian justification is given prominence, with particular emphasis on the 
coercion which unions are said to exercise' (1985: 186).
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Hence, the language of’privilege' was used almost as a diversionary strategy in justifying 
legislation - as a means of diverting attention away from the real motivation, which might 
have proved politically unacceptable (for the language of the 'free market', see pp.42-7). 
The importance of the language of'privilege' in the debate on industrial relations reform 
can readily be seen from the writings of the 'New Right' and from the Government's own 
discourse.
Hayek, for one, was clear about the existence of'privilege' in industrial relations. 
He viewed the Trade Disputes Act 1906 as having 'conferred on the labour unions unique 
privileges' (1982: Vol.I: 142), and trade unions as 'uniquely privileged institutions to 
which the general rules of law do not apply' (1960: 267). In 1980s Unemployment and the 
Unions, he wrote that 'There can be no salvation for Britain until the special privileges 
granted to the trade unions three-quarters of a century ago are revoked' (1984: 58) and 
argued that the 'reform of trade union privilege' - the unions being 'the only privileged 
institution licensed to use coercion without law' - was necessary for economic recovery 
(ibid: 61). On this analysis, the collective 'coercion' exercised by the unions, protected 
from the general law by their 'privileges', prevented the market from operating freely and 
was the chief cause of unemployment and the decline of the British economy (see p.42).
The language of 'privilege' was also used extensively by others writing in 
publications produced by the various New Right' pressure groups: 'the growth in the 
economic power of British unionism has thus rested fundamentally on their ability to 
acquire unparalleled legal privileges, by their pressure in the political arena' (Burton 1979: 
44); *trade unionists do not object to legislation per se, only to the legislative reform which 
in some way threatens the remarkable array of immunities and privileges which they enjoy' 
(CPS 1980: 5); 'the 80-year-old immunities and other exceptional privileges granted to the 
unions by vote-seeking politicians in the early years of the century have become an 
outdated, superfluous and damaging encumbrance to industry' (Seldon 1988: 8).
Indeed, in some places, 'privileges' and 'immunities' were effectively taken to be 
synonyms: 'The immunities granted by this Section [s. 14 of the Trade Union and Labour
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Relations Act 1974] are recent privileges' (CPS 1980: 33);10 'Trade union immunities, or 
privileges, are of two main kinds' (Hanson 1984: 69). The rhetorical 'transformation' from 
negative 'immunities' to positive 'privileges' was so complete that the two terms had 
become interchangeable.
However, the language of'privilege' was by no means restricted to 'New Right' 
theorists. It was also deployed by politicians and in Green Papers, particularly in the early 
1980s. Thus, Norman Tebbit, writing subsequently about the 1982 Act, justified it on the 
basis that 'too few reformers had faced the fact that the power of trade unions is based on 
the privilege of immunity from liability in tort' (1988: 184) (see p.37). Arguing in favour 
of the measures in Parliament, a Government minister equated 'immunity' with 'privilege': 
'we should remind ourselves what the concept of immunity means. It means that people 
who would otherwise have been able to bring civil proceedings to secure redress against 
unlawful behaviour are prevented from doing so. In that sense an immunity is a privilege - 
a privilege which must be used responsibly, with proper regard for the interests of others 
and of the community as a whole' (Alison, M. OR HC, 6th ser., vol. 24, col. 375). In 
similar manner, Democracy in Trade Unions (about which Wedderbum remarks that it 
took the process of'the misrepresentation of trade unionists' rights to 'privileges'' to 'a new 
peak' (1991: 90)) argued that 'Trade union power, which springs from legal immunities 
and privileges, can be used not just against employers but against individual members of 
unions' (DE 1983: 1). Even the generally cautious Prior deployed the language of 
'privilege', which should be 'restricted to what is necessary' in speaking of the 'exceptional 
immunities' possessed by unions which were to be restricted by Government legislation 
(OR HC, 5th ser., vol. 967, col. 824), although characteristically (and in contrast to
10 The implication here was that recent 'privileges' were less defensible than those 
which had existed since 1906, a view repeated later in the paper, in a discussion of 
amendment of s. 17 of the 1974 Act: 'Section 17 is not part of the ancient rights and 
liberties of trade unions. Its first subsection gave a legal privilege to trade unions for the 
very first time in 1974. Its second subsection gave another legal privilege to trade unions 
for the first time in 1975' (ibid: 27 - emphasis in original). This appears to demonstrate a 
degree of caution over the extent of trade union reform and an unwillingness to repeal all 
immunities, unlike Hayek (hence, the CPS recommended a series of Bills rather than a 
'rushed, ill-considered or superficial' 'large-scale and repeated attack on a range of 
different fronts' {ibid. 5)). Note also the conflation of 'privileges' with 'rights' in the 
discussion of s. 17, for which see pp. 80-2.
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Tebbit), he saw these immunities as ’necessary to redress the balance’ which was tilted in 
favour of the employer ,u
However, it would seem that the Government exhibited greater reluctance than 
’New Right' commentators to make an explicit equation between 'immunity' and 'privilege'. 
This can be seen from an examination of the Second Reading debate on clauses 12-15 of 
the Employment Bill 1982, which removed immunity from liability in tort for unions (see 
Chapter 2). During this debate, both Tebbit and Waddington referred consistently to 
'immunity' (OR HC, 6th ser., vol. 17, cols. 744-5, 818-9). This can be explained by 
Tebbit's desire to ensure that the Bill won backing, and to avoid unenforceability (see 
p.38), which might have been the consequence had the 'privilege' argument been directly 
evoked.
Nevertheless, while the language of'privilege' may not have been explicit, it clearly 
underpinned the arguments of Government spokesmen. Hence, Waddington defended the 
limitation on damages payable by unions as a concession to them: 'I remind the House that 
in putting into the Bill that limitation on damages, we are thereby still conferring upon 
trade unions an element of privilege not afforded to anyone else who commits an unlawful 
act' (ORHC, 6th ser., vol. 17, col. 819). Tebbit, meanwhile, although avoiding the explicit 
use of the language of 'privilege', clearly drew from the existence of immunities two 
important related conclusions common to those who used the vocabulary: 'Since 1906 
trade unions in this country have enjoyed virtual total immunity from civil actions even if 
they have acted unlawfully, quite outside a trade dispute. No other trade union movement 
in the world is outside the law in that way and, as the Donovan Commission pointed out 
in 1968, no other person or organisation - not even the Crown - has comparable immunity 
in this country1 (OR HC, 6th ser., vol. 17, col.745).
I would conclude, therefore, that Wedderbum is correct to observe that, in the 
early 1980s, 'the argument for legislation to make unions ineffective was supplemented
11 Labour MPs were critical of the claim that 'immunities' equalled 'privileges', 
arguing that the Government itself had refuted this view in Trade Union Immunities: 'The 
Green Paper pointed out that we have a system of immunities instead of positive rights 
which other countries have. They are not privileges. They are alternatives to rights. 
Therefore, they are not wicked or sinister. They make up the system that we have to 
enable trade unions to operate. I wish the Minister would learn that simple fact which 
every O-level schoolboy knows' (Radice, G. OR HC, 6th ser., vol. 24, col. 374).
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by semantics that turned legal 'immunities’ into social ’privilege" (1986: 846). However, 
it is possible to go further and identify other aspects of Conservative/New Right' 
discourse which sprang from the use of the language of'privilege'.
Firstly, the implication was that unions were in some sense above the law, as they 
were exempted from the full impact of the common law by the existence of the 
'immunities' - for example, Shenfield argued that 'the confusions and idiosyncrasies of 
trade union law make them feel in a sense outside the law and therefore above it' (1986: 
25). In essence, this was a Diceyan 'rule of law* argument, and therefore particularly 
attractive to judges (see p. 71), but by no means restricted to them.12 Hence, Shenfield 
went on to urge unions to 'change their character to conform with the rule of law' (1986: 
42), Hanson stated that s.4(l) of the 1906 Act 'put trade unions above the law. In future 
they could do what they liked and cause the most immense damages without being subject 
to any legal sanctions whatsoever* (1984: 69), the CPS claimed that 'it is probably true to 
say that trade unions have been writing their own laws', which infringed the fundamental 
constitutional principle that 'it is Parliament's task to introduce and enforce general laws 
applicable to all, including those who belong to or work for trade unions' (1980: 5), and 
Burton argued that by the enactment of legislation in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, trade unions were put, in many respects, above the law of the land that holds 
for all other individuals and institutions' (1979: 68).
Government spokesmen were also heard to make this argument, particularly in the 
context of the 1982 Act: 'The situation was absurd - the rich and powerful unions were 
beyond the reach of the law' (Tebbit 1988: 185); 'It is wrong in principle to set trade 
unions above the law1 (Waddington, D. OR HC, 6th ser., vol. 17, col. 818). The argument 
was undoubtedly appealing to Conservative politicians, given that 'the sanctity of the rule 
of law' was a 'key principle of Conservatism' (Dorey 1995: 4).
12 Hayek (1984: 52), Hanson (1984: 70) and Burton (1979: 83) all referred to 
Dicey's view of the Trade Disputes Act 1906. In addition, several commentators made 
considerable capital out of the Webbs' opinion that the 1906 Act conferred an 
'extraordinary and unlimited immunity, however great may be the damage caused, and 
however unwarranted the act, which most lawyers, as well as all employers, regard as 
nothing less than monstrous' (Webb & Webb 1920b: 606, quoted by Hanson, ibid:; see 
also Burton 1979: 44; CPS 1980: 5).
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The 'uniqueness1 of unions
It was a small step from this position, which argued that unions were 'above the 
ordinary law of the land' applicable to all other individuals and institutions in British 
society, to the second claim, that unions were unique, in that only they were exempt from 
the common law applicable to everyone else. The language of'uniqueness' was a central 
element of *New Right' rhetoric on the unions: 'the new labour legislation has conferred 
upon trade unions and their members in Britain a freedom from legal regulation which in 
its near-comprehensiveness is unique among all the countries of the world' (Grunfeld 
1978: 85); 'no other group has managed to acquire such unique and unconditional 
immunities from the rule of law' (Burton 1979: 45); 'among all social and economic 
institutions, in the case of the unions Parliament and the courts have uniquely relied upon 
the principle or device of immunities from the normal provisions of the law. It is an 
abdication from the true way by which legislatures and courts develop the legal status of 
social and economic institutions' (Shenfield 1986: 25).13 In part, this complaint that unions 
were treated differently from others reflected a belief that they had acquired excessive 
influence within the political and economic process: The growth in the economic power 
of British unionism has thus rested fundamentally on their ability to acquire unparalleled 
legal privileges, by their pressure in the political arena' (Burton 1979: 44-5); 'When 
Parliament put trade unions above the law, it put them on a par with itself. In other words, 
Parliament invited the unions to play a major part in the legislative process' (Hanson 1984: 
71). Such analyses therefore pointed to a reduction in the unions' corporatist role of the 
sort which the Government undertook (see Chapter 2), and also opened up the possibility 
of accusing the unions of being 'anti-democratic' (see below and pp.57-60).
The language of'uniqueness' was by no means exclusive to *New Right' authors. 
The Government also employed the vocabulary, particularly in Green Papers during the 
early part of the decade. For example, Trade Union Immunities discussed the historical 
reasons for the development of the system of immunities and pointed out Britain's peculiar 
status (DE 1981: 2). This historical and legal exceptionalism led naturally to use of the
13 See also Hayek's remarks (above p.73), the CPS' view that 'the British system 
of collective bargaining has rested (uniquely in the world) on the principle of 'voluntarism'' 
(1980: vii), and Seldon's description of the 'privileges' as 'exceptional' (1988: 8).
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language of'uniqueness': 'Britain is not, of course, unique in having to define the status 
of trade unions and industrial action in law. What is unique is the way the way in which 
it has been done: not, as in other countries, through positive rights, but rather through a 
system of legal immunities' (ibid: 11).
What is particularly revealing about the 1981 document is the way in which the 
language of 'uniqueness' appeared to follow logically from a simple (and seemingly 
ideologically neutral) description of the historical and legal background to the creation of 
the system of immunities. The Green Paper was drafted in a deliberately balanced' manner 
and 'avoided any clear statement of preferred policy on any point' (Auerbach 1990:70 - 
see p.37). However, even when the agenda was as cautious as that of Prior, it was 
remarkably easy for a debate over the exceptional nature of the form  of protection given 
to unions under English law to be transmuted into criticism of the extent of that 
protection, in relation to other countries:
'Great Britain is unique in the extent of the immunity from legal action which it 
affords to trade unions as such. Whereas in most other countries the legal liability 
of trade unions is deeply rooted in the legal system and has shaped their growth 
and development, the trade unions in this country have grown up with a legal 
system which has since 1906 protected them from legal action for the unlawful 
acts of their members. Industrial relations have undergone great changes since the 
present immunity was introduced in 1906 and it must now be considered whether 
the extent of the immunity then thought necessary to safeguard the existence and 
operation of trade unions is still appropriate 75 years later* (DE 1981: 36).
The abnormality of the manner in which unions were accommodated within the legal 
system thus facilitated their portrayal as 'unique' institutions. In the hands of a less 
tentative Employment Secretary than Prior this could be a powerful rhetorical tool for the 
justification of legislation to bring unions into line with other institutions, and Britain with 
other nations. Tebbit demonstrated this in the Green Paper produced during his time in 
the post, which sought to regulate the internal affairs of unions: Unions have important 
legal immunities and privileges not afforded to other organisations... the unique legal 
status which trade unions enjoy and the power their leaders possess to initiate industrial 
action which can damage the economic and commercial interests of others make it 
essential for their internal affairs to be conducted in a manner which commands public 
confidence' (DE 1983: 1).
Nevertheless, although by no means averse to using the argument of'uniqueness',
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the Government's rhetoric seemed to lack the forcefulness of that of the 'New Right'. 
While Hayek and other theorists sought to justify their call for the removal of all 
immunities on the basis that unions should not be above the law and treated in an 
exceptional manner, the Government was reluctant to make such strident claims and 
preferred to combine the argument with the other forms of discourse discussed in Chapter 
3. This seems to point to the view, expressed most powerfully by Auerbach (1990: 
passim, but especially 226-239) that the Conservative Government's policies diverged in 
certain significant ways from the prescriptions of the New Right' (see pp.32-3).
However, the language of'uniqueness' resulting from the claim of'privilege' was 
significant in that it offered the opportunity to 'marginalise' the unions within the British 
political system. By presenting the unions as 'special', 'privileged' and 'unique', the 
ideologues of the New Right' placed them in a position apart from other groups within 
the political system. 'Marginalising' the unions in discourse in this way could thus render 
it easier to justify any legislative attacks upon them in that these could be represented 
simply as attempts to bring the unions into line with all other institutions and individuals 
(and with unions overseas).
This can particularly be seen in claims that the 'unique' status of unions and their 
access to the political process as a 'privileged' interest group had enabled them to subvert 
democracy: 'A first and outstanding aspect of the way in which British unionism has used 
its accreted power has been to prevent in the last decade, the attempts of democratically- 
elected British governments - of both Labour and Conservative varieties - to reform it by 
statutory measures... Now we find the unions seeking... to 'hold the country to ransom', 
using mob violence to intimidate, writing the laws of the land, and attempting to dictate 
to government and Parliament the shape and content of government policy. My view is 
that great dangers face any democracy that allows such power to fall into the hands of any 
of its constituent parts' (Burton 1979: 55, 67); 'By way of promise of benefit to their 
members they [unions] first climb on the worker's back, and from that coign of vantage 
they seek to climb upon the back of the whole society. Thus they become a state within 
the state, with a claim of right to the use of force upon the citizens which ought to be the 
monopoly of the state' (Shenfield 1986: 43). On this analysis therefore, the 'unique 
privileges' of unions placed them apart from the rest of political society; and the 
exploitation of those 'privileges' enabled them to present a threat to the universally
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accepted democratic system of government (which impliedly did not encompass these 
'peripheral' institutions). It was thus necessary for the properly elected Government to take 
measures against those privileges.
As suggested above, the Government itself, with its commitment to 'step-by-step' 
reform and reluctance to follow fully the Hayekian blueprint, was less inclined to use 
arguments as bold as these; but the strategy of 'marginalising' the unions through 
language, which the vocabulary of 'privilege' and 'uniqueness' opened up, remained a 
powerful rhetorical tool for the justification of its policies, albeit in conjunction with other 
themes and concepts, as argued in Chapter 3.
Privilege and 'rights'
I wish briefly to consider a further 'rhetorical leap' made by some on the 'New 
Right' - that from 'privileges' to 'rights'. Paradoxically, this was at once both more and less 
valid than the shift from 'immunities' to 'privileges'. It was less valid because it was widely 
understood that the main factor distinguishing the voluntarist British system of industrial 
relations was the fact that unions did not possess positive rights, in contrast to the 
situation in other countries: 'Other countries with different legal traditions and 
constitutional frameworks have taken a different approach. They have elected instead to 
give trade unions positive but defined rights. In Britain there is no specific legal right to 
strike' (DE 1981: 2). It should thus have been considerably harder to make the claim that 
unions possessed 'rights' than to argue that they had 'privileges'.
On the other hand, as Wedderbum (1986: 20) and Mcllroy (1991: 3) argue, behind 
the 'form' of the 'immunities' lay certain 'social rights' - to exist, organise, bargain and 
withdraw labour - with the 'immunities' simply constituting the method by which these 
were guaranteed. Those who spoke the language of'rights' had thus succeeded in seeing 
through the 'confusing semantics' of the 'immunities'.
This being so, and given the tactical advantage to be gained by the Right in 
'mystifying' 'immunities' into 'privileges', one might expect the language of'rights' to have 
been the province of the unions and the Left. To an extent this was true, as I shall 
demonstrate below. But the language of'rights' also proved of value to those with an anti-
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union stance.14 Thus, the claim was made that: 'only by the withdrawal of the special legal 
privileges which provide the basis of union bargaining - the right to conspire, the right to 
the closed shop, the right to impose union-negotiated contracts upon all employees, the 
right to coerce their own membership via secondary strikes and boycotts, the right to 
employment protection, the right to picket, the right to state-financed strikes and the right 
of exemption from general rules applying to corporate bodies - would a determined 
government restore balance in the political process and offer the rest of society an equal 
opportunity to make their impact' (Rowley 1978: 92). Such an analysis saw the unions' 
'rights' as essentially negative and destructive in substance, disrupting the 'balance' of 
society (see pp.35-42) and denying liberties to other individuals and groups within that 
society.
This type of argument was echoed by the CPS, in terms which were even more 
critical of the unions: 'Parliament, since 1974, has introduced a whole range of laws - 
many of them contradictory, complex and unwieldy and which, far from limiting the 
excesses that trouble the public mind, have actually increased them. These laws have 
created a wide imbalance between the privileges of trade unions and the liberties of 
ordinary people. They have done much to elevate the right to strike and to make it 
superior to all other rights, including the right to work and, indeed, even the right to live' 
(1980: vii); 'in a changed situation we have elevated the 'right to strike', conceived in quite 
different circumstances, into an absolute right regardless of the consequences to 
individuals, to the public at large and to the wellbeing of the country. In a world where 
people may die by the withdrawal of labour from electricity, water and fire stations; where 
health is endangered by similar 'industrial action' in hospitals and main drainage systems, 
we have made the 'right to strike' superior to all other rights' (1983: 2).
What is happening here is that the 'rights' of trade unions are being set up in 
contrast to other rights possessed by individuals. These are so fundamental to human 
existence that the juxtaposition itself and the allegation that union 'rights' are trumping
14 It is interesting that Prior, while clearly seeing the reality of'immunities', felt 
constrained to use the *New Right'/Conservative language of 'privilege': 'it was the 
industrial barons of the last century who occasioned the need for the privileges which the 
unions subsequently secured from Parliament to protect their proper rights' (OR HC, 5th 
ser., vol. 983, col. 1537).
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them clearly casts union 'privileges’ in an extremely unfavourable light. The implication 
seems to be that there is a zero-sum game being played - the existence of union 'rights' 
necessarily meant that other individual rights were consequently infringed and reduced. 
This was endorsed both by Wedderbum, who wrote that judges 'have perceived the 
statutory 'immunity' as something that detracts from the common law rights of other 
persons and therefore as a 'privilege',which must be construed narrowly' (1986: 20), and 
perhaps more significantly, by Tebbit: 'Of course, the plain fact is that the laws which give 
trade unions rights are laws which take away the historic common law rights of the people' 
(ORHC, 6th ser., vol. 17, col. 738); ’trade union leaders favour legislation that takes away 
the common law rights of ordinary working people and gives the power and the privilege 
to the TUC and the leadership of the unions... the TUC always oppose legislation that 
trimmed that power and privilege and returned common law rights to ordinary people' 
(ORHC, 6th ser., vol. 24, col. 399).
This returns me to the issue of 'marginalisation'. If the unions were seen as 
removing the rights and liberties of other individuals and groups within British society, 
they were, in a sense, launching an attack upon the 'law-abiding' members of that society. 
Accordingly, they could be seen as somehow 'external' to the remainder of the community 
of the British nation - 'outside' as well as 'above' the law - or, at best, as an 'enemy within' 
(see p.64), making it easier for ’New Right' theorists and the Government to justify action 
against them.
How could the unions respond to the powerful rhetorical attack based on 
'privilege'? One possibility was to adopt the language of'rights' - understood in a more 
positive manner than in the writings of the *New Right' discussed above - for themselves. 
As Wedderbum notes, this was a logical move, because 'rights', unlike the confusing 
'immunities', 'say what they mean' (1986: 855): "rights' must be considered a useful style 
even if only as the rhetoric of change, secondary though the form may be to the substance 
of social reality* (ibid). I will now turn to examine the extent to which this vocabulary was 
in feet taken up by the union movement during the course of the 1980s, or whether other 
responses predominated.
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The unions: debunking the 'myths' on immunities
One important element of the union response to the Government and Right’s claim 
that they were in a privileged position was simply to deny that this was the case. More 
specifically, union leaders and TUC publications sought to argue that the Conservative 
and judicial argument represented a 'mystification' of the true position and that the so- 
called 'immunities' were merely the means adopted by British law to provide elementary 
rights to unions:
'In Britain, the essential legal freedom of trade unions and their members to 
organise industrial action has been based on a system of statutory 'immunities' 
from common law and judge-made liabilities... These immunities were widely 
portrayed by Conservative politicians as 'privileges' with trade unions being 'above 
the law*. Elements in the judiciary tended to the same view. Lord Denning said: 
'When Parliament granted immunities to the leaders o f trade unions, it did not 
give them any rights. It did not give them a right to break the law, or to do wrong 
by inducing people to break contracts. It only gave them immunity i f  they did*. 
Both Conservative politicians and judges chose to ignore the fact that the 
'immunities' were the British method of providing the elementary social 'rights' 
which in other legal systems are often provided by legal rights. This attitude 
underlay the Conservative Government's approach when it assumed office in 1979' 
(TUCa 1986: 6 - italics in original).
As previously discussed, this argument had a good deal of support from academics such 
as Wedderbum and was even endorsed by the Government itself in Trade Union 
Immunities (see below).
Yet, despite the apparently strong basis for the unions' claims, there remained the 
difficulty of putting this view across to union members and the public. There appeared to 
be a consciousness within the union movement that the Government's deployment of the 
language of'privilege' had struck a chord and accordingly had facilitated the introduction 
of the legislative changes.15 It was therefore thought to be particularly important to offer 
an effective counter-argument (and possibly, a vocabulary to counter the Government's 
assertions - see further below) in order to pave the way to effective union opposition to 
the legislation: 'I think that it cannot be said too often that these immunities do not place
15 See in particular the TUC Workbook of 1982, which listed five 'myths' 
(including 'trade unions are above the law') 'that have been generated and then used to 
justify anti-union laws' (TUC 1982c: 7).
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trade unions above the law in any real sense but simply make practicable trade union 
activity in the peculiar context of English law. I think that everyone here knows very well 
that is the case, but it remains the fact that it is a powerful propaganda weapon used by 
this Government and by its predecessors to say that trade unions are above the law, as 
though we were in some way enabled to ignore all civilised obligations. I think that the 
true nature of the so-called 'immunities' needs to be further brought home to our own 
membership* (Morton, J. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 384-5).
The unions therefore sought to stress that the peculiarity of the English system lay 
in the form  which protection for trade unions took, rather than in the protection itself - 
the semantics rather than the substance. This enabled them to claim that they were asking 
for no more protection than was offered to trade unions in other nations, and that they 
were thus not 'uniquely privileged', as the Government and 'New Right' theorists had 
argued, but were simply attempting to do the job for which they had been created: 'These 
legal protections are called 'immunities'. The press and the Conservatives like to call them 
'privileges'. But it is these protections that create a right to strike in this country - which 
is not a privilege in any democratic society' (TUC 1981a: 7).
Additionally, the argument of'uniqueness' was, to an extent, turned back against 
the Government, in that it was claimed that, because legal protection in Britain took the 
form of negative immunities, the British system was characterised by fewer positive rights 
(and impliedly, less protection from a hostile Government or judiciary) than other 
countries: 'Briefly, the claim that 'immunities' mean 'privileges' is a perversion of the truth. 
They are merely basic rights, without which all trade union activity could be exposed to 
actions in the courts. The argument that British unions 'have greater freedom from legal 
intervention than any other trade union Movement in the world' is balanced by the fact 
that British unions have fewer legal rights than other trade union Movements in 
democratic societies' (TUC 1982c: 7 - italics and emphasis in original). The system of 
industrial relations in Britain was, therefore, unique, not because unions were above the 
law (as the Government argued), but because they had less protection than in any other 
comparable system. This line of argument led logically to a call for the system of 
immunities to be replaced (at least in part) by one of rights, which was a feature of union 
debates in the later 1980s, as I shall shortly demonstrate.
Ifj as the unions claimed, 'immunities' were simply a legal form giving protection
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to their activities, the claim that they took them above the law was unsustainable. This 
being accepted, the unions could then stress that they did operate within the law, and thus 
counter the view that the system of immunities infringed the principle of the rule of law: 
'Cabinet Ministers like to give the impression that unions are somehow 'above the law'. 
They are referring to the fact that trade union rights in Britain stem from 'immunities' from 
legal action under civil law and they call these 'privileges'. In fact they are basic rights 
without which all trade union activities would be exposed to action in the courts and 
massive claims for damages... Unions and their members do work within the law' (TUC 
1983: 37); 'It is worth recalling that the so-called special position of trade unions is not 
concerned with what most people regard as illegal behaviour. The whole debate has 
nothing to do with the rule of law. These pronouncements about bringing trade unions 
within the rule of law are rubbish, and the people who put them forward know it' (Morton, 
J. TUC 1979: 445). However, it would be inaccurate to regard these passages as wholly 
indicative of the unions' attitude towards the law, particularly during the early years of the 
Thatcher administration. There was a continuing debate within the union movement as to 
the extent to which the law should be obeyed, to which I now turn.
Limited acceptance or defiance of the law?
Although, as discussed above, industrial relations in Britain was characterised by 
'voluntarism' or abstention by the law, it did not follow that the law had no part to play 
in regulating relations between unions and employers. The union movement accepted the 
need for legislation in many areas, notably health and safety, sexual and racial 
discrimination, and individual employment rights. Such legislation provided a basic 
minimum, or ‘floor’, of rights, which could be built upon by voluntary collective bargaining 
free from legal control.
Accordingly, the unions sought to emphasise their willingness to accede to certain 
laws which provided the foundations for their wider functions. Such a standpoint fitted 
closely with the line of argument examined above, that the unions were acting within the 
law and were not violating any principles of the rule of law:
'While the law is very much secondary to collective bargaining in establishing
workers' rights, trade unionists have supported two broad kinds of laws:
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- laws that protect union organisation and unions' ability to take industrial 
action
- laws that set basic minimum standards which can be built on through 
collective bargaining.
The Conservative Government has put forward legislation and policies that affect 
trade union rights in both these areas. These policies are a sharp reminder of two 
points:
- 'the law' is not something fixed. Laws reflect the current economic 
balance of power - and in a recession workers are not in a strong position
- unions can never afford to rely on the law. It is no substitute for strong 
trade union organisation and negotiation' (TUC 1980c: 2).
'Although there has traditionally been a minimum of legal intervention in, and 
regulation o f industrial relations, the TUC has recognised that certain kinds of 
statutory measures can be of positive influence in an essentially voluntary system 
of industrial relations; and the amount of legislation in these fields has been 
building up since the early 1960s with the laws on unfair dismissal, redundancy 
and equal pay, health and safety and sex and race discrimination being the most 
important. The TUC has welcomed and sometimes promoted such legislation 
insofar as its aim is to extend, and sometimes supplement, collective bargaining 
and improve standards; but it has been careful that the process of voluntary 
negotiation should not be disrupted. Nevertheless, the fact is that the law is in 
industrial relations and cannot now be excluded - if it ever could... The TUC's 
approach to the law in industrial relations has therefore been increasingly 
pragmatic. That is not to say that trade unions should rely on the law and that new 
proposals should inevitably always take the form of new legislative provisions. A 
viable and convincing future strategy for industrial relations will require both 
legislative action and voluntary initiatives by the trade union Movement' (TUC 
1986a: 3).
However, as can be seen from these two passages, the unions exhibited a considerable 
degree of suspicion of the law, which manifested itself in a reluctance to rely too heavily 
upon legislation or to draw the law too closely into industrial relations. There was a 
grudging recognition that law formed part of the geography of industrial relations, but 
there was little question that, at least in the earlier part of the period, the law was regarded 
in an essentially negative light, with voluntary collective bargaining being the preferred 
method for unions to achieve their goals: Unions were set up by working people despite 
the law... Unions have learned through experience not to put too much faith in the law. 
Union organisation and collective bargaining have been much more important in winning 
workers' rights. But unions have always seen a basic role for the law in setting minimum 
standards' (TUC 1981a: 3 - emphasis in original).
Why did this negativity in rhetoric and attitude exist? An answer can be gleaned
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from the passage quoted above. The unions were wary of the law for historical reasons 
connected with the philosophy of the common law. Its individualist nature and propensity 
to protect capitalist property rights from collective socialist entities (see p.67) rendered 
it antipathetic to trade unions, as evidenced by the line of judicial pronouncements from 
Taff Vale to Express Newspapers Ltd. v McShane. Thus, although the unions were 
suspicious about law in general, their particular concern was with the common law (which 
was seen as subverting the achievements of legislation) and, especially, with the attitude 
of the judiciary: 'Judges have a lot of discretion in the way they interpret law, and over 
time they can change the whole meaning of an Act of Parliament. They have used much 
ingenuity over the years to undermine the protections unions fought for through 
Parliament - for example, by inventing new common law 'torts' (TUC 1982c: 11-12); 
Historically unions have had to fight for basic legislation which establishes in the face of 
common law the essential legal freedoms to organise and carry out their activities. Again 
and again those rights have had to be regained from adverse and restrictive decisions by 
the courts' (GC Report, TUC (Wembley) 1982: 352).
Consequently, the judges were viewed in union discourse as malevolent figures 
motivated by anti-union hostility and eager to take every opportunity to attack them: *Let 
us make clear once and for all that judge-made law has never been other than hostile to 
the working class of this country' (Keys, W. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 397); 'the sheer 
complexity of the new statutory provisions will open the way to speculative court actions 
by employers and others, and give a hostile judiciary the opportunity to encroach even 
further on unions' dramatically reduced legal rights' (GC Report, TUC (Wembley) 1982: 
360). As the quotation from Keys implies, antipathy towards the judiciary was not simply 
a function of union disagreement with judgments; it was also intimately bound up with 
issues of class, the perception being that the judges were biased against the working class 
because of their origins, education and socialisation (see Griffith 1991). I discuss the 
vocabulary of'class warfare' at greater length on pp. 136-8.
The essentially negative attitude to the common law evident in these passages had 
important implications. If the law in general and the judiciary in particular were indeed 
hostile to the unions, as union rhetoric sought to argue, it was easier for union leaders to 
justify a policy of disobedience to the law to their membership (and perhaps also to the 
wider public, if they could effectively be convinced of the injustice of the proposed
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measures). Thus, those who argued for a policy of defiance of the legislative provisions 
invoked the vocabulary o f’unfairness' and 'injustice' (for an extended discussion of these 
concepts, see pp. 176-82): 'No Government can take away from working people their right 
to defend themselves and to defend the unions which they have created and which they 
sustain. If, while unions are going about their proper function, they run up against laws 
which threaten their very survival as effective bodies, then nobody should be surprised if 
union members say We cannot live with this law*. That is the danger that any Government 
courts if it puts ordinary men and women into situations where they are left with no option 
but to resist an unjust law, and to face fearlessly the consequences which flow from doing 
so' (Murray, L. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 381).
An interesting example of this argument can be found in the speeches made by Bill 
Keys to the 1981 Congress and the Wembley Conference of 1982. He based his 
opposition to the legislation upon an analysis of the moral content of the measures, which 
he found to be lacking: 'The making of hostile and unjust acts against the trade union 
Movement is consistent with the state of mind of those in power, reflecting their deep 
enmity towards the majority of working people. They are not promoting true laws. I 
would submit to this Congress, to be true laws they must nurture life, they must promote 
the common good. Mere order and mere laws are not ends in themselves. They must at 
all times be related to life' (TUC 1981: 426). This approach had strong echoes of a natural 
law philosophy, with Keys arguing that laws which are not 'true' according to some 
moralistic criteria (a somewhat vague concept of'nurturing life1) do not have to be obeyed. 
He justified this apparently startling proposition by reference to hi story - by deploying the 
language of the tradition of'struggle': 1 believe that the law becomes forfeit when workers 
believe it to be perverse and when they believe it to be prejudiced. I passionately believe 
that all we have been able to achieve in society - that is industrially, politically and 
religiously - has been achieved because men and women were prepared to stand up and 
fight whenever perverse law seemed to them to be intolerant and unjust' (TUC (Wembley) 
1982: 397). As I shall demonstrate below (pp. 131-6), the argument from the tradition of 
the trade unions was a particularly powerful form of rhetoric which was deployed by many 
in the union movement, especially the more militant leaders such as Arthur Scargill.
While Keys deployed the 'just law1 argument in the most developed fashion of any 
of the union leaders, others echoed his sentiments: 'This is not the use of the law, the
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proper and legitimate purpose of the law, to generalise good practice or to correct 
occasional errors. On the contrary, this is an abuse of the law... 'Mr. Tebbit has told us 
that his Government has a majority and he is prepared to use it. While he has a majority 
the TUC will be the last to usurp the democratic processes of this country. Workers are 
entitled and are determined to pursue a legitimate grievance to defend essential rights' 
(Murray, L. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 407); 'respect for the law requires that elected 
Governments legislate within a broad consensus and that they do not attack the right of 
democratic institutions to exist and operate. What this Government is contemplating is a 
gross abuse of the law and a gross abuse of the British workers' respect for the law... If 
these laws do attempt to completely emasculate the trade union Movement, to destroy the 
closed shop, to put trade unionists in gaol for the exercise of their traditional freedom, we 
must create a united Movement to fight back' (Basnett, D. TUC 1981: 430) (for 
'democracy*, see pp. 147-54); This Movement has always cooperated with the law but this 
Government is using the law to destroy consensus on which our society depends' (Basnett, 
D. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 388).
Basnett's comments demonstrate the way in which the trade unions attempted to 
adopt a primarily defensive position - claiming that they were not law-breakers by nature, 
but had been forced into this position by the Government's lack of respect' for the law 
(see further pp. 128-31). This represented a reversal of position - rather than the unions 
being guilty of abusing the law by ignoring it, it was the Government which had shown 
disregard for law by legislating in violation of'true' principles and of democracy. 'Turning 
the tables' on the Conservatives by deploying their own language against them was a 
significant strategy, as I shall show at later points in this study.
Although speeches such as this attempted to 'shift the blame' for infringement of 
the law onto the Conservative Government, many in the union movement remained 
unconvinced. In particular, they pointed to the difficulties inherent in challenging the 
democratic processes of Parliament, and the likely effect this would have upon public 
perception of the unions: 'I urge you that we do not regard this campaign as an 
encouragement to trade unionists to set out to break the law. Previous speakers have 
referred to the need to emphasise the positive side of trade unionism, to win the popular 
and intellectual battle. We are not going to do that, either with our own members or with 
the general public, if we set out to encourage our members to break the law and if we
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entangle with this legitimate campaign of defence on industrial relations issues the idea 
that we are overturning the Government; that by extra-Parliamentary activities we are 
usurping the power of Parliament1 (Ward, C. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 387). Law-breaking 
might indeed be justified in the cause of some revolutionary struggle, but Britain was not 
a society appropriate for this type of response: 'when you break the law now you strike 
against law determined by that universal suffrage. Rejection of arbitrary law not so based 
in Poland, Russia, South Africa and Chile is justified. In Britain, it is a rejection of 
democracy itself - and that is the only real means that we have to change bad law' 
(Hammond, E. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 394).
Certainly, there was a potential conflict between the unions' often-repeated 
commitment to democracy and defiance of law made in Parliament. Those who argued for 
a policy of defiance were forced to justify this by using quasi-natural law arguments based 
upon the language of justice. Even the more militant union leaders sought to portray 
themselves as acting out of self-defence. The rhetoric of the rule of law was powerful and, 
despite the unions' negative attitude to the law (manifest particularly in attacks upon the 
judiciary) they were reluctant to exhibit open contempt for the law, in part at least because 
this would be unappealing to the public. They accordingly attempted to clothe their 
actions, whether of opposition to the law or of grudging acceptance, with rhetoric which 
protested that unions were, at base, law-abiding, an argument which also underpinned a 
refusal to accept Conservative accusations of'privilege'.
'Rights talk* in the union movement
However limited the acceptance of the law may have been in union rhetoric of the 
early Thatcher years, events in the courts, in the collieries and pits which formed the 
battleground of the miners' strike of 1984-5, and within the TUC itself (see Chapter 2 for 
a summary of these developments), effectively dictated the unions' stance in respect of the 
law. By 1986, the unions had come to accept that a policy of defiance of the Conservative 
legislation was not workable. How did this manifest itself in language?
Undoubtedly the most significant development was the gradual move by the TUC 
towards embracing a system of positive rights. The consultative document of 1986 
canvassed the options in a balanced manner, evaluating the benefits to the union 
movement of retention of the traditional system of immunities as against a shift to a
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'charter* of rights. In particular, it referred to a Fabian pamphlet written by Lord McCarthy 
(1985), which dealt with the potential advantages to the unions of adopting the language 
of 'rights': 'The question at issue however is whether there would be benefits in 
introducing positive rights as the basis of law on industrial disputes - legislating for, say, 
the right to strike...Lord McCarthy is not arguing that immunities are unnecessary, and 
he also said that by speaking the 'language o f rights, we do not solve any o f the major 
problems' although his view is that in presentational terms, there are good reasons for 
advancing proposals which are positive (ie rights) rather than negative (ie immunities)' 
(TUC 1986a: 7 - italics in original).
One can clearly see here the significance of language to the unions' position. 
Talking the language of rights' had considerable presentational benefits for the unions, as 
Wedderbum has argued (see above). Moreover, it opened up the possibilities explored in 
the Green Paper on Trade Union Immunities, in particular that the negativity of the unions 
towards the law and the suspicion of the judiciary would be diminished (see p.99).
While the 1986 document demonstrated an awareness of the potential profit for 
the unions in moving towards positive rights, it was somewhat tentative in its 
recommendations. There was a continued reluctance to advance too far down this 
particular road, in part because it represented a sweeping break with the past in a manner 
which was anathema to the unions' essentially conservative instincts: Tor the TUC to 
adopt such an approach to industrial action would mark a radical breach with the 
immunities approach which has been supported by the TUC since 1871. This must not be 
done without the most careful examination of all the possible consequences' (TUC 1986a: 
7). Additionally, the unions felt that, just as 'immunities' simply represented the form or 
style of protection offered by the law, and that the substance was the issue of real 
significance, so the same would be true of a switch to a system of rights - if this was to 
be more than a simple change in vocabulary, there would need to be a change injudicial 
attitudes:
Moreover, just as there have been problems with the boundaries of immunities, 
so there would be with the limits of a positive right...Not many trade unionists 
would have much confidence in the courts deciding in their favour on these 
issues... It may be that it is wrong to pose the argument sharply in the 'rights' or 
'immunities' way and instead the aim should be to concentrate on finding clear 
definitions of the boundaries of immunities or rights or both which would be likely
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to stand up in court. Legislation to widen the collective bargaining agenda beyond 
wages to crucial investment decisions will in any case mean an increased reliance 
on rights'(TUC 1986a: 8).16
The perception was that, whilst undeniably powerful, the language of'rights' might not be 
sufficient in itself to alter the supposed hostility of the common law towards the unions.
Despite these reservations, the strategic arguments in favour of endorsement by 
the TUC of a system and vocabulary of positive rights eventually won the day. In July 
1986, the TUC and Labour Party produced a joint statement, New Rights, New 
Responsibilities, which started the shift away from 'immunities': 'The Labour Party and 
the TUC are committed to the repeal of the present Government's divisive trade union 
legislation and its replacement by positive legislation. In our view there is no question of 
excluding the law from industrial relations. But it can be given a positive role - with new 
rights and protection for individual workers and their unions' (TUC-Labour 1986: 4). The 
statement therefore represented an acceptance that a voluntarist system of industrial 
relations was no longer an appropriate goal - law must play some part. The statement, 
predicated upon a combination of rights and immunities, was endorsed by the 1986 
Congress:
'Congress calls on the next Labour Government to enact a new system of 
Industrial Relations Law which includes a wide-ranging charter of legal rights for 
all people at work. Congress calls on the labour Movement to campaign for a 
system of legal rights which will cover all people at work and give them full 
protection from abuse at the hands of uncaring and unscrupulous employers. 
Congress believes that workers' rights should be protected by a combination of 
positive rights and legal immunities. These should avoid over-reliance on judicial 
interpretation and should support, not undermine, the process of achieving 
improvements through collective bargaining' (Composite Motion 1, TUC 1986: 
451);
'None of us believes, I imagine, that you can throw away a traditional history of 
an immunity-based system, but we do say that the union Movement has always 
accepted a floor of legal protection, and we must build on that. As we said in our 
evidence to the consultative exercise earlier in the year, the repeal of the 
Conservative Government's legislation will produce an opportunity progressively 
to introduce a... rights-based system' (Dawson, P. TUC 1986: 458).
16 See also the passage quoted from Lord McCarthy: 'By speaking the language 
of rights, we do not solve any of the major problems'.
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However, the debate was far from over. Many in the union movement were 
uncomfortable with a move towards rights and looked to maintain the traditional system 
based around immunities: 'we see no alternative whatever to a return to the basic legal 
immunities on which trade union strength has been built. Indeed, without shame or 
embarrassment we insist on them, and we know that they need to be extended, rather than 
just restored' (Todd, R. TUC 1988: 623). The arguments between the 'traditionalists' and 
the ’modernisers' were particularly bitter at the Congresses of 1989 and 1990 (see p. 192). 
In 1989, in the wake of the so-called 'Summer of Discontent', several speakers spoke 
angrily about the involvement of law in industrial relations and called for a return to 
immunities: 'We see the continued involvement of lawyers and the courts in industrial 
relations - at what cost in terms of delays, fines, sequestration and receivership?... We 
cannot let these blatantly biased laws prevent us from carrying out our responsibility' 
(Fitzsimmons, S. TUC 1989: 351);
'we are entitled to be angry when we have to spend months before the courts, 
putting our case, arguing from a legal point of view, before we can give help, 
support and protection to our members. The Tories have made much of the phrase 
- and it is only a phrase - 'giving the unions back to their members'. But let me tell 
you what they have really done; they have actually given the unions to the courts, 
to the judges and to the lawyers... A wave of the legal wand, a stroke of the 
judicial pen, and we find that the dockers have never had the right to strike since 
1946. And even though we won in the House of Lords, we have left on the statute 
book the legal missiles fashioned by the Court of Appeal judges. Those missiles 
are labelled balance of convenience', 'public interest', 'statutory duty'. And you had 
better understand that they can be launched on any union at any time in any 
dispute... We need a new framework of labour laws. We are told that those who 
have rights must accept responsibility. Well, those who have responsibility now 
have a right to ask for some rights as well. My union is not seeking to be above 
the law, we are not asking for the democratic participation of our members to be 
reduced. Yes, we want new, positive rights on health and safety, pay and industrial 
democracy, but we believe that there is another important right: it is important for 
those who are in dispute to have their industrial action and their freedom 
guaranteed by the British system of a return to basic legal immunity' (Morris, W. 
TUC 1989: 353-4).
However, it is notable that Morris speaks here of both 'rights' and 'immunities'. 
This reflected the composite itself which called for 'the repeal of anti-union legislation and 
its replacement by a framework of industrial relations legislation which enshrines the right 
to strike including immunity in tort for trade unions' (Composite Motion 6, TUC 1989:
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348). The language of'rights’ had infiltrated the discourse even of those who wished to 
repeal the legislation in its entirety.
The argument flared again at the Congress of 1990, but this time with more 
positive results for the 'modernisers'. The TUC had produced a statement of priorities in 
1989 which had at its heart 'a charter of employment rights to protect individuals at work' 
(GC Report, TUC 1989: 24), based upon the 1986 joint statement. This was followed by 
the General Council statement, Employment Law: A New Approach (1990), which firmly 
rejected a return to immunities in favour of a rights-based system and accepted that 
wholesale repeal of the Conservative legislation was no longer feasible: 'The rights of 
individuals at work are at the heart of our vision... That is the inescapable logic that 
governs the need for a new Charter of Rights for individuals as set out in the TUC 
Priorities statement of 1989... It is only malevolent commentators who have ever ascribed 
the objective of being above the law to the trade union Movement. The idea that unions 
could somehow be sealed off from the law, is not, and never has been, desirable or 
deliverable' (TUC 1990c: 23).17 Speaking in favour of the statement, the General 
Secretary of the TUC gave clear expression to the view that the language of'rights' had 
considerable strategic advantages for the union movement in making it harder for the 
Conservatives to claim it was 'above the law':
The relationship between trade unions and the law is fundamental to our existence 
and our role, and it always has been. Today in the General Council statement, you 
are being asked to endorse a new settlement, based on rights and responsibilities 
fairly balanced... In the harsh daylight of the 1990s, the yearning for old 
immunities does not amount to a policy: it is more like a cry for help. It is just not 
sensible to give any impression that we are asking for trade unions to be above the 
law, when we have the chance to obtain something which we did not have in the 
1970s and which we need desperately today - namely, the chance to have the trade 
union Movement within a fair system of laws. The law is part of our future' 
(Willis, N. TUC 1990: 285).
There was still considerable opposition to this approach: 'Congress expresses its 
strong belief that any future Labour Government must repeal and replace existing anti­
union legislation, and restore rights and immunities in fine with existing policy, by a new
17 It is interesting to note here that the TUC was still anxious to claim that it had 
been law-abiding all along - however, the adoption of the language of'rights' represented 
a recognition that it had presentational advantages over 'immunities'.
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framework of measures designed to be immune to unwarranted judicial interference by the 
application of hostile common law doctrines' (Composite Motion 2, TUC 1990: 294). 
However, on this occasion the Gerleral Council and the 'modernisers' won the day and the 
statement was endorsed. Moher (1995: 32) comments that, from this point onwards, the 
'rights' approach began to command majority support from the major unions.
The shift from 'immunities' to 'rights' within the union movement was therefore 
gradual and controversial. However, by the end of the decade, there had been a palpable 
change in the unions' attitude towards the law: 'I would say that the biggest change is now 
a rather more settled philosophy about the respective roles of legislation and collective 
agreement' (Lea, interview); 'The debate now was not about defying the law, but whether 
the TUC and the Labour Party should remain committed to repealing 'all the anti-union 
laws' and the restoration of the 'immunities' in full - in effect going back to the 1979 
position. The terms of the debate had also changed as greater prominence was now given 
to an alternative 'positive rights' approach. Implicit in this position was the acceptance of 
legal limits on the conduct of industrial action and some legal regulation of internal union 
affairs. The talk now was of rights and responsibilities' (Moher 1995: 32). How did this 
movement to 'rights talk' impact upon union responses?
Just as there was debate over the appropriateness of the replacement of an 
immunities-based approach with a system of positive legal rights, so there were a variety 
of responses evident in union rhetoric concerning the role of the law in general, and the 
use to which it could be put by unions, during the later part of the decade.
As already discussed, many of the more 'traditionalist' union leaders were uneasy 
about the involvement of the law in industrial relations, and this manifested itself in a 
continued suspicion of the law and hostility towards the judiciary, evident most strongly 
in the acrimonious debates of the 1989 Congress (see pp.93-4). However, it is notable that 
even here there was an acknowledgment that unions should act within the law - Ken Gill, 
while critical of the 'legal hoops' through which trade unionists must pass, and of the 
'blatantly class biased' nature of the Conservative legislation, expressed the wish that a 
new framework of legislation would 'ensure that when workers take action, they do so 
legally, as is their right' (TUC 1989: 350). There seemed, therefore, to be a grudging 
acceptance that law was involved in industrial relations (and, arguably, always had been) - 
the issue now was the extent of this involvement and the form  it should take.
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It is interesting to note in this context that, despite the argument that a change in 
form from 'immunities' to 'rights' would not be fully effective without a corresponding 
change in the attitudes of the judiciary, certain union leaders believed that it could be a 
significant means of'insulating' the unions from a hostile judiciary:
'Remember again that trade union action was protected by an unreliable system of 
immunities. It sounded all right in theory... But almost every time we went to 
court, we seemed to lose, because some judge or other would remember a half- 
forgotten principle of British law and our cast-iron case would end up with holes 
all over it. Remember Rookes v Barnard, remember the legal action over 
Grunwick and remember the BBC v Hearn. I f  after that list of inglorious defeats, 
you still have a hankering after the traditional British system, then give yourselves 
a real nightmare. Remember what the system of trade union immunities looked 
like in the hands of Lord Donaldson and Lord Denning, that dynamic duo of the 
judiciary, dressed up in their wigs and gowns like a pair of caped crusaders, 
stopping at absolutely nothing in their determination to make the world safe for 
employers... I do not want to go back to the 1970s and I would much prefer going 
into the 1990s with a system of law which is more civilised, more robust and less 
likely to be manipulated by some barmy judge with a prejudice against trade 
unions' (Edmonds, J. TUC 1990: 309).
There is a continuing suspicion of the judiciary here (albeit expressed in jocular manner), 
but this is compatible with the involvement of the law in industrial relations if a system of 
rights is seen as a protective shield against the common law. In this way, a change in 
judicial attitudes to unions might not be necessary so long as judges felt constrained by 
the existence of a 'charter' of positive rights.
Edmonds' remark illustrates that it was possible for the unions to deploy the 
language of'rights' in a positive manner, to turn the law to the advantage of unions rather 
than simply viewing it in a negative light. However, the positive uses to which the law 
could be put by the unions ranged much further than simple protection from hostile 
judges.
Undoubtedly the most significant benefit which a strategy and vocabulary of 
positive rights offered to the unions was the ability to focus attention upon individual 
rights. I will discuss this issue at greater length in Chapters 5 and 6 - however, the move 
towards a vocabulary of individualism was a marked feature of the language of the unions 
in the 1980s, and it was made possible by the shift from the essentially collective 
conception of immunity from liabilities for unions toward rights which could attach to 
individuals. The law was thus seen as supporting the unions' drive to protect individuals
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at work - it played a positive, not a negative role in union campaigns: The law should 
underpin, and not undermine, the role of unions in supporting individuals at work. There 
must be a clear and effective right to be a trade union member and to take part in trade 
union activities without victimisation’ (TUC 1990b: 9);
The composite represents a wide range of radical advantage in policy across the 
whole area of workers' rights - a legal framework in support of people's rights to 
replace laws enacted to put down workers. Throughout history trade unions and 
our members have faced hostile legal judgments. Every time we thought we had 
won an extra immunity the judges came in, re-interpreted the law and took it 
away... We cannot go on like this always on the defensive. We need a legal 
framework for people which judges will find impossible to re-interpret or for 
governments to repeal. This way - and to do it this way - gives individual workers 
rights that they never had before, and once given they will not easily surrender 
them again in the future' (Tuffin, A. TUC 1986: 453).
In this way, it was possible for the unions to reverse the traditional 'class bias' of the 
common law, and put it to their use:
'Other countries - and sometimes we scorn them - erect a safety net to protect the 
poor and the oppressed. In Britain we have always said in the trade unions that we 
are wary of the law. But think of what our enemies do. Margaret Thatcher has no 
hang-up about using the law... The TUC has a chance to say to the people of 
Britain, the law should not encourage exploitation; it should prevent it. The law 
should not help the rich; it should be on the side of the poor. The law should not 
be on the side of the powerful; it should be on the side of the underdog. To put 
it in personal terms, the law should not be on the side of Murdoch and 
MacGregor, it should be on the side of the kitchen porter, the shop assistant, the 
chambermaid, the hairdresser' (Edmonds, J. TUC 1986: 452).
Far from the unions avoiding the invocation of the law in industrial relations, the language 
of'rights' enabled them to adapt it for their own purposes.
A related development in this field was the move of the unions towards support 
for the European Community, marked by the triumphant appearance of the President of 
the Commission, Jacques Delors, at Congress in 1988. In particular, the unions stressed 
commitment to the Social Charter which set out positive rights to freedom of association 
and collective bargaining (including union recognition and the right to strike) and to 
individual employment rights such as employment contracts, paid leave and working time 
(Mcllroy 1995: 324): 'The European Community's Charter of Fundamental Social 
Rights... sets an important benchmark against which a new balanced framework of law can
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be measured. The Social Charter sets minimum standards... it is essential that there is an 
effective right to belong to a trade union... There must be a new right for members to be 
represented by a union where no union is recognised. And where there is significant 
support, there must be a legal right to recognition itself.. Union members must have other 
rights too' (TUC 1990c: 23). Undoubtedly, the unions were influenced by the manner in 
which the Social Charter set out its protection for individuals and unions in the form of 
rights, and the TUC's own commitment to the language of 'rights' allowed it to fit 
comfortably with the European approach. The support for Europe was seen, both at the 
time and subsequently, as a means of opposing Conservative policies: 'Europe is helping 
to undermine the Thatcher model' (Lea, interview).
Additionally, the UK Government's failure to adopt the Social Charter provided 
the unions with another form of response. They were now able to claim that the 
Government was 'unique' on a European level in not offering workers the protections they 
would have received elsewhere. This was a powerful attempt to appeal to notions of 
'fairness' in members and the wider public (see pp. 176-82) and represented a strong 
counter to the claim made by the Right that unions were 'uniquely privileged' - now they 
argued that they were 'uniquely discriminated against'.
Perhaps an even more dramatic example of the way in which the unions were able 
to deploy the language of rights and of law against the Government was by accusing it 
of acting in breach of the law. This did not take the form, as earlier in the decade, of 
arguing from the breach of some abstract 'moral code', but rather the more concrete 
breach of international legal obligations arising out of Britain's accession to the 
Conventions of the ILO. Adoption of the language of rights and a positive attitude 
towards what the law could achieve for unions enabled them to turn the accusation of 
disobedience of the law (which had been used against them earlier in the decade - see 
p.76) against the Government. This was perhaps more convincing than the arguments of 
leaders such as Keys (pp. 88-9), which sounded somewhat hollow in the light of the 
unions' negative view and occasional defiance of the law.
In concluding this discussion on the language of the law in industrial relations, I 
wish briefly to return to the 1981 Green Paper on Trade Union Immunities. This 
document was quite clear about the strategic importance of language in British industrial
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relations, arguing that the 'immunities' were not easy to relate to the realities of industrial 
conflict, the result being that 'the language and concepts of the law relating to collective 
industrial action are not the language and concepts of industrial relations' (DE 1981: 26). 
It went on to argue that a change to a system of positive rights would be beneficial, both 
because 'the language of positive rights can be more easily related to industrial reality' and 
because it might result in a change of attitude towards the law on the part of unions:
To the extent that a positive rights system succeeded in moving the language and 
concepts of the law on industrial conflict away from immunities against tortious 
liability, it might be easier to understand and more straightforward to apply, not 
just for unions and management but for the courts as well. Indeed, it is possible 
that a system of positive rights would help remove the unions' traditional suspicion 
of the courts. The latter have often been seen as anti-union because their function 
has been to uphold the common law which is based on individual rights. To the 
extent that a system of positive rights changed that function into one of defending 
collective rights, the courts might seem more neutral in interpreting the rights of 
management, unions and workers' (ibid: 91).
These are strong claims, and I believe they are ultimately not susceptible to 
positive proof. One cannot make a direct causal link between a change in 'language and 
concepts' of the law from 'immunities' to 'rights' and a change in attitudes towards the law 
on behalf of the unions. Rather, the language and the strategy were intimately fused, the 
former being perhaps the primary 'public manifestation' of the latter; yet language was 
significant as a political event and strategy in itself. It was not simply a question of the 
unions portraying their legal position in terms which were more appropriate or 'realistic' 
(although that was undoubtedly important) - the shift in vocabulary from 'immunities’ to 
1rights' also functioned to structure and open up possibilities o f response to the 
legislation which were previously unavailable to them. In this sense, language was vital 
in setting the agenda for industrial relations, a fact which the Conservatives grasped from 
an early stage. While the debate focused oil 'immunities', the 'New Right' and the 
Government had a powerful rhetorical weapon to justify and gamer support for the labour 
legislation of the period, even if, as has been seen, claims of'privilege' were unsustainable 
in law. In this situation, the unions could only respond defensively, either by denying 
Government claims that they were above the law - which (as they often acknowledged) 
was unconvincing as the Conservatives had already got their message of union 'privilege'
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effectively across to the public and to 'ordinary' members; or by defying the law - which 
tended to reinforce GovemmentANew Right' claims that unions were above the law, 
despite attempts to justify defiance on the grounds of morality.
Consequently, the unions shifted gradually to a policy and vocabulary of'rights'. 
This enabled them to act offensively, to seek to turn the law to their advantage and to 
make positive claims for the betterment of individual workers (which chimed well with the 
growing emphasis on individualism which discussed in Chapters 5 and 6); to portray 
themselves in a more favourable, forward-looking light to the public; and, not least, to 
turn the attack against the Conservatives by portraying them as denying such rights. At 
the same time, the unions could still counter the powerful 'privilege' argument by stating 
that they were simply looking for elementary social rights. The combination of these 
defensive and offensive rationales for adoption of the language of 'rights' in place of 
'immunities' was well stated by Bill Jordan18:
'Trade unions do not seek to be above the law. They do not seek special privileges 
above the law... This Government's obsession has found its way into seven Acts 
of Parliament on employment law, an overdose of law, and justice has been the 
casualty, shown in the scandalous treatment of the fastest-growing section of the 
nation's workforce, women workers - the overwhelming majority of whom are low 
paid and part time, most denied protection against unfair dismissal - the 
unwarranted abolition of vital special protections for young people at work, the 
indefensible injustice of the denial to individuals at GCHQ of the right to belong 
to a trade union. These are the flesh and blood reasons for the reform of 
employment law - reasons for a charter of rights for people at work, reasons the 
public can see and sympathise with. But let no one here believe that degree of 
sympathy, that understanding, extends to support for the collective rights of trade 
unions, the rights they need to defend their organisations and fight for the 
collective improvement of their members' conditions. Ten years, even ten Thatcher 
years, have not wiped out their perception of a misuse of privilege. We have to 
demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that we are determined to see an industrial 
framework of law for the future' (TUC 1990: 305-6).
Of course, there were those in the unions who considered that the cost of this 
approach was too great, in that it accepted once and for all that the law played a part the 
industrial relations framework. However, by 1990 both the leadership of the TUC and the
18 See also Tuffin's remark, We cannot go on like this always on the defensive. We 
need a legal framework for people' (TUC 1986: 453 - full quote above, p.97).
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majority of major unions had become convinced that the advantages of adopting a policy 
and language o f’rights’ were too substantial to resist.
The controversy over the nature and form of the law affords a powerful example 
of the significance which differing patterns of language could have upon the whole debate 
over the reform of industrial conflict law in Britain during the 1980s. It demonstrates the 
extent to which forms of words could function not only to enable political actors to 
represent the realities of their situations in a more appropriate manner, but also to open 
up various possibilities for political action and response. In the following two Chapters, 
I will give extended consideration to the various other themes in language which were of 
significance in articulating the union response to Government policies on labour legislation 
during the Thatcher era.
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CHAPTER FIVE: Union responses and language 1979-83
Mcllroy (1991: 191) analyses TUC policy towards the labour legislation of the 
first Thatcher administration as having two distinct stages, namely 'limited evasive action' 
from 1979 to 1982 and 'coordinated opposition' from 1982 to 1983. In essence, these 
periods correspond to the debates over the Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982 
respectively, with the Conservative election victory in 1983 marking an approximate end 
to these approaches as 'new realism' came to dominate the agenda (Taylor 1993: 268).
The responses of the TUC reflected its changing assessment of the political 
situation. Thus, the reaction to the measures which became the 1980 Act was 'muted and 
limited' (Mcllroy 1991: 50) - the TUC organised a demonstration against the measures 
and a 'Day of Action' in May 1980, in addition to producing pamphlets (discussed here) 
and conducting some educational workshops, but 'there was no intention of mounting a 
campaign to stop the Bill reaching the statute book' {ibid: 51). Moreover, when the Act 
was finally passed, although the TUC expressed its opposition in the form of a call for a 
campaign of non-cooperation with the Government, no specific proposals were advanced 
as to how to give effect to this, and decisions on responses were left to individual unions 
(ibid).
A number of reasons can be cited for this restricted response. Firstly, Prior's 
approach was extremely cautious, as discussed above (p.23). Related to this was the fact 
that the legislation was of a piecemeal nature, and there was no single provision which 
might have provided a focus for coordinated opposition. Thirdly, unemployment was 
beginning to rise, which put the unions in a weaker position; and finally, the unions 
seemed to underestimate Thatcher's resilience and to misunderstand her views. There was 
a belief within the union movement - perhaps based on a 'mixture of arrogance and short­
term miscalculation' (Taylor 1993: 268) that Thatcher, like Heath, would be forced to 
backtrack on her industrial and economic policies: 'The biggest mistake we made was not 
to believe she meant what she said... We thought she would be a harder version of Edward 
Heath and we therefore thought we would be able to 'outargue' her' (Murray, interview). 
Consequently, the unions behaved as if it were essentially 'business as usual' (Hall, 
interview) for much of Thatcher's first administration.
The response to Tebbit's Employment Bill was, however, somewhat more robust. 
Although some on the TUC staff were 'careful and cautious', warning of the difficulty of
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coordinating action against the legislation (Mcllroy 1991: 64), a Conference of Executives 
at Wembley in April 1982 agreed an extensive programme of opposition to the legislation 
which involved the refusal to participate in closed shop ballots or to accept public funds 
for ballots; the establishment of a TUC campaign fund and the setting-up of a campaign 
against the legislation; and giving the General Council power to coordinate action by other 
unions if called upon to assist a union and if satisfied that such assistance was justified 
(GC Report TUC (Wembley) 1982: 366-7). The Conference itself was marked by strong 
rhetorical opposition to the legislation - Mcllroy describes it as an 'orgy of verbal 
militancy1 (1991: 67) - and the ensuing campaign, under the banner of Tight Tebbit's Law1, 
was arguably the most vigorous of the Thatcher years in its attempt to win public support: 
Sve produced a lot of materials - 9 million leaflets. It was an attempt to get the message 
across to the public’ (Smith, interview).
Following enactment of the 1982 Act, opposition to Government policies 
continued to be expressed upon publication of the Green Paper on Trade Unions and their 
Members (1983), the TUC countering with refusal to comment on the document and 
publication of its own pamphlet, Hands Up For Democracy, which argued the case 
against state regulation of union democratic procedures.
Taken overall, therefore, the TUC's policy towards the legislation in this period 
can be characterised as one of non-cooperation and opposition, although the extent of this 
varied - it was certainly most marked in respect of the 1982 Act.1 Such a description, 
however, fails to pinpoint precisely how these responses were manifested in the language 
used within the union movement during this period. In this Chapter, therefore, this issue 
will be addressed by analysis of the way in which certain key themes, narratives and words 
were employed by the unions to articulate their approach to the Government's policies and 
to mobilise support for the campaigns against them. The discussion will focus at length 
upon the comprehensive materials produced by the TUC in the early 1980s, in addition 
to speeches made at Congress, neither of which have previously been subjected to more 
than superficial analysis and interpretation in existing studies of the period.
1 In practice, the TUC used its discretion under the Wembley principles to refuse 
to give assistance to several unions, notably the NGA in 1983.
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I. The vocabulary of confrontation
The TUC's attitude towards Government policies on the reform of labour law can 
be gauged from its use of language expressive of hostility towards the measures. The 
various pamphlets, workbooks and other literature produced to accompany campaigns 
against the Employment Bills and Acts of 1980 and 1982 made widespread use of a 
vocabulary of opposition, expressed with varying degrees of forcefulness.
Thus, the explanation of the Wembley principles of refusal to participate in closed 
shop ballots, to accept state funds for ballots and to participate in industrial tribunal cases 
arising from closed shops was that 'non-cooperation is an essential feature of the TUC's 
policy of resistance to the new laws' (TUC 1982c: 32; see also Composite Motion 1, 
TUC 1980: 390).
The language of'resistance', touched upon here, was itself a significant element 
of the unions' rhetorical response - for example: 'Through public campaigns, through our 
continuous opposition to the Government and, indeed, if necessary through industrial 
action, we must show our resistance to the imposition of this law within the labour 
Movement' (Lloyd, G. TUC 1980: 392); We are regrouping our resources and harnessing 
them to our collective needs at a time when the trade union Movement will need its 
maximum strength to resist the legislative attacks on us that this Government wishes to 
impose' (Fisher, A. TUC 1981: 397); The determination of the Movement to mount a 
campaign of resistance is emphasised by the setting up of a fighting fund' (TUC 1982c: 
32 - emphasis in original). The significance of this form of words was that it portrayed the 
unions as acting primarily defensively2; responding and reacting to the Government's 
'attacks' which could thereby be seen as unprovoked. I discuss this at greater length below 
(pp. 128-131).
However, while 'resistance' had a defensive tone, it shaded frequently, in union 
discourse, into more offensive forms of language. For example, the quote from Lloyd 
above juxtaposes 'resistance' and 'opposition'. A similar combination of 'resistance' and 
'confrontation' was to be found elsewhere: 'If this leads the print unions into a 
confrontation with our employers, we have no doubt that, in the same way that we have 
committed ourselves to support any other union in trouble, we shall have the
2 Note that the extract from the Workbook continues: 'Campaigning and defensive 
work will require much time and many resources' (ibid - my italics).
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wholehearted support of the Movement in our fight and our resistance. Because, with 
your support, fight and resist we shall with all the resources at our disposal, in the certain 
knowledge that a defeat for one group of unions, or any one union, will be a defeat for us 
all. So we say, let the message go out from this conference that we do not intend to be 
defeated' (Wade, J. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 391). This was also true of the language of 
non-cooperation, as the following extract demonstrates: 'Congress reasserts its total 
opposition to the anti-trade union and misnamed Employment Act and other legislative 
changes... Congress congratulates the General Council on their consistent opposition to 
the Employment Act and calls on all affiliated unions to refuse to cooperate in its 
implementatioa.. Congress calls on the General Council to continue to mount a campaign 
opposed to these attempts to control trade unions and undermine trade unions' ability to 
defend their members. Congress demands the mobilisation of the Movement to vigorously 
oppose any further legislation placing restrictions on trade unions' (Composite Motion 1, 
TUC 1981: 429).
The above would seem to suggest that, in terms of rhetoric, although the union 
movement might use relatively moderate language to express its antipathy towards 
Government policy (thereby enabling it to preserve an appearance of'reasonableness', see 
below p. 121), the more confrontational language of'vigorous opposition' and 'fighting' 
was never far away, and was not exclusively confined to militant union leaders: But while 
the law is in force, we need to fight against intimidation and demoralisation' (TUC 198 la: 
14).
Undoubtedly, however, as Mcllroy suggests (above, p. 103 and 1995: 254), it was 
the 1982 campaign which saw the TUC and unions using their most stridently conflictual 
rhetoric. This was notable at the Wembley Conference, with many union leaders (of 
varying degrees of militancy) expressing their opposition to the measures in fiercely 
antagonistic terms: We have to fight back and we have to defend the right of workers to 
combine, their right to bargain collectively, the right not to work except on terms and 
conditions that have been agreed with employers and (a very important right indeed) the 
right of the strong in our Movement to come to the aid of the weak when they need help... 
In this fight, unity and leadership are what are going to count' (Murray, L. TUC 
(Wembley) 1982: 378, 408); 'It is not the responsibility of the British trade union 
Movement to try and argue the pros and cons of legislation that seeks to destroy us. Our 
responsibility is to fight and destroy the Bill and all that goes with it' (Scargill, A. TUC
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(Wembley) 1982: 383); ’Solidarity will win and all that we are talking about today is how 
quickly the fight will take place in order to establish that victory' (Gill, K. TUC (Wembley) 
1982: 401). The subsequent TUC campaign also drew heavily on the vocabulary of 
'fighting', one of its key slogans being Tight Tebbit's Law* (TUC 1982b): 'The TUC is 
committed to fighting it [Employment Bill] all the way... Every trade union member must 
join the fightback against it' (ibid; see also leaflet 'Join the TUC fightback against the 
Bill'); *we must fight again today with the same determination as our predecessors to look 
after ourselves, and look after our unions' (ibid).
There was, therefore, a 'certain stridency' (Smith, interview) about the union 
movement's tone in the early Thatcher years, particularly in relation to the 1982 measures, 
and considerable evidence to support the view that 'we [the unions] were using the 
language of confrontation, of fighting, of employers as enemies, of capitalist exploitation' 
(Poole, interview - for the language of'class', see below, pp.136-8).3 However, the 
vocabulary of confrontation was frequently even more vociferous than the above 
discussion suggests.
Industrial relations as conflict: theory and vocabulary
There are a variety of theoretical perspectives which seek to explain or analyse the 
institutions, activities and behaviour of the participants in the industrial relations process, 
both in a British context and more widely. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss 
these in detail (for summaries, see Famham and Pimlott 1994: 44; Gospel and Palmer 
1993: 11); but brief reference to one of the major conceptual approaches will assist in an 
understanding of the language used within the union movement in connection with the 
Thatcher labour legislation.
3 It is also interesting to note the masculinity of much of the unions' language, for 
example: I f  these laws do attempt to completely emasculate the trade union Movement, 
to destroy the closed shop, to put trade unionists in gaol for the exercise of their 
traditional freedom, we must create a united Movement to fight back. This Government 
and the media will doubtless call that fight back the use of industrial action for political 
purposes. Let them call it what they like. For it will be a case of industrial survival' 
(Basnett, D. TUC 1981: 430); note also the reference to 'neutering' the unions (TUC 
1982c: 7). Such an element of'machismo' fitted neatly with the general tone of hostility: 
'the language was very military and very masculine' (Morris, interview). The evidence as 
to the effect of this image upon women is ambivalent (Kelly 1990: 45-6).
106
Commonly labelled 'pluralism', and deriving from the broader political science 
usage of this term, this school of thought holds that trade unions are legitimate institutions 
operating as pressure groups in the political and industrial arenas in defence of their 
members' interests. Collective bargaining, which resembles political processes of 
compromise and conciliation, affords stability to the system by containing and defusing 
disputes between unions and employers (Clegg 1975: 311). Central to this framework is 
the ubiquity of socioeconomic conflict between employers and employees, which is seen 
as being regulated and controlled by the activities of trade unions and the institutions of 
collective bargaining (Edwards 1995: 10).4 That is, each 'side' in industrial relations 
(managers and employees, represented collectively by unions), pursues its own interests 
in relation to the wage/work bargain, and a process of negotiation and bargaining takes 
place in an attempt to reach an agreement between them.
Pluralist theory represented the dominant paradigm in academic analyses of British 
industrial relations throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Famham and Pimlott 1994: 48). 
Perhaps more significantly for the present work, it had widespread acceptance among 
policy-makers and trade unions alike: 'it was, in fact, the consensus model of industrial 
relations broadly accepted by many managements, especially in the large corporate and 
public sectors, by the trade unions and by successive governments as a matter of public 
policy' (ibid: 56). Thus, a pluralist perspective underpinned the conclusions of the 
Donovan Commission, which reported in 1968 (Edwards 1995: 10; Famham and Pimlott 
1994: 48); while the unions themselves were apt to view their history as dominated by the 
'conflict' or 'struggle' implicit in this view of industrial relations, as discussed below.
This support for a pluralist approach rooted in differences of interest between 
unions and employers held clear implications for union discourse. It led naturally to an 
adversarial vocabulary which was predicated upon the existence of two opposing sides in 
the industrial relations process and the possible existence of a 'balance' between them (see 
pp. 182-5). It also manifested itself in language which evoked images of conflict; not only 
in the talk of'opposition' or 'resistance' to the legislation discussed above, but also in the 
form of a trope or metaphor of industrial relations as warfare.
4 Indeed, Famham and Pimlott (1994: 47) refer to this perspective as the 'conflict 
theory' of industrial relations, while Gospel and Palmer speak of the pluralist school of 
thought as accepting *the inevitability of conflict' (1993: 15). However, such conflict is not 
viewed as irreconcilable, but can be mediated through collective bargaining processes.
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Trench warfare: a 'root metaphor* ?
Stephen Dunn, seeking to uncover a system of ideas by means of which a thinker 
describes a domain to which those ideas do not literally apply (such as society as an animal 
or machine), has written of the ‘root metaphor' in the 'old' industrial relations as being 
trench warfare' (1990: 7). He draws attention to the preponderance of words connoting 
military action within traditional industrial relations discourse: 'The old industrial relations 
has its store of military words, half of them culled from the Great War, which we trot out 
with monotonous regularity. The management offensive, entrenched shop stewards, the 
NCB and the NUM digging in for a long struggle, a frontal assault on union rights and so 
on - these are standard phrases... Words like 'entrenched', 'digging in', 'offensive' and 
'frontal assault' are so rooted in industrial relations discourse that they have become literal 
descriptions of what happens in industrial conflict' {ibid: 8-9).
Dunn is critical of the root metaphor of trench warfare as being 'profoundly 
pessimistic' (ibid. 17), and sees the attractiveness of the 'new paradigm' of business- 
oriented industrial relations, with its emphasis on the techniques and strategies of 
management and focus upon the worker as a resource to be developed (as opposed to the 
stress - characteristic of the 'old industrial relations' - upon workers as autonomous actors 
whose pursuit of their interests inevitably led to conflict with management), as being 
inextricably connected to the optimistic nature of the new prevailing metaphor - that of 
the pioneering, American-style journey (ibid: 17-20), although it is not clear precisely 
when this new paradigm is seen as emerging.
Dunn acknowledges that he is, to some extent, simplifying and developing ideas 
which remain implicit in the literature: 'All this is not to say that the wagon train metaphor 
is explicitly developed in new wave business and industrial relations writings, no more 
than the trench metaphor is explicitly developed in the old industrial relations. It is, in a 
sense, my own metaphor of the root metaphor of the new industrial relations. I am merely 
bringing to the surface what is buried in the idiom' (ibid: 21). Further, his ascription of the 
success of the 'new1 industrial relations to the attractiveness of its optimistic root metaphor 
has been questioned:
'At the root of the trench metaphor lies a conviction that the employment 
relationship is an institution that mediates the differential interests of employer and 
employee. The theoretical touchstone is the ubiquity of socioeconomic conflict.
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And at the root of the journey metaphor lies the conviction that the employment 
relationship is an institution that cements the reciprocal interests of employer and 
employee. The theoretical touchstone is the ubiquity of socioeconomic 
competition. The first perspective draws its legitimatory rationale from a belief in 
collectivist or socialist values, the second from individualist and capitalist values. 
In other words, what differentiates the adherents of Dunn's root metaphors is not 
the appeal of 'optimism' over 'pessimism', but a preference for a particular 
explanatory framework' (Keenoy 1991: 324).5
Nevertheless, despite such criticism, there appears to be much of value in Dunn's 
analysis - in particular, the attempt to demonstrate the importance of language 
(specifically, metaphor) in shaping approaches to a subject and the framing of responses, 
a concern which also underpins my work in this thesis (see Chapter 1), and which Keenoy 
himself welcomes: by identifying the extensive and sometimes unreflexive use of metaphor 
and of the figurative devices in industrial relations analysis, he [Dunn] highlights not only 
the extent to which we actively construct and reconstruct the world but also the perils and 
limitations of language itself. In this respect it seems that virtually any conceptual 
apparatus carries figurative, allusive or even metaphorical overtones. We see what we 
choose to see, and one way of seeing generally precludes alternatives' (ibid: 319).
Although Dunn is concerned with the writings of theorists in the field of industrial 
relations, my analysis of the language used in TUC publications and Congress speeches 
suggests that similar conclusions can be drawn in respect of the unions themselves. 
Military metaphor abounds in union debates on industrial relations legislation in the early 
1980s.
Hence, industrial relations were seen as a battleground upon which the 
Government was putting into effect its 'strategy' for defeating trade unions: 'The trade 
union Movement is entering a battleground... the proposals for new law would turn 
industrial relations into a battleground' (TUC 1979b: 2); 'This time they are aiming their 
attack at widespread and well-established organisational and negotiating agreements and 
at the funds of trade unions. Their current targets are the organisational basis of trade 
union influence: the battlefield will be British industry' (GC Report, TUC (Wembley) 
1982: 350). The Government's introduction of anti-union legislation was seen as an act 
of war against trade unions and those they represented: 'this Government declared war on
5 One might add that the 'explanatory framework' of the 'old' industrial relations 
is pluralist, with its emphasis upon conflict; while that of the 'new' is unitarist ie focusing 
upon cooperation and the identification of employee interests with the enterprise.
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working people when they came into office' (Keys, W. TUC 1981: 426); 'The Government 
has declared war on trade unions' (TUC 1982b); 'It is the Tory Government which has 
declared war on the trade union Movement and declared war on the working class of this 
country' (Marsland, T. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 402); and, continuing the imagery of 
warfare, the legislative measures could be seen as attacks within a wider campaign or 
broader strategy: 'The first part of this report... examines the background to the present 
Government's sustained offensive against the basic rights of workers and their unions' (GC 
Report, TUC (Wembley) 1982: 349).
There were, of course, differences of opinion among union leaders as to how best 
to respond to the individual offensives or the 'campaign' as a whole. The more militant 
leaders favoured launching a counter-attack; others saw the unions resisting the assaults 
by marshalling their forces and using them strategically. The military imagery was, 
however, common to all: 'it is imperative that we begin to take the offensive against the 
Tory Government, who are designing a Bill to destroy the British trade union Movement' 
(Scargill, A. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 383); 'It will not merely be token resistance; it will 
be the maximum mobilisation of the resources of membership of the entire trade union 
Movement' (Wade, J. TUC 1979: 442); We are regrouping our resources and harnessing 
them to our collective needs at a time when the trade union Movement will need its 
maximum strength to resist the legislative attacks on us that this Government wishes to 
impose' (Fisher, A. TUC 1981: 397); 'when workers are being attacked by the law and 
when those workers are supported by their own union the TUC has an obligation to come 
to their assistance, using the combined strength that is necessary and the tactical 
disposition of forces to ensure victory' (Gill, K. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 400).
On occasion, analogies were drawn between the confrontation taking place in 
industrial relations and actual military encounters, whether current or historical: 'The 
Government is handling industrial relations in this country with the same sensitivity and 
understanding that it has used over the Falkland Islands. There a tin-pot dictator chose the 
issue and chose the battle ground. Well, 'Tin-pot Tebbit' has chosen the issue, but it is 
important that the trade union Movement is careful in selecting its battle ground to make 
certain that we win' (Pollock, J. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 383); Remember what Wellington 
said on the night before Waterloo. He said Hard pounding gentlemen, we will see who 
can pound the longest' (Murray, L. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 408).
More often, however, the references to warfare remained less specific: Tor two
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years we have struggled on all these fronts. We have had some victories. The miners drew 
a line on pit closures and even this Government did not dare to cross it. The gas workers 
deterred ministers from carrying out their lunatic plans to sell off or close gas showrooms, 
but often we have faced defeats. Because of those defeats the Thatcher Government 
believes it can now move in for the kill. But it forgets that all the defeats and victories of 
the past two years were just the minor skirmishes of yesterday. We know that defeat on 
Tebbit's Bill will not be just for a day' (Basnett, D. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 387); We are 
going to go into batde. It is going to be a bruising battle. It will not call for a velvet glove 
approach and I do not believe the General Council are calling for a velvet glove approach. 
Unity is the most prized weapon that we have in our armoury, and our prime objective at 
this conference must be to enforce that unity and then to take it out and commit finally this 
legislation to the dustbin of history. Yes, our troops have been demoralised in recent times 
but I believe we can raise them, and with everyone cheering us, up and down this country, 
we can meet them’ (Keys, W. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 397).
The prevalence of military language in union rhetoric of the early 1980s is thus 
readily apparent. It is possible that this reached its height during the miners' strike of 
1984-5: 'the miners were referred to as the Vanguard' and 'shock troops' of the Movement' 
(Poole, interview). I will examine the extent to which this tone became moderated later 
in the decade in Chapter 6. For the present, the importance of the language of warfare 
both in reflecting and shaping a confrontational stance on the part of the trade union 
movement, cannot be underestimated.
Employers: an adversarial relationship
As discussed above, the acceptance by the trade unions of a pluralist approach to 
industrial relations characterised by competition and conflict between management and 
unions had the natural consequence that the unions viewed the relationship with employers 
in an adversarial manner, that is, that the structure was essentially one of bipolarity.
This attitude had its roots in the historical origins of the British system of industrial 
relations. Fox traces the 'adversarial relationship', described as 'that disposition of labour 
to respond with a wary arms-length stance which regarded all workplace conditions and
111
changes in them as potential issues for manifest or tacit bargaining* (1985: 215) to the 
relatively early development of liberal individualism in agrarian, commercial and 
manufacturing capitalism which replaced the paternalistic system of control {ibid. 433). 
Hyman concurs with this assessment, drawing attention to the implications which this held 
for trade union language:
'Successful resistance to royal power in the seventeenth century involved the 
assertion of the rights of the individual against the state. This in turn encouraged 
the entrenchment of market individualism as the dominant principle of the British 
political economy: an ideology which both underwrote the rights of property and 
gave legitimacy to notions of plebian independence. The outcome was a society 
in which consciousness of class distinction and division was particularly acute, but 
in which opposing interests were normally reconciled through compromise and 
accommodation. This is the matrix in which industrial relations evolved: marked 
by an adversarial tradition in which it was natural to speak of the 'two sides' of 
industry (the continental vocabulary of'social partners' is almost incomprehensible 
in English)' (1995: 30).
The consequence of this adversarial approach to industrial relations was the 
existence of a 'them and us' attitude towards management, which has been considered to 
be a central feature of the British system of industrial relations (Mcllroy 1995: 48).
An examination of the materials demonstrates the accuracy of this assessment - 
much of union language in this period can be seen as indicative of an adversarial or bipolar 
'world-view1. The most notable evocation of the *them and us' attitude came in Hands Up 
for Democracy, in the context of a rebuttal of Conservative attempts to marginalise unions 
as institutions opposed to democracy and freedom: 'Most people don't have very much 
power. Big decisions always seem to be taken by someone else. They have put the taxes 
up. They are closing the local factory or school or hospital. Unions are the way ordinary 
people try to turn the they into we, to claim for themselves some of the power over the 
decisions that can shape their lives... Workers acting together, through trade unions, can 
achieve much more for themselves and for their families than they ever could if they tried 
to go it alone against a powerful boss' (TUC 1983: 5-6 - emphasis in original).
Elsewhere, the vocabulary of'them and us' was less explicit, but an adversarial 
attitude towards employers nevertheless underpinned much union language. However, in 
the context of union responses to labour legislation, it is arguable that the true focus of
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opposition was the Government, as I shall discuss in the next section. Consequently, 
employers were rarely seen as the sole authors of the unions' difficulties - rather, they were 
bracketed with the Government as 'joint adversaries' (as suggested by the extract quoted 
above, which refers to factory closures as well as tax increases and school/hospital 
closures): The Government wants to give more power in industrial relations to employers. 
The Employment Act seeks to do this by weakening union organisation and cutting back 
unions' ability to take lawful industrial action' (TUC 1980f: 8); 'The 'answers' to economic 
and social problems, according to this nineteenth century approach, is to dismantle 
planning machinery, to give more power to employers to dispose of labour and capital and 
to create competition for jobs by reducing state benefits... Employers are to have the 
benefit of increased power to introduce change without consent, and to resist union claims 
to protect the living standards of their members' (TUC 1982c: 9 - see below, p. 119). 
Employers were seen as the beneficiaries of the legislative measures and of the overall 
economic situation and could be expected to take advantage of the new conditions, in 
precisely the manner suggested by a pluralist approach which was posited upon the 
pursuance of self-interest by both 'sides' in industrial relations: Many employers, not just 
those who are tottering on the brink of bankruptcy, have seized this opportunity to discard 
workers, to impose new work procedures and to roll back trade union influence' (Murray, 
L. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 378); This new economic climate has been exploited by some 
employers who have reasserted outdated managerial prerogatives; sacked union activists; 
and generally behaved in a dictatorial manner' (TUC 1983: 32). In effect, therefore, 
industrial relations were viewed as a 'zero-sum' game - any measure or development which 
decreased the power of the unions necessarily increased that of employers (or vice-versa): 
That is why the Government has launched these measures - to weaken the Movement by 
increasing the power of capital and reducing the power of labour* (Sapper, A. TUC 1979: 
444). The dualism of this discourse was clear - what did not benefit 'us', clearly benefited 
'them'.
However, the adversarial relationship with employers suggested by this analysis 
does not tell the full story. It is important to reiterate that management was bracketed
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alongside the Government in discussions of legislative changes.6 This meant that it was 
possible for the Conservatives, rather than employers, to be portrayed as the 'real' 
adversaries for the unions, with employers as relatively passive beneficiaries of the 
legislative changes: ’However, it [bankrupting unions via damages awards] can only be 
achieved by the employers. It is they who have been chosen as the surrogate of this 
Government's intentions. It is they who are thrust into the firing line by the armchair 
strategists of Tothill Street, and it is they and only they who can trigger off* the use of this 
law1 (Basnett, D. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 388).7
This approach towards employers became of increasing importance over the 
course of the decade, as I shall show in Chapter 6 (pp. 173-4). Rather than being in league 
with, or even controlling, the Government's actions, employers were somewhat reluctantly 
using the opportunities with which they were presented. This more conciliatory type of 
language thus changed the nature of the trade unions' task towards employers. Instead of 
attacking them for using the laws, the unions sought to persuade them that it would not 
be in their interests to use them: Managers at the sharp end of things recognise these 
provisions for what they are - an encouragement to industrial disruption' (Murray, L. TUC 
(Wembley) 1982: 380); 'It [legislation] will damage our employer as much as us - and 
perhaps indeed that is what this Conservative Government wants' (Tuffin, A. TUC 
(Wembley) 1982: 399). This was attempted in practice as well as rhetoric, Len Murray 
remarking that We tried to persuade the CBI that this was not going to do any good for 
employers' (interview), and a number of TUC publications calling upon workers to
6 This is scarcely surprising, since it was the Government which implemented the 
measures; however, some viewed the employers as being the driving force behind the 
developments, reflecting perhaps a belief in the continued existence of corporatism which 
was out of step with Thatcher's attitude towards employers as well as unions: 'The 
employers are making their demands on the Government and the Government is 
conceding to the employers so as to weaken the bargaining power of the trade unions, and 
all this talk about trade union reform should be seen in this light. This is a demand from 
the big employers, from big business, to weaken the bargaining power of the trade unions, 
and this Government is going along with those proposals. It is evident that the 
Government is a legislative instrument for big business' (Urwin, C. TUC 1979: 437). This 
view held the employers, not Government, to be the more powerful enemy.
7 Note the metaphor of warfare.
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persuade employers not to use the legislation (eg TUC 1980e; TUC 1982a).
On this view, unions and employers were effectively (albeit not explicitly) in 
partnership - pursuing the common interest of peaceful industrial relations in the face of 
a Government bent upon chaos and disruption (see pp. 123-4). This was the traditional 
language of voluntarism, based upon the belief that employers and unions should be left 
to formulate their own arrangements, appropriate to their workplace, with minimal state 
involvement: 'the original employer in Tebbitland is going to lose control of his own 
industrial relations, instead of being put more in charge, as the employers want, the 
individual employer will finish up with less control... Well, you do not have to be very far- 
seeing, Chairman, to understand how once again the employer loses control of his own 
side of industrial relations and finds on the union side a very, very aggrieved group of 
members into the bargain' (Evans, A. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 392); 'we have been 
reminded again and again of how employers will suffer from the undermining of their 
procedures, their agreements, and of responsible trade unionism. To our brothers in the 
public service, Jerry, do not refrain from going and putting the frighteners on that 
manager, because he or she in turn just may say 'But, Minister' - and that is what we want 
them to say, not 'Yes, Minister1, but *But, Minister' (Murray, L. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 
407). A specific concern in this context was the closed shop, the unions arguing that many 
employers supported such agreements as it made negotiations simpler: 'This is recognised 
by many employers who welcome union membership agreements as a contribution to good 
industrial relations' (TUC 1980f: 8); Most employers now recognise they can't possibly 
settle terms and conditions with separate individuals' (TUC 1981a: 18).
Despite their existence on opposite sides, therefore, unions and employers could 
be seen as being involved in the same game and sharing similar objectives. This opened 
up the possibility of portraying management and unions as constituting a 'united front' 
against the Government. The unions attempted to do this by arguing that their position 
was supported by many employers and employers' groups: 'even employers' 
organisations... are beginning to say, Well, what are you going to do? In certain cases you 
are going to make it impossible for us to conduct reasonable industrial relations systems', 
and they are beginning to ask the Government to look again at this sort of thing' (Urwin, 
C. TUC 1979:438); Even the Engineering Employers' Federation have expressed 'grave
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concern' over aspects of the Bill' (TUC 1980a: 2); 'I do want to talk through this question 
with reference to some - 1 repeat 'some' - of our British employers. You know, you have 
to ask if they have got the message yet. Or, if they have, why have they not started 
shouting already, as one or two groups have, like the shipowners and the Engineering 
Employers' Federation, on the so-called 'closed shop' issues?' (Evans, A. TUC (Wembley) 
1982: 392). The potential effect of this was to isolate and marginalise the Government as 
a destructive force uninterested in solving the nation's problems which employers and 
unions united were attempting to address: 'Throughout the country trade unionists, 
together with management representatives, are trying to solve difficult problems. More 
often than not they succeed and damaging stoppages of work are avoided. These people 
need all the help they can get' (TUC 1980a: 3). In consequence, it was the 'partnership' 
of unions and employers which was acting in the national interest, not the Government 
(see p. 127).
The employer, therefore, was on the whole viewed as opposed to the position of 
the union - simply because he/she stood on the opposite side in industrial relations. 
However, the employer was not necessarily viewed in a hostile light as evil or immoral; 
rather, management was essentially participating in the same process as the unions, was 
ultimately working towards negotiation and compromise and was a relatively passive 
beneficiary of the Government's legislative changes.
There were, of course, exceptions to this. Union rhetoric drew upon the imagery 
of the 'rogue' or 'unscrupulous' employer who was not playing according to the rules and 
who could therefore be labelled as a real 'enemy1: 'they would introduce highly contentious 
laws into industrial relations - laws which could be exploited, as was the Industrial 
Relations Act 1971, by unscrupulous employers' (TUC 1979a: 76); 'The new law would 
enable a rogue employer to sue workers during a dispute' (TUC 1980a: 2); Mr. Tebbit 
seems to think that strikes are never caused by employers. According to him employers 
are never awkward or incompetent or plain bloody-minded. Does he think they are all 
angels?'(TUC 1983: 34).
I will return to this characterisation of certain employers as 'deviant' in Chapter 6. 
However, it points to a possible distinction in union language between the 'adversary', 
such as the majority of employers; and the 'enemy' such as the 'rogue' employer or the
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Government itself, the unions' attitude towards which I now wish to examine.
'Labelling the enemy': attitude to Government
Edelman draws a distinction in political language between 'adversaries' and 
'enemies': the former are accepted as legitimate opponents participating in a 'game' which 
involves the finding and pursuing of winning tactics; but 'where an opponent is an enemy 
rather than an adversary, it is not the process but the character of the opponent that 
focuses attention. Enemies are characterised by an inherent trait or set of traits that marks 
them as evil, immoral, warped, or pathological and therefore a continuing threat regardless 
of what course of action they pursue' (1988: 67). Enemies serve an important function in 
political discourse enabling the building of support around a focus of antagonism and, in 
consequence, defining the identity and beliefs of the group at least in terms of its 
opposition to the 'Other1 (Dalby 1990: 17): 'Politicised people define themselves in large 
part in terms of their opposition to other groups they fear and condemn... To name 
specific enemies is to evoke specific ideologies' (Edelman 1988: 82).
Can it be said that the unions attempted to define an enemy in the manner 
suggested by Edelman? In part, this question has been answered in the previous section. 
On the whole, the unions regarded employers as 'adversaries', who were involved in the 
same process as themselves and who were accepted as legitimate opponents. However, 
there were certain employers (who may in fact not have existed as claimed by the unions; 
however, this was unimportant for the purposes of political language - support can be 
built upon the construction of enemies who either do not exist or are not harmful to those 
who label them' (Edelman 1988: 69)) who were regarded as 'rogue', 'unscrupulous', 
'awkward' or bloody-minded' - these might be seen as 'enemies' iri that attention was 
focused on their character and motives rather than their positioning on the 'other side' of 
industrial relations.
However, although the 'rogue' employer was an important feature of union 
demonology, the focus of enmity for the TUC and unions was the Government itself. In 
the early Thatcher period this can be seen in particular from the campaign against the 1982 
Employment Bill. As already mentioned, one of the major slogans was Tight Tebbit's Law'
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(TUC 1982b), and this pointed to the personalisation of opposition to the legislation in 
the figure of Norman Tebbit. The Secretary of State for Employment was a highly 
identifiable figure with a combative personality and manner (see p.24), and it was 
therefore understandable that he should represent a focus of opposition to the legislation. 
Speeches at the Wembley Conference abounded with references to Tebbit and 'Tebbit's 
Bill': The media, not surprisingly, have been kind to Norman Tebbit. They have portrayed 
union-bashing Norman Tebbit as a hard man but not an unjust man. They present Tebbit's 
Law as if it was a minor technical change in the laws of cricket, and it is nothing of the 
sort' (Basnett, D. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 387); 'these proposals are a stupid and 
dangerous attempt by Tebbit to bring to Britain the sort of legal controls that may operate 
in other countries... I think that they [employers] have not shouted out the truth about 
Tebbit yet because they realise that they have backed the creation of a Frankenstein's 
monster which they do not know how to stop' (Evans, A. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 392); 
T think our good friend Mr. Tebbit this morning has taken us one step further towards a 
fascist society in this country' (Keys, W. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 397). Language such as 
this functioned to construct Tebbit as the principal enemy of the unions - the description 
of him as 'unjust', 'stupid', 'dangerous', a Trankenstein', impliedly 'fascist' and 'malevolent' 
(McCall, W. TUC 1982: 476) drawing attention to his behaviour and character as immoral 
or pathological in the manner suggested by Edelman. Personalisation of hostility in the 
figure of Tebbit thus served an important purpose for the unions in that it provided a clear 
focus for their opposition to the legislation and made it easier to build a coalition of 
support amongst union members and others.
Elsewhere, the union movement regarded the Government in a broader sense as 
its enemy: We have one enemy, one enemy that seeks to destroy this very Movement' 
(Keys, W. TUC 1982: 477). However, justification for opposition to the legislation was 
often expressed in similar terms as with the individual figure of Tebbit, in that the 
behaviour or character of the opponent was criticised: 'They are an insidious and a 
calculated attempt by the Government to undermine and interfere in the internal 
democratic process of trade unions' (Wade, A. TUC 1979: 441); 'It [1980 Act] is a 
devious, dishonest piece of legislation' (Urwin, C. TUC 1980: 389); 'The vindictiveness 
of the Government's industrial relations policy has been underlined by the Movement'
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(TUC 1980d: 2); 'This Government has made a vicious, legislative attack against the trade 
union Movement' (Sapper, A. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 377); *We have three to four million 
out of work, and the level of intelligence of Government today in Britain is such that they 
then turn and attack 12 million organised workers who, by hand and by brain, produce the 
wealth of the nation. It is the most idiotic way to conduct the affairs of a nation that I have 
seen in my lifetime' (Weighell, S. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 386). Accusations of 
'dishonesty', 'vindictiveness', 'viciousness' and 'idiocy' implied that the Government's 
motives in introducing the legislation were 'malicious' and motivated from ill-will and this 
form of language therefore functioned to anthropomorphise the collective opponent as an 
individual acting from pure spite - unjust or immoral if not evil - and therefore lacking the 
legitimacy of an adversary in the 'game' of industrial relations.
The unions also sought to justify opposition to Government policies by depicting 
the motivation underlying them as being more than simple malice or prejudice - rather as 
an aspect of a broader economic/industrial strategy. This might be seen as a more 
sophisticated basis for hostility towards the Government in so far as it attributed a degree 
of coherence to the policies which the argument from 'vindictiveness' did not allow. 
Certainly, the legislation had an anti-union nature: 'it was designed to weaken trade unions 
and to weaken their ability to resist attacks' (Murray, interview), but the deeper economic 
objectives of creation of 'free markets' via reform of the labour laws were clearly 
perceived by the unions as underpinning the measures:
The real aim of the Government is to bring about a permanent weakening of trade 
union strength. This would give employers more freedom to dispose of both 
labour and capital as they want, by weakening union bargaining power over wages 
and conditions, and allowing the laws of the market' to operate more freely. Thus 
the restriction of union rights is not a minor issue of legal reform; it is a key part 
of the Government's economic and social strategy... the real motives behind the 
new legal attack on unions are quite different. They cannot be understood properly 
unless set in the context of the general economic and social policies of the 
Government. The underlying philosophy of many of the Government's actions is 
that of the 'free market'... The 'answers' to economic and social problems, 
according to this nineteenth century approach, is to dismantle planning machinery, 
to give more power to employers to dispose of labour and capital and to create 
competition for jobs by reducing state benefits'. (TUC 1982c: 7).
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'The logic of this reactionary approach is to seriously reduce the role of fair labour 
standards across industry... The Government, then, are not concerned with a 
reform of'abuses': they are trying to achieve a permanent reduction in trade union 
influence. Employers are to have the benefit of increased power to introduce 
change without consent, and to resist union claims to protect the living standards 
of their members... Many of the details in the Employment Bill cannot be 
understood unless they are seen as part of this general economic philosophy' (TUC 
1982c: 9).
This type of structured analysis of Government policy might be expected from a 
policy document produced by the TUC; it might conversely be thought that union leaders 
delivering rousing speeches at Congress would incline more to depiction of the legislation 
in the overt language of hostility and enmity already discussed. While this was 
undoubtedly the case to a large extent, the language of such leaders did demonstrate an 
awareness of the broader 'strategy' being pursued by the Government: I t has been said 
today that we face a new challenge and I would like to stress again the fact that that 
challenge cannot be looked at in isolation but is part of a much broader framework of 
government policies and government attitudes... over and over again the broad intent of 
government policy is to diminish and, if possible, destroy the effectiveness and the role of 
the representatives of the broad spectrum of working people' (Dawson, P. TUC 
(Wembley) 1982: 401); 'Tebbit's Bill has got to be seen finally as part of a wider assault 
on working people. Unemployment, dismantling of the Welfare State, the fostering of the 
hue and cry about law and order1 all go together to reverse the achievements of years, and 
they say it is done in the name of freedom' (Bickerstaffe, R. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 390).
The concern demonstrated here was that the legislation was designed to 
marginalise and undermine the trade unions as representatives o f working people (for the 
unions' role in society, see below, pp. 154-8); and that it was therefore impliedly an attack 
on the living conditions of such people, which could only effectively be protected by 
unions: These changes to employment law should be seen in the light of the Government's 
overall policies. The message of the Government's policies for working people is a grim 
one - rising unemployment, rising prices, the slashing of social services, the eroding of 
social security benefits. Attacking the legal support that has traditionally been given to the 
collective organisations of working people is all part of this strategy' (TUC 1980c: 3). On 
this analysis, the Government's economic policies - of which the labour legislation formed
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a subset - were 'anti-working people' (they had nothing to do with the freeing of markets), 
and even 'mass unemployment [was used] as a disciplinary device for British workers' (GC 
Report, TUC (Wembley) 1982:351). Such an evaluation of the Conservatives' policies and 
motivation facilitated the mobilisation of an important category of trade union discourse - 
the language of'class' - as justification for opposition to the legislation (see further below, 
pp. 136-8).
Rhetorical hostility towards the Thatcher Government thus went beyond the 
simple ascription of pathological or immoral behaviour to its activities (although this 
formed an important feature of the unions' opposition, particularly in the form of the 
personalisation of antagonism in the figure of Tebbit); nevertheless, it was clear that the 
Government represented an 'enemy1 in the way that (most) employers did not in that its 
motives were not accepted as legitimate by the unions. However, criticism of the motives 
underpinning the legislation as designed to weaken the unions and consequently reduce 
the living standards of working people (ie as motivated by anti-working class prejudice, 
thereby opening up the entire discourse of'class') shaded very much into criticism of the 
likely effects or consequences of the measures (ie that the legislation would create 
insecurity and disaffection or disorder among working people, which would damage the 
economy), which offered a means whereby the unions could move away from the 
vocabulary of confrontation and present themselves as moderate and rational, as I shall 
now argue.
II. The vocabulary of moderation
My discussion to date has indicated the importance of'bellicose rhetoric' (Taylor 
1993: 268) in mobilising support among members and activists for the TUC's opposition 
to the legislation, particularly in the 1982 campaign. I also attempted to demonstrate how 
this style of language reflected the long-standing outlook of the unions on the system of 
industrial relations in Britain.
However, as discussed above (p. 102), the TUC's policy towards the legislation 
was, especially in the 1979-81 period, marked by a considerable degree of caution - an 
outlook matched by Prior's approach (see Chapter 2). The General Council urged the
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Government to meet with unions and employers to discuss how industrial relations could 
be improved (GC Report, TUC 1980: 19-20); while at meetings with ministers, TUC 
representatives attempted to appear open to the possibility of self-reform: 'Our natural 
response was to try to engage them [Government] in discussion in order to establish what 
were the issues, what were the problems... on the early occasions when we went to see 
Jim Prior I literally took a blank piece of paper and pushed it across to him and asked him 
to say what he thought was wrong with the unions' (Murray, interview). Such overtures 
proved ineffective, given the Government's refusal to enter into any sort of corporatist 
arrangement and Thatcher's dogmatic hostility towards unions: 'one of the first things we 
had to do we had to do when Mrs. Thatcher came to power was to talk to her - it took 
months and then when she came we had an hour's 'harangue' on what was wrong with 
unions. We never had a conversation with Mrs. Thatcher' (Murray, interview). 
Nevertheless, the TUC continued to try to persuade the Government to change its policy 
right up to the publication of the 1982 Bill, meeting with Tebbit in December 1981 to 
impress 'strongly upon him the TUC's outright rejection of his proposals' (GC Report, 
TUC (Wembley) 1982: 358); Tebbit refused to alter his position, following which the 
TUC decided to step up its campaign.
The language used in campaign pamphlets and publications, and in the speeches 
of some union leaders, frequently reflected the cautious approach pursued by the TUC, 
at least until the end of 1981. The General Secretary of the time acknowledged that an 
attempt was made to depict the TUC and the union movement in general as moderate, 
reasonable and unjustly treated by Government: We wanted to proceed in what we saw 
as a rational way - let rationality prevail. Our speeches, our pamphlets at the time were 
written as if the voice of reason would prevail' (Murray, interview). There were a number 
of ways in which the unions tried to achieve this goal.
The effects of the legislation: disorder and damage
The starting-point for much union criticism of the likely consequences of the 
Conservative labour legislation was to argue that it was not needed. Effectively, this was 
a voluntarist argument (or at least, an argument for maintaining the status quo), since it
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assumed that the current position in industrial relations was satisfactory, and that any 
abuses which might exist could be addressed through traditional voluntary means - the 
problems were not sufficiently great to warrant legislative attention. In fact, two related 
but perhaps not identical claims were made by the unions. They argued that legislative 
measures were 'unnecessary’, ie that no problems existed or that they could be solved by 
bargaining; and that they were 'irrelevant' ie that they failed to address the 'real' problems 
in industry and the economy - the measures were inappropriate to solve Britain's 
difficulties.
The argument that legislation was not needed and was inappropriate itself cast 
doubt upon the Government's motives for introducing it, suggesting that there might be 
some ulterior motive, and thereby returning to the claim of'deviousness and dishonesty' 
discussed above (pp. 117-21). At best, it implied that the Government lacked intelligence: 
*the stupidity and monumental irrelevance of this Bill to the real world of industry that you 
and I inhabit' (Murray, L. TUC (Wembley)1982: 407) - such an accusation implying that 
the legislative measures lacked legitimacy as they were not rooted in the knowledge of 
those who 'truly understood' industrial relations - the unions and employers (see further 
below).
However, it might be thought that if the measures were 'irrelevant', they could 
simply be ignored. In order to mobilise resistance to them, therefore, union discourse 
combined the language of'irrelevance' with that of'danger1, as in the title of a 1980 
pamphlet 'The Employment Bill is Unfair, Unnecessary and Dangerous' (TUC 1980a),8 
and expanded upon elsewhere: 'the proposals are irrelevant to the basic issues of 
improving industrial relations and promoting improvements in productivity, real earnings 
and job and income security. Worse, they would make it more difficult to achieve progress 
on these issues because they would introduce highly contentious laws into industrial 
relations' (TUC 1979a: 76) We warned them that these measures were unnecessary. They 
were dangerous at the present time, having regard to the exceptional economic 
circumstances that we would be going into' (Urwin, C. TUC 1979: 440); 'this Bill is 
utterly irrelevant to the nation's real needs and a danger to the public' (Murray, L. TUC
8 For the language of'fairness', see pp. 176-82.
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(Wembley) 1982: 381); 'it [the legislation] is irrelevant and totally damaging' (McCall, W. 
TUC 1982: 476).
The 'danger' alluded to in these statements was that of disruption in industrial 
relations, of the exacerbation of antagonistic feelings among the workforce, of disorder 
and chaos: 'This Act will cause nothing but trouble: trouble between pickets and police, 
trouble between employers and workers' (Parry, T. TUC 1980: 362); 'The introduction 
of more laws will transform the whole nature of industrial relations and the role of courts 
and the police in a way which will lead to more anarchy and not less, more danger of 
vulnerability by the public and not less' (Basnett, D. TUC 1981: 430); 'the current 
Employment Bill will not only not benefit our members or our industry or our trade unions 
as a whole; it will exacerbate industrial relations at a time when constructive attitudes are 
more needed than ever1 (Mills, L. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 382). The talk was of'inflaming 
feelings' (TUC 1979a: 76) amongst workers, with an implied threat to the public which 
perhaps drew upon the spectre of the Winter of Discontent'.
It might be argued that this was simply the vocabulary of confrontation once more 
- that the unions were holding out the threat of conflict and disorder as a means of 
persuading the Government to drop its legislative measures. How then could such an 
analysis fit with the attempt made by many within the union movement and the TUC to 
portray themselves as reasonable and moderate which, as argued, underpinned many of 
the responses, particularly in the 1979-81 period?
Displacement of responsibility: blamelessness
It was possible for the unions to appear cautious and rational while still using the 
language of'danger1 as a justification for opposition to the legislation by denying that the 
responsibility would lie with them if the threatened disorder or chaos did ensue. The 
blame would lie elsewhere: 'The trade union Movement is entering a battleground - but 
not of its own choosing' (TUC 1979b: 2); We are expecting the Act to lead to 
confrontation in the coming months and years. Such confrontation will not be of our 
choosing, for the Government seems determined to pass laws which are unworkable and 
to bring, indeed, the law itself into disrepute' (Lloyd, G. TUC 1980: 392); We in the trade
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union Movement have not picked a fight with the employers or with the Government... 
Our message to the Government is that they, not the trade unions, have picked this 
quarrel, this fight, but that life will be as difficult as they care to make it' (Murray, L. TUC 
(Wembley) 1982: 378, 381); 'the trade unions did not choose this confrontation: the 
Government did' (Pollock, J. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 383).
Such language pinned the responsibility for any disruption in industrial relations 
or damage to the economy firmly on the Government. Portraying the Government as 
being the party to blame for the creation of disruption in the field of industrial relations 
had obvious advantages for the unions. It enabled them to depict themselves as 
reasonable, responsible and as simply trying to 'get on with their job'. In contrast, the 
Government was viewed as malicious, unnecessarily antagonistic and reckless about the 
potential chaos its measures might cause to the nation. Moreover, pinning the blame firmly 
on the Government allowed the unions to appeal to the sense of 'fairness' both of the 
public and of responsible employers: 'the trade union Movement is being pushed once 
again into a defensive battle which it does not want. I am convinced that the majority of 
employers do not want it and that our nation, which still believes in democracy, does not 
want it' (Dufly, T. TUC 1982: 469). This was, therefore, one means of'marginalising' the 
Government - depicting it, rather than the unions, as the intractable obstacle to fairer 
industrial relations - which was a significant element of the unions' approach, as I shall 
discuss below (section VI).
This type of'displacement' of blame onto an acknowledged enemy is a common 
feature of political language, as Edelman argues: 'to evoke a problem's origin is to assign 
blame and praise... Each origin reduces the issue to a particular perspective and minimises 
or eliminates others. Each reflects an ideology and rationalises a course of action' (1988: 
17). Fixing the blame on the Government reinforced the latter's position as 'enemy' of the 
unions and mobilised support among members and the public for a policy of opposition 
and, if necessary, confrontation. The other 'enemies' of the unions - 'rogue employers' and 
'disaffected individuals' - were also invoked as responsible for the disruption which might 
result, the TUC arguing that the legislation 'could be exploited... by unscrupulous 
employers and eccentric individuals seeking to disrupt established, customary 
arrangements and to inflame feelings in already difficult disputes' (TUC 1979a: 76).
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Simply blaming one of the union movement's traditional 'enemies' might, however, 
be insufficient. In order for potential supporters to feel that responsibility had been 
effectively transferred from those who participated in the industrial disorder, the unions 
needed to show that they had given proper notice of the likely consequences of the 
legislative measures. They were able to do this by emphasising that they had 'warned' the 
Government of what might happen: We warned [Prior] that the measures would create 
bitter hostility in the trade union Movement, and would poison industrial relations and this 
would spill over into collective bargaining and influence wage claims and everything else' 
(Urwin, C. TUC 1979: 440); The purpose of the General Council's recommendations for 
action is... to give due warning to... the Government that the use of the law to impose new 
and unjustified limitations on unions, and to induce employers and others to attack union 
funds, could well have widespread repercussions. If there are such repercussions the 
responsibility will be fairly and squarely on the Government which has initiated this 
legislation and on those who seek to use its provisions to attack workers and their unions. 
They are not of the trade union Movement's seeking' (GC Report, TUC (Wembley) 1982: 
363).
Due warning having been given by the unions, the Government's refusal to listen 
rendered it solely responsible for the consequences: Tor the Government to turn their 
back on the opportunities for progress offered by the TUC Guides would be an act of 
industrial relations vandalism. To continue on this course will turn industry into a 
battleground in which the whole nation will be the casualty' (TUC 1979b: 8); 'The TUC 
consistently warned the Government of the dangers of pressing ahead with its ill- 
considered and inappropriately titled 'Employment Bill'. In a series of meetings with the 
Employment Secretary... members of the General Council pointed to the damage which 
would be caused by the proposed legislation. Yet the Government turned a deaf ear to 
those who know first hand the real problems of industrial relations. Instead it chose to 
listen to its wilder backwoodsmen and to bodies which have little or no experience of 
industry' (TUC 1980d: 2-3).
Similar warnings were given to employers, although as befitted their role as 
'adversaries' rather than 'enemies', the tone was somewhat softer and the belief that they 
would cooperate greater, although the veiled threat of disruption remained: 'The second
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task is to leave employers in no doubt that if they use this proposed legislation they will 
be guilty of causing disruption and damage. Most employers recognised this between 1971 
and 1974; their successors in 1982 need to remember this and show the same 
understanding' (GC Report, TUC (Wembley) 1982: 352); 'Employers have got to 
understand - they have got to be made to understand - that they could become casualties 
of this Act... if they are foolish enough to start legal trouble they will face the risk of an 
escalation of action by the trade union Movement acting together' (Murray, L. TUC 
(Wembley) 1982: 379); 'unions must stress the dangers of the new legislation to all the 
employers with whom they deal. Employers must be warned that if they try to use the 
Bill's provisions they run the risk of serious disruption to industrial relations' (TUC 1982c: 
32). The clear hope here was that individual union representatives could persuade 
employers via the traditional voluntarist channels of bargaining and negotiation in which 
both sides were involved, that the legislation also threatened their position (see also TUC 
1980e: 7; TUC 1982a: 4).
Responsibility for confrontation and damage having been displaced onto the 
Government (and to a lesser extent, employers), the unions could portray themselves as 
the party which sought to avoid confrontation and which had behaved in a reasonable and 
rational manner while the Government, in contrast, had ignored all advice and proceeded 
out of prejudice and irrationality.9 They could also claim to be representing national 
rather than sectional interests since they were seeking to avoid damage to the economy, 
disruption to industry and anarchy and chaos which might threaten the public whereas the 
Government was prepared to risk these 'inevitable' results in pursuit of its anti-union goals. 
Hence, the Government, responsible for turning 'industrial relations into a battleground 
in which the whole nation will be the casualty' (TUC 1979b: 2 - see p. 109) could be 
'marginalised' as acting against the interests of the British people, a result which might 
also be achieved by the emphasis laid by the unions on rejection of their offers to discuss 
national problems with the Government (see section VI).
Having transferred the blame for any industrial disorder or disruption onto the 
Government, the unions in effect appropriated the vocabulary of'order', traditionally a
9 Note in particular the reference to the Government listening to 'its wilder 
backwoodsmen' (p. 126), which clearly implied irrational prejudice on its part.
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Conservative discourse (Barker 1994: 23-4) contrasting it with the Thatcher 
Government's 'incitement', in this instance, to anarchy and disorder. Yet, while the 
displacement of responsibility allowed the unions to depict themselves as seeking to avert 
confrontation, the very fact that such conflict, if it took place, would not be their fault 
allowed them to continue using the vocabulary o f confrontation - at least as an underlying 
threat - without necessarily losing popular support, as in the following instance: 'If our 
opponents will not listen to the voice of reason, then let them feel the weight of our 
industrial strength' (Wade, J. TUC 1979: 442). The TUC and the unions might thus seek 
to appear moderate and reasonable in policy and rhetoric, but the language of conflict 
remained an underpinning theme to be invoked where necessary.
Passivity and the defensive posture
It follows from the above, however, that while the vocabulary of confrontation 
undoubtedly remained open to the unions, they conceived of their role as being primarily 
passive. Although conflict was a highly likely outcome of the Government's legislative 
measures, responsibility for its occurrence could not be pinned upon the unions if it did 
transpire. They were not actively seeking to bring about such confrontation (since to do 
so would be a derogation from their role as protectors of the interests of the nation), but 
it might be forced upon them: 'I do not want to see confrontation - 1 see too much of it 
in my life - but I believe that confrontation is inevitable under this proposed legislation' 
(Keys, W. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 397); We are not looking for a fight as a trade union 
Movement... But when you are faced with an attack which could leave you crippled, then 
you have to retaliate in kind' (Marsland, T. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 402); 'we are not 
embarking on a widespread campaign of civil disobedience,... we are not hell-bent on law- 
breaking, but... when the sword is forced into our hands we will have no option but to use 
it. But it is not something that we are looking for: it is something of later or last resort' 
(Drain, G. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 394-5).
Drain's remark is significant because it indicates the way in which a more passive 
posture and vocabulary was thought to be appropriate for gaining support among the 'rank 
and file' trade union members, who might be less confrontational in attitude (and here, less
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willing to break the law - see p. 89) than the union leadership - he goes on to say that 
'unless we can get this concept over very clearly we, or many of us, shall have difficulty 
in carrying our members in the most whole-hearted way. The last thing that we need at 
the moment is sabre-rattling. What we need is explanation and sober clarification' (ibid: 
395). In contrast, certain of the more militant union leaders viewed the unions' role in a 
more active light, and used language which reflected that viewpoint (see Scargill, A. TUC 
(Wembley) 1982: 383 - above, p. 110).
A more common theme, however, was that the Government was 'attacking' trade 
unions, and that the latter were simply protecting their position. The legislative measures 
were described variously as 'attacks', 'assaults' and a 'sustained offensive' on the part of the 
Conservatives (eg Sapper, A. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 377; GC Report, TUC (Wembley) 
1982: 349; Bickerstaffe, R  TUC (Wembley) 1982: 390), as well as a 'declaration of war' 
(see p. 110). It was clear from this type of language that the Government was portrayed 
as taking the initiative. Conversely, the unions were described as acting 'defensively. The 
language was of 'defence', of 'resistance', of 'retaliation' and of the 'fightback': 'Trade 
unionists have the right to defend themselves, and will do so if it proves necessary' (TUC 
1979b: 8); 'The TUC is committed to fighting it [1982 Employment Bill] all the 
way...Every trade union member must join the fightback against it' (TUC 1982b); 'There 
has never been a greater need than at the present time for strong trade unions to defend 
our members against the most vicious attacks that have occurred in the whole history of 
the trade union Movement' (Pollock, J. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 383).
There was an element of mutuality about this defensive posture - unions would 
defend their position from the Government, and therefore continue to defend those that 
they represented (from employers and the Government); but this could only be achieved 
if union members were prepared to defend the unions themselves by supporting the 
campaigns against the legislation. This interaction was well captured by another of the 
1982 campaign slogans, 'Look after Yourself: Look after your Union', which, as argued 
below, reflected the growing significance of the language of individualism, and upon 
which Len Murray drew at the Wembley Conference: *We have to fight back and we have 
to defend the right of workers to combine... No Government can take away from working 
people their right to defend themselves and to defend their unions which they have created
129
and which they sustain... We shall defend ourselves and we shall defend the essential rights 
that we here have inherited* (1982: 378, 381).
Language which depicted the unions in a defensive or passive light was clearly an 
important element of a moderate policy which attempted to show the unions as reasonable 
and non-confrontational in order to encourage popular and membership support. It served 
further to marginalise the Conservative Government in union discourse as the 'aggressor* 
and thus as an enemy. However, the 'defensive* posture also had disadvantages. It meant, 
in effect, that it was the Government which was dictating the agenda - both in terms of 
rhetoric and of concrete policies - and the unions were simply responding to this. This 
made it very difficult for the unions to shape the course of events, a fact acknowledged 
by Len Murray, both at the time and with the benefit of hindsight: 'It has been said that we 
must choose the ground for the fight. That will be a luxury. We have not chosen the 
ground for this fight, and I do not think that we shall be able to choose the ground for 
particular fights. It will not be of our choosing* (TUC (Wembley) 1982: 408); We were 
reacting. There was no way in which we could have taken the initiative. We were on the 
back foot* (interview).
These remarks echo the view of commentators that 'since 1979, British unions 
have been thrown on to the defensive* (Waddington and Whitston 1995: 196), as well as 
general assessments of unions as 'conservative institutions' (Poole, interview), more given 
to reacting to events than to shaping them (see p. 11) - 'Trade unionists react to events' 
(Keys, W. TUC 1982: 467); [unions are] 'amorphous masses upon which external forces 
push and move them in various directions' (Hall, interview). Such evaluations are borne 
out by the defensive nature of much of the language I have discussed which portrays the 
unions as ready to fight, but only because they had been forced to do so. The problem this 
presented was particularly significant in the face of a Government determined to push 
through substantial changes in labour legislation. By being reactive rather than active, the 
TUC and unions threatened to concede rhetorical and ideological advantage to the 
Conservatives, especially given the Government's ability to shape public thinking via the 
media (see Chapter 7). In seeking to win the argument, the unions then faced the difficulty 
of constructing and conveying their own understandings of terms such as 'democracy' and 
'individual rights' (see pp. 141-53 and Chapter 6) - in contrast to the definitions espoused
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by the Government, a task which was often highly problematic.
III. History and the vocabulary of collectivism 
The history of the labour movement
Thus far I have focused primarily upon the unions' responses to the legislative 
measures in terms of their view of the motives which underpinned its introduction, or the 
effects of the changes in the law on industrial relations and the economy in general. 
However, the unions also justified their oppositional stance by reference to history, 
placing the present difficulties which they were facing in the context of previous conflicts 
with Government and employers.
In essence, what was involved here was the use of 'myth' as a unifying symbol and 
as a stimulus for action. As Phelps Brown remarks, this word does not necessarily imply 
that the happenings did not actually occur - the important fact is that a 'myth is an account 
of past happenings that epitomises and inculcates a certain interpretation of contemporary 
affairs; it reinforces and energises a certain approach to them' (1986: 215; also Wahrmann 
1995: 18). This has been seen as a significant feature of a number of discourses by 
commentators on political language. For example, Kertzer comments that organisations 
'propagate myths regarding their origin and purpose' (1988: 18) in order to establish their 
identity and distinctiveness; while Edelman emphasises the importance of the simplifying 
power of myths: 'Myths and metaphors permit men to live in a world in which the causes 
are simple and neat and the remedies are apparent. In place of a complicated empirical 
world, men hold to a relatively few, simple, archetypal myths... In consequence, people 
feel assured by guidance, certainty, and trust rather than paralysed by threat, bewilderment 
and unwanted personal responsibility for making judgments' (1971: 83). One might add 
that 'myth' can engender support and justify and explain courses of action.
In the context of the oldest organised labour movement in the world, 'myth' and 
the language of history could be seen as particularly important features of political 
vocabulary furnishing interpretations and explanations of contemporary events - 'the 
appeal to tradition is a very telling argument' (Flanders 1968: 10). Phelps Brown stresses
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the importance of the 'group memory' (1986: 20) of British trade unions and argues that:
British trade unionism in this way has been concerned to keep alive and propagate 
the memory of the struggles and martyrdoms of its early years. The story can be 
told of many a tight-fisted employer or hard-faced magistrate, of the dragoons 
riding down the pickets that were striving to keep out imported blacklegs, of the 
judges repeatedly forging fresh shackles for humble men only seeking to protect 
the barest livelihoods of their wives and children... With the force of drama it [the 
myth] convinces the British trade unionist that he is inherently liable to oppression 
and exploitation, and that the working class is engaged in a continuing struggle to 
defend and advance itself (ibid: 215).
A study of the materials produced for the campaign against the 1982 Bill strongly 
verifies these observations. The campaign pack included a poster headed 'They have tried 
to crush unions before',10 which detailed a number of 'mythic' events in the union 
movement's heritage which might offer a justification for similar action against the present 
legislation:
From their earliest days, workers banding together into unions have faced 
fierce opposition from people who wanted to see their organisations destroyed. 
The transportation of the six Tolpuddle Martyrs to Australia in 1834 was by no 
means the first time that the law had been used to attack trade unionists.
Yet despite the threats and intimidation, unions grew. In 1906 the law 
was changed so that employers could no longer sue unions for losses due to a 
strike. But that did not stop employers and government using the threats of 
unemployment and the courts as the chief weapons in their attack on trade 
unionists.
Ten years ago Edward Heath tried in vain to shackle unions with his... 
Industrial Relations Act. He failed because trade unionists were prepared to 
defend their unions.
From small beginnings, the trade union Movement has grown to over 
eleven million strong. Yet still we are attacked. So we must fight again today with 
the same determination as our predecessors to look after ourselves, and look after 
our unions'(TUC 1982b).
The history described here is one of conflict and of resistance, thus fitting the pattern 
described earlier, but also alluding to the language of'struggle against oppression' which 
linked into the vocabulary of class (see below). The TUC Workbook for the campaign 
also contained references to TaffVale. and two fiill-page 'lessons from the past' scenarios. 
A similar theme was taken up by speakers at the Wembley Conference: 'The trade union 
Movement has been attacked by governments many times in its history, and that we have
10 Note the 'them and us' vocabulary here. See above, p. 112.
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been able to resist and fight back is a testimony to the unity that our Movement is able to 
forge in times of adversity. I hope that will be the spirit of our deliberations today so that 
this Special Conference injects a new impetus into our campaign against the Employment 
Bill and gives us the cohesiveness and confidence to win our fight and to defend free and 
effective trade unionism in Britain today' (Sapper, A. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 377).
Such language attempted to imbue the present campaign with the heroism of 
previous struggles, portraying the 1982 Bill as the latest in a long series of attacks on the 
unions. This reaffirmed the identity of the union movement in opposition to the 
Government and was designed to rouse union members to support the campaign against 
the legislation by portraying them as of equal valiance as figures of union folklore such as 
the Tolpuddle Martyrs and the Pentonville Five. This type of language, with its rousing 
allusions to past battles, heroes and victories, was clearly very powerful - it was, indeed, 
redolent of the stirring patriotic rhetoric of a wartime leader such as Churchill, which was 
appropriate given the significance of the language of warfare (see pp. 108-11).
Its ability to mobilise support for TUC/union policy amongst union members was 
arguably increased by the claims made that the movement faced unprecedented danger 
from the legislation - ie that this was a moment of immense historical significance. The 
extent of this claim varied - some saw it as the most serious threat in the entirety of the 
unions' existence: There has never been a greater need than at the present time for strong 
trade unions to defend our members against the most vicious attacks that have occurred 
in the whole history of the trade union Movement' (Pollock, J. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 
383), while others chose to compare it to more recent challenges: We believe that this 
Employment Bill is the greatest threat to free trade unionism in Britain since the Industrial 
Relations Act of 1971' (Duffy, T. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 395). However, the inference 
to be drawn from the remarks was similar: the seriousness of the threat was underlined, 
thus providing a focus for opposition; and those who opposed the Bill would need equal 
or greater fortitude than the 'heroes and martyrs' of the movement's past.
The reference to the 1971 Act was particularly significant, since it was an event 
frequently called in aid in union rhetoric on the 1982 Bill. Allusions to the earlier law 
served a number of purposes. Firstly, comparison of the 1982 Bill with the 1971 Act 
emphasised the severe danger to the unions, a necessary tactic given that the 'step-by-step' 
nature of the Thatcher Government's reforms meant that there was not the same focus for 
opposition which existed in 1971: 'the Government's anti-union laws have been promoted
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as 'cautious reforms' aimed at 'abuses' by unions... The new legal attack is as - or more - 
serious than the 1971 Industrial Relations Act' (TUC 1982c: 11). Secondly, and related 
to this, the unions' 'success' in defeating the Industrial Relations Act was used as 
encouragement for a similar campaign against the Tebbit Bill - if the unions could overturn 
the 1971 Act (and, indeed, earlier pieces of legislation), then they could achieve the same 
result again: 'Our aim... is to lay this proposed law to rest alongside the infamous 
Combination Acts, the 1927 Trade Disputes Act, and the Industrial Relations Act of 1971' 
(Murray, L. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 381); 'Our hope and our expectation is that this anti­
trade union legislation will share the fate of the 1971 predecessor and end up on the scrap 
heap' (Sapper, A  TUC (Wembley) 1982: 377). Again, the reference to a defining moment 
of union folklore was intended to imbue the present campaign with similar heroic stature 
and elements of'martyrdom', thus generating support for the continuing 'struggle': We 
defeated the 1971 Act. Yes, five dockers went to prison, but it is my personal belief that 
men and women in the British trade union Movement will hold that ideal so high that there 
will not be enough official solicitors to get them out of prison' (Keys, W. TUC (Wembley) 
1982: 397-8). Thirdly, union accusations that the 1971 Act was a 'disaster1 called into 
question the Government's motives for introducing the 1982 Bill and implied that the 
consequences would be equally deleterious for industrial relations: 'As in 1971 the united 
opposition of our Movement will expose the folly and the nastiness of this proposed 
legislation' (Grantham, R  TUC (Wembley) 1982: 398); We have been reminded of what 
happened under the 1971 Act. Do not let us forget that and do not let us forget to remind 
employers and governments of what happened under that Act. Well, no thanks for the 
memoiy of that. I thought that that corpse had been buried in 1974 but now it is being dug 
up again and the fact that it is being dug up one grizzly limb at a time should not conceal 
that fact from us' (Murray, L. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 407).
The consciousness of the past evident in union rhetoric of this period extended 
further than the making of references to 'mythical' events in order to imbue the present 
situation with similar heroic connotations. The language was also that of 'duty' and of 
'responsibility arising from the union movement's previous 'battles'. Since earlier trade 
unionists had fought for and obtained certain rights from employers and the Government, 
the present generation of union members would be letting their predecessors down, and 
effectively disowning their heritage, if they failed to resist the present Conservative 
'attacks': 'Our rights have been fought for by previous generations. They are not ours to
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tamely give away1 (TUC 1982b); We are not going to sit idly by and watch the 
Government destroy the Movement that we and our forefathers worked so hard to build. 
We are not going to go back 150 years. The rights of working-class people and the 
standards of life that they enjoy were not given by some enlightened employers, they were 
not given by some enlightened Government some time in the past: they were fought for 
by working people and working people will not give them up easily' (Keys, W. TUC 1981: 
426). Trade unionists who failed to fight would not only be letting their predecessors 
down - they would also be destroying the rights of future trade unionists. It was as if the 
current generation was holding certain rights and standards 'in trust' for future 
generations: We shall defend ourselves and we shall defend the essential rights that we 
here have inherited and that we here - every one of us - are duty bound to pass on to those 
who come after us' (Murray, L. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 381).
The argument that the union movement's heritage created a responsibility towards 
the future demonstrated the power of the language of tradition in union discourse. The 
movement was seen as being 'engaged in a continuing struggle to defend and advance 
itself (Phelps Brown 1986: 215), in a process of unceasing steps forward from its origins. 
In this way the unions could be represented as forces of progression: We have had to 
struggle for power and authority ever since men and women banded together to start the 
trade union Movement. We have made magnificent advances since we started that 
journey, but we have got a long way to go. I am not prepared... to hand over to this 
Government the most important commodity that the nation has, and that is its people' 
(Keys, W. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 396). In contrast, the Government was represented as 
backward-looking and retrogressive: 'They are an attempt to reverse progressive 
legislation established over many years for the advancement and protection of workers and 
their trade unions... However much they might dress it up, there can be no doubt that they 
see this as the first step along the road of returning us to the era of the ragged trouser 
philanthropist' (Wade, J. TUC 1979: 441); 'This Government, by their economic policies, 
have turned Britain into an industrial wasteland. Such policies belong to the 1930s and 
these industrial policies they are now promoting belong to the 1830s. We have got to get 
the message over to our people, and to the nation as a whole. We are not going to give 
away 150 years' (Keys, W. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 397). Once again, portrayal of the 
unions as a force for social and economic advance, contrasted with a 'reactionary' 
Government, called into question both the validity of the motives for the introduction of
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the legislation and its likely consequences, thus marginalising the Government as 
unconcerned for the improvement of the nation.
Class and struggle
Bill Keys, quoted above, speaks of the history of the trade union movement in the 
language of'struggle', a word which carried Marxist overtones (eg Marx and Engels 1955: 
10,18).11 This conception of industrial relations is closely linked with the 'conflict theory' 
previously discussed, in that it views the interests of capital and labour as opposed, and 
confrontation between these forces thus as inevitable and ubiquitous. To this limited 
extent, British unionism might be seen as sharing the vocabulary of Marxist analysis of 
industrial relations. However, the pluralist theory supposes that the differences can be 
resolved via collective bargaining, and as Mcllroy points out, British unions have been, 
with relatively few exceptions, prepared to work within capitalism, seeking gradual 
reform, improvements in conditions and limited redistribution of wealth (1995: 48). Such 
an approach was manifested in the adversarial, *them and us' discourse, which accepted 
the legitimacy of capital and the state. In consequence, the Marxist language of 
'revolution' is largely absent from union rhetoric.
This is not to suggest, however, that anti-capitalist discourse was totally non­
existent, for example: 'The Bill's purpose is simple and its simplicity is an economic 
simplicity. It is designed to undermine beyond repair the living standards of the British 
people and it is meant to undermine them in the interests of profit' (Gill, K. TUC 
(Wembley) 1982:400). As previously discussed, the Conservative legislation of the early 
1980s was seen, at least in part, as an element in a coherent strategy designed to weaken 
working people and the institutions which represented them. It was a relatively small step 
from this to the argument that the motivation underlying the legislation was to perpetuate 
the conflict between capital and labour and hence was class-based:
11 Keys was not the only leader to conceive of union history in these sort of terms - see 
also: History has always proved that when laws are made to protect class interests, to 
bash people, we always get trouble. To talk of compromise on hard-fought trade union 
principles would be letting generations of trade unionists down' (Kennedy, P. TUC 1979: 
446); 1 call on Congress not to betray those who have fought and struggled before us to 
build this Movement' (Dubbins, A. TUC 1982: 472).
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'They are in fact an essential part of Government economic and social packaging, 
the economics of money supply, manipulation and control, the theft of our national 
assets - aerospace and oil, for example, they are selling off to their friends in cut- 
rate lots; the demolition of the social wage, cuts in education, pensions, social 
services and transport, and the deliberate use of inflation and unemployment. All 
these attacks against us and our people can only be rebutted by a trade union 
Movement which is the most highly organised bulwark against any attacks against 
the working class in their living and working standards. That is why the 
Government has launched these measures - to weaken the Movement by 
increasing the power of capital and reducing the power of labour1 (Sapper, A. 
TUC 1979: 444).
Such an analysis called upon the collectivist vocabulary of 'class' as a unifying 
focus for opposition to the legislation: 'The object of this Act is perfectly clear: it has been 
brought into operation in order to facilitate the implementation of the vicious anti-working 
class political and economic policies of this Administration' (Scargill, A. TUC 1980: 392); 
'They are loyal to their class and when they become the government of the day they 
attempt to blackmail the workers into submission... Equally, we have to recognise our 
responsibility to our class' (Scargill, A. TUC 1982: 472-3). Thus, the confrontation which 
would inevitably result from enactment of the legislation was seen as 'class warfare': We 
have to make up our minds today on what we are going to do in the face of this 
declaration of war - because that is what it is. It is a declaration of class war against the 
trade union and labour Movement' (Scargill, A. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 384); 'It is the 
Tory Government which has declared war on the trade union Movement and declared war 
on the working class of this country (Marsland, T. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 402); while the 
resistance which was necessary was needed not only to 'Look after Yourself, Look after 
your Union', but also to look after your class': 'each and every one of us pledge to take 
industrial strike action to defend our position, our Movement and our class' (Scargill, A. 
TUC (Wembley) 1982: 384).
These union leaders might be viewed as some of the more militant in the 
movement. It could be argued, however, that they were simply making explicit a discourse 
which remained implicit in most TUC publications which referred to 'working people' or 
'workers' (see eg TUC 1981a: 4; TUC 1982b) - after all, as Mcllroy argues, 'unions are 
class organisations: they consist of'workers by hand and brain' (1995: 3 - italics in 
original). Moreover, no specific attempt was made by the more moderate leaders to 
disavow the language of 'class' either at Wembley or elsewhere; although Len Murray 
implied that there was a certain discomfort with the discourse in agreeing that the
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Conservative legislation could be viewed as class-based though I would be loath to use 
the phrase because of its ’class warrior1 implications' (interview). The vocabulary of class 
may also have had implications for other elements of union discourse; notably, the 
language of'unity1 and 'solidarity1 which also had strong collective connotations, as I shall 
now discuss.
Unity and solidarity
Trade unions are of course collective institutions - combinations of individuals 
formed to redress the inequality of bargaining power between employers and workers who 
come together because the influence they can wield collectively is greater than the sum 
of their individual strength. As such, the vocabulary of'unity' and 'solidarity' - of workers 
pulling together for the good of the collective organisation - was inherent in the very 
nature of unions. This was particularly so because, as Mcllroy notes (1995: 3), while 
unions are class organisations, they are organised on a sectional basis and therefore exhibit 
tendencies to both sectionalism and unity, the latter counterbalancing the former.
It has also been suggested that there are sociological explanations for the 
prevalence of solidarity in British unionism, Kahn-Freund remarking upon the 'intense 
corporate consciousness of the union members, their readiness to fight for their particular 
corporate body, all this too is part of a national heritage, an outstanding characteristic of 
British society' (quoted in Phelps Brown 1986: 216).
'Unity' and 'solidarity' were particularly important to the TUC leadership as 
'keywords... standard phrases' (Murray, interview) facilitating its role as coordinator of 
union responses to Government (see p. 17). The differing interests of various affiliates and 
the absence of any power to enforce decisions (Marsh 1992: 34) made this task 
problematic. The regular invocation of'unity' and 'solidarity' was a means of counteracting 
the centrifugal tendencies of many unions: 'One is always emphasising the need for unity 
in order to achieve a reaction against Government and solidarity to produce fair results 
between unions' (Murray, interview).
The call for 'unity' was especially significant in the context of responses to the 
labour legislation of the early 1980s. As noted above, the step-by-step nature of the 
legislative measures, the absence of a specific focus of opposition as had existed in the 
Industrial Relations Act 1971 and the economic difficulties faced by the unions made the
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coordination of opposition to the legislation difficult. However, there was a perceived 
need - especially in 1982 - to present a 'united front' against the legislation if there was to 
be a chance of defeating it - indeed, the Wembley principles' were centred around the 
notion of unity: 'The purpose of the General Council's recommendations for action is to 
unite the trade union Movement in the face of this grave legal challenge' (GC Report, 
TUC (Wembley) 1982: 363).
In consequence, it was particularly important for the leadership of the TUC to 
coordinate responses to the legislation. Len Murray therefore made particular use of the 
language of'unity': 'This legislation is not even a curate's egg. We are opposed to it in 
total, and let us be clear that cooperation with any one part of it could undermine what 
has to be a united collective response... We need to re-affirm today our commitment to 
work more closely together, and to help each other in difficulty. That is not just something 
we can leave until a legal case emerges. We have to build a sense of common purpose 
among unions in negotiations and industrial action where members see immediately that 
they have common interests' (Murray, L. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 380); I f  we are to defend 
ourselves properly, it is crucial for unions to avoid debilitating battles which divide the 
Movement, and it is critical that we should unite against the external threat' (ibid: 381); 
'In this fight, unity and leadership are what are going to count' (ibid: 408).
His calls were, however, echoed by others on the General Council: 'the fact that 
we are meeting today is a good show of our recognition of the need to unify and solidify 
the trade union Movement as it has never been before. We have our differences on the 
General Council. You know that we are not a mutual admiration society, but there has 
never been the unity we have at present' (Duffy, T. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 395); 'Only one 
thing can stop us from stopping them. Disunity, division and lack of leadership. The whole 
wall of oppression will crumble if the trumpet calls are not discordant and are not 
unharmonic' (Gill, K. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 400).
The relationship between the language of confrontation and that of'unity' is readily 
apparent: 'unity' was a 'weapon' to be used by the unions in their battles with the 
Government: 'Unity is the most prized weapon that we have in our armoury' (Keys, W. 
TUC 1982: 466); the inference being that defeat would be the likely outcome if the full 
mobilisation of union power implied by 'unity1 was not achieved. As events transpired, this 
assessment proved to be correct, with coordinated opposition to the legislation 
disintegrating between 1984 and 1987, considerably facilitating the Government's task of
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ensuring compliance with the legislation, as I shall discuss in Chapter 6.
Whereas ’unity' tended to be used to refer to the coordinated response of the 
movement as a whole to the legislation, 'solidarity1 applied more to the taking of sympathy 
action - one union supporting another in its dispute - and to the cohesiveness of individual 
workers within their union, particularly in a closed shop: Many disputes couldn't be won 
without support from other groups of workers. Unity is strength' is more than just a 
slogan. Traditionally, sympathy action has had just the same protection as any other kind 
of industrial action' (TUC 1981a: 12); 'solidarity action is crucial to our very existence. 
The right of the strong to come to the aid of the weak - God Almighty, if we stand for 
anything at all, that is what we stand for, and sometimes we should remember it a bit more 
ourselves, brothers, but that is one thing that we are going to be fighting for' (Murray, L. 
TUC (Wembley) 1982: 407); 'Building up membership to 100 per cent is a key trade union 
objective. It shows employers the solidarity of the workforce' (TUC 1981a: 18). As this 
last remark shows, union 'solidarity1 might be primarily directed towards employers rather 
than Government, but there were clear connections between 'unity' and 'solidarity', which 
were both seen as vital elements of the union movement's approach: 'That is why, in 
meeting this squalid attack, it is imperative that we maintain trade union unity and 
solidarity. The unity of our Movement is our most precious strength' (Parry, T. TUC 
1980: 362); 'solidarity is an important weapon' (TUC 1981a: 15).
The significance of the language of 'unity and 'solidarity' was that it was a 
collectivist discourse, 'the language of people working together' (Morris, interview). As 
such, it tended to reinforce the 'them' and 'us' standpoint discussed earlier: 'us' standing 
together can resist 'them', whether employers or Government: 'We can't allow our unions 
to be put in this position. We must warn employers that a blow against one is a blow 
against all, that a legal case against one union is a challenge to all unions. An employer 
starting a legal case must expect a united response' (TUC 1982b); 'The Government may 
seek to divide us, the CBI may try to do the same, but the effect of all they do is to bind 
us even closer together in our belief that an attack on one is an attack on all' (Fisher, A. 
TUC 1981: 395). In effect, these words were 'a way of triggering responses' (Murray, 
interview); keywords which called up the tradition of collective struggle within the 
movement and thus mobilised support for continued - collective - resistance. The 
potential problem for the unions was that they may have been incompatible with the 
increasing emphasis placed by the Conservative Government on the language and policies
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of individualism (see pp.48-52). I now move to discuss the unions' response to this 
discourse.
IV. The language of individualism
As discussed in Chapter 2, a number of provisions in the 1980 and 1982 Acts 
formed part of the continuing Conservative theme of promoting individualistic attitudes 
among union members and constraining solidarity and collectivist behaviour. In particular, 
the restrictions upon the closed shop, the limitation upon solidarity or sympathy action and 
the provision of state funds for secret ballots represented the prioritising of an 
individualistic over a collectivist approach. The Government justified these measures, at 
least in part, by using the language of individualism, as analysed in Chapter 3.
It was accordingly necessary for the union movement to construct an appropriate 
response to these policies. This was, of course, a continuing task and to some extent the 
'problem' grew greater as the decade wore on, since the Government's affirmation of the 
primacy of the individual over the collective was perhaps at its strongest after the 1987 
election (see p.50). Accordingly, I shall deal with this issue at greater length in Chapter 
6. However, much of the later union discourse on the individual was foreshadowed by 
debates in the earlier years, and it thus seems appropriate to examine the initial responses 
of the unions.
In essence, the unions needed to demonstrate that they were concerned for the 
individual, but that this did not detract from or conflict with the traditional collectivist 
virtues of unity and solidarity, without which they might be viewed as little more than an 
agglomeration of individuals. One possible response was to stress the weakness of the 
individual vis-a-vis the employer and the state in order to demonstrate the necessity of 
joining together in collective organisation: 'The basis of trade unionism is the experience 
of workers who, as isolated groups or individuals, have been picked off by employers. 
Trade unionists have realised that protection is provided by safety in numbers. In most 
situations collective action and solidarity are the only defence workers have against 
arbitrary decisions by employers' (TUC 1982c: 23 - emphasis in original). The notion was 
of the powerlessness of the individual against capital: Most people don't have very much 
power. Big decisions always seem to be taken by someone else' (TUC 1983: 5), an 
important constituent of the Marxist analysis of industrial relations (Famham and Pimlott
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1994: 54), but ultimately traceable to the fundamental rationale for the existence of 
unions, the inequality of bargaining power between employer and employee. The 
conclusion to be drawn from this analysis was that disempowered individuals needed the 
protection of strong collective organisation to be able to deal on relatively equal terms 
with employers, and the stronger the organisation, the more protection that could be 
offered: ’Only by collective action through trade unions can individual workers effectively 
influence their terms and conditions at work. The logical objective of a trade union is to 
achieve 100 per cent organisation by recruiting all the workers in the relevant trade or 
workplace' (TUC 1980f: 8).
The discourse of the powerless individual requiring protection from a collective 
body might be thought to be fundamentally at odds with the 'New Right' notion of self­
advancement in the absence of coercion, collective or otherwise, via participation in free 
markets (see Chapter 3). However, this did not mean that the language of'the individual' 
and the related discourse of 'freedom' was closed off to the union movement. It was 
possible for the unions to make the argument that, rather than destroying individual rights 
by 'immersing' them in a collective institution, trade unionism actually functioned to 
enhance and increase those rights. If the individual was powerless against employers when 
acting alone, it followed that the protection offered by the collective strength of a trade 
union enabled the union member to establish and maintain individual rights - such as 
protection from unfair dismissal. That is, individual rights were being achieved via the 
medium o f the collective institution - the union offered a means for realisation of self. This 
can clearly be seen from the debates on 'freedom' and the closed shop: 'The Conservatives 
say they're against the closed shop in principle, because it goes against the idea of personal 
freedom. Trade unions see things differently. Individual workers have little or no 'personal 
freedom' when faced with their employer unless they have a strong union behind them' 
(TUC 1981a: 20); Mr. Tebbit believes that the 'closed shop' is contrary to the British 
tradition of liberty of the individual. It is nothing of the kind. Working people have no 
'freedom' at work to better their wages and conditions unless they are a part of a strong 
trade union, bargaining collectively on their behalf (TUC 1983: 37-8).
The unions' argument was thus that the Thatcherite/New Right' conception and 
discourse of the individual and of'freedom' was incomplete - that the full realisation of 
individual potential required collective protection. This was not a rejection of 
individualism - indeed, it took the individual as a starting-point - but the different
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understanding of the concepts and discourse allowed continued stress to be placed upon 
the collectivist values and vocabulary of ’unity' and 'solidarity', a fact specifically 
acknowledged by the TUC in response to the powerful Conservative anti-collectivist 
discourse on the closed shop: 'The closed shop does mean individual workers have to 
accept more limitation of their personal freedom. But in return the individual workers get 
a much greater collective strength. It's this that underpins their rights and opportunities 
at work' (TUC 1981a: 20 - emphasis in original).
Such language also allowed the unions to be critical of certain Government 
policies on the ground that they were not 'genuinely* designed to enhance the position of 
the individual or to increase 'freedom', according to the unions' conception of these topics. 
For example, the argument was made that Conservative policy merely increased the 
potential for employers to exploit labour, and therefore did not result in 'real' freedom: 
Mrs. Thatcher and her friends go on a lot about freedom... But their kind of freedom is 
the freedom of the employer to pay sweated wages (and there are still plenty who do that) 
and the right of the hungry person to starve. Far from increasing genuine liberty they have 
cut back on our personal rights just as surely as they have cut back on public spending' 
(TUC 1983: 14). Similarly, the argument was made that Conservative policies removed 
the 'right to work1: 'It takes away the fundamental human freedom of the right to work 
which is just as important as the right of free speech, and day after day, decent people are 
having this freedom destroyed' (Fisher, A. TUC 1982: 425); and that they allowed 
disaffected individuals to create instability (see further below): 'It seems the new law ranks 
the 'freedom' to be a ‘union-wrecker' higher than the 'freedom' to join a trade union' (TUC 
1982c: 26).
The union accusation was that of hypocrisy - that the Government was 
proclaiming its attachment to the concepts and vocabulary of 'freedom' and 'individual 
rights' while actually damaging them. This argument could be made in the context of the 
removal of various individual employment rights (maternity leave, unfair dismissal etc.), 
the freedom to join a union and even the supposed 'right to a job', which all formed 
elements of union belief as to the proper content of'freedom' and individual rights: 'On top 
of that it [1980 Act] robs individual workers of basic rights - protection against unfair 
dismissal, the rights of working mothers to return to their jobs after childbirth. While 
trumpeting hypocritically about individual liberties, the Government are systematically 
taking freedoms away (Parry, T. TUC 1980: 362); 'The first of these changes [to the
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length of the qualifying period for claims of unfair dismissal] robbed around one million 
workers of protection against unfair dismissal, making nonsense of the Government's often 
repeated professions of concern for the rights of individuals' (GC Report, TUC (Wembley) 
1982: 355);
It has been suggested that the closed shop is a denial of individual rights and that 
for an individual not in a union to no longer be acceptable to the people he or she 
works with is almost tantamount to mortal sin. I have always found it extremely 
contradictory that the so-called Freedom Association can, on the one hand, be so 
concerned about the rights of the one individual in the West Midlands who lost her 
employment through not joining a trade union, and on the other hand, without any 
apparent regard to individuals' rights, can blatantly support the most anti-trade 
union employers, like George Ward of Grunwick, who sacked those who 
exercised their right to become trade union members. It would also be a little more 
convincing if the Government, who express their concern about the closed shop 
and the rights of individuals, were somewhat more concerned about the right of 
the individual to a job, bearing in mind that 2 million people have lost their jobs 
since this Government came to office' (Dubbins, A. TUC 1981: 431).
This was an important element of union response to Government policy, as I shall argue 
further in Chapter 6. It involved the unions adopting the language of 'freedom' and 
individualism, but using their different understandings of this discourse to criticise the 
legislative measures. The potential difficulty for the unions was to convince their members 
and the public that their definitions were more appropriate than those of the Government.
However, if the union view of these related concepts created problems, it also 
offered opportunities to emphasise aspects which might be excluded from 
ConservativeANew Right' discourse. Prominent amongst these was the notion of 
'responsibility1 or 'obligation' to one's fellows and to society as a whole. The origin of this 
argument lay in the claim that it was unfair to single out unions as institutions which 
restricted 'freedom' when it was impossible for society to function effectively in the 
absence of certain restrictions: 'The 'closed shop' does mean that individual workers 
accept some limitation of their personal freedom. But there is nothing unusual about this. 
In all walks of life, society imposes all sorts of obligations and limitations on freedom of 
action by individuals. It is the same in industry' (TUC 1982c: 7-8 - emphasis in original); 
'Restrictions to the 'freedom of the individual' exist in any society, for good reasons. 
Payment of income tax, jury service, laws against committing a nuisance, even traffic 
lights, are a restriction on your freedom to do what you please, for the good of the 
majority. Many unions take the view that if there is a 'right' not to join a trade union, then
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trade unionists should have a similar right not to work with ’free-riders" (TUC 1982c: 24). 
Society consisted of a balance of'freedom' and 'responsibility', and the latter vocabulary 
allowed the unions both to defend the closed shop and to criticise the Government's 
concept of individualism as characterised by sheer self-interest involving no wider duty 
to others: 'Responsibility is the other side of the coin from freedom. Far from restricting 
'freedom' in the practical sense, 100 per cent trade union membership requires workers to 
accept collective responsibility for their decisions affecting their work, their industry 
and their own union... The question which Tories and other groups, like the Freedom 
Association', always dodge is 'who benefits from the freedom-of-the individual 
philosophy?' (TUC 1982c: 24 - emphasis in original).
Once again, this did not amount to a repudiation of the importance of the 
individual; it was rather a view that self-interest offered only a partial opportunity to 
achieve proper freedom'. The point was well made by Len Murray in connection with the 
1982 campaign slogan 'Look after Yourself Look after your Union', which itself took the 
individual as the focus:12 'But that [slogan] is only a beginning, because it is not just a 
matter of narrow self-interest. That is the starting point. But we have to go beyond 
that...Again and again we have heard from the rostrum about how the union is the 
collective means through which freedom is enlarged in this country' (Murray, L. TUC 
(Wembley) 1982: 407). Collective protection was seen as necessary for the ultimate 
enhancement of the individual, achieving benefits to society as a whole which 'pure' 
individualism could not.
The criticism of the 'self-interested individual' as the beneficiary of Conservative 
policy manifested itself most forcibly in rhetorical attacks on the legislative measures as 
motivated by a desire to 'divide and rule'. The unions saw the provisions on secret 
balloting, sympathy action and the closed shop as a means of separating the leadership 
from the members and of attacking solidarity in general: 'The emphasis on taking action 
against individuals once again shows that part of the aim is to fragment and divide 
workers and their unions... The Conservative philosophy of'market forces' and individual 
'incentives' leaves little room for the trade union principles of solidarity and across-the- 
board standards. Many of the Conservative proposals on the law are aimed at isolating and
12 This slogan was a play on the Health Education Authority’s contemporaneous 
campaign entitled Look After Yourself, which focused on lifestyle changes which could 
be made by individuals in order to enhance their personal health.
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fragmenting workers and restricting collective action. They also undermine basic standards 
on working conditions and the rate for the job' (TUC 1980c: 3); [Sympathy] action isn't 
popular with judges or the Conservatives. They prefer to isolate workers - to divide and 
weaken them' (TUC 1982c: 17); 'secret ballots can discourage greater involvement of 
members in union activity and decision-making - people can vote without bothering to 
attend meetings and take part in the arguments and discussion. This can increase the 
potential for media manipulation of union decision-making' (TUC 1980c: 20); 'The 
intention of the Employment Bill is to destabilise union membership arrangements and to 
encourage individuals to leave the union' (TUC 1982a: 4).
The consequence of these policies would thus be to decollectivise the unions, 
isolating the individual member. This would make it considerably easier for the self- 
interested, 'disaffected' individual to challenge union solidarity. This was a significant and 
negative figure in union iconography, somewhat resembling the 'rogue employer' (above, 
p. 116), whose motives were at best 'eccentric' and at worst vindictive or destructive: 'The 
Government now want to:... introduce a procedure under which disgruntled individuals 
could challenge, and perhaps wreck, well-established agreements...Under these laws 
provocative individuals could blow up small local issues into major industrial relations 
problems' (TUC 1979b: 5); The incentive now given to the 'cowboy' and free rider to grab 
the carrot on offer for opting out of trade union membership and the restrictions 
introduced on the application of union discipline are such that there can be no doubt that 
they are designed to smash union organisation and to undermine our ability to maintain 
union rates of pay and conditions' (Wade, J. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 390). Such a figure 
was marginalised by his/her suspect motives and lacked legitimacy as a result of damaging 
unions (and employers) and of going against the wishes of the majority of union members: 
Under this law an eccentric individual could trigger off a dispute about a well-established 
membership agreement between a union and an employer - despite the wishes of the vast 
majority of the workers and the management. He could take advantage of all the terms 
and conditions worked out by union and management together but dodge making the 
proper contribution to the union which negotiated on his behalf (TUC 1980a: 2). 
Accordingly, unions needed to be wary of such individuals: Unions should not take at face 
value any employee's professed 'conscientious objection' or 'deeply-held personal 
conviction' against trade union membership and every claim should be strongly questioned. 
It should not be enough for the employee to object to aspects of union policy, the level
146
of subscription, or a particular incident. Nor should it be sufficient for anyone to object 
to union membership on political grounds in view of the existing legal right to 'contract 
out' of contributing to the political fund' (TUC 1980f: 10).
The marginalisation of such individuals by the attachment of epithets such as 
'eccentric', 'provocative' or 'disgruntled', or the labelling of them as 'cowboys' or 'free 
riders' was significant because, as was the case with the 'rogue employer', the unions were 
able to argue that most individuals did not act in this way. This enabled them to continue 
to use the language of individual rights (since most individuals did not threaten union 
organisation) while remaining critical of union members who acted for purely destructive 
motives. But the suspicion of individuals which is evidenced here does point to certain 
difficulties which the unions may have experienced in marrying the language of 
individualism with their traditionally collectivist outlook. There seems at times to have 
been a degree of tension between the discourses, and although the unions attempted to 
resolve this by criticising the Right’s definition of'freedom' and maintaining that individual 
rights could best be protected under a collective umbrella, the suspicion remains that it 
was the Government's definitions of 'freedom' and 'individual rights' which dominated 
public perception, and that it was thus difficult for the unions to talk these languages. 
Whether they had any greater success in doing so in the latter part of the 1980s, when the 
discourse of individualism was even more dominant in Government policy, is a question 
which I shall examine in Chapter 6.
V. The language of 'democracy'
The problem for the union movement in responding to the Government's legislative 
policies and vocabulary of'democracy' was that this language had achieved a hegemonic 
status in British political discourse, in a manner which was perhaps not true of any of the 
other discourses discussed in Chapter 3, with the possible exception of the still vaguer 
concept of'freedom'. Any attempt to challenge the Government's proposals was thus likely 
to meet with the accusation that the unions were 'anti-democratic', a claim which would 
serve to strengthen the marginalisation of the unions by the Government/New Right' as 
unacceptable and irrelevant institutions in British political society. Accordingly, in 
constructing a response to the Government's proposals for democracy in trade unions, the 
TUC and union leadership had to be wary of appearing opposed to democracy per se,
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instead challenging the specific form  of democratic regulation that the Government sought 
to impose. Equally, however, if the unions could plausibly use the language o f’democracy' 
against the Government, so as to label it as 'anti-democratic', they themselves could make 
a powerful claim to marginalise it as acting contrary to the national interest.
Such considerations may be seen as strongly structuring the unions' rhetorical 
response to the Government's legislative measures on secret ballots, balloting for the 
closed shop, proposals on the political levy and, most significantly, the 1983 Green Paper, 
Democracy in Trade Unions. The union/TUC reaction, enunciated in Congress debate, 
TUC publications and in the response to the Green Paper, Hands Up for Democracy, can 
thus be seen as falling into two broad categories - an assertion that, contrary to 
Government discourse, the unions were democratic institutions; and criticism of the 
Government's measures, an important element of which was - as with the language of 
individualism - the use of the language of 'democracy' against the Government, by 
accusing it of 'hypocrisy', an assertion to which I shall return at greater length in the 
following Chapter.
The starting-point for the union movement was thus a proclamation of its 
democratic nature, contrary to Government accusations:
'Critics of union democracy normally do not understand that union policies and 
activities are continually subject to the wishes of our members. These critics are 
often guilty of arguing one minute that individual members should have 'more say* 
in the running of the union, and the next that unions should 'exercise greater 
control' over the actions of their members. This contradiction appears in the 
detailed provisions of the Employment Bill. More generally, unions actively 
encourage all members to participate in their democratic structures which decide 
their policy. Power within unions always ultimately lies in the hands of the 
membership. It is only through unions that workers can have a say in what 
happens at their place of work. Contrast the open workings of union democracy 
with the secrecy and unaccountability of virtually every other institution in 
industry' (TUC 1982c: 8).13
'In Britain's trade unions it is the members who decide what is going to happen. 
Unions run their affairs in the ways laid down by their own members. Just as there 
are many different unions so there are many different forms of union democracy. 
One thing however is common to them all. Despite all Mr. Tebbit's attempts to 
portray them as irresponsible and undemocratic: despite Mrs. Thatcher's belief that
13 But note that here the assertion of union democracy was combined with an 
argument that the unions were being unfairly 'singled out' for legislative attention - see 
p.151.
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her Government and her Government alone is the authentic voice of democracy 
in Britain: every man and every woman who belongs to a trade union in Britain 
has a voice and a vote in their union's affairs' (TUC 1983: 11 - emphasis in 
original).
Indeed, it is interesting to note that the closed shop, which was attacked by the 
Government using the language of individual freedom, was on occasion justified by the 
TUC as an instrument for the expression of democracy: 'Making sure everyone is in the 
union guarantees that this process is as democratic as possible. It also makes sure that 
union standards and decisions are kept by everyone. The union can discipline members 
who go against democratic decisions' (TUC 1981a: 18); 'Workers' ability to be involved 
in decision-making is made more practical where 100 per cent membership has been won. 
Collective bargaining depends on workers being able to elect representatives who speak 
for the whole workforce' (TUC 1982c: 23 - emphasis in original). This pointed to a 
possible contradiction in the Government’s approach. In pursuing 'freedom' for the 
individual, the Government might be prejudicing democracy (if one accepted the union 
view that the closed shop was a means by which democracy could be promoted). This 
potential incompatibility between individual rights and democracy was seized upon with 
even greater vigour by the union movement in the debate over s. 3 of the Employment Act 
1988, as shown on pp.211-3.
This small point leads, however, into the more important accusation that the 
Government itself was anti-democratic. Various ways in which the unions sought to attack 
the Government with its own 'weapon' of the language of democracy can be identified. 
Firstly, the claim was made that, by requiring unions to follow certain centrally-regulated 
democratic procedures, the Government was overriding the democratic choices of union 
members as to how their union should be run: 'These provisions are wholly at odds with 
the principles of union democracy and responsibility. Unions have developed their own 
rules and procedures for dealing with industrial action. Those rules are ultimately under 
the control of the membership' (TUC 1982c: 19). The language here was that of 'freedom' 
(Government legislation was interfering with the freedom of union members to 
(democratically) choose their own rules and procedures) and of the 'autonomy of unions' 
(TUC 1980f 31) vis-a-vis the state (an appeal to maintain a voluntarist framework which 
was bound up with the historical development of unions, manifest in their differing rules 
and procedures for the involvement of members: 'Just as there are many different unions
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so there are many different forms of union democracy' (TUC 1983: 10)).14 The union 
view, therefore, was that rather than encouraging democracy via its legislation, the 
Government was actually destroying it (see Wade, J. TUC 1979: 441 - above p. 118).
The proposals on the political levy were also attacked as anti-democratic: 'It is a 
deliberate attack on the democracy of our nation. The plan is more reminiscent of the 
dictatorial decisions that are made in other countries and not in our country, which I still 
believe is one of the most democratic nations in the world' (Duffy, T. TUC 1982: 470). 
It is noticeable here that the Government's policy is criticised not only for its effect upon 
the unions, but for its interference with the democratic nature of British political culture, 
thus marginalising the Government as acting against national interests. I shall return to this 
topic in the next section.
The imposition of certain specified 'democratic' rules and procedures on trade 
unions was not only seen by the unions as anti-democratic; it was also seen as 'unfair'. The 
language of 'fairness' was increasingly common in the later part of the period, as I shall 
show in Chapter 6 (pp. 176-82). However, the language of'fairness' was also implicitly 
invoked in this period, particularly in Hands Up For Democracy.
For example, it was argued to be unfair on trade unions to have to achieve an 
80/85% vote in favour in order to impose a closed shop (s.3 Employment Act 1982), 
when no politician would expect to receive such a percentage of votes:
'What constitution in which country states that you need 80 per cent or 85 per 
cent of the votes, not in favour of change, but in order to maintain the status quo 
set out in agreements? There are countries with reserved legislation which you 
have to get a substantial majority to alter, but this Government says you have to 
get this enormous majority in order to maintain what you have already agreed and 
what is already operating. What politician in this country ever got an 80 per cent 
or 85 per cent vote in favour of their government on anything at any time? The 
only people I know who got such majorities were Hitler, Stalin and the other 
dictators. The position adopted by this Government builds up opposition to the 
whole democratic principle of involving trade union members in decisions. This 
Government continues its policy of undermining democracy' (Grantham, R, TUC 
(Wembley) 1982: 398).
Equally, it was argued that it was unfair that unions should be required to institute postal 
ballots when politicians were not elected in this way:
14 This very variety could, however, be seen as a source of weakness for the 
unions, as I shall argue presently (pp. 152 and 213).
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'Mr. Tebbit wants to put the unions into a strait jacket. He seems to think that 
postal ballots for senior posts are the only 'pure* form of democracy. But Mr. 
Tebbit isn't elected that way. He owes his position as Secretary of State for 
Employment to a decision by the Prime Minister. And he was elected MP for 
Chingford not by postal ballot - people had to go to the polling booths and vote 
for him (or one of his opponents). Why should unions be different? Why should 
the various democratic systems - postal ballots, voting at work, voting at union 
branches - which unions have developed all be reduced to one system? Is it 
because he believes that a voting paper filled in over the breakfast table and a copy 
of that morning's paper will favour the candidates he would like to see elected?' 
(TUC 1983: 12 - italics in original).
The union claim was that they were being treated in an exceptional and inequitable 
manner.
Taking this analysis one stage further, it was not simply that the legislative 
provisions would impose requirements upon unions that other institutions (particularly 
politicians) did not have to meet; it was also that these institutions were themselves 
lacking in democracy. This was made most clear in the section of Hands Up For 
Democracy which was devoted to the application of the 'Tebbit test of Democracy'15 on 
various 'great institutions of national life' (TUC 1983: 21) - the conclusion being that 
commercial companies, pension funds, banks, the press, the Conservative Party and the 
House of Lords failed the test as undemocratic. This, coupled with the assertion 
(discussed earlier) that the unions were democratic enabled the unions to 'turn the tables' 
fully upon the Government by representing themselves as unrivalled democratic 
institutions, setting an example to all others: 'In no other organisation in this country are 
the commitment to, and the practice of, democracy more deeply embedded than in the 
trade union Movement' (Murray, L. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 379); The TUC is not arguing 
that every national institution should be legally forced to operate on democratic lines. If 
Conservatives, like Mr. Tebbit, prefer to belong to a party which gives its ordinary 
members virtually no say in making policy or electing its leaders, that is up to them... We 
accept that not every institution may be able or willing to follow our democratic example' 
(TUC 1983: 29). Consequently, as an exemplar of democratic practice, the trade union 
movement could make a powerful case for inclusion in the 'democratic community' of 
Britain from which the Government had sought to drive them (see the following section 
of this Chapter): 'I have always believed that the British trade union Movement is a very
15 Note the personalisation - see above, p. 118.
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important part of one of the finest democracies in the world1 (Dufly, T. TUC (Wembley) 
1982: 396).
The adoption by the union movement of the language of'democracy' to describe 
its own arrangements, and criticism of the Government as anti-democratic in principle and 
undemocratic in practice placed it in a position to accuse the Government of hypocrisy in 
that it was requiring standards of democracy from the union movement which it was 
unwilling to impose upon itself: What we object to most strongly is people who live in 
undemocratic glass houses throwing stones at the trade union Movement on the grounds 
that our democratic processes are allegedly deficient. We would remind them of some 
sound advice. If they want to see clearly to cast out the mote in their brother's eye they 
should first cast out the beam in their own' (TUC 1983: 29). The Biblical language here 
emphasised the sense of'righteousness' evidently felt by many in the unions over this issue
- We were genuinely under the impression that we'd pretty well invented democracy' 
(Murray, interview) - and the allegation of hypocrisy, combined with that of prejudice 
resulting from the exceptional treatment meted out to unions by comparison with other 
institutions once again cast the Government as 'enemy1 (see pp. 117-21), marginalising it 
as insincere in its motives in the eyes of 'fair-minded' people.
The union movement can therefore be seen to have made a powerful attempt to 
reclaim the language of democracy from the Conservatives and to turn it to its advantage. 
However, a potential problem remained. As the unions acknowledged in defending the 
existence of differing procedures against Government attempts to regularise them, there 
were various forms of democracy: There is no one form of democracy. Different countries 
have different ways of electing their government. In the USA and France all the people 
can vote on who should be president. In Britain, however, we elect MPs and, as citizens, 
we have no direct say in who is Prime Minister. No one would say one system was more 
democratic than the other. It is the same with union democracy' (TUC 1983: 11-12). The 
fact that there was no single accepted definition of the concept, and the union willingness 
to admit that there might be problems with their procedures which needed to be addressed
- the 'mote' in their eye and the concession that Unions are not perfect' (TUC 1983: 3) - 
left open the possibility that the Government's definition16 might achieve dominance in the
16 Or that of right-wing union leaders such as the EETPLFs Eric Hammond who 
remarked that We believe that for a union to conduct its elections by postal ballot is 
honourable and desirable. For sections of the Movement to say otherwise is (cont.)
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consciousness of the public and union members.
To win support on the issue of democracy, the unions had to convince them that 
their definition was 'correct' and that the Government was misusing or abusing the term: 
He says he is concerned to enhance democracy in trade unions. He says he wants to help 
ordinary members. He says he wants to bolster individual freedom. He says he wants to 
ensure that powerful organisations, like unions are genuinely representative and 
accountable. Well, he would say that wouldn't he? Democracy is a fine word for a fine 
thing. Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Tebbit misuse it. The unions don't just talk about it - we put 
it into practice everyday1 (TUC 1983:3 - emphasis in original). As will be seen in Chapter 
6, this was not necessarily easily achieved.
VI. Unions, society and the public
I argued in Chapter 3 that much Government discourse, in connection with 
policies which excluded the unions from a corporatist role, functioned (in part at least) to 
effect a delegitimisation or marginalisation of the trade union movement within British 
society. It caused the public and, to a lesser extent, union members to question the 
significance and continued relevance of trade unions in an increasingly individualised 
milieu. The materials analysed here show an awareness of this: 'In Mr. Tebbit's nightmare 
world, trade unions are the evil ogres, threatening democracy and freedom everywhere... 
Mrs. Thatcher seems to think the unions are a threat to the British way of life' (TUC 
1983:5, 10). In response, they needed to devise a means of re-integrating themselves 
within the 'community1 or 'nation' - to establish that they were not a 'threat' to society, and 
that in fact they had a vital role to play in protecting and forwarding national, rather than 
sectional, interests.
Responding to the Conservative attempt to challenge their relevance to society 
was a continuing process for trade unions which arguably became more significant as the 
decade wore on, simply because the 'attritional' nature of Government rhetoric and 
policies increasingly called the labour movement's role into question. I will accordingly 
return to this issue at somewhat greater length in Chapter 6. Moreover, the analysis by the
(cont.) standing principle on its head, for there are some whose opposition to public 
ballots masks hostility to ballots themselves, for they fear the changes that come in the 
wake of members' power' (TUC (Wembley) 1982: 393).
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unions of their role in British society, which was prompted by the Government's attempts 
to marginalise them in rhetoric and policy, inevitably ranged more broadly than the issue 
of labour legislation, covering recruitment policies, services to members etc.; matters 
which are beyond the scope of this thesis (see Taylor 1994). However, in so far as the 
attempt to exclude the unions from politically acceptable society formed an important 
element of the Government's anti-union discourse in justification of its legislative policies, 
it seems appropriate to analyse the union movement's initial response.
Role of the unions in society
Maclnnes (1990: 222; following Flanders 1975) has drawn a distinction between 
two roles for unionism in the British context - 'vested interest', which refers to the use of 
industrial power in order to achieve improvements in wages and conditions, usually at a 
local, workplace level; and 'sword of justice', which refers to nationally-based campaigns 
(often conducted via the TUC) against inequality and injustice. It is the second of these 
roles which is of particular interest here.
The pluralist analysis of industrial relations, which, as discussed (pp. 106-7) 
informed and structured British union discourse and behaviour, was based upon the need 
for unions to exist to protect individual workers, given the inevitable divergence of 
interests between workers and employers and the fact that the former lacked power when 
set against that of the employer. The role of trade unions, in this theoretical structure, was 
to act as a 'counterbalance' to managerial prerogative (Webb and Webb 1920a: 173-4). 
This function found frequent expression in TUC/union discourse, although the claim was 
that the unions had too little power to perform this role adequately, not too much, as the 
Government maintained: 'The new legalistic devices are designed to diminish the 
negotiating strength of trade unions in modern society - a society in which the power of 
employers increases everyday. That power does not rest only, or even primarily, on 
contracts of supply and the like. It is expressed in complex financial and commercial 
arrangements, through associated companies both national and transnational, against 
whom trade unions and even governments can frequently offer no countervailing force' 
(TUC 1980b: 15); *the past two or three decades has seen the spectacular growth of multi­
plant enterprises. This has greatly strengthened the power of employers, enabling them to 
switch production and use 'divide and rule' tactics. We have seen the rise of huge
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transnational corporations with economic power often as great as countries such as 
Belgium and Norway. Trade unions offer only inadequate countervailing pressure to such 
developments' (TUC 1982c: 8).
Such remarks were predicated upon the ubiquity of conflict between capital and 
labour discussed above, but the role for the unions was not simply to protect their 
members from employers. Protection was also needed for working people against 
Government policies which worsened their standard of living or job security: 'The 
Government's policies have caused soaring unemployment, falling living standards, and 
dramatically reduced social services. Unions are the only defence working people have 
against the effects of these pernicious policies - that is why the Government wants to 
weaken us' (TUC 1982b); 'at a time when there are four million unemployed, when living 
standards are falling, when there is an inhuman attack on the Welfare State - the working 
people have only one Movement to turn to, the trade union Movement (Duffy, T. TUC 
(Wembley) 1982: 396).
The adversarial, 'protective' attitude manifest in these statements found perhaps 
its most dramatic expression in the discourse of Bill Keys, who saw the union role as 
extending even more broadly, to protection from society as a whole: 'I have never seen 
the trade union Movement other than as an organisation of working people challenging 
the excesses of a political-industrial-economic society with which our people have to 
struggle day by day. We are the countervailing force to those excesses, and it is for that 
reason alone that this Government wish to destroy us as an effective force' (TUC 1982: 
466).While this might be seen as an isolated remark, it nevertheless demonstrated the 
potential which existed for the Conservative Government to marginalise the unions - if 
there were those within the union movement who viewed 'society' as an 'external force', 
as Keys implies, then it could plausibly be argued, as the Government/New Right' sought 
to do, that the unions were not a legitimate or valid element of that society.
The protective aspect of the unions' 'sword of justice' role thus shaded into a claim 
by the unions to make representations about, and perhaps become involved in, wider 
Government policies on the economy and social welfare. In consequence, the unions, and 
particularly the TUC, claimed the right to exercise a voice in government, a function 
which had a lengthy history (Taylor 1993: passim), given the 'continuing political 
imperative of British trade unionism' (Mcllroy 1995: 185):
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Through unions and the TUC, pressure can be brought on the Government on a 
whole range of subjects that matter to ordinary people:
- on education, training and youth unemployment;
- on the public transport system, equality for all those at work and fair treatment 
for all those without a job;
- on the social services, the National Health Service, pensions.
In short, the trade union Movement is concerned about the well-being of its 
members and their families 'from the cradle to the grave' (TUC 1983: 6).
In effect, the unions were calling for a consultative role on economic and industrial policy 
which had been denied them by Thatcher's policy of excluding them from decision-making 
processes: 'Government is determined to deny the trade union Movement any effective 
voice in the decisions which deeply affect working people. It has rejected any notion of 
engaging in genuine consultation with, or reaching a broad understanding with, the trade 
union Movement on economic and social policy' (GC Report, TUC (Wembley) 1982: 
351).
However, while the unions' protective role was founded upon the inevitability of 
conflict with employers and Government, the calls to exercise a voice in economic policy 
were couched in much more conciliatory terms. The vocabulary here was of rationality, 
moderation and cooperation: Unions want to build a better future. Successful industry 
competing in world markets. Efficient public services meeting the needs of ordinary men 
and women. Unions can achieve most when they work with Government and employers, 
playing a positive role in moving our country forward - when they can work towards 
common goals rather than being locked out from influence and involvement' (TUC 1983: 
13). The unions' cooperative approach was placed in stark contrast to the Government's 
damaging and destructive attitude towards the economy: 'The trade union Movement has 
a massive contribution to make in solving Britain's problems. But instead of harnessing 
the commitment of the Movement to a joint endeavour to cure our national ills this 
Government have repeatedly turned away from the hand we have held out to them' (Parry, 
T. TUC 1980:362). In this manner, the TUC/unions could claim to be protecting the 
national interest, with the Government unprepared to do so and thus marginalised.
As custodians of the interests of the nation, the union movement could seek to 
argue that it was protecting the interests of a much wider constituency than 'working 
people'. This was a particular theme of Hands Up For Democracy, which listed 'some of 
the things the trade unions are doing' Tor children and young people', 'for people at work', 
'for the unemployed' and 'for the retired' (TUC 1983: 6-9):
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Many things which we now take for granted would not have been achieved 
without pressure from the trade union Movement. In recent years, for instance, the 
Sex Discrimination, Equal Pay and Health and Safety at Work Acts were 
introduced following pressure from the trade union Movement. The Health and 
Safety Commission; the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service; the 
Manpower Services Commission; and the National Economic Development 
Council - all doing vital jobs for the country in different ways - depend for their 
existence on the active support and work of trade unionists. Child benefits, pay 
slips which show how much has been deducted in tax, the pensioners’ Christmas 
bonus, country of origin markings on goods, public holidays on May Day and 
January 1 - these are just a few of the things which have become reality only after 
pressure from the trade union Movement' (ibid: 9).
Union leaders also made use of the language of history to emphasise that their role and 
achievements were fundamental within British political society: 'the very basic fabric of 
the society that we have taken hundreds of years to build is now under attack and some 
of us even doubt if it can be restored' (Keys, W. TUC 1981: 426); 'none of our accepted 
freedoms today would be a possibility had our forefathers not been prepared to defy the 
law. We could not have combined had we not defied the law. Women would not have 
won the vote had we not defied the law. We would not have the right of freedom of 
political expression in the way that we have had we not been prepared to defy the existing 
law' (Scargill, A. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 384).
As previously discussed (pp. 131-6), the language of history could be a powerful 
rhetorical device. If the Conservative Government was seen not only to be denying unions 
a present role, but also to be attacking a movement which had made a crucial contribution 
to making the nation what it was today, then its policies might come under increasing 
public scrutiny, if only because the Government was thereby 'invalidating' nearly a century 
of British history: 'trade unionism is a major and unique barrier to mass impoverishment 
and a return to the servitude of pre-1906' (Gill, K. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 400). By 
focusing in this way upon what they had achieved for the nation, both past and present, 
the unions thus sought to counter Conservative attempts to portray them as an irrelevant 
or inimical institution within that nation.
Such language could thus serve the purpose of'reintegrating' the unions into the 
political community or nation. A similar result could be achieved by an inclusive definition 
o f who the unions represented - the greater their 'coverage', the more difficult it might be 
for the Government to marginalise them. Thus, the argument was made that the unions 
were representing a growing number of working people: During the past decade the
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Movement has come to represent more than ever before a broader and broader spectrum 
of working people throughout the country and, representing that broader and broader 
spectrum, we have made great advances and we have made them together1 (Dawson, P. 
TUC (Wembley) 1982:401).
However, while this widening of union coverage might enable them to speak for 
increasing numbers of people, it is notable that the union movement was still only seen as 
representing 'working people’, a description which might return it to the language of'class' 
discussed above: We represented the working class, not anyone else. That was what we 
talked about' (Poole, interview), and thus lend credence to the Conservative argument that 
unions were 'sectional interests'.
In Hands Up for Democracy, in contrast, the emphasis upon the achievements of 
unions within British society was combined with a definition of unions which equated 
them with the wider community: 'The next time you are in a crowd look around. Whether 
you are in a supermarket or a football ground, in a bus or in a cafe the chances are that 
many, if not most, people around you will be trade union members. Doctors and lorry 
drivers; dockers and designers; office workers and shop assistants; they all go to make up 
the unions... Unions don't just represent the people of Britain. They are the people of 
Britain. So when Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Tebbit attack the unions, they are not having a 
go at some evil abstraction, some secret conspiracy. They are attacking the British people' 
(TUC 1983: 2 - italics in original).
Such an equation of'the people/nation' with the trade unions was potentially an 
important means of gaining broader support for resistance to the legislation in so far as 
the public or national interest could be portrayed as damaged directly by the 
Government's policies. Such language attempted to contradict the notion that the 
Conservatives were attacking a force 'alien' or threatening to British society by 
'humanising' the trade unions and rendering them familiar - if you were not a member, then 
your neighbour would be. The Conservatives were therefore attacking you, or those you 
knew.
Defining the audience
Linked closely to this question of 'who the unions were' was the issue of the 
audience being addressed. If, as implied by Hands Up for Democracy, the unions and the
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public were fused and indistinguishable, then it could be argued that there was no 
particular need to adapt the message so that it was appropriate for public consumption - 
union interests were identical to those of the public. To an extent this would seem to have 
been the case - Peter Morris remarked that public service unions ’made no particular 
attempt before 1983 to appeal to the public' (interview).
Nevertheless, from around the time of the Wembley Conference onwards a greater 
attempt to appeal specifically to the public may be detected, rather than an assumption 
that the concerns of unions and the public were the same. This could be done directly, 
tailoring the message slightly so as to suit different audiences: We must get across to the 
public the positive face of trade unionism, which is so distorted in the hostile propaganda 
spread by our enemies... So these are the messages that we want you to get over. To your 
members, this Bill is aimed at them and at the ability of their unions to defend them... To 
the public, that this Bill is utterly irrelevant to the nation's real needs and a danger to the 
public' (Murray, L. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 380-1); The trade unions have to educate their 
members at the grass roots about what this Bill is going to be to them and what it is going 
to mean to their families. We also have to go on a programme of educating the public at 
large that the trade union Movement, in defending their rights, are actually defending their 
civil liberties as well' (Marsland, T. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 402). Alternatively, the public 
could be addressed by using union members as channels of communication: 'The first task 
will be to spread the message of opposition among union members, and through them to 
the wider public and employers' (GC Report, TUC (Wembley) 1982: 352).
Union discourse can therefore be seen as constructing an audience - classifying 
those who were receiving the messages (either those sitting in the conference hall listening 
to Congress speeches, or those reading reports of those speeches or TUC pamphlets or 
posters) into various categories and choosing the message most suitable to each. A 
threefold division can be detected, between activists, 'ordinary' union members and the 
wider public: We have to get over the case against the Employment Bill, not just to those 
who are active within our unions, but to the majority of members who are inactive and to 
the wider public' (Mills, L. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 382). The advantage of this approach 
for the unions was that the language could be adapted to suit those being addressed: 
There was an important debate throughout the 1980s as to who the constituency of the 
unions was... there was a recognition of different types of audience. However, the better 
General Secretaries did not have 'different voices' - they would say the same thing to
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different audiences, but in different ways which reflected the audience’ (Morris, interview). 
This might enable the unions to be somewhat more sophisticated in their use of language, 
reflecting the fact that each type of audience had a different set of priorities and concerns.
The perceived need to devise or adapt a message to suit a particular audience 
sprang in part from an awareness that there were high levels of support among union 
members both for the Conservative Government and the legislation itself: 'some members 
themselves may naively think that the Bill is necessary and there is no shortage of privately 
funded opinion polls quoting large numbers of trade union members supporting this 
unnecessary legislation. We have to convince our own members and also convince the 
wider public' (Mills, L. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 382); T)oes not every measurement of 
public - indeed, trade union members’ - opinion show that we have only minority support? 
Why?* (Hammond, E. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 393). There was also a consciousness that 
media support for the Government and the legislation had played an important part in 
shaping members' attitudes to the policies: Many members' ideas about the legal attack 
on unions are taken straight from the media. Yet the media and politicians present the 
legal changes in a very misleading way. We have seen how myths have been created to 
lead into the idea of'reforms' of'abuses'. Most members will only learn of the real threats 
to them and their union if activists take the trouble to tell them' (TUC 1982c: 34).
Yet while this showed the unions to be responsive to the need to adapt their 
discourse to the interests and concerns of differing audiences, the final extract shows that 
potential problems remained with this approach. The 'activist' was seen as the primary 
conduit by which messages about the legislation could be transmitted to the members (and 
thence to the public): 'So we need to spell out to our activists, and they in turn have to 
bring home to the members, the nature and purpose of this attack' (Murray, L. TUC 
(Wembley) 1982: 379); 'Active trade unionists must think clearly how to counter these 
myths as part of the campaign against anti-union law. Putting forward a positive image 
of trade unionism is a key element in rebuilding morale and strengthening membership 
awareness of the essential role of trade unions' (TUC 1982c: 7). Thus, although the 
TUC/unions knew that they needed to 'convince our members - every one of them, not 
just the activists, not just the local officials - of the need to highlight the damaging effects 
that this legislation will have upon their union' (Tuffin, A. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 400),
160
the language in which they sought to achieve this tended to be directed towards activists,17 
a fact acknowledged by the former TUC General Secretary:
In so far as we were addressing trade union members, and trying to stir them into 
action with demonstrations etc., we were addressing activists. There most 
certainly were pamphlets which were addressed to the public, but I suspect we 
never thought our approach through and we were in fact addressing activists, not 
the wider public. What we never did was to take opinion polls... We never got 
through to the rank and file. Demonstrations in Hyde Park, Newcastle, Cardiff - 
they were gatherings of the faithful. One used to see the same faces all the time. 
We were talking to each other - it was an internal conversation... We never took 
a deep breath and said 'what is our public relations position' (Murray, interview).
The result of this approach was that, as another interviewee remarked, the 'activist' tended 
to be prioritised over the other categories of audience, and the language used was that 
which would appeal to him/her: 'unions addressed public, members and activists in the 
same way - using the language of activists' (Poole, interview).
The problem with this - and a potential difficulty in classifying the audience into 
various categories - was that the interests and vocabulary of activists may not have been 
compatible with those of'ordinary' members and the public. In particular, activists, well 
versed in the history of the labour movement and frequently tending toward a greater 
degree of militancy than other union members, might favour the discourses of 
confrontation, unity and solidarity, class and tradition, while the public and union members 
might regard such language as unpersuasive: 'There was a gap between what was said for 
public consumption and what may have been said to please the activists. Union leadership 
was involved in a 'game' in which they appeared sensible and rational to the public in order 
to win public esteem, and at the same time appealing to activists by talking in fairly 
traditional terms' (Hall, interview); Members didn't want a barnstorming speech - they 
actually wanted their problems solved' (Poole, interview). These were difficulties with 
which the unions had increasingly to deal as the decade wore on, as I shall discuss in 
Chapter 6.
17 This problem tended to be exacerbated by the fact that the TUC Congress was 
attended by union activists rather than 'ordinary' members or the public; while many TUC 
publications (with the notable exception of Hands Up fo r Democracy, which had a 
considerably more populist tone) were also addressed to activists - for example, the 1982 
campaign pack contained a set of 'speaking notes' designed for union officials conducting 
meetings.
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In conclusion, Len Murray's observation that, in the early 1980s, unions were 
'using language in ways which were hallowed by tradition' (interview) seems to be strongly 
borne out by the material discussed in this Chapter. The language of conflict and 
confrontation, the discourse of class, the emphasis upon 'unity1 and 'solidarity' and the 
stress laid upon the historical development and achievements of the union movement all 
essentially emanated from the unions' pluralist analysis of the industrial relations system 
in Britain, which had developed over the course of many years, while even the attempt to 
present the unions as reasonable institutions offering assistance to the nation as a whole 
owed something to the desire to return to the 'quasi-corporatist' arrangements of the 
1960s and early 1970s. The use of such language is understandable, given the 
conservative nature of trade unions (see p.l 1), the unions' conviction that Thatcherism 
'was a passing phenomenon' (Murray, interview - see p. 102) and the priority given to 
activists as consumers of union discourse.
However, certain shifts in patterns of language can also be seen as emerging 
during this period - particularly in the unions' response to the Government's use of the 
language of individualism and 'democracy'. The unions showed themselves aware of the 
need to respond to these discourses and to construct an effective counter-argument. 
Moreover, from around the time of the Wembley Conference in 1982, the TUC and union 
leaders also started to demonstrate a consciousness of the need to adjust the vocabulary 
to suit a particular audience and to make appeals to the public and union members in an 
attempt to counteract the Government's attempts to marginalise them as illegitimate 
institutions within British political society. I shall now move on to discuss the progress of 
these developments by analysing themes in union discourse in the period 1986-1990.
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CHAPTER SIX: Union responses and language 1986-90
In order properly to comprehend the responses, as articulated in discourse, of the 
trade union movement to Government policies and legislation in the period from the 
publication of the consultative document on Industrial Relations Legislation in January 
1986 to the fall of Thatcher in November 1990, it is necessary first briefly to discuss 
developments in the TUC and unions following the Conservative election victory in 1983.1
The 1983 Congress, the first after Labour's substantial election defeat, saw the 
emergence of'new realism' in the union movement (Taylor 1993: 268; Bassett 1986: 46). 
This amounted to a retreat from the confrontational stance of non-cooperation which 
characterised much of the TUC's response during the first Thatcher administration (see 
pp. 104-21), and placed emphasis upon the moderation and reasonableness of the unions. 
This conciliatory policy found expression in the document TUC Strategy (1984) which 
stressed the contribution which unions could make to economic improvement and the 
important representative role they played in society, thereby enabling them to assist in the 
task of governing the nation. To this end, Len Murray sought to enter into broad policy 
discussions with ministers, and the refusal to coordinate union action under the Wembley 
principles in support of the NGA's dispute in December 1983 strongly signalled the TUC's 
desire for rapprochement with Government. However, Thatcher's refusal to agree to a 'no­
strike' deal following the banning of unions at GCHQ (see p.26) and the subsequent 
miners' strike of 1984-5, temporarily derailed' 'new realism' (McHroy 1991: 79), causing 
the TUC to withdraw temporarily from NEDC and persuading Murray to resign as 
General Secretary.
The Trade Union Act 1984 produced a more restrained response from the TUC 
than previous pieces of legislation, with decisions as to compliance with the provisions 
being left to individual affiliated unions, several of which changed their rules to accord 
with the new measures. Although the unions achieved a 'victory' on the issue of political 
fund ballots (Part HI of the Act; see p.26), taken as a whole, 'the summer of 1984 saw the 
change from opposition to compliance firmed up, even if formal defiance was maintained 
in relation to certain aspects of the legislation' (Mcllroy 1991: 87). This was exacerbated 
by the dissolution of opposition to the receipt of state funds for union ballots, with the
1 See p. 19 for an explanation of the periods chosen for analysis in this thesis.
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AEU and the EETPU conducting ballots resulting in majorities to accept, and culminating 
in agreement by the General Council of the TUC in 1986, that decisions on the acceptance 
of state funds for ballots should be left to the discretion of affiliates.
Important as these developments were for TUC/union language in the latter part 
of the 1980s, it can be argued that it was the miners' strike of 1984-5 which 'brought 
about a fundamental shift in the balance of power between the government and the trade 
unions' (Davies and Freedland 1993: 492), the effects of which manifested themselves in 
the unions' discourse concerning their role in the British nation (see section V). In 
particular, the fact that the Government was able to portray the strike as a threat to 
national security and public order, assisted by the actions of the NUM in transferring funds 
abroad and accepting funds from the USSR (ibid. 495) contributed to the rhetoric and 
policy of marginalisation, which formed an important element of the Conservative/New 
Right' approach to unions (pp.60-6). Moreover, the absence of any coordinated response 
from the TUC in support of the strike, despite the national - rather than sectional - nature 
of the underlying grievances, underlined the inability of the TUC to mount an extensive 
campaign of defiance or to engineer substantial solidarity support. In this respect, the 
strike was 'a watershed which facilitated the resurgence of the now not so new realism' 
(Mcllroy 1995: 214), reaffirming the TUC's cautious response during the remainder of the 
decade and causing the TUC and Labour leadership to begin to 'review and revise their 
whole approach to the law' (Moher 1995: 31), manifested in the gradual shift from a 
system of 'immunities' to one of 'rights’ advanced in the 1986 documents Industrial 
Relations Legislation and People at Work: New Rights, New Responsibilities (see pp.91- 
2).
Thus, 'by the time of the Conservative election victory in 1987 any pretence of 
TUC coordination of union opposition had vanished' (Mcllroy 1995: 259). The TUC 
opposed the 1988 Act, but the campaign was very different in tone from that surrounding 
the 1982 Act, being focused around 'lobbying] employers, Conservative MPs and the 
House of Lords on the dangerous consequences of the proposals' (GC Report, TUC 1987: 
31; see also GC Report, TUC 1988: 29-30): 'we adopted a workmanlike and methodical 
approach in our opposition to the Bill. A key focus was on the Bill's various parliamentary 
stages. We lobbied long and hard at meetings with Ministers and backbench MPs. We 
attended every meeting of the Commons Standing Committee on the Bill. We kept in very 
close contact with the Labour Front Bench dealing with the Bill, attending weekly
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meetings bn tactics to delay and oppose the Bill, and helping to draft probing and 
weakening amendments' (Grantham, R. TUC 1988: 422). Similar tactics were adopted in 
respect of the Acts of 1989 and 1990 (GC Report, TUC 1989: 19; 1990: 4), with 
particular emphasis being given to opposition expressed by certain employers' 
organisations, notably the IPM (see p. 172).
By 1990, therefore, the nature of TUC/union responses to the legislation had 
changed considerably. The policy of defiance and non-cooperation evident earlier in the 
decade - and exhibited most powerfully in 1982 - had dwindled, in the light of the inability 
and reluctance of the TUC to mount any coordinated opposition to the legislative 
measures, into one of relatively perfunctory protest at each new piece of legislation,2 
coupled with an attempt to persuade employers, MPs and others that the legislation was 
inequitable (see below, pp. 176-82). The unions had learned to 'live with the law' (Moher 
1995: 37), accepting - in the light of the Labour Party's reluctance to repeal all of the 
legislation (Mcllroy 1991: 211-20) - that the law was in industrial relations to stay.
The developing responses and strategies of the TUC and unions during this period 
have been chronicled by Mcllroy, while alterations in patterns of workplace behaviour and 
the rise of so-called 'business unionism' - which might be expected to generate its own 
language - have been examined by others (Bassett 1986, Roberts 1987 - see further 
p. 196). There remains, however, a need to evaluate and interpret the discourse of'new 
realism' and the changing patterns of union vocabulary in the later 1980s, which I shall 
attempt to do in this Chapter, once again drawing upon TUC publications and Congress 
speeches for the purposes of the discussion.
I. The language of 'new realism'
The reassessment which was implied by 'new realism' in the TUC and unions thus 
involved, in the first instance, a recognition that they were functioning in a changed (and 
hostile) political and legal environment. In part, this was an acknowledgment that the 
voluntarist approach to industrial relations was no longer appropriate: 'In our view there 
is no question of excluding the law from industrial relations' (TUC-Labour 1986: 4 - see
2 The TUC official response to Unofficial Action and the Law consisted of a five 
page typed sheet, in stark contrast to the extensive materials produced for the 1982 
campaign (TUC 1989d).
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also TUC 1986a: 3), causing the unions to consider the need to switch to a system of 
positive legislative rights (see Chapter 4). However, it also reflected an awareness of 
broader changes in the economy and in the culture of management which might affect the 
position of unions: ’The pattern of work in Britain is changing: the kind of jobs many 
people do is different, and so is the way they do them1 (TUC-Labour 1986: 6); 'Congress 
recognises the major changes that have taken place in the UK labour market in the last 
nine years as a result of mass unemployment, the Government's relentless assault on trade 
unions and individual employment rights, the increasing use of aggressive management 
tactics in both the public and private sectors, and the development of a divisive and 
discriminatory, two-tier labour market' (Composite Motion 26, TUC 1988: 622). It also 
came to entail an acceptance of the fact that the Conservative Government was unwilling 
to enter into a dialogue with the unions, and that they accordingly needed to wait for the 
election of a Labour Government for the realisation of their proposals: 'It is not an agenda 
that we can negotiate with the present Government. It is something that can only be 
delivered by the return of a Labour Government' (Young, A. TUC 1990: 289). This was 
not, of course, the initial view of Len Murray, whose proposals at the 1983 Congress were 
intended to form the basis of discussion with ministers - however, the refusal of Thatcher 
to compromise on the issue of GCHQ seems to have forced the abandonment of this 
strategy (Mcllroy 1991: 79).
The changes in political, legal and economic conditions which the unions 
confronted were seen as being so significant that there was no possibility of reversing 
them. This view was particularly strongly espoused by Murray's successor as TUC 
General Secretary, Norman Willis, who expressed the belief that 'We cannot simply turn 
back the calendar, and obliterate the past, damaging decade. We must start from today's 
problems, and tackle them in a way that reflects the concerns and priorities of today's 
workers' (Willis, N. TUC Bulletin, July 1990: 2). This type of acknowledgment of the 
intensity of change preventing a reversion to the pre-Thatcher position allowed Willis and 
his supporters to portray themselves as up-to-date and concerned with contemporary 
issues - note the repetition of the word 'today' in the extract. In contrast, those who 
opposed the TUC position were depicted as backward-looking and unrealistic, an 
accusation made with particular stridency by the 'modernisers 'in the 1990 debate over 
the TUC statement Employment Law: A New Approach (see p. 192): We all share a bit 
of nostalgia - the feeling that if it was only like that again, problems would somehow go
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away, but life is not like that... We have to start with the only world that we have - the 
world as it is, not the world as we would like it to be' (Willis, N. TUC 1990: 285); 
•Nostalgia is all very well. But it is a bad basis for making policy. I do not want to go back 
to the 1970s and I would much prefer going into the 1990s' (Edmonds, J. TUC 1990: 
309).
Edmonds' statement indicates that this approach involved more than simply 
learning to live with current circumstances. The unions might have learned to adapt to a 
changed situation; but they also sought to remodel themselves for the future. In this 
respect, a key word in 'new realist' discourse was 'challenge'. The changes in political, 
legal and economic circumstances represented difficulties for the unions - but they were 
surmountable, and therefore also offered opportunities for development which might 
enable them to move forward: We have had many challenges to face during the past year, 
and there are undoubtedly many challenges ahead. There can be no slackening in our 
resolve' (Grantham, R. TUC 1988: 423); We shall respond to this challenge positively, 
by continuing to look ahead and to set our own agenda' (Christopher, C. TUC 1989: 304); 
'Our task - our responsibility - is to take the Movement to the challenges of the 1990s and 
beyond' (Willis, N. TUC 1990: 285; see also SRB 1988, Meeting the Challenge).
The significance of this language was that it allowed the 'new realist' stance to be 
represented as positive - turning obstacles into advantages, as a fuller consideration of 
Christopher's remarks indicates:
'The Government's attempts to kill off trade unions have failed. Were that not the 
case it would not have been necessary to keep introducing fresh bills. Unions are 
certainly hamstrung to a point, but they are keeping to the law and even turning 
it to advantage... Our enemies have tried to force trade unionism into a negative 
mould - to portray unions as enemies of progress. We shall not fall into this trap. 
We are eager to play a positive role. We know that if we are negative we have no 
real say in planning our future at all. We are willing to take responsibility to help 
create the future... Next year, as the General Election approaches, the Government 
will try to hit us hard... Having lost the initiative themselves on the main issues of 
the day, they will try to characterise the unions as backward looking. We shall 
respond to this challenge positively, by continuing to look ahead and to set our 
own agenda' (TUC 1989: 302-4).
The notion that the unions, by meeting the challenges offered by the various changes, 
could turn them to their advantage and set their own agenda, contrasted starkly with the 
defensive rhetoric previously commented upon (pp. 128-31). Moreover, this approach was 
active rather than passive - rather than simply responding to events, the unions were seen
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to be vigorously creating their own future. The vocabulary was accordingly that of 
’building' and 'construction': We have to start the work and keep it up constructively over 
the years because our time is coming. We have to build well for the future' (Grantham, R. 
TUC 1989: 346); 'Congress welcomes therefore the policy adopted by the General 
Council which stresses the creation of new constructive legislation' (Composite Motion 
1, TUC 1990: 287); 'we are not trying to build the shabby monuments of the past again, 
but trying to get something better. We are building our new system on the knowledge that 
other people in other countries have done better than us, have got better rights and better 
powers for trade unions' (Edmonds, J. TUC 1990: 309). This emphasis upon the creativity 
of unions was thus closely bound up with the shift from a policy of'immunities' to one of 
positive 'rights' (see Chapter 4) which enabled them to shape the law to their own benefit, 
rather than simply seeking to minimise its impact.
The language of'new realism' was therefore positive, constructive and forward- 
looking. Unions had not merely recognised the changes in the law and adapted to them; 
they had started to turn them to advantage - they were not simply coping with present 
difficulties, but looking to shape and create their future. 'The future' was a fundamental 
element of'new realist' discourse, as I have already suggested. The conception that the 
changes of the 1980s were so fundamental that they could not be reversed encouraged 
'new realists' to look forward and to portray their proposals - particularly in the form of 
Employment Law: A New Approach - as progressive: 'The buck stops here. The future 
starts here. It is an historic step that we have to take... Make a start for the future... 
Support each other and let us start getting a line under where we have been and a direct 
line to the future' (Willis, N. TUC 1990: 285, 286, 311); 'to maintain this progress we 
have to make a clear choice between looking forward to the future and harking back to 
the past... I urge you to vote for the future' (Young, A. TUC 1990: 288,289); We have 
to demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that we are determined to see an industrial 
framework of law for the future, not resurrect the power of the past' (Jordan, W. TUC 
1990: 306). In contrast, those who did not support the proposals were seen as 
retrogressive, motivated by nostalgia and divorced from reality (see above): In the harsh 
daylight of the 1990s, the yearning for old immunities does not amount to a policy. It is 
more like a cry for help. It is just not sensible to give any impression that we are asking 
for the trade unions to be above the law' (Willis, N. TUC 1990: 285 - see above, p.94). 
The perception seems to have been that the forward-looking vocabulary would be of
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greater appeal to the public and to ’ordinary' trade unionists.3
Those who endorsed the 'new realism' or modernising approach thus sought to 
distance themselves from the past. The key vocabulary was thus that of renewal, as the 
very phrase 'new realist' implies. By labelling their policies as 'new', the TUC and its 
supporters among the affiliated unions could emphasise that they were distinct from those 
of the earlier 1980s, and therefore that unions had recognised the changes which had taken 
place and had acted upon them by adapting their policies to meet those developments. 
This was implicit in the titles of both the 1986 Labour Party/TUC statement, New Rights, 
New Responsibilities and the TUC document of 1990, Employment Law: A New 
Approach. Elsewhere, the language of renewal was to be found in many publications and 
speeches: 'Britain needs a new approach to industrial relations' (TUC-Labour 1986: 3); 
'nothing less than a new start is needed, a new deal for the people of Britain' (TUC 1990b: 
9); 'The case for a new, balanced approach to employment law is overwhelming' (TUC 
1990c: 21); 'at the heart of our vision is a new deal for individuals at work' (Willis, N. 
TUC 1990: 285); 'It aims to replace Mrs. Thatcher's anti-union laws all right, but it aims 
to replace them with a new framework of positive rights, not with the old framework of 
immunities which have ceased to serve their purpose, a new framework which recognises 
the rights and responsibilities of trade unionists' (Young, A. TUC 1990: 288).
In so far as the unions had moved away from 'immunities' and towards 'rights', the 
approach was indeed 'new* (or at least non-traditional),4 but I would argue that, to a large 
extent, the content of the policy was less significant than the labelling of it as 'new', which 
enabled the unions to make the claim that they had reinvented themselves: '[Composite 
Motion 1] embraces a policy which lets us get on with the job of winning working people 
to our ranks, creating the new blood of activists and stewards and rebuilding our great 
Movement, so that we can play our proper part in the economic and social regeneration 
of this nation' (Davies, D. TUC 1990: 307). As such, the unions could argue that they had 
divested themselves of the unsuccessful and unpopular policies of the early 1980s and, in
3 C/Dunn's discussion of the 'attractiveness' of the pioneering metaphor, which 
was also progressive and forward-looking (see p. 108).
4 As pointed out (p.67), the debate over 'rights' and 'immunities' had a lengthy
history.
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response to change, were changing themselves, in order to move forward to the future.5
Relationship with employers
Another important component of 'new realism' in the TUC and unions, as 
mentioned (pp. 164-5) was the relationship with employers and, especially, employers' 
organisations. Particular emphasis was placed upon lobbying employers as to the likely 
consequences for industrial relations of the 1988 and 1990 Acts, the argument being that 
the measures would cause disruption which was in the interests of neither side: 'I want to 
say that the employers are concerned about this proposal as well. They are very genuinely 
concerned, and so they should be, because it will sour industrial relations on the shop 
floor, the credibility of ballots will go, and there will be more unofficial action' (Knapp, 
J. TUC 1987: 439); We are not alone in our opposition to the Government's employment 
legislation... Employers have criticised the impractical burdens which the draft code of 
practice on industrial action balloting would have imposed. They realise that the code 
would only inflame disputes resulting in more industrial action' (Grantham, R. TUC 1989: 
345).
The ‘warning' that the policies would create disruption and damage for unions and 
employers alike by exacerbating industrial relations problems was, of course, nothing new 
- similar claims had been made in the earlier part of the decade (see pp. 114-115). 
However, there was a subtle alteration in the tone of these statements. The active nature 
of the unions' role, with the implicit threat of damaging consequences (Murray's 'putting 
the frighteners on that manager' (p. 115) or the claim that 'employers have got to 
understand - they have got to be made to understand' (p. 127)) had been replaced by an 
assessment of the prevailing mood amongst employers - that they were worried about the 
measures - which did not necessarily require union leaders to take any action. Again, this 
represented a 'realistic' evaluation by the unions as to what they could achieve in a 
changed political, economic and industrial environment - that in the light of declining 
levels of membership, economic difficulties and the popularity of some of the legislative 
measures with union members, coordinated action which would bear out the validity of
5 There is an obvious parallel between this aspect of trade union discourse and the 
Labour Party under Tony Blair's leadership, effectively renamed 'New Labour' to 
distinguish it from the electorally unsuccessful party of 1979-92.
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the view that the measures would cause damage and disruption could not be guaranteed; 
moreover, previous Acts had not caused widespread damage to the economy.
This change in tone from a threatening, adversarial approach to one based 
primarily upon an assumed identity of interest with the employer was also reflected in the 
particular consequences which were selected for emphasis. Although some union leaders, 
as just discussed, warned of possible disorder in industrial relations, the TUC itself chose 
to focus largely upon the administrative consequences for employers of the legislative 
measures: The Green Paper appears to be as much an attack on employers, for tolerating 
the closed shop, as on the unions concerned. Although the Green Paper refers to closed 
shop 'arrangements', we would point out that they are in fact agreements, either formal 
or informal, between unions and employers. We doubt whether employers would welcome 
legislation which could result in them being liable for substantial compensation. We also 
question the proposal to extend the right to compensation to those belonging to a union 
other than the one with the membership agreement. This could cause employers problems 
with multi-unionism' (TUC 1989b: 4). Such an analysis of the effects of Government 
policy moved well beyond the problems which unions themselves could create by 
industrial action to embrace other difficulties which might be caused to employers. The 
TUC was thus able to portray itself as - in effect - looking after the interests of employers, 
as well as workers: 'Contrary to the picture of them that the Government has, small 
employers are not ignorant or illiterate. The real burdens on small businesses are high 
interest rates, VAT regulations and commercial uncertainty' (TUC 1989a: 4); 'one of the 
Government's aims in introducing the Bill is to divert attention from the real problems 
facing employers such as high interest rates and skill shortages' (TUC 1990b: 7). The 
implication of this argument would seem to be that while the TUC was dealing with what 
it claimed were the 'real needs of the labour market' (GC Report, TUC 1989: 22), the 
Government was simply acting out of anti-union prejudice.
Unions and employers might, therefore, be seen as having common interests and 
as being ranged together against the Government's proposals, which would damage them 
both. As in the earlier part of the decade (see p. 115) the unions tried to demonstrate that 
there was a 'community' of opposition to the measures by quoting employers' 
organisations in support of their position: 'Concern has also been expressed by the 
Institute of Personnel Management and other employers’ organisations that further 
legislation is unnecessary' (TUC 1990a: 10); 'It is not inconceivable that an employer
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could provoke a strike, dismiss those deemed surplus to requirements and then continue 
business with the workforce reduced to the required size...our concerns in this respect are 
shared by the Director General of the Institute of Personnel Management' (TUC 1989c:
4). I would argue, however, that such a stance was more persuasive in relation to the later 
Acts, and more closely grounded in reality rather than rhetoric, since employers' 
organisations did indeed express concerns over various aspects of the legislation - for 
example, the Code of Practice on Industrial Action Ballots initially published in draft form 
in 1988 was criticised by the CBI, the EEF and the IPM (Mcllroy 1991: 161 - see quote 
from Grantham, above p. 170), while the TUC and the IPM produced a joint statement 
criticising various aspects of the Employment Bill 1988 (GC Report, TUC 1988: 30).
The greatest level of criticism was, however, reserved for the provision which later 
became s.3 Employment Act 1988 (see further below, pp.211-3), which ‘united all the 
employers organisations from the CBI and the EEF to the IPM. Even the Freedom 
Association and the Association of Conservative Trade Unionists opposed it' (Mcllroy 
1991: 139). The TUC and union leaders made considerable capital out of this: Employers' 
bodies, including the CBI, the Engineering Employers' Federation and even the Freedom 
Association, have all opposed the latest proposals. They recognised that it will cause 
anarchy in internal union organisation. Only last week the Scottish Engineering Employers 
told the Government that this latest dose of union bashing was going too far. The 
proposals to remove the right to discipline or expel rule-breakers was described as going 
against natural British justice by the Secretary of the Federation' (Chiverton, M. TUC 
1987: 446); We are not alone in seeing this as signalling a contempt for democracy, and 
as undermining ballots in principle and practice. The CBI, the IPM and a whole host of 
organisations with whom we would not always find ourselves in agreement have 
condemned this clause' (Willis, N. TUC Bulletin November 1987: 2).
The rhetorical effect of this was to isolate the Government, rather than the unions, 
as Conservative language sought to do - note the phrase We are not alone' - thus 
facilitating the depiction of its policies as disruptive, prejudiced and unsuccessful. In 
contrast, the TUC/union policies, backed by a broad range of support, could be seen as 
forward-looking and efficacious: My hope would be that our vision of employment law 
would be backed not just by our political friends, but by employers, and all who want to 
see a stable and effective system of industrial relations' (Willis, N. TUC Bulletin July 1990: 
2). In some senses, this might be seen as a stance informed by the union movement's
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voluntarist tradition6 - the unions and employers, not Government, knew best how to 
construct a stable and effective system, but, of course, with the crucial difference that the 
TUC now accepted that law and 'positive rights' formed a part of its 'new vision - hence 
the need for a ’new legal framework' introduced by 'a new Government committed to 
fairness' (TUC 1990c: 22, 23).
Having established that unions and employers' organisations shared concerns 
about the legislative measures, the 'new realists' in the TUC and the unions could invoke 
the language of'partnership' to describe their relations with employers. Once more, it is 
perhaps erroneous to view this as a wholly new development in union discourse - in 1980, 
the TUC had spoken of trade unionists and management working together to solve 
problems (TUC 1980a: 3 - see pp. 116) - but the concern shown for employers' wider 
interests in this later period, coupled with movement by certain unions towards 'business 
unionism' principles based upon greater cooperation with employers, lent renewed 
emphasis to this language. There was, moreover, a close relationship between the 
vocabulary of partnership and the positive or constructive tone discussed above (pp. 167- 
8): 'good industrial relations... must be developed through joint negotiation and agreement 
at the workplace' (TUC-Labour 1986: 3); '[Employment Law: A New Approach] 
underwrites the guarantee that the Labour Party has given to the electorate to end the 
conflict-ridden record of Britain's industrial relations, a promise to work for a positive 
partnership between trade unions and employers... laws that institutionalise cooperation, 
not conflict' (Jordan, W. TUC 1990: 306); We look forward to working with employers 
to improve industrial relations... We know organisations like the Institute of Personnel 
Management and the British Institute of Management have been critical of the 
Government’s one-sided measures and we look forward to widening employer support 
for our new approach and improvements in collective bargaining arrangements' (TUC 
1990c: 23).
The language was thus of cooperation rather than conflict, although this was a 
policy and vocabulary which had to be pursued by other participants in the industrial 
relations process, not just the unions: 'This is no time for macho management. It is not a 
time for more law. It is a time for management to listen to what workers are saying, to 
respond constructively and to work together to solve common problems. The big stick is
6 Note also criticism of Government attempts to regulate closed shop 'agreements' 
between unions and employers (TUC 1989b: 4 - above p. 171).
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a crude weapon of limited effectiveness. It can bring compliance in the short term. But 
what we need is cooperation. That can only be achieved by imagination and a genuine 
willingness to work together, rather than batter a workforce into submission. If the 
Government was to recognise that, and to encourage that attitude among employers, then 
it would be a fitting end to a decade of damaging legislation' (Willis, N. TUC Bulletin, 
May 1989: 2).
As Willis suggests, however, the underpinning vocabulary and threat of 
confrontation had not been totally superseded by that of partnership and cooperation. 
Conflicts of interest could not be fully eliminated from relations between workers and 
employers: 'In a free society it is inevitable that disputes will sometimes occur' (TUC 
1990c: 23); We have constructive relations with countless employers up and down the 
land, and we always have had - that has always been our goal, a partnership for prosperity. 
But even in the most ruthless dictatorship you cannot legislate away the clashes of interest 
that can occur at work' (Willis, N. TUC 1990: 285). It was apparent, therefore, that the 
unions had not abandoned their pluralist conception of industrial relations, despite the 
changing environment in which they operated. The persistence of the language of conflict 
and confrontation could be seen even more strongly in the discourse of those union 
leaders who were sceptical about 'new realism', as I shall discuss in the next section.
Despite this, the vocabulary of'partnership' continued to play a significant role in 
TUC/union discourse well into the 1990s (see GMB/UCW 1990; TUC 1994): 'There has 
been a seismic shift towards co-determination - this means talking a whole different 
language' (Poole, interview). In large part, this could be seen as a response to 'human 
resource management' strategies which had begun to emerge in the 1980s and which 
generated their own discourse (Dunn 1990; Keenoy and Anthony 1992). In so far as this 
can be seen as a reaction to changes in management, rather than to the specific issue of 
Government legislative policies, it is beyond the scope of this thesis; nevertheless, 
attempts to justify the TUC's 'new realist' policies towards the legislation by using this 
language, as discussed here, should be seen in the context of this broader development.
The language of the market
Closely linked to the notion of'partnership' with employers was the vocabulary of 
economics and the market. Working together with employers was supposed to achieve
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economic benefits for union members, since stability in industrial relations (albeit that 
conflict might on occasion take place) would offer British industries the opportunity to 
compete effectively in markets: 'All our proposals have as a primary objective the 
establishment of stable and constructive relations between unions and employers. We want 
our members to work in successful enterprises and organisations, competing vigorously 
and effectively. That is most likely to be achieved when all sides are working together and 
not working against each other, but in a free society you cannot legislate away the 
possibility of disputes' (Grantham, R. TUC 1989: 346). The stated objective was thus 'a 
flourishing and fully-employed economy: one that is efficient and internationally 
competitive; and one in which rising productivity leads to growth in output' (TUC-Labour 
1986: 8). Later proposals were therefore justified as providing the 'foundations for a 
genuine and sustained push for prosperity... essential for achieving the high 
productivity/high pay economy that the UK needs and deserves' (TUC 1990c: 22,23), and 
represented a denial of the Government's claim (in Removing Barriers to Employment) 
that unions acted as a brake on investment, profitability and jobs (see pp.45-6): 'The Green 
Paper ignores the fact that unions recognise that productivity growth is in the interests of 
their members as well as the employers. A CBI contributor to a recent TUC seminar on 
trade unions and the economy said that there appeared to be a greater acceptance of 
change and flexibility to enhance productivity as part of pay settlements amongst 
unionised firms compared with non-unionised firms' (TUC 1989b: 9).7
Nevertheless, despite arguments such as these, and the assertion that trade unions 
were addressing the 'real' problems of the labour market - reflected in the claim that 'trade 
unions were all about the markets' (Murray, interview) - the discourses of the economy 
and the market do not appear to have been used as extensively, or in as structured a 
manner, in justification of TUC/union responses to the legislation as in Conservative 
discourse (pp.42-7). Instead, somewhat vaguer references to 'economic regeneration' 
(Davies, D. TUC 1990: 307), 'prosperity' (TUC 1990c: 22; Willis, N. TUC 1990: 285) 
and industries 'thriving' (Philbin, B. TUC 1989: 354) were made.
In part, this may have reflected the failure to develop a viable alternative to
7 Note the use of supporting evidence from an employers' organisation.
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Thatcherite economic policies.8 Certainly, union leaders were unwilling to accept the 
policies of deregulation and freeing of markets which informed Conservative/New Right' 
policies and discourse: 'The purpose of deregulation and, in particular, the removal of 
employment protection, is to create a flexible and fearful workforce, one which is 
compliant, can be sacked at whim and is reluctant to organise' (McEwen, P. TUC 1986: 
459); 'I believe Nicholas Ridley speaks the truth, he echoes the sentiments of Margaret 
Thatcher, and listen to what he said, and if this is not an indictment, I do not know what 
is. He was in Japan and he said: 'Japanese businessmen should come to Britain and exploit 
our low costs and unprotected workforce. Invest in Britain' and the Trade and Industry 
Secretary informed his incredulous hosts - 'and you will be able to reap the benefits of 
cheap, compliant but skilled, flexible labour that is unprotected by legislation' 
(Christopher, C. TUC 1990: 296); We cannot leave the issue of union rights and 
recognition to an unregulated market. Any market must have a social aspect and a social 
framework, and without it we are left with jungle predators, red in tooth and claw, with 
constant strife, constant problems and an absence of the progress and prosperity that we 
and our members want' (Mills, L. TUC 1990: 299). Certainly, in this area, union policies 
and discourse remained fundamentally at odds with that of the Government.
The language of 'fairness'
The TUC and most union leaders thus continued to express opposition to the 
Government's policies, both on industrial relations legislation and the economy in general. 
As noted above, however, the period from 1983 onward saw the disintegration of 
coordinated opposition to the legislation - no campaigns of defiance comparable to that 
of 1982 were mounted against the later measures; moreover, the accommodative and 
conciliatory strategy of 'new realism' emphasised the vocabulary of cooperation, 
partnership and constructive policies which I have discussed above. Such developments 
might tend to point to a move away from the use of the 'traditional' vocabulary of 
confrontation analysed in Chapter 5, predicated upon a conception of industrial relations 
as adversarial, to justify resistance to the legislative provisions of the later 1980s.
While, as I shall discuss below, it would be overly simplistic to assume that the
8 Mcllroy (1995: 223) remarks that the TUC's 'Alternative Economic Strategy' of 
the early 1980s 'never got off the ground'.
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confrontational language of the early 1980s had disappeared altogether, it should also be 
noted that the TUC and union leaders did seek to justify both their policies and their 
stance of opposition to the legislation in less confrontational ways. One of the keywords 
for achieving this goal was 'fairness'. Thus, New Rights, New Responsibilities was said to 
be based around two themes, one of which was 'fairness and security at work' and aimed 
to secure freedom and fairness for people at work' (TUC-Labour 1986: 3, 9). Similarly, 
Employment Law: A New Approach was described as being 'based on rights and 
responsibilities fairly balanced' (Willis, N. TUC 1990: 285) - for the related vocabulary of 
•balance', see below); while the statement itself argued that Thatcherite 'abuses' 'must be 
put right by a new Government committed to fairness' (TUC 1990c: 22).
Calls for 'fairness', which could relate to the treatment accorded to individuals 
('consent and support can only be won where there is a perceived fairness in the way 
people are treated at work' (TUC 1990c: 22); 'A new deal is needed for people at work. 
Those who are insecure and vulnerable have to be given the confidence which comes from 
knowing they will be treated fairly' (TUC 1989c: 45)), to unions (see below) or to 
describe the nature of the industrial relations system as a whole, allowed the unions to 
present their proposals as moderate and realistic. All that they were requesting was 
reasonable, equitable treatment: 'All we ask for is a fair industrial relations system - 
something which is commonplace in other European countries - but only the British Tories 
cannot live with it' (Todd, R. TUC 1990: 303 - see further below); 'if we are to have... 
employment laws in this country... that give the trade unions the only thing we need, 
fairness, then we have to show the public that the laws we seek are realistic, relevant and 
disciplined' (Jordan, W. TUC 1990: 306).
Such language also enabled the TUC and unions to make a link into a wider 
discourse of social justice and equal treatment which formed a fundamental tenet of 
British labourism from the early days of the labour movement - as Mcllroy writes, [union] 
'practice was based on 'a fair day's work for a fair day's pay' rather than the abolition of 
the wages system" (1995: 11). In this sense, the vocabulary of'fairness' was far from new - 
'fairness was a continuing theme' (Smith, interview), as illustrated by a TUC pamphlet 
regarding the first of the legislative measures of the Thatcher era entitled The Employment 
Bill is Unfair, Unnecessary and Dangerous (TUC 1980a).
The moderation and practicality of the TUC proposals enabled it to call for 
support from a wide spectrum of the public, thus facilitating its reintegration into the
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political society from which the Conservatives and 'New Right' had attempted to exclude 
it: 'The General Council are confident that most workers’ and fair-minded people’s 
legislative priorities are closer to those of the TUC than to the artificial concerns of the 
Government' (TUC 1987a: 7). The unions could thus be seen as located closer to the 
centre of the political spectrum than the Government, which was marginalised as a result 
of the prejudice which motivated the legislative measures:'Against this background, all 
fair-minded people will grasp the one-sided, unbalanced, and hostile nature of the Green 
Paper’s proposals, which in turn will add to the growing public perception that under this 
Government the law has become unfairly biased against workers and their unions' (TUC 
1987a: 4). The vocabulary of'balance', discussed below, functioned in a similar manner.
In consequence, if the unions' policies were 'fair1, then the Government's measures 
were obviously 'unfair', a central claim in the union movement's continued opposition to 
them: Throughout the year the General Council have continued to highlight the unfairness 
of the employment legislation introduced since 1979' (GC Report, TUC 1989: 19); 'The 
ILO has roundly condemned the Tory anti-trade union laws. They are unfair. They are 
unjust' (Morris, W. TUC 1989: 353 - for the ILO, see pp. 198-202). The argument was 
that the Government was prejudiced against unions, and that this was the stimulus for the 
legislation: 'There is an increasing recognition that the Government's partisan approach 
is based on prejudice rather than on any genuine attempt to improve the climate of 
industrial relations' (Grantham, R. TUC 1989: 345). However, simple assertion that the 
legislation was 'unfair' and 'prejudiced' was likely to prove insufficient; the unions needed 
to demonstrate why this was the case. A number of interrelated grounds used in support 
of this allegation can be detected from the materials studied.
Firstly, it was argued that the legislative proposals were based on insufficient 
evidence. This fits with the analysis of Conservative policies from 1987 onward as being 
strong on rhetoric, but weak on analysis (Auerbach 1990: 159-60 - see p.41). Moreover, 
it could be seen as pointing to a more reasoned refutation by the unions of the measures 
than the language of confrontation might permit. Thus, the TUC criticised both of the 
1989 Green Papers on this basis: 'The Green Paper does not provide any convincing 
evidence to support the proposed legislation... Chapter One of the Green Paper merely 
gives some bare statistics and anecdotal examples in an attempt to justify the case for 
legislation... the international comparisons quoted in this chapter are misleading (TUC 
1989d: 1); The Green Paper is highly selective in its use of research evidence... There is
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a considerable volume of academic analysis available on the economic effects of trade 
unions, but we do not accept that any firm conclusion can be drawn one way or the 
other... The Green Paper provides no evidence to suggest that so-called secondary action 
is a problem which requires further legislation... the Green Paper claims that the 
Commissioner has received such complaints [on union rule books], but no details have 
been provided' (TUC 1989b: 1, 2). The conclusion to be drawn from the Government's 
inability to cite any clear evidence in support of its measures was that they were not 
needed: The TUC does not consider that the Green Paper provides any justification for 
further industrial relations legislation' (TUC 1989b: 1); *We do not, however, accept that 
further legislation is called for1 (TUC 1989d: l).9
The language of'irrelevance' may seem to have been some distance away from the 
use of the language of confrontation to justify rejection of the Government's policies 
which had characterised union discourse in the early 1980s; however, this was, once again, 
not a new argument, the claim having been made that the 1980 Bill was 'unnecessary' 
(TUC 1980a). Moreover, the allegation that the Government was selectively using 
evidence to justify its position was sometimes backed up by language which called into 
question the Government's motives as malicious or vindictive, an approach which, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, firmly cast the Government in the role of'enemy'. For example, 
the TUC attacked Trade Unions and their Members on the basis that 'few [of the 
proposals] have been properly thought through - which is unsurprising because the Green 
Paper is based on either a misunderstanding, or more probably a deliberate 
misinterpretation, of the way trade unions operate and of the relationship they have with 
their members. Not only is the case for the proposed 'reforms' flimsy, the motives behind 
them are malevolent' (TUC 1987a: 1). To this extent, the confrontational approach of the 
early 1980s remained beneath the surface of TUC discourse (see section II).
The unions also sought to justify their claim that the legislative measures were 
motivated by anti-union prejudice by comparing the manner in which they were treated 
with other organisations. Most common, for obvious reasons, was the argument that they 
were being treated unfairly by comparison with employers, a variant of the language of 
'balance' discussed below: 'It should be noted that the proposed legislation [rendering a 
union liable if an official endorsed unlawful industrial action] goes far beyond the ordinary
9 Note also the claim that the IPM and other employers' organisations considered 
further legislation unnecessary (TUC 1990a: 10 - see p. 172).
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law which regulates the responsibility of an employer for the acts of its employees... There 
is no reason in principle why unions should be subject to different requirements, and the 
fact they are further emphasises the unfairness of the legislation' (TUC 1990a: 9); '[the 
proposals] seek to impose a burden of administrative law and detailed statutory regulation 
on unions which is not borne by any other equivalent organisation and is in marked 
contrast to the Government's readiness to remove many of the statutory obligations from 
employers in relation to their workforces, and its preference for self-regulation by the City 
and financial institutions. This illustrates graphically the one-sided approach of the 
Government to employment law' (TUC 1987a: 4).
As this last extract demonstrates, an implicit comparison was being drawn with a 
range of institutions wider than those involved in industrial relations: 'The trade union 
Movement’s central criticism of the 1984 Trade Union A ct’s provisions on political funds 
is that the Act provides for the further regulation of unions' political activities while 
companies continue to be exempt from any legal restrictions equivalent to those applying 
to trade unions. This inequitable situation cannot be allowed to continue' (TUC 1986a: 
12 - italics in original); 'There is also an element of unfairness in this proposal [for a 
Commissioner for Rights of Trade Union Members]. Members of other voluntary 
associations do not have Commissioners to protect their rights when the organisations to 
which they belong are in breach of their rules... An aggrieved trade union member ought, 
in fairness, to be in the same position as a member of any similar organisation' (TUC 
1990a: 14). The inference to be drawn was that unions were being uniquely victimised by 
the Government: 'the Government is singling out trade unions as having to meet standards 
which no other comparable organisation is required to meet' (TUC 1987a: 7); 
Independent trade unions are more tightly controlled than any other voluntary 
organisation' (TUC 1990b: 5). In consequence 'fair-minded' people would reject the 
policies as simply being a product of anti-union bias and hence unworthy of support: We 
have to say to people that this is discrimination. This is a discriminatory act against a 
group of trade unions, against the trade union Movement in this country, because nowhere 
else is that sort of provision made for anybody who seeks to pursue a grievance in 
whatever sphere of society he may be moving at the time' (Knapp, J. TUC 1987: 438).
Such an analysis resembled the Government's use of the language of'uniqueness', 
discussed in Chapter 4 (pp.77-80) to portray the unions as 'above the law' - just as the 
theorists of the New Right' and Conservative politicians claimed that immunities placed
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trade unions in a 'uniquely privileged' position above the law, so the unions alleged that 
the legislative measures had imposed unique requirements upon them. To this extent, the 
discourse of'unfairness' could be seen as shared.
Neither was this argument a novel one on the unions' part. As discussed (p. 151), 
the pamphlet Hands Up For Democracy had sought to compare the state of democracy 
in unions with that in various comparable institutions so as to demonstrate that the 
Government's proposals for legislation to regulate them were inequitable. What was new 
was that the language of 'uniqueness' was also deployed on a European level, to 
demonstrate that British unions were being treated in a worse manner than their European 
counterparts: Today, as a result of the present Government’s policies, workers in the UK 
have fewer and less effective employment rights than their counterparts in virtually every 
other Western European country' (TUC 1987a: 1); 'Britain is now at the bottom of the 
European league table for trade union rights' (Gill, K. TUC 1989: 350); 'Congress believes 
that the unending series of ill-founded legislation concerning union affairs has created an 
unfair and unbalanced framework of law for industrial relations in Britain... By contrast, 
workers and their unions in all other EC countries enjoy respect from their governments, 
whatever their politics or differences. Congress believes that workers in Britain should 
enjoy no less favourable conditions than those granted elsewhere in a free democratic 
society' (Composite Motion 1, TUC 1990: 286).
The view that unions were being persecuted in a manner unique in Europe gained 
currency following the TUC's move towards the European Community and the Social 
Charter (see pp.97-8), and offered an easy opportunity to marginalise the Government, 
given Thatcher's antipathy towards Europe generally and the Social Charter in particular: 
'In Europe the Government is isolated in its opposition to employment protection and 
measures to promote worker and trade union consultation rights' (Grantham, R. TUC 
1989: 345); The Government's approach to industrial relations puts Britain at odds with 
developments in the rest of Europe. The British Government has blocked EC directives 
in a number of important areas... The measures to establish the single European market 
by 1992 have further exposed the Government's isolation in Europe... Alone among the 
12 EC states, Britain refused to support the Community Charter of Fundamental Social 
Rights' (TUC 1990b: 8).
Some, however, went still further and argued that the treatment given to unions 
in Britain meant that workers were worse off than anywhere else in the world:
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Meanwhile legal rights are being stripped away from ordinary people. It is now easier to 
sack a person in Britain than in any other country in the industrial world' (Edmonds, J. 
TUC 1986: 452). The assertion that unions and their members were suffering by 
comparison with all others worldwide, which was given added emphasis by the judgments 
of the ILO (discussed below, pp. 198-202) was perhaps the most powerful of the claims 
of inequitable treatment which were made in justification of opposition to the legislation.
The language of 'balance1
Closely linked with the argument of 'fairness/unfairness' which formed a key 
element of union discourse during this period was the vocabulary o f’balance'. Indeed, the 
two terms were frequently to be found juxtaposed in union rhetoric, to the extent that they 
seemed interchangeable; certainly, accusations of'imbalance' could be seen as a subset of 
the broader discourse of'fairness' - the legislation was 'unfair', at least in part, because it 
was unbalanced. If there was any distinction in meaning, it perhaps lay in the difference 
between an appeal to the moral sensibility of the listener (in the case of'fairness'), while 
'balance' was more descriptive of the state of industrial relations, being based around a 
conception of some sort of abstract 'balance of power' between employers and 
employees/unions.
As discussed in Chapter 3, 'balance' was also a keyword of Conservative rhetoric 
on industrial relations reform and in this sense could be seen as a shared discourse. 
However, the views of Government and the unions as to where the 'balance' should lie 
were clearly different, as acknowledged - albeit in jocular manner - by the TUC General 
Secretary: 'The Government’s original logic was to redress the balance in industrial 
relations... In fact the legislation has been about as balanced as a two-legged table, and 
about as fair as those ancient sporting fixtures between Christians and lions' (Willis, N. 
TUC Bulletin June 1988: 2). Thus, while the Government's rhetoric of the late 1980s 
focused upon the correcting of a disequilibrium in industrial relations, the unions pursued 
precisely the opposite argument - that the Government's measures had created imbalance 
in the system of industrial relations:' If its proposals [Removing Barriers to Employment] 
are proceeded with, they will create yet further imbalance in trade union law* (TUC 1989b:
5); *Yet another stage in the Government’s step by step approach to trade union law will 
only create further imbalance in the already unfair industrial relations framework' (TUC
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1989d: 1); 'After eleven years of much ill-founded and malicious legislation the legal 
framework governing employment matters and industrial relations is unfair and 
unbalanced... The present law is wholly unbalanced' (TUC 1990c: 21, 23). This problem 
was exacerbated by the changing economic environment, which had also materially 
affected the position of working people vis-a-vis employers: 'recession and the massive 
rise in unemployment has had the effect of worsening the imbalance that exists between 
the worker and his or her employer' (TUC 1987a: 3).
This imbalance had been brought about as a result of the Government's consistent 
interventions in favour of the employer. Individual legislative measures were portrayed 
solely as benefiting employers - The proposal represents a further shift in favour of 
employers in the already unfair legal framework for industrial relations (TUC 1989b: 4) r 
and thus as 'one-sided' (ibid: 3), 'partial' (TUC 1987a: 1) or 'biased' (Gill, K. TUC 1986: 
433). Once again, this cast doubt upon the validity and morality of the Government's 
motives and depicted it as the 'enemy of the unions.
The consequence of such actions was to create disequilibrium in the entire 
industrial relations system: 'The present Government has tilted the law too far towards 
employers and this imbalance causes great unfairness in companies where industrial 
relations have broken down' (TUC 1989c: 45). The 'systemic' difficulties which were 
created by the prejudiced legislation were such that it was in danger of losing its 
legitimacy and thus ceasing to function in an effective manner: 'The current industrial 
relations legislation is so unfair and one-sided that it cannot command respect' (TUC 
1990b: 9). In contrast, if the TUC/unions could 'correct' the disequilibrium by introducing 
a more balanced structure, this would benefit all parties in industrial relations: 'Industrial 
relations are not improved by having unfair laws. We need a balanced framework of law 
which commands support from all sides of industry' (TUC 1990b: 2) - accordingly they 
could be seen as acting in the national interest (including that of employers) in a way 
which the Government was not.
In this respect, union calls to re-establish balance' in industrial relations, which 
were central to TUC statements on employment law of the late Thatcher era ('the TUC 
will... continue to argue for a 'fair and balanced' framework of employment law (TUC 
1990a: 6); 'the case for a new, balanced approach to employment law is overwhelming' 
(TUC 1990c: 22)) formed part of the claim to reasonableness and moderation. The laws 
which they were seeking were not intended to place workers and unions in a predominant
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position; rather they were designed to place them on an equal footing with employers: 
'Our aim is to improve industrial relations, balancing the interests of people at work and 
their employers' (TUC 1989c: 45); 'Congress welcomes... the policy adopted by the 
General Council which stresses the creation of new constructive legislation designed to 
restore a reasonable balance between employers and employees’ (Composite Motion 1, 
TUC 1990: 287). The language of balance' also served to emphasise that unions were 
aware that they had duties as well as the hoped-for rights: 'a fair balance of rights and 
responsibilities, which is something that I believe our members and the public will 
overwhelmingly accept because they know it is fair and makes sense' (Young, A. TUC 
1990: 310).
Young's remark indicates that the essentially moderate nature of this discourse was 
intended to facilitate acceptance of the TUC stance (backed by Labour) amongst union 
members and the wider public; it did not, however, find favour with the more militant 
union leaders: We find it astonishing that all the Labour Party is looking for is a fair 
balance between employers and trade unions... There never has been a fair balance. We 
were nowhere near it in 1979, and we will not go along with a policy of even-handedness 
that treats us as the equal of employers' (Hearn, D. TUC 1990: 301-2).
Clearly, therefore, the precise location of the point of equilibrium was a matter 
about which there could reasonably be disagreement. This raises an important issue, to 
which I have already alluded (p. 182). The language of'balance', although a prevalent 
feature of the discourse of 'new realism' and used by proponents of this approach to 
convey reasonableness and moderation, could equally be utilised by those holding 
alternative views - indeed, it was used by the Conservatives. 'Balance' was not, therefore, 
unequivocally a 'new realist' vocabulary. In fact, it could be seen as inherent in the pluralist 
approach to industrial relations discussed in Chapter 5, which was based upon the 
existence of opposing groups pursuing their own interests and the working out of a 
mutually acceptable compromise between them via the institutions of collective 
bargaining: 'just as society is perceived as comprising a number of interest groups held 
together in some sort of loose balance by the agency of the state, so work organisations 
are viewed as being held in balance by the agency of management' (Famham and Pimlott 
1994: 48). While it has been argued that a 'balance' in the sense of equality of bargaining 
power between unions and employers is not a prerequisite for settlements reached by such 
processes to be effective (Clegg 1975: 309), the balance' could be seen as the (perhaps
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unattainable) goal which both parties seek; certainly, the existence of a *balance' appears 
to postulate the presence o f’opposing sides' in industrial relations.
To this extent, the language of 'balance' was perfectly compatible with the 
traditional, 'adversarial' approach to industrial relations which informed union discourse 
of the early 1980s. For example, the argument that trade unionism represented a 'counter­
balance' to the power of employers - a claim made both by those supporting and those 
opposing the TUC statement on employment law at the 1990 Congress ('trade unions will 
be needed... to make sure that we have that counter-balance to the power of cruel, 
vicious, unscrupulous employers' (Dean, B. TUC 1990: 290); 'Congress recognises that 
strong trade unionism., counter-balances the enormous and unaccountable power wielded 
by employers' (Composite Motion 2, TUC 1990: 292)) was part of the original rationale 
for trade union existence, as analysed by the Webbs (see p. 154 ). Similarly, the view that 
the legislative measures had tilted the balance in favour of employers and therefore away 
from employees and unions was predicated upon the 'zero-sum' nature of adversarial 
employer-union relations which had historically been characteristic of the British system 
(Maclnnes 1990: 220-222- see above, p. 112). I would conclude, therefore, that the more 
moderate discourse of'new realism' was not necessarily inconsistent with a continued use 
of the language of conflict and confrontation which underpinned the pluralist approach. 
I turn now to examine the extent to which this discourse did indeed persist.
II. Confrontation, tradition and collectivism
In Chapter 5 I examined a number of features of the language of trade unions 
which could be said to be attributable to their nature as collective institutions, their 
consciousness of their historical traditions, their existence as class organisations and their 
role as representatives of relatively powerless individuals seeking to assert themselves 
against employers in a relationship which gave rise to clashes of interests between the two. 
In particular, I attempted to demonstrate that the union perception of British industrial 
relations as an adversarial, 'them and us' process gave rise to a belligerent, antagonistic 
rhetoric towards some employers and, especially, the Government.
Although the strategy and vocabulary of 'new realism' represented a softening of 
this traditional' stance, the fact that many of these characteristics were intrinsic to the very 
rationale of trade unions meant that the language with which they were clothed did not
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undergo a fundamental change in character. For example, Employment Law: A New 
Approach maintained that 'in a free society, it is inevitable that disputes will sometimes 
occur1 (TUC 1990c: 24), a point also made by the TUC General Secretary in introducing 
the statement: 'even in the most ruthless dictatorship you cannot legislate away the clashes 
of interest that can occur at work' (Willis, N. TUC 1990: 285 - see above, p. 174). This 
demonstrates a continued belief in an essentially pluralist approach to industrial relations - 
unions existed to defend and protect their members against the employer whose interests, 
in minimising labour costs and obtaining maximum productive capacity from his/her 
workforce, were necessarily opposed to their own.
Employers
In the light of this, one might expect union language, even in the period during and 
after 'new realism', to preserve components of the adversarial approach towards employers 
discussed in Chapter 5 - and this was indeed the case. Some union leaders portrayed 
employers in a highly traditional, anti-capitalist way, viewing them in an almost Dickensian 
manner: 1 remind you that when lives are lost as a result of profit-hungry carelessness, the 
guilty men at the top walk free - some even get golden handshakes - but when workers 
try to fight for jobs or try to exercise their democratic rights, then the full force of the law 
is used' (Gill, K. TUC 1989: 350);
Many of us can tell chilling tales. Let me tell one... A young woman joined the 
company, soon became pregnant. She told the company, she had a difficult 
pregnancy. She lost time. It was soon clear why she lost time. The baby was bom 
and, within a few days, died. Four days before that young woman - her name is 
Louise - buried her baby, she was called in by management and she was sacked. 
That is Thatcher industrial relations for you... While there are employers around 
like Louise’s employer in London, trade unions will be needed, not just by trade 
union members, but by society in Britain, to make sure that we have that counter­
balance to the power of cruel, vicious, unscrupulous employers' (Dean, B. TUC 
1990: 290).
However, as had been the case earlier in the decade, employers were frequently 
portrayed as relatively passive beneficiaries of the Government's legislative changes. The 
measures were described as 'encouraging employers to adopt heavy-handed tactics in 
disputes' (TUC 1989c: 45) and 'giving enormous scope' to employers 'to frustrate 
industrial action' (TUC 1990b: 5). This allowed the depiction of the Government as the
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'real' enemy of the unions, and thus reinforced the legitimacy of the employer in the 
industrial relations relationship. Given that this was so, a degree of compatibility could be 
achieved between the language of'partnership' discussed above (p. 174) and language 
which presented employers as opposed to the union position: 'Forward-thinking managers 
would want to maintain good industrial relations with their workforce. To do otherwise 
generates future instability, leaving old scores needing to be settled. Privately, they will 
admit that the Government have gone way over the top in tilting the balance in their 
favour; nonetheless, they acquiesce' (Philbin, B. TUC 1989: 354). In consequence, the 
vocabulary of conflict could be downplayed in this context, as Norman Willis sought to 
do in arguing that We are not engaged in total war with employers' (TUC Bulletin July 
1987: 2).
The exception to this representation of employers as legitimate opponents was, as 
previously, the 'rogue' employer. Distinguishable from most other employers by being 
labelled as deficient in character or morals, this remained an important figure in union 
demonology to be set alongside the Government itself as an 'enemy of the unions. Such 
an individual or company would experience no qualms about exploiting the 'unbalanced' 
legal framework put in place by the Government in order to achieve an advantage over 
employees: Employment law in the UK is now effectively loaded against workers' 
interests, giving wide scope for the unscrupulous employer to exploit, ill-treat and sack 
their employees' (TUC 1987a: 1); We fear that unscrupulous employers could exploit this 
proposal in order to avoid liability for redundancy payments. It is not inconceivable that 
an employer could provoke a strike, dismiss those deemed surplus to requirements and 
then continue business with the workforce reduced to the required size' (TUC 1989d: 4). 
The existence of'malevolent' employers such as this necessitated a continued role for trade 
unions in offering protection to relatively powerless individuals: 'Congress calls on the 
labour Movement to campaign for a system of legal rights which will cover all people at 
work and give them fiill protection from abuse at the hands of uncaring and unscrupulous 
employers' (Composite Motion 1, TUC 1986: 451) - such a role might have been 
superfluous had the rhetoric and strategy of'cooperation' been fully pursued.
The Government
In some respects it was simpler for the unions to continue to adopt a
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confrontational approach towards Government notwithstanding the more accommodative 
vocabulary of'new realism' because of the Government's refusal to enter into discussions 
with the TUC and union movement over the legislation or economic and industrial matters 
in general (see Chapter 2). Thus, even Employment Law: A New Approach described the 
legislative measures as 'malicious' (TUC 1990c: 21), while other union leaders were still 
more strident in their denunciation of the Government as malign: 'It has been a callous, 
vindictive and spiteful attack on the ordinary citizens of this country and the institutions 
that try to protect them' (Young, A. TUC 1990: 288); 'British people do believe that this 
vindictive action has, more than any other, highlighted the iniquitous and hypocritical 
behaviour of this Government, calling as it does on the one hand for the freedom of the 
individual and, on the other hand, restricting the individual's right to seek trade union 
recognition and representation... the British people recognise the injustices which this 
Government are perpetrating through their various industrial legislations (sic). They 
believe that individuals have the right to have trade union representation' (Horton, D. 
TUC 1990: 307).10
Such language attributed deficiencies of 'character' and 'behaviour' to the 
Government which facilitated its portrayal as the 'enemy', rather than the adversary, of the 
unions (see p. 117). Thus, even when a 'new realist' appeal for unions to use the law to 
their advantage was made, the Government continued to be depicted in conflictual terms: 
'But think of what our enemies do. Margaret Thatcher has no hang-up about using the 
law. This government has used legal changes time and again to strengthen employers 
against working people' (Edmonds, J. TUC 1986: 452). Perhaps the ultimate expression 
of'Otherness' in union discourse came in the Presidential address to the 1986 Congress, 
when Ken Gill cautioned: We still have a duty to trade unionism. We must not allow the 
victory of evil over good' (TUC 1986: 433).
As in the earlier part of the decade, however, the TUC and union leaders did not 
simply argue against the Government's policies on the basis that they were malevolent or 
prejudiced. They also sought to demonstrate that the legislative changes formed part of 
a wider strategy, attributable to the Government's ideological beliefs, designed to weaken 
the unions as representatives of working people:
10 Horton refers here to the banning of unions at GCHQ in 1984. For the argument 
of 'hypocrisy1 in this context, see further p.203.
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'hostility to effective trade unionism has characterised a wide range of the policies 
pursued by the Conservative Government since 1979. The massive rise in 
unemployment, the privatisation of public enterprise and services, the dismantling 
of the welfare state and the persistent and damaging cuts in public expenditure are 
all intended at least in part to weaken trade unions and undermine their ability to 
safeguard and advance ordinary people's interests and living standards...The 
presentation of much of the present Government's trade union legislation has been 
consciously designed to foster and exploit anti-union prejudice. But the legislation 
is also a key part of the Government's overall social and economic strategy and 
embodies many of the elements which make up the Government's general 
philosophy... The Government has sought to justify many of its measures in this 
field as being to 'improve the operation of the labour market'. Trade unions are 
seen by the Government as distorting the free market...The aim of the Government 
has been to bring about a permanent weakening of trade union strength, and to 
increase the power of employers to introduce change without consent' (TUC 
1986a: 4).
The importance of this approach lay in the unions' search for a relevant role in 
political society. If it could be shown that the Government was not merely 'anti-union', but 
had in fact caused damage to some of the important elements of British society via its 
social and economic policies in conjunction with the industrial relations legislation which 
had constrained unions, it would be easier for the unions to make a claim to be protecting 
the national interest, in contrast to a marginalised Government: 'the Thatcher Government 
seeks both to undermine our organisation and to dismantle or weaken the tripartite bodies 
in which the trade union Movement has played a constructive part in the development of 
the economy... her Government has intervened more in the lives of working people than 
any previous administration. It is more intolerant, more authoritarian, more determined 
to weaken the protection offered to working people, more intent on undermining services 
which help ordinary people, and by its economic policies has exposed more people to 
unemployment and insecurity than any previous Government' (Jarvis, F. TUC 1987: 391); 
'Let us remind ourselves that this plethora of legislation that concerns us today is not 
merely the result of some deep-rooted prejudice against unions and their members. It is 
central to a larger vision of destroying those aspects of our society that grew out of the 
needs and aspirations of working people and their collective struggles - health care, 
educational provision, social welfare and ultimately, of course, the industrial base which 
sustains them all' (Woolf, G. TUC 1990: 304). Similarly, the argument that Government 
measures had the effect of'turning back the clock' facilitated its portrayal as opposed to 
the interests of the nation: 'we see how this Government react to such successes by 
banging their primitive drums and threatening yet more restrictive anti-trade union laws
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to prevent unions from representing their members' wishes... These acts by the Thatcher 
government are destroying rights, attacking democracy and taking this country back into 
the 19th Century, instead of forward into the 21st. They do this in order to weaken the 
movement so that we can no longer properly represent and organise our members. They, 
are, therefore, an attack on every working woman and man in this country (Fitzsimmons, 
S. TUC 1989: 351).
These were not new propositions - similar language had been used earlier ill the 
decade (see pp. 119-21; 135). They were, however, particularly significant in the light of 
the TUC’s concern over its role in society, which culminated in the work of the SRB 
(1988, 1989) discussed in the final section of this Chapter; equally, however, they 
complemented a continued 'traditional' vocabulary of conflict, as Woolfs statement 
implies.
Confrontation
Although there were no coordinated campaigns of resistance to the legislation of 
the later 1980s to match those which had taken place earlier in the decade, the TUC and 
the unions continued to oppose the measures. This stance, coupled with the enduring 
pluralist outlook on industrial relations which viewed the existence of disputes as 
inevitable, and the characterisation of the Government as 'enemy', helps to explain the 
persisting use of the vocabulary of conflict and antagonism in much of the material 
investigated.
Thus, some continued to talk in terms of the 'root metaphor* of warfare which had 
been so significant in the earlier period: 'This Congress should say to Thatcher and to the 
employers in the gallery 'not one inch further1 and that we are determined to win back the 
ground that has been lost in the past period...What is the lesson of GCHQ? I would 
suggest that if the tremendous support in Britain for those workers when the ban was 
announced had been translated into immediate industrial action the Tories would have 
been forced back' (Macreadie, J. TUC 1987: 443); We have to fight daily recognition 
battles in the private sector with some of the worst employers in Britain. And how will 
these plans help us and the workers who look to us for help and strength? Or can we look 
forward to more frustrations and defeats in such battles? Because the next Labour 
government, with the best of intentions, has given the employers an alternative to use as
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a weapon against us... It is never easy under attack, and there are those who always flinch 
at the sound of gunfire' (Todd, R. TUC 1988: 623); 'given the sustained attack we have 
been under, it is inevitable that heads have been kept well down beneath the parapet. Now 
that the possibility of change is in the air, our union welcomes that. But few battles have 
ever been won by crouching in the trenches' (Plouviez, P. TUC 1990: 297).
However, despite the combative nature of these statements, which suggest that 
the vocabulaiy of conflict remained an important underlying theme in union discourse, not 
all in the union movement were so militant. As discussed above, TUC publications tended 
to emphasise the language of'fairness', 'balance' and to argue that the Government's use 
of evidence to justify measures was selective, rather than to focus a campaign of resistance 
around an antagonistic slogan such as Tight Tebbit's Law'.11 Other union leaders seemed 
to feel it necessary to urge the unions to resist, implicitly acknowledging that the 
Government's measures had had an 'attritionaT effect, wearing down the unions so that 
they had to be encouraged to 'fight back': We need to show them that we have still got 
a bit of spirit in us and that we are still prepared to argue our comer and take the message 
around the country' (Knapp, J. TUC 1987: 439). The absence of coordinated opposition 
to the legislation on the scale of that of 1982 meant that the unions' adversaries and 
enemies almost needed reminding of the continuing resistance by the TUC/unions to the 
measures: 'This motion sends a clear message to the Government and the employers. We 
have not given up the fight. There have been umpteen battles but the war on working 
people and their organisations is not over' (Philbin, B. TUC 1989: 354). While remaining 
essentially confrontational and adversarial in outlook,12 such language certainly seemed 
to lack the self-confidence and assertiveness of the earlier years.
Tradition, class and collective values
I have previously discussed the significance of the language of 'newness' in the
II Indeed, the TUC argued that 'The Government's legislative approach to 
industrial relations encourages conflict. It is more concerned with coercion than 
cooperation' (TUC 1990b: 6), thus attributing the vocabulary of conflict to the 
Government, and of cooperation to itself. This was, of course, similar to the 
'blamelessness' argument of the earlier period, but with less of a threat of organised 
disruption (see eg Murray, L. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 378, 381 - pp. 124-5 above).
12 Note the 'them and us' tone of Knapp's statement.
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discourse of the 'new realists', and argued that those supporting such a stance portrayed 
themselves as looking to the future, while their opponents were seen as 'nostalgic' and out 
of touch. The difficulty with this approach was that, as argued in Chapter 5, the British 
union movement had a powerful sense of history and a number of'mythic events' in its 
past to draw upon, which reinforced its sense of identity. Consequently an equally 
powerful counter-discourse to that of renewal was that of tradition, and a number of union 
leaders sought to locate themselves within this idiom.
This was most noticeable at the Congress of 1990 which effectively amounted to 
a debate between the 'modernisers' and 'traditionalists' over the TUC statement 
Employment Law: A New Approach. Those who rejected the General Council's position 
argued that it was 'abandoning traditions' (Jinkinson, A. TUC 1990: 295) and claimed that, 
although accused of being 'old fashioned', their standpoint was not incompatible with 'a 
new positive framework' (Christopher, C. TUC 1990: 295). Others were still more 
vociferous in their defence of the labour movement's history: 'If you support the General 
Council's statement, if you support the Labour Party document, if you support Composite 
Motion 1, you are supporting a move to betray all those principles upon which we have 
fought for the past 25 years... For God's sake, do not betray two centuries of struggle' 
(Scargill, A. TUC 1990: 297, 298); We are not among those who find it illogical, 
immoral, or objectionable to go back to 1979. After all, by going back to 1979, we are 
only making good the 100 years that Margaret Thatcher took us back when she took 
office in 1979. For the life of us, we cannot understand how, by going back to 1979 and 
all the things that those who came before us fought for, we cannot build for the nineties' 
(Hearn, D. TUC 1990: 301).
It can be seen from a number of these statements that an attempt was made by the 
speaker to locate themselves within both discourses - that of'renewal/future' and that of 
'tradition/past'. This shows the potential appeal of both forms of language - a similar 
conclusion being reached by the 'modernisers', who argued that 'We have to learn from 
the past' (Davies, D. TUC 1990: 306) and that We are not betraying all previous 
principles of trade unionism... I would like to think that we could have built a bridge 
between the two [ie motions]. But we really could not, because it would have confused 
the situation. It would have been seen as us facing both ways' (Young, A. TUC 1990: 
309-10); nevertheless, the precise difficulty would seem to have been that 'past' and 
'future' might have equal but contradictory claims in union discourse which might cause
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some to question the policies being adopted.13
Closely linked to the language of tradition was that of'class', in that, as analysed 
in Chapter 5, the history of the labour movement was frequently conceived of in the 
Marxist terminology of the 'struggle'. This was once again evident from Scargill's speech, 
which continued: We ask for no more and no less, Norman, than the Tories. They give 
to their class special favours. Our party should give to our class special favours' (Scargill, 
A. TUC 1990: 298). Certain other union leaders also used the language of class, albeit 
somewhat less stridently, eg. 'Perhaps we... should... be as hard-headed in our search for 
justice as Margaret Thatcher has been in her drive for class advantage' (Edmonds, J. TUC 
1986: 452); Those laws must go and they will go. They bring the law into total disrepute 
because it is so blatantly class-biased' (Gill, K. TUC 1989: 350). Yet, as in the earlier 
period, the language of'class' tended on the whole to be subordinate to descriptions such 
as 'people at work', 'workers' and 'working people' (TUC 1989c: 45) and, in contrast to 
1979-83, there was implicit criticism of the discourse (and explicit criticism of Scargill): 
'If there is anybody here who thinks that Arthur Scargill is an electoral asset, you want 
your brains tested. If anybody here thinks that any programme supported by Arthur 
Scargill is an electoral asset, you want your brains tested' (Lyons, J. TUC 1990: 298). This 
was echoed by the Assistant General Secretary of the TUC, who remarked to me that 
'although there will still be Scargill, voice raised, saying that this is selling out our 
birthright for a mess of potage, 98% of people don't agree with him - they believe that 
we've got to see how we can positively protect real people and advance their cause in their 
real employment problems' (Lea, interview).
Also closely connected to these themes was the collectivist language of'unity' and 
'solidarity'. As discussed (p. 139), this was a particularly important appeal for the TUC 
leadership in 1982, when attempting to coordinate united resistance to the legislation. 
However, given the disintegration of such opposition after 1983, the language might be 
thought to have lost some of its intensity. Nevertheless, calls for 'unity' and 'solidarity' 
continued to be heard from within the unions. As in the earlier period, they acted as 
rhetorically powerful keywords for the mobilisation of opposition to the legislation: We
13 This was not, of course, a problem unique to the unions in 1990. Similar 
difficulties encounter any political grouping seeking to 'reinvent' itself; Blair's New 
Labour' has equally been accused of betraying its political and ideological heritage by 
(amongst others) Arthur Scargill.
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shall need our unity and strength to combat the effects of a further period of Conservative 
Government' (Jarvis, F. TUC 1987: 392); 'Congress reaffirms its opposition to Tory anti­
union laws and calls on the General Council to lead an all-round campaign of vigorous 
opposition, including mobilising solidarity with those trade unionists directly affected by 
these laws' provisions' (Composite Motion 6, TUC 1989: 349).
It was, of course, possible to use this language in support of the changing strategy 
within the TUC and union movement. For example, expressions of'unity' were used in 
promotion of People at Work: New Rights New Responsibilities'. 'That is why Composite 
1 is so important: it gives us a real unity of purpose, based on real rights for all our 
members' (Dawson, J. TUC 1986: 458); 'try to band together on the rather more 
constructive and widespread unity about fighting oppression through a new legal 
framework that will give inspiration to our people and rebuild our self-esteem' (Edmonds, 
J. TUC 1986: 462).
There was, however, a potential difficulty here - as Mcllroy points out (1995: 7): 
'Unity, often vital to the full mobilisation of power in organisations characterised by 
sectionalism, is an important goal: it may however conflict with democracy’. The increased 
emphasis upon individual rights and democracy which I will explore in the next two 
sections implied a move away from the much more collectivist discourses of 'unity' and 
'solidarity'. Yet the two words remained potent symbols of the union movement's origins 
and 'mythic tradition': *No law, designed by the Tories to immobilise us, should be used 
within the Movement to excuse or underwrite bad trade union behaviour. Neither must 
it erase solidarity from our practices, because if solidarity dies trade unionism dies. Mutual 
support and respect for other trade unionists must remain our obligation' (Gill, K. TUC 
1986: 433).
TJnity and 'solidarity' were, therefore, central to the discourse of many of those 
who opposed the 'renewal' of unions via 'new realist' policies: 'The cornerstone of our 
Movement is solidarity' (Dubbins, A. TUC 1990: 291); 'Trade unionism was built on 
solidarity, and that is fundamentally what it is about - the strong supporting the weak, the 
many supporting the few' (Carr, J. TUC 1990: 292); I f  we abandon these traditions this 
week, it will certainly be an historic Congress and one that we will look back on with 
shame and regret. Think of all those banners - 'An Injury to One, an Injury to All', 'All for 
One and One for All', Unity is Strength', Workers of the World Unite'. Forget them! If 
you have not deposited those banners in the Museum of Labour History, do so now,
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before they run out of space. And if ever again you find yourself singing the anthem 
’Solidarity Forever1, remember to incorporate these words in the chorus: ’only when there 
is a direct interest of an occupational or professional nature' (Jinkinson, A. TUC 1990: 
295). The language of 'unity' and 'solidarity' thus represented a powerful rallying call 
which the TUC leadership may have found difficult to counter.
I have demonstrated in this section that the 'traditional' discourses of 
confrontation, class and collectivism continued to exist within the unions despite moves 
toward the more emollient language of'new realism', particularly from the leadership of 
the TUC. This can be attributed to the maintenance of an essentially pluralist outlook 
which was underpinned by the existence of differences of interest and to the consciousness 
of the rationale and origins of trade unions as collective organisations. Although, as I shall 
discuss in the remaining sections of this Chapter, the increasing emphasis on individual 
rights and democracy coupled with the unions' reassessment of their position and role in 
society increasingly called into question the validity of discourses such as 'class', 'unity' 
and 'solidarity1, they remained potent forms of language which could be mobilised if 
appropriate.
III. The language of individualism
Emphasis upon the individual formed a key tenet of Thatcherism, informing both 
its discourse and its policies, as discussed in Chapter 3. The Acts of 1980 and 1982 had 
introduced the theme of promotion of the individual as against the collective (see p . 141), 
and the unions had accordingly had to begin constructing an appropriate response to these 
measures. However, the full impact of the Conservatives' individualistic rhetoric and 
policies was arguably not reached until the latter part of the decade (see p. 50). 
Consequently, it became increasingly important for the TUC and the unions to devise an 
effective strategy to deal with these developments and discourses, seen by some as a 'very 
provocative ideology' (Lea, interview).
Furthermore, it was not only legislative policy which forced the unions to 
reappraise the balance between individualism and collectivism. It has been claimed that 
Government and 'New Right' ideology was merely a reflection of deeper structural 
changes in the nature of society during the 1980s, which emphasised individuals over and
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above collective groupings (Phelps Brown 1990: 1 - see p.49). This view seems to have 
been accepted by at least some of those involved with constructing an effective response: 
The emphasis on the individual is a change broader than this [ie industrial relations]. The 
80s were an era when there was a cultural emphasis on the individual' (Smith, interview).
Equally significant in causing the unions to consider the notions and vocabulary 
of individualism were changes in management style during the 1980s. This topic is beyond 
the scope of this thesis,16 but could be said simplistically in this context to involve a more 
individualistic approach to employees, with the introduction of direct communications 
structures between management and employees, the use of consultative committees 
outside unions and increasing involvement with and commitment to management via a 
unitarist identification with goals and achievements (Martin et al 1991: 197). These 
moves, coupled with the changing pattern and structure of the unionised workforce in 
Britain (particularly in respect of the decline of traditional manufacturing industries and 
the increase in service industries, in addition to increasing numbers of part-time and female 
workers in the economy) called into question the significance of collectivism in British 
industrial relations, both for employers and unions: 'The new emphasis upon the individual 
employee in management strategies suggests that any notion of a standardised group of 
workers pursuing similar interests has become increasingly difficult to sustain, whether or 
not it had been an accurate reflection of a 'collectivist' past' (Bacon and Storey 1996: 43).
As Bacon and Storey observe (ibid), union responses to these developments have 
been diverse; nevertheless, they detect a 'drift': 'unions have adopted more of an 
individualist agenda both in vocabulary and in seeking to identify the wishes of their 
members'. While their argument focuses upon union responses to changing management 
strategies (and only touches tangentially on the question of language), my concern in this 
thesis is with responses to legislative policy - nevertheless, I believe that it also holds 
validity in this context.
Individual employment rights
The most significant development in the move towards an individualistic discourse 
and strategy on the part of the unions came in the development of policies advocating
16 There is an extensive literature on this topic. See, inter alia, Blyton and Turnbull 
(1992); Guest (1989); Storey (1992).
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enhanced individual rights both for union members and 'people at work' in general, 
facilitated (as discussed in Chapter 4) by the shift away from 'immunities' towards 'rights' 
and a corresponding acceptance by the TUC and unions of the positive role which the law 
could play. In effect, this shift began with the consultative document on Industrial 
Relations Legislation in January 1986, which acknowledged the presence of the law in 
industrial relations (see pp.90-3) and was reinforced by the joint statement People at 
Work: New Rights New Responsibilities which called for 'new rights and protection for 
individual workers and their unions' (TUC-Labour 1986: 4). The statement was described 
as 'a framework for collective freedom and individual rights to replace the thumbscrews 
and rack of Tory legislation' (Todd, R. TUC 1986: 460).
After the defeat of Labour in the 1987 election the party undertook a substantial 
policy review which eventually appeared under the title Meet the Challenge Make the 
Change in 1989. This document, which advocated the creation of a Workers Charter' 
based upon the EC Social Charter, 'switched the emphasis from the defence of union 
'immunities' to the improvement of individual worker rights in Britain' (Moher 1995: 32 - 
emphasis in original), thereby implying a drift away from collectivism and towards 
individualism. The TUC responded by 'spelling out and promoting a vision of future 
industrial relations based upon enhanced individual employment rights... at the heart of 
[which] is a charter of employment rights to protect individuals at work' (GC Report, 
TUC 1989: 24) in the statement Employment Law: TUC Priorities (TUC 1989c), while 
in 1990 Congress endorsed the Labour Party proposals and the General Council statement 
Employment Law: A New Approach, which proclaimed that 'the rights of individuals at 
work are at the heart of our vision' (TUC 1990c: 22) and encompassed the extension of 
employment rights to part-time and temporary workers, new rights to information and 
consultation for employees, the provision of the right to membership of and representation 
by a trade union, in addition to more 'collective' rights such as a right to recognition and 
a right to take sympathy action where there existed a direct interest of an occupational or 
professional nature.
Policy statements such as these could clearly be seen as representing a move 
towards a strategy of individual rights within the TUC and unions, particularly when 
combined with the increased emphasis upon services which could be offered by unions, 
a focus of the strategic reappraisal of TUC/union roles (see section V). The various 
'charters' for individual worker rights were endorsed, unsurprisingly, in an individualistic
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vocabulary: *the trade union Movement is in business to defend their interests as 
individuals’ (McEwen, P. TUC 1986: 458) ; 'Looking after individuals is the primary 
purpose of trade unions’ (Grantham, R  TUC 1989: 345-6); ’The law should underpin, and 
not undermine, the role of unions in supporting individuals at work’ (TUC 1990b: 9); ’The 
rights of the individual are paramount - not just to join a union, but to join a union and to 
have that union speak on your behalf (Horton, D. TUC 1990: 308). The assurance with 
which those making these remarks seem to adopt the discourse of individualism suggests 
that they considered there to be no conflict between individual rights and basic principles 
of trade unionism, a view endorsed by the former TUC General Secretary: We thought 
that we were the guardians of the individual’ (Murray, interview). However, it is 
important to note that each speaker reaffirms the role of trade unions as ’defending’, 
’protecting’, ’speaking for’ and ’supporting’ individuals - this indicates that they still 
perceived the individual to require some form of collective protection. I will examine 
below the extent to which the unions attempted to balance the issues of collective 
representation and individual rights.
Freedom, human rights and the ILO
In Chapter 5 1 commented that the unions had attempted to adopt the vocabulary 
of’freedom’ which formed a significant element of Conservative discourse in justification 
of their position, although their understanding of this concept differed from that of the 
Government and the ’New Right’. This remained true during the later period. The unions 
were keen to assert the right to ’freedom of association’ which might form part of the new 
’positive rights' approach: 'Congress, concerned to develop and promote democratic 
principles and practice, affirms the basic right of freedom of association and, in particular, 
the basic human right to choose to belong to a trade union and to be represented by it' 
(Composite Motion 2, TUC 1987: 437); 'The issue is freedom. That is why we have based 
our contribution to this motion on the notion of freedom of association' (Morton, J. TUC 
1989: 350). They also argued that the right to withdraw labour was 'widely accepted as 
a basic civil liberty in the UK as in all democratic societies' (TUC-Labour 1986: 19). 
These were, of course, different to the 'freedoms' espoused by the New Right', which
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focused upon economic freedom and freedom of choice,17 but it remained a powerful 
discourse simply because 'freedom is generally considered to be one of the highest 
aspirations of modem society' (Fredman 1992: 38).
Yet while 'freedom' could be seen as a goal towards which society might strive, 
it might also be viewed as a fundamental characteristic of modem democratic systems, the 
basis upon which all other social, political and economic achievements could be 
constructed. The unions used 'freedom' in this sense to demonstrate that the Government's 
policies were so destructive that they denied them the ability to perform their 'basic' 
functions: 'our unions should not play games with immunities and rights. We should not 
tolerate attempts to put fundamental rights in the political market place. They cannot be 
traded or bartered. We will insist on a framework of law and immunities that give us the 
basic freedom that we need to support and represent our members, the freedom that we 
need to do our job' (Todd, R. TUC 1988: 623); 'It is vital that the law should guarantee 
the essential legal freedom of workers and their unions to organise effective industrial 
action, without the continual threat of employers launching debilitating legal actions 
against unions' (Composite Motion 6, TUC 1989: 348). The depiction of such 'freedoms' 
as 'fundamental* allowed the unions to make another significant argument - that the 
Government was acting contrary to basic human rights and civil liberties.
This was not a new claim - the argument had been made in 1982 that We also 
have to go on a programme of educating the public at large that the trade union 
Movement, in defending their rights, are actually defending their civil liberties as well' 
(Marsland, T. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 402) - but it was given added emphasis by several 
developments. Firstly, the European Commission of Human Rights ruled that the banning 
of unions at GCHQ did not constitute a violation of the European Convention on the 
grounds that it was justified in the interests of national security.18 This decision was 
condemned by Composite Motion 2 of the 1987 Congress (see above), which 'pledged to 
continue to campaign for the restoration of human and trade union rights at GCHQ and 
to protect them in all other employments where they are under threat' (ibid. 392).
Secondly, civil liberties groups increasingly denounced the Conservative legislation
17 Although Hayek refers to 'freedom of association' (see p.53), Wedderbum 
argues that he places emphasis 'upon the right to dissociate' (1991: 211 - italics in 
original).
18 Council of Civil Service Unions v UK No. 11603/85
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as a breach of fundamental freedoms and rights. Prominent amongst these was the 
National Council for Civil Liberties which reported on several specific aspects of the 
legislation,19 as well as the measures as a whole, arguing that the Government had shown 
'contempt' for individual rights and had restricted trade union rights to an extent greater 
than anywhere else in the western world (1989: 1). It concluded:
Trade unions are the most effective means by which citizens can defend their civil 
liberties at the workplace. The protections laid down for employees and their 
organisations in international law set important standards with which domestic law 
should strive to comply. These standards should not be disregarded merely as 
bureaucratic impediments to the operation of the free market. The effect of 
Government measures since 1979 however has been to strip individuals of their 
rights at work, restrict the ability of unions to take effective industrial action and 
has amounted to an unwarranted interference in internal union affairs' (1989: 4).
Support from an organisation such as this was important for the unions. It served 
to emphasise the validity of their use of the language of'freedom' and 'individual rights' 
so that this vocabulary could be confidently employed in support of the new 'charter of 
individual rights': Hut to protect those interests workers must have basic human rights - 
freedom of association, the right to join a union and for that union to be recognised by 
management for representation and negotiating purposes' (Dean, B. TUC 1990: 289). 
Moreover, it facilitated the construction of a broad 'community of opposition to the 
Government's policies in a similar manner to the way in which employers' organisations 
were called in aid (see pp. 171-3) - this served to marginalise the Government. It was 
especially significant that the support of groups of this type enabled the unions to move 
away from the portrayal of such issues as solely related to industrial relations, depicting 
them instead as having consequences for society as a whole: 'every citizen who loves civil 
liberties must defend trade unionism' (Gill, K. TUC 1989: 350); 'What is at stake is not 
just trade union rights, important as they are, but the fundamental rights that should apply 
in a democratic society' (Fitzsimmons, S. TUC 1989: 352). This was, therefore, a means 
by which the unions could seek to reintegrate themselves within British political society, 
as the representatives of national, rather than mere sectional interests (see section V).
The third development which strengthened the potency of the vocabulary of 
'freedom' and human rights for the union movement in this period was the decision of the
19 Notably the removal of the right to discipline strike-breakers under s.3 
Employment Act 1988 (NCCL 1987). See further, pp.211-3.
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ILO in May 1989 that the Conservative Government had violated Convention 87 on 
freedom of association and the right to organise. In addition to finding a number of 
specific violations, ’the ILO also warned the Government about the complexity and 
cumulative effect of piecemeal legal reforms and an apparent lack of concern with the 
rights of trade unions' (Hendy 1993: 38).
The ILO's condemnation of the legislation reinforced the unions' use of the 
language of 'freedom' for individuals: 'The ILO has roundly condemned the Tory anti­
trade union laws. They are unfair. They are unjust. And they are an affront to human 
freedom and human dignity1 (Morris, W. TUC 1989: 353). The argument was particularly 
strong because the standards set by the ILO were supposed to represent a basic 'floor1 of 
rights for individuals to associate and enjoy protection against employer discrimination, 
which could be met on a near-universal basis: 'The standards against which the law has 
been judged are the minimum standards' (Morton, J. TUC 1989: 351). Accordingly, this 
gave added emphasis to the argument that the Government had not acted fairly towards 
the unions, particularly when comparisons were drawn with Europe (which of course 
benefited from a charter of individual rights in the form of the Social Charter): We will 
continue to press for UK employment law to be brought into line with the minimum 
internationally accepted labour standards set by the ILO. All this points to the need for a 
fairer balance in industrial relations laws' (Grantham, R. TUC 1989: 345); 'Britain's 
approach to employment law is out of step with our European neighbours and at odds 
with international conventions' (TUC 1990b: 2).
All of this served further to marginalise the Government as a 'deviant case', unable 
to meet the standards set elsewhere in Europe or even the basic requirements of the ILO: 
'The British Government's record has attracted criticism from around the world - 
comprehensively condemned by the ILO, systematically isolated in Europe' (TUC 1990c: 
22). In particular it may be noted that, by invoking the judgment of the ILO, the trade 
union movement was arguing that the Government was violating international law - thus, 
not only was it behaving in a manner which demonstrated pathological antipathy towards 
unions which was almost unparalleled on a worldwide scale, it was transgressing one of 
the central principles of its own policy and discourse by violating the 'rule of law': 'The 
ILO states that the policies of the British Government are in serious breach of civil 
liberties and democratic rights. That, I would remind you, comes from an organisation 
which rarely had anything to say to Britain, the home of trade unionism. It usually made
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comments on the antics of petty dictatorships. The Tories claimed that they simply wanted 
to reintroduce the rule of law. Now they have been named as an international outlaw' 
(Gill, K. TUC 1989: 350). The discourse of the 'rule of law' which had been used by the 
Conservatives and New Right' to justify action against union 'privileges' (Chapter 4) had 
been adopted by the unions and turned against the Government so as to effect a 
marginalisation of its position.
Government 'hypocrisy*
This was not the only occasion in this context in which the union movement 
sought to deploy the language of the Government against itself. An increasingly frequent 
argument was that the Government was guilty of'double standards' - while proclaiming 
its attachment to the discourse and policy of strengthening the rights of the individual, it 
was in fact diminishing those rights.
The starting-point for this analysis was the unions' attachment to the concept of 
individual rights, discussed above. Once the unions had depicted themselves as the true 
'guardians' of the rights of the individual, which they looked to do with increasing vigour 
from 1986 onward, they were in a position to criticise the Conservatives' policies as not 
legitimately* concerned with individual rights: 'the Green Paper [Trade Unions and their 
Members] cannot be regarded as a genuine attempt to safeguard the interests of the 
individual union member' (TUC 1987a: 5); 'The Government is not seriously interested 
in individual workers as its stripping away of their rights at work has proved' (TUC 
Bulletin, April 1987: 4).
However, as this last statement suggests, the 'charge' levelled against the 
Government's measures was not simply one of inefficacy. Rather, unions argued that the 
Government was acting hypocritically, because its measures were actually achieving (and 
were intended to achieve) precisely the reverse of what was claimed for them: 'A 
government which is saying it stands for the rights of the individual is perpetrating these 
industrial crimes against these same workers, and there are many more attacks of that 
kind. That is hardly consistent with any genuine concern for individual workers' (Knapp, 
J. TUC 1987: 438).
A number of interrelated strands to the union claim of Government 'hypocrisy' can 
be detected. In general terms, the unions argued that, while professing concern for the
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individual, the Government had actually removed many individual employment rights in 
the interests of deregulating the labour market: 'The Government seems intent on pursuing 
its twin policies of'deregulation' and restrictive trade union legislation. Yet the victims of 
both these misguided and damaging policies is the ordinary worker - the individual 
employee and trade union member whose interests the Government misleadingly claims 
to have at heart' (TUC 1987a: 1); 'The Government claims its measures have promoted 
the interests of individuals, but over the past ten years protection has been stripped away 
from workers across the board' (Grantham, R. TUC 1989: 345-6); 'This latest so-called 
Employment Bill is yet more evidence of the Government’s cynical disregard for the real 
interests of people at work. Despite its title, the Bill has nothing to do with creating jobs 
or improving employment conditions and everything to do with removing rights from 
individual employees' (TUC 1989a: 11); 'One of the myths promoted during the last 
decade has been that the Government’s measures have been aimed at protecting the 
interests of individuals at work. But in reality important safeguards and statutory rights 
for those at work have been stripped away' (TUC 1990b: 3).
It was also claimed that the Government, despite its rhetorical attachment to the 
betterment of the position of the individual vis-a-vis the state, had attacked individuals on 
issues broader than the question of employment rights. For example, the Government's 
economic and social policies as a whole were seen as weakening the position of'working 
people' by creating unemployment and insecurity and reducing services and benefits (see 
Jarvis, F. TUC 1987: 391; Woolf, G. TUC 1990: 304 - above, p. 189). Such an analysis 
suggested a continued 'protective' role for the unions of the sort frequently discussed in 
the earlier part of the decade (see pp. 154-6).
A more specific matter on which the unions sought to accuse the Government of 
double standards was the issue of banning trade unions at GCHQ (see p.26). This was 
seen as denying freedom to the individual to join a trade union if he/she chose so to do, 
and thus as contrary to the Conservatives' basic policies: 'There is this constant emphasis 
on the individual and the right to choose - except to be a member of a trade union, for 
example, at GCHQ and now in many other areas - there is constant prattle about giving 
unions back to the members, but there is no regard at all for the interests and rights of 
people in employment' (McCall, W. TUC 1988: 623). Moreover, if the Government could 
be shown to have been hypocritical in this context, its arguments against the closed shop 
as a denial of individual freedom (see pp.53-5) would lose weight: 'The Green Paper’s
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argument that the pre-entry closed shop is an infringement of the liberty of the individual 
does not hold up given the Government’s ban on union membership at GCHQ and the 
recent dismissals of 18 trade unionists there' (TUC 1989b: 3).
By pointing out the Government's duplicity in talking the language of individual 
liberty but, in practice, denying that freedom by removing individual employment rights, 
creating unemployment, restricting freedom of association in trade unions etc., the unions 
attempted to make appeals to 'fair-minded' people and to marginalise the Government as 
deceitful and untrustworthy, thus contributing to the portrayal of its behaviour as 
prejudiced and malicious - see Horton, D. TUC 1990: 307, above p. 188. Perhaps the 
strongest and most wide-ranging statement in this context came from Ron Todd:
'The present Government’s anti-trade union legislation is not only a denial of 
freedom but a fraud. While the Tories are snatching away the rights of workers to 
make their own decisions, they talk about democracy. While they are stopping 
time off for expectant mothers, they talk about caring Conservatism. While they 
are restricting the rights of workers to take industrial action in their own defence, 
they talk about freedom. While they are wheeling out police cordons, High Court 
judges and sequestrators, in an attempt to destroy independent trade unionism, 
they talk about human rights. Let us get the record straight: Tory anti-union laws 
have nothing to do with democracy, compassion, freedom or human rights. Their 
aim is to undermine the ability of working people to defend themselves through 
collective organisation. The legislation is industrial terrorism, disguised with liberal 
window-dressing' (TUC 1986: 460).
As with the issue of democracy, which I will discuss below, the unions were 
attacking the Government on its own terms - arguing that instead of encouraging freedom, 
the Conservative legislation represented a denial of it; rather than enhancing individual 
rights, the measures were restricting them. The legislation was criticised because, despite 
its professed individualistic objective and vocabulary, it actually resulted in fewer rights 
for the individual. This might lead one to conclude that the language of individualism had 
been fully adopted by the unions and turned to their advantage against their political 
opponents. However, a certain amount of discomfiture over the language of individual 
rights seems to have persisted within the union movement, even during this latter period.
Harmony between collectivism and individualism?
The unions would seem to have gone some distance towards asserting their 
commitment to individualism by confidently employing an individualist vocabulary and
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proclaiming their attachment to policies of individual employment rights. Yet difficulties 
remained: unions were by nature collective organisations, and too strong an emphasis 
upon the rights of the individual might lead some to question whether they were necessary 
at all. This indeed seemed to be the standpoint of 'New Right' theorists such as Hanson 
and Mather (1988) who argued for the decollectivisation of industrial relations, while even 
the Government itself, in the post-1987 era, moved in this direction: Tor the first time 
since the early nineteenth century and the passage of the Combination Acts, the British 
state appeared to see no merit in the continuing existence of trade unionism' (Taylor 1993:
304). The unions needed to find some sort of response which acknowledged and 
incorporated the increased emphasis upon individualism, yet reasserted their value as 
collective institutions.
The problem for the unions was that there was a certain degree of tension between 
the pursuit of vocabularies of individualism and collectivism, which was exploited by the 
Government: *the Government uses the language of individual rights to attack collective 
rights and the ability of trade unions to defend their members' (TUC-Labour 1986: 15). 
This was demonstrated by a number of provisions in the 1988 and 1990 Acts which 
sought to use the individual 'disaffected member' as a means of regulating and controlling 
trade union behaviour.20 The reaction to these measures, perhaps understandably, was to 
argue that the Government was prioritising individual rights in an attempt to attack 
collective organisations: 'In its continuing attack on the trade unions the Government 
pretends to be concerned for the rights of the individual. What it is actually doing is to 
elevate the rights of the individual above the rights of the majority and of union 
membership as a whole' (Jarvis, F. TUC 1987: 391); 'These attempts at undermining trade 
unions have come in two ways: firstly, by the Government’s emphasis on the individual, 
on self disregarding the majority for personal gain; and secondly, by direct government 
action in withdrawing rights from trade union members' (Smith, R. TUC 1987: 439).
20 Notably Employment Act 1988, s.l (member could take legal action against 
union inducing workers to take industrial action without ballot), s.3 (right not to be 
unjustifiably disciplined - see p.211), s. 8 (member can object to union indemnifying for 
criminal offence or contempt), s.9 (application for court order restraining unlawful use of 
union funds), ss. 19-21 (setting up Commissioner for the Rights of Trade Union Members); 
Employment Act 1990, s. 1 (right of complaint to industrial tribunal for individual refused 
employment on ground of non-membership of trade union), s. 10 (expanding scope of 
assistance by Commissioner).
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However, such a response laid the unions open to the charge that they were concerned 
with collective values over and above individual rights.
Accordingly, the unions attempted to construct a response which achieved some 
compatibility between individualism and collectivism by stressing the potential for 
individual enhancement which could be achieved via the collective. The individual was 
seen as the basis for the existence of trade unions but, being weak in bargaining power 
relative to the employer, he/she required the collective protection offered by unions to 
effectively assert the individual employment rights against management: 'we need ways 
to help unions provide that collective approach, that strength without which individuals' 
rights have too often been proved meaningless' (Willis, N. TUC 1986: 450); 'But 
individual rights are no use if they cannot be monitored and enforced. Many issues at work 
can only be resolved on a collective basis and our experience shows that too often 
individual rights are a sham unless they can have collective backing' (TUC 1990c: 23); 
'The rights that we propose would bring a life jacket to all those victims of Thatcher’s 
Britain, struggling, often drowning, in a sea of despair. Individual rights are the 
cornerstone on which our edifice is built, but rights need effective enforcement through 
the collective security of trade unionism' (Willis, N. TUC 1990: 285); 'The advantage of 
the approach we have here is one that talks about individual rights, but understands that 
those individual rights are useless if it is one person sitting across a desk dealing with the 
employer. They require collective support and collective action' (Petch, S. TUC 1990:
305). In this way the unions could adopt the vocabulary of individualism without forsaking 
their collectivist traditions and values altogether.
There was nothing particularly novel in this approach. The inequality of power 
between employers and workers was a fundamental precept of trade unionism in that it 
implied the collective bonding of individuals in order to equalise these respective 
positions. Accordingly, it was perfectly possible for those who argued from the traditions 
of the union movement, and for those who opposed the new strategies, to argue in similar 
terms: 'The first trade unions came into existence precisely because the individual 
recognised his ineffectiveness as an individual against the employer and the state. To 
overcome this weakness individuals combined with other individuals to form a collective, 
and trade unions were bom. Without that collective force, individuals would be back 
fighting alone' (Chiverton, M. TUC 1987: 446); Tor heaven's sake, there is nobody in this 
hall who is against individual rights... But the individual rights are useless without strong
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trade unionism' (Hearn, D. TUC 1990: 302). Moreover, the familiarity of this argument - 
Len Murray remarked that the 'tension between collectivism and individualism has always 
been what trade unionism was about' (interview) - apparently meant that the unions were 
relatively comfortable about responding to individualisation: 'Nothing she [Thatcher] said 
about individuals caused unions any difficulty. The reason individuals do great things is 
because they are part of the union, the collective' (Poole, interview); 'the essence of trade 
unionism was about the right of the individual to answer the boss back and the only way 
he could express that was to have the support of his fellows - any rights you might confer 
on him were unavailing unless he could go in with half a dozen of his mates and say 'you're 
pushing us around" (Murray, interview).
Can it be concluded from this that the unions did not particularly need to adapt 
their vocabulary in order to accommodate the individualist policies and language of the 
Conservatives and New Right'? To an extent there would seem to have been considerable 
continuity in the language which was used - unions argued that they were simply doing 
what they always had done. However, I believe that certain developments can be detected.
Firstly, there was an increased focus on using the law to establish a basic set of 
individual employment rights from 1986 onward; this was identified by the Head of the 
Press Department of the TUC as the priority during the later part of the period (Smith, 
interview). The individual was seen as the starting-point, with trade unions and collective 
rights necessary as a means of supporting him/her; accordingly collective rights and 
discourse such as 'unity' and 'solidarity' could be seen as somewhat downplayed, although 
they still persisted (see above).
Secondly, the unions' reassessment of their role in society included, inter alia, a 
move towards the provision of more services to individual members (see p.219); and 
thirdly, the support given to the position of the unions by civil liberties groups together 
with the capital made from the ILO's denunciation of Conservative policies and legislation 
enabled the unions to turn the language of the 'freedom of the individual' against the 
Government.
I would endorse, therefore, the view of Bacon and Storey (in a slightly different 
context) that 'unions have adopted more of an individualist agenda both in vocabulary and 
in seeking to identify the wishes of their members' (1996: 43-4); however they also claim 
that 'it is not easy for trade unions to adopt a more individualist strategy' and that such a 
vocabulary 'requires some revisionism' (ibid. 70). The confident incorporation of
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individualist language and policies with 'traditional' union functions discussed above would 
seem to refute their argument. However, the disparity between Conservative/'New Right' 
understandings of individual freedom and rights, focusing upon freedom of choice in an 
unregulated market, and Left/union views, which emphasised freedom of association and 
individual protection against employers should not be overlooked. It may have been 
difficult for the unions to adopt the Conservative language and strategies of individualism: 
'the Tories do not understand the question of the imbalance of individual rights against the 
employer' (Smith, interview), but it was easier for them to emphasise the individual within 
their 'traditional' analysis which saw him/her asserting themselves against management 
with collective support. The question then was which one of these understandings 
achieved hegemony (see Chapter 7). This problem - that of a contested meaning of a 
shared discourse - is equally apparent from consideration of the issue of'democracy.
IV. Democracy
In Chapter 5 ,1 characterised union responses to Conservative policies requiring 
individual balloting and the attendant discourse of'democracy', as falling into two broad 
categories - an assertion that the unions were democratic, and an allegation that the 
Government was not, which linked into the accusation of'hypocrisy'. These basic themes 
can be seen as running through union rhetoric during this latter period, with the additional 
development of a specific focus for the claim of Government duplicity, in the form of s. 3 
Employment Act 1988. However, this period also witnessed a growing acceptance of the 
democratic requirements imposed by the Government and the incorporation of balloting 
into the repertoire of union bargaining tactics; in consequence some union leaders voiced 
criticism of the previous democratic arrangements of unions and emphasised their 
commitment to the new approach.
Union attachment to democratic principles
As in 1979-83, however, the basis for most union leaders' analysis of the issue of 
balloting was the confident declaration that unions were democratic organisations: 
Democracy is the essence of trade union organisation. In no other major national 
institution is the commitment to, and the practice of, democracy more deeply embedded
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than in the trade union movement' (TUC-Labour 1986: 20); We in the unions are the 
champions of democracy in the workforce. We do not like being lectured by employment 
ministers who never stood in a parliamentary election. We do not welcome advice from 
newspaper proprietors whose idea of democracy is notice of termination and the raising 
of a wire fence' (Todd, R. TUC 1986: 460). As can be seen here, the union claim of 
democratic essence dovetailed into a criticism of other institutions for failing to achieve 
comparable standards of democracy, an argument which had been used extensively in 
Hands Up fo r  Democracy (see p. 151), and which could be extended, as there, to an 
accusation of double standards: Why is it, if the Government believes so wholeheartedly 
in making bodies accountable to their members, that the same restrictions have not been 
put on the city institutions, the legal profession or indeed the Conservative Party itself?' 
(Chiverton, M. TUC 1987: 446). The language of'democracy' was being used against the 
Government to criticise its arrangements and to allege unfairness and prejudice on its part.
The immanent nature of democracy in trade unions was also emphasised by the use 
of the language of history and tradition to depict the union movement's 'democratic 
heritage': 'Just as our history goes back to the Tolpuddle Martyrs and before, so must our 
vision go beyond the next general election. We have won our democracy not because of 
governments and courts, even though they may be well-intentioned and sympathetic to us, 
it is the faith in our members and their right to determine what they want to do and how 
they want to run their organisations that has achieved that for us' (Daly, J. TUC 1986: 
460); We led the way in the Chartist movement for one man, one vote; today we stand 
for the involvement of working people in decisions which affect their lives' (Todd, R. TUC 
1986: 460); 'One of the great deceptions is that this Government has given democracy to 
the trade unions. The first ballot held by the NUR was in 1911. That was 30 years before 
Norman Fowler was bom. He is going to tell me that he has given democracy to the 
workers of Britain! The trade unions have practised that sort of democracy for decades, 
and they have practised it freely and within the kind of constitution they were prepared 
to adopt' (Knapp, J. TUC 1987: 438).
Such an analysis, based on the view that 'the principles of free trade unionism., 
should include... the right of members to determine and enforce union rules and 
constitutions through their own democratic procedures' (Composite Motion 2, TUC 1990: 
293), offered a potent contfast between the lengthy history of the unions and the more 
recent 'conversion' of the Conservative Government to the principle. Invocation of the
209
labour movement's history was, as argued in Chapter 5, a powerful discourse for 
mobilising and reaffirming opposition to the legislation - here, it served the function of 
refuting the Government's allegation of anti-democracy (which formed part of the broader 
attempt to marginalise the unions in rhetoric). It also served to assert the contribution 
which the unions had made in instilling democratic principles within 'workers' and society 
in general, and therefore to achieve a reintegration of unions within the democratic 
community. This was reinforced by attempts to portray the issue as wider than a 'trade 
union' one by referring to the fundamental rights that should apply in a democratic society 
(Fitzsimmons, S. TUC 1989: 352 - above, p.200) and arguing that 'every citizen that 
values democracy has an interest in defending free trade unionism' (Gill, K. TUC 1989: 
350), which broadened the potential opposition to the Government's measures.
In so far as this analysis denied the necessity for Government intervention to 
regulate trade union behaviour and was based upon the historical traditions of the unions, 
it might be thought to be a 'traditionalist' argument made primarily by those who wished 
to return to a voluntarist position with minimal state involvement in industrial relations 
(and in union democracy in particular). However, the language of'democracy was also 
used by the policy-makers within the TUC leadership. New Rights New Responsibilities 
proclaimed that 'the TUC and Labour Party are committed to extending industrial 
democracy as a foundation for economic policy and planning' (TUC-Labour 1986: 16), 
but argued that 'it would run counter to the spirit of industrial democracy to impose any 
one arrangement' (ibid: 18). Similarly, Employment Law: A New Approach stated that the 
TUC was 'committed... to the rights of union members to have ballots on strikes and in 
the election of union executives... Unlike the present Government, the TUC is fully and 
genuinely committed - as we always have been - to the ideal of a rich and active 
participatory trade union democracy' (TUC 1990c: 23). The focus upon the diversity of 
union arrangements, a view heard earlier in the decade (see pp. 149-50) afforded a link 
between the language of 'democracy' and that of individualism - resistance to the 
legislation could be justified on the basis that it was denying to individuals the right to 
choose the procedures by which their unions were to be governed: 'If therefore, the 
Government is intent on proceeding with its legislative proposals, despite the opposition 
that exists well beyond the trade union Movement, the General Council challenge the 
Government to let union members decide for themselves on their union's rules and 
constitutional arrangements' (TUC 1987a: 5 - emphasis in original).
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The vocabulary of’democracy1 thus went alongside the moves towards a language 
and agenda of individualism discussed in the previous section, and, I would argue, could 
be seen as part of the developing strategy of the TUC in the late 1980s. This was further 
emphasised by language which projected the unions' democratic contribution into the 
future, and thus corresponded with the language of renewal (see p. 169): 'Colleagues, the 
1990s will be a decade of democracy. From Pretoria to Prague the demands for more 
individual and collective rights will ring around the world. We can capture the mood and 
help lead the campaign for a new democracy in Britain, or we can leave it to others, 
whose objectives are less ambitious' (Christopher, C. TUC 1990:296).21
Government 'hypocrisy' - s.3 Employment Act 1988
I have already touched upon the way in which the unions' assured adoption of the 
language of'democracy1 enabled them to turn the vocabulary against the Conservatives 
and to accuse them of being anti-democratic. However, the most potent example of this 
tactic came in the context of the provision which became s.3 of the Act of 1988, which 
introduced a right for union members not to be unjustifiably disciplined for failure to 
participate in a strike, even if official and backed by the majority of workers in a ballot.
This measure provoked widespread criticism, not only from the unions themselves, 
but also from employers' organisations (see p. 172) and civil liberties pressure groups {eg 
NCCL 1987), which facilitated the construction - at least in rhetoric - of a broad coalition 
of opposition on an issue which went beyond its specific target: We are not alone in 
seeing this as signalling a contempt for democracy, and as undermining ballots in principle 
and practice. The CBI, the IPM and a whole host of organisations with whom we would 
not always find ourselves in agreement have condemned this clause...For if the law 
protects those who ignore a democratic majority to call a strike, what about those who 
might ignore a majority to end one?... This is not just a trade union issue. It is a question 
of democracy. All democrats must make their voices heard' (Willis, N. TUC Bulletin, 
November 1987: 2 - emphasis in original).
The argument of the unions and other organisations was that the Government was
21 It should be noted that Christopher supported the composite motion demanding 
the repeal of the Conservative legislation and could thus be seen as a 'traditionalist'; 
nevertheless, he sought to locate himself within both discourses, - see above, p. 192.
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guilty of double standards in seeking to promote democracy within unions and then 
allowing an individual to override a decision which had been democratically taken: 
Moreover, while using the language of democracy to impugn the trade union Movement, 
its proposal for a 'right to strike break' despite majority support for industrial action in a 
ballot is manifestly anti-democratic' (TUC 1987a: 1); 'Then of course we have the most 
infamous proposal of all, that the right of the individual to choose to go back to work 
despite a call to take industrial action is a fundamental freedom. That is what the Green 
Paper says. It would have been more honest if they had said they were giving individuals 
the right to ignore democratically arrived at decisions' (Knapp, J. TUC 1987: 438). In this 
sense, the unions were attacking the Government in its own terms, by using the language 
of'democracy' against it. By doing so, the depiction of the Government as 'prejudiced', 
'duplicitous' and 'malicious' - as the enemy - was reinforced, with its policies seen as 
'unfair* and thus rejected by the majority of 'fair-minded' people: 'The Government 
apparently wants to ‘have its cake and eat it’ - by requiring a secret ballot, but 
encouraging people not to abide by its outcome when the majority favour industrial 
action. The dangerous principle behind the Government's proposed 'legal right to strike 
break' if applied in reverse would imply that minorities could justifiably take industrial 
action despite a majority vote against. While no sensible person would support action on 
this basis, it serves to illustrate the Government's double standards' (TUC 1987a: 
Appendix: 2). In addition, resistance to the measure was justified on the basis of its likely 
damaging consequences:
'The facts of trade union life are that unions often have to take hard, finely 
balanced and closely contested decisions... These decisions are taken by votes 
rather than by someone exercising autocratic power (in marked contrast to 
employers). There is frequently a minority who intensely disagree with the 
majority. Yet the tradition of democracy is that minorities abide by the decisions 
of the majority. If this principle is substantially undermined as far as unions are 
concerned - and this appears to be the Government’s aim - then it becomes 
difficult for unions to act in a coherent, consistent and reliable way. That is not in 
the best interests of union members, nor employers, nor the Government' (TUC 
1987a: 4).
The response of the unions to this provision thus seems fairly robust. Bolstered 
by the support of other organisations, they were able to use the language of'democracy' 
against the Government in order to accuse it of double standards, prejudice and a lack of 
concern for stability in industrial relations. However, two related problems remained.
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Firstly, it could be argued that, by condemning this clause, the unions were failing to show 
concern for the rights of an individual to choose to work despite a strike call. The unions 
responded to this by impliedly labelling such an individual 'disaffected', thus delegitimising 
their views: 'In proposing measures for individuals to deploy against their unions, the 
Government clearly intends to establish detailed mechanisms which could make it difficult 
for unions to operate without constant harassment from disappointed minorities and 
individuals' (TUC 1987a: 4); yet this merely demonstrated the disparity between union and 
Government definitions of'individual freedom'. This leads to the second difficulty - the 
effectiveness of using the language of'democracy' against the Government hinged upon 
whether the unions themselves were perceived as democratic. I turn now to this issue.
Contested meanings of 'democracy1?
A number of the above statements from union leaders - particularly those of Todd 
(p.209) and Christopher (p.211) seem to demonstrate the confidence with which the 
unions used the discourse of'democracy'. This was significant because an accusation of 
'anti-democracy' levelled at the Government would lose considerable force if the 
perception among public and union members was that the unions were not democratic. 
This point was clearly grasped by at least one speaker at Congress: 'Motion 1 rightly calls 
for the removal of Section 3(1) of the 1988 Employment Act, which allows members of 
a trade union to ignore majority ballot results for industrial action, without being 
disciplined by his or her trade union. Quite right. That is anti-democracy and we can only 
make this demand if we are in favour, and publicly prepared to say so, of ballots before 
strikes in the first place' (Chambers, M. TUC 1990: 302).
The problem for the unions, as pointed out in Chapter 5, was that there were a 
number of differing varieties of democracy - 'the Thatcher definition was just one 
definition of democracy' (Morris, interview). The unions could therefore claim that they 
were democratic as they understood the term, but if this understanding of the required 
procedures and institutions was not shared by the audience, any assertions made of their 
democratic nature and allegations of lack of democracy on the Government's part were 
less likely to be effective. Significantly, there were several senior trade unionists who 
suggested that the union definition of'democracy' had not gained acceptance: 'The unions 
allowed Thatcher and Tebbit to cloak themselves in democracy. Union democracy was
213
good for the 1940s, but it had not been updated. We assumed that because things had 
always been like that they were OK' (Poole, interview); By our own ineptitude in the 
argument about union democracy we managed on many occasions to get on the wrong 
side of the argument and to make it seem to people who perhaps were not listening as 
carefully as they should have been that we were not so much against the precise legal 
restraints but we gave some people the impression that we were actually against union 
democracy' (Edmonds, J. TUC 1986: 462);
It is also possibly our last chance to show that we are true democrats - rather than 
Thatcher-enforced ones. I say 'possibly1, because it may already be too late. It may 
be that the message has already got home to our members that we do not think 
they are clever enough to make an informed choice about whether they want to 
go on strike. Maybe they have already twigged that we do not think they are wise 
enough to decide who should be their General Secretary and who should sit on 
their Executive Committee. Of course, we can pretend that we are democrats by 
chanting that it is up to our members to determine their own rules. But who is 
fooled? We all know how that operates: A handful of activists turning up at a 
meeting, often in pubs, to determine how hundreds, sometimes thousands, of votes 
in a local branch should be cast at the union's conference. Let us be honest. That 
is how it happened in union after union, and my union was as guilty as the rest' 
(Chambers, M. TUC 1990: 302).
These remarks strongly imply that mere assertions of the democratic origins and 
traditions of the unions might be insufficient to convince members and the public that 
unions were properly democratic institutions, particularly given Government dominance 
of the media and political culture which arguably rendered its individualistic model of 
democracy more persuasive than that of the unions (see Chapter 7). Although unions 
practised a form of democracy, this did not necessarily correspond with others' 
understanding of the term.
Alongside this rhetorical acceptance of the potency of the Government's definition 
of 'democracy', there was an adaptation to the legislation in practice. Undy et al 
demonstrate that unions changed their rules and practices to comply with the legislation, 
although they did so reluctantly, making the minimum changes necessary to avoid 
sanctions (1996: 236). Such compliance eventually led to incorporation of the definition 
of 'democracy' as securing accountability via individual balloting - as distinct from 
'participative' or 'developmental' definitions which emphasise interaction and involvement 
(Fredman 1992: 30) - into union discourse, such that: 'there is no longer any serious
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argument in the unions about the principle of balloting' (Moher 1995: 42).22
Accordingly, union challenges to Government policies on balloting may be seen 
to have diminished in intensity over the period. In any event, it had always been difficult 
for the unions to be strongly critical of the Government's provisions, as pointed out on 
pp. 147-8, because, as Fredman argues, 'criticisms of aspects of the current legislation can 
simply be labelled as 'anti-democratic' and dismissed' (1992: 24). Accusations of'anti- 
democracy' were powerful forms of marginalisation, as the TUC acknowledged: 'To 
simply remove these provisions [ie those on balloting contained in the 1984 Act] and not 
introduce some new measures in this area could lead to accusations that unions were 
diminishing the rights of members and were undemocratic' (1986a: 11-12); this fact, 
coupled with the apparent popularity of the provisions among members (see p.225) and 
the adaptation to them which was evident in union bargaining processes, rendered the 
Conservative/New Right' definition increasingly dominant.
But I feel that Fredman exaggerates in arguing that the Government 'has 
effectively deprived its opponents of the vocabulary of democracy' (1992: 24). Although 
the Government definition of this contested term (Gospel and Palmer 1993: 149) was 
gradually (if reluctantly) accepted by the unions, they still sought to turn the discourse 
against it by continuing to accuse the Conservative Party and other institutions of being 
comparatively undemocratic. While the effectiveness of this may be questioned - the 
TUC's former Press Officer remarked that the public might have felt that 'we were using 
the concept of democracy against them [ie the Government], but not addressing the real 
issues' (Smith, interview), the support given to the campaign against s.3 of the 1988 Act, 
which centred around the accusation of'hypocrisy', demonstrated that it was still possible 
for unions to obtain widespread backing for a response which prioritised democracy over 
individualism, even if this did not result in a change in the law.23
22 Notwithstanding the call for an 'active participatory trade union democracy' 
(TUC 1990c: 23), Mcllroy argues that the prevailing TUC and union trend has been 
towards a protective, plebiscitary model (1995: 161).
23 Greater success was achieved on the draft Code of Practice on Industrial Action 
Ballots (1988), which the TUC (again supported by the EEF, CBI and IPM) criticised as 
'one-sided', identifying as particularly 'iniquitous' a proposal that unions should only 
endorse action if there was a substantial majority and tunout exceeded 70% (GC Report, 
TUC 1989: 21). A less extreme Code came into effect in 1990 (Mcllroy 1991: 180).
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V. Unions and the public
Responses to marginalisation
I have referred on a number of occasions in this thesis to the way in which much 
of Conservative discourse and policies functioned to marginalise the trade unions, and this 
remained an important theme in the period 1986-1990; indeed it could be argued that this 
strategy reached a pinnacle in these years, following the defeat of the miners in 1985 and 
the Conservatives' third election victory in 1987 which ushered in a period of increased 
boldness and dogma on the part of Government ministers (see p.41).
The continuing exclusion of unions from policy-making processes, coupled with 
the legislative attack on them prompted the TUC to fundamentally reassess the role, 
objectives and methods of trade unions in society. The document TUC Strategy (1984) 
examined the position of trade unions in a changing environment and offered cooperation 
with Government and employers - Mcllroy characterises it as 'a calling card for the TUC's 
readmission into politics and society based upon an acceptance of the Government's 
achievements 1979-83 and the consequent scaling down of union influence' (1991: 78). 
Further substantial reviews were carried out by the Special Review Body (SRB) of the 
TUC, established in 1987; its reports Meeting the Challenge (1988) and Organising fo r  
the 1990s (1989) examined the future role of trade unions and the TUC.
These developments were a clear indication that the Government's language and 
strategy of marginalisation had had an impact upon the unions. There was a perceived 
need to reaffirm the relevance of trade unions to people: 'many in modem Britain need 
reminding about the case for trade unionism' (SRB 1988: 3), which underpinned the work 
of the SRB. The task for the TUC and unions was to construct an appropriate and 
effective response to marginalisation, as the consultative document on Industrial 
Relations Legislation acknowledged: 'The Government has in effect attempted to de- 
legitimise trade union membership and collective bargaining... the series of challenges has 
highlighted the importance of the TUC strategy exercise which pinpoints the need to 
project trade union achievements which are otherwise ignored. As the TUC consultative 
document issued in March 1984 said: 'The Movement has to counter-attack to make 
known and understood the positive contribution unions make to British society. But 
getting the message across will not be enough. Unions must also prove their fitness to
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play a continuing role in the future" (TUC 1986a: 4, 5 - italics in original).
One possible response was for the unions to turn the tactic of marginalisation 
against the Government by seeking to place it beyond what was politically acceptable. It 
is therefore important to identify the themes and vocabularies which may have contributed 
to this goal. For example, the use of language designed to depict the Government as 
Vindictive,, 'malicious', Tiypocritical', 'deceitful' etc. or simply as *unfair' could be regarded 
as an attempt to challenge the motives underpinning the legislation and, by ascribing mere 
prejudice, render the Government's policies unpalatable to ordinary 'fair-minded' people.24 
Similar results could be achieved by branding it or the measures 'anti-democratic', as 
failing to achieve the standards of other nations, as 'isolated' in Europe and as an 
'international outlaw'. In addition, the unions could seek to portray the Government as 
isolated within domestic politics by emphasising the support which employers' 
organisations and other groups (such as civil liberties bodies) had given to their position; 
this served to construct - at least in rhetoric - a broad coalition of opposition to the 
Government's policies.
Redefining the relationship
Another means of responding to Government attempts to marginalise them was 
for the unions to reassess their role and strategies in relation to the public. Rather than 
criticising the Conservative Government, or its legislative measures, this discourse focused 
upon reintegrating unions within the political community by winning public support.
In part this could be achieved, as the quoted passage from TUC Strategy above 
suggests, by emphasising the contribution, historical or potential, of unions to British 
society. This had been a feature of earlier documents, such as Hands Up fo r Democracy 
(see pp. 156-7), and a number of union leaders continued to use language which stressed 
the centrality of trade unionism to the improvement of Britain's economic and social 
position: Mr. President, a few days ago a very distinguished journalist referred to my 
father as a Bolshie, backroom barber, and so he was. He had such a regard for his fellow 
workers, and such a love for his country, that he once gave me a classic definition - a 
working man's definition - of patriotism. It was, Make our country better'. Let us do it;
24 See particularly TUC 1987a: 4 - above, p. 180; Horton, D. TUC 1990: 307 - 
above, p. 188.
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let us do it together; let us do it now* (Willis, N. TUC 1986: 451); 'We understand that 
trade unions are vitally important to the fabric of our national life and democracy. Our 
procedures are therefore of interest and concern to the nation as a whole' (Switzer, B. 
TUC 1986: 454); The trade union Movement is potentially the greatest power in society' 
(Macreadie, J. TUC 1987: 444). This language, which implied that trade unions still 
occupied a position as 'the fifth estate' (Taylor 1980) and called upon the patriotic 
discourse of 'nation', might be seen as linked to 'traditional' calls for a corporatist-style 
role in political and economic policy-making (Jarvis, F. TUC 1987: 391 - see above, 
p. 189), but it could also support a more modem, European concept of'social partnership': 
'These [proposals] look forward to an end to confrontation between Government and 
unions as a basis of building on the European Social Charter. This could only benefit the 
economy and society (Young, A. TUC 1990: 287).
However, the refutation of the Government's tactic of marginalisation by asserting 
the centrality of trade unionism to British society seems to have been regarded by many 
as increasingly problematic. The 1986 consultative document acknowledged that 'there 
may be argument about the central role that trade unions must play in the affairs of the 
nation and industry (TUC 1986a: 2), while the second report of the SRB spoke of 
'promoting trade unionism as a vibrant and attractive force within the community' (1989: 
1). The implication of these statements would seem to be that trade unionism was merely 
one o f a number of groupings or 'philosophies' within British society and that other social 
groups could play an equally significant role25 - a view supported by Roger Poole: Uet us 
never use language which says that we are the central point around which society revolves' 
(interview).
The downplaying of trade unionism's centrality in this manner corresponded with 
the shift towards an agenda and vocabulary of individualism. The individual was now 
viewed as the cornerstone, and the task became to persuade him/her that trade unionism 
was compatible with pre-existing beliefs, rather than presuming an inevitable correlation: 
'it will be important to ensure that non-members are aware that the basic values they 
support are central to trade unionism...there is a need to convince non-members that 
unions are relevant to their concerns and interests. That can mean understanding the things
25 This seems to have been a continuing process - Mcllroy comments that the 
'relaunch' of the TUC in 1994 'appeared to suggest the TUC was accepting a role as one 
of many pressure groups' (1995: 224).
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that are already done, or it can mean addressing new issues in a trade union way1 (SRB 
1989: 6 - emphasis in original). This was linked to a growing emphasis upon the services 
which unions could provide to individuals - pensions, insurance, credit cards, legal 
services etc. - which would supplement existing collective bargaining functions and be 
attractive components of recruitment campaigns (SRB 1989: 8). Such developments led 
toward the conclusion that unions primarily existed to enhance the position of the 
individual: Unions therefore contribute to the dignity, self-respect and standing of 
individual workers' (SRB 1988: 3).26
If the individual was, indeed, predominant in the manner that these arguments 
might suggest, and unions were no longer to be seen as of central significance to British 
society but were merely one of a number of pressure groups competing for the 
commitment of individuals, it would seem that the equation of 'unions and 'nation/people' 
which had characterised Hands Up For Democracy (see pp. 157-8) was no longer 
appropriate. The interests of individuals and *the people' as a whole were no longer viewed 
as necessarily identical with those of the unions. This represented a realistic response to 
the declining levels of union membership and to the apparent attractiveness of 
Conservative policies to union members,27 but it might have been thought to render it 
more difficult to counter languages and strategies of marginalisation - the unions could 
no longer simply invoke the discourses of'nation' or 'people' to counter the Government.
Addressing the public
However, it could be argued that a move away from an assumption that union 
interests and vocabulary necessarily coincided with those of the public resulted in the 
unions attempting to adapt their language to a greater degree in order to win public 
support. As noted in Chapter 5 (pp. 158-9), this was a process which had apparently begun
26 It is notable, however, that this paragraph continues in a more collectivist, 
'protective' vein: Unions are a counter-weight to employer and management power. By 
seeking to organise individuals at work into groups with a common interest, unions seek 
to avoid that power being used in arbitrary, exploitative or careless ways' (ibid). This was 
therefore a further example of the way in which unions attempted to harmonise 
individualist and collectivist discourses (see pp.204-8).
27 In the 1987 general election 30% of trade unionists voted Conservative; only 
42% supported Labour (Kessler and Bayliss 1995: 59).
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around the time of the Wembley Conference in 1982, but it became increasingly important 
as the 'attritional' effects of Conservative legislation took hold and union membership 
continued to decline. The SRB's first report spoke of the need 'to create an atmosphere 
more favourably inclined towards trade unionism' (1988: 26):
It is also important to seek as wide support for the trade union view as possible. 
This has necessitated fresh thinking about the presentation of policy and about the 
need to work with a range of concerned individuals and institutions. This approach 
is at the heart of TUC work on the NHS, the inner cities and the need to maintain 
public services. Sometimes this approach involves unions - as on the NHS issue 
currently - in being careful to present policies in ways which emphasise the needs 
of the community above the direct and immediate interests of the groups of 
workers concerned - a development in which unions and members are showing 
considerable judgment and maturity. It has been argued that during the period of 
greatest trade union influence in the 1970s, unions paid insufficient attention to 
their standing with the community. In consequence, unions were portrayed, with 
some success, as the enemies of the public and when the economic climate 
worsened in 1980 and the Government was hostile, unions had few allies to call 
upon for support' (ibid: 25-6).
In order to assist in improving public perceptions of trade unionism, the SRB 
called for the use of techniques such as advertising, videos and opinion research, both 
generally and in targeting specific groups (1988: 26-7; 1989: 10). There seem to have 
been several objectives underpinning this call; broadly, there was a desire to 'create an 
environment more responsive to the role of unions' (1988: 25), which would assist the 
unions in constructing a coalition of support to counter the Government's marginalisation 
strategy, as the above extract suggests. But there were also more specific goals of 
promoting trade unionism among non-members to assist recruitment campaigns (SRB 
1989: 6 - see p.219), an approach which had already begun within some unions;28 and 
using public support to put pressure upon employers/Govemment in a particular dispute.
The latter objective is best exemplified by the ambulance workers' dispute of 1989, 
which involved the use of strategies designed to win public support including the 
commissioning of private opinion polls, use of the media and the decision to have one
28 The TGWUs Link-Up campaign, involving the use of television advertising, had 
begun in 1986, while the GMB had produced a video magazine (Mcllroy 1995: 403). 
Note the leader of the GMB's remark 'The TUC ought to speak with authority for all the 
working people of Britain, not just the 10 million in trade unions but also the 12 million 
who ought to be in trade unions' (Edmonds, J. TUC 1986: 453) which demonstrated the 
importance attached to presenting an image favourable to non-members.
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spokesperson, Roger Poole, for the all of the unions involved. The belief was that 
'industrial action on its own would not win the day, so a major public relations offensive 
was launched at the start of the dispute. The unions' strategy was a twin-track one: in 
addition to the pressure created by the industrial action, the unions would try to make the 
government reconsider its offer by making it sufficiently unpopular through a public 
relations campaign' (Kerr and Sachdev 1992: 133-4). Public support was thus regarded 
as vital for success, in a way which had not been the case during the 'Winter of 
Discontent': 'In 1978 we ran the ambulance dispute in a very different way... There was 
a deliberate conscious decision [in 1989] that our members deserved to be represented 
property - the only way of doing this was to win over the public for a chance of winning' 
(Poole, interview); 'the dispute was a fight for public opinion' (Morris, interview).
Given that this was so, the unions involved attempted to adapt their language and 
image so that it would be acceptable to the public - Roger Poole, described as an 
'emollient' (quoted in Blyton and Turnbull 1994: 263) and as 'amiable and unfailingly 
reasonable' (Kerr and Sachdev 1992: 134) stated that there was a conscious attempt to 
avoid confrontational language (interview), a stance assisted by the fact that 'the 
emergency nature of ambulance work also made good television. There was no film of 
ugly confrontations with police that had scarred previous disputes' (Kerr and Sachdev: 
ibid). This policy would seem to have worked - opinion polls conducted during the 
dispute suggested that 80% of the public supported the dispute - and this crucially allowed 
the unions to marginalise the Government: rather than enabling the Government to portray 
itself as the guardian of public interest, the ambulance workers were able to represent 
themselves in this light (Bewsher 1990: 28).
As a dispute in the public sector over a specific issue, it might be queried how far 
developments evident in the ambulance workers' dispute were applicable to the broader 
issue of counteracting the Government's marginalisation of unions in general via language 
and legislative policies. However, Peter Morris argued that it was 'a model for approaches 
elsewhere' (interview), and support for this view can be found not only in the SRB 
reports, but also from the 1990 Congress, where a number of union leaders showed an 
awareness of a need to adapt the union message for public consumption, or to persuade 
the public of its validity: We need to determine what is in the interests of our members, 
and then we need to persuade the country that those interests will benefit the 
overwhelming majority of the population, to secure justice at work and a radical,
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reforming Labour government’ (Carr, J. TUC 1990: 291). In particular, those supporting 
a continued right to take sympathy action were depicted as being out of touch with public 
opinion: 'I just do not believe that that [an 'open-ended right to take secondary action'] 
would be accepted in the court of public opinion and that means our members' opinion 
too... The statement that we are putting to you is something that you could take on to any 
doorstep in Britain and win the argument. That is what we are going to have to do. Many 
of the people on the doorsteps are our members, and we have got to win them to it too. 
We are in tune with Europe. We are in tune with the British people. We are in tune with 
our members on this statement' (Willis, N. TUC 1990: 286); '[Composite Motion 2] 
advocates the return of unrestricted sympathy action. We all know that that is 
unacceptable to the public and that it would open the door to another round of Tory 
union-bashing' (Young, A. TUC 1990: 289); But I will tell you what I heard in some of 
those speeches today. I heard the reappearance of the arrogance of trade union demands 
which we had in the late 1970s, which led to the election of the Thatcher Government in 
the first place and, by golly, you have got to be aware of it. It does not go down well with 
the public of this country. It may go down with a few of us here, and a few of us back at 
the branch. But the great majority of trade union members, let alone the public, will not 
wear it’ (Lyons, J. TUC 1990: 298-9).29
These remarks suggest a shift towards presentation of union policies in language 
which would appeal to 'ordinary' union members and the public in order to win support 
against the Government. While this process remained incomplete - Roger Poole remarked 
that 'we still need to work towards addressing everyone as if they were the public' 
(interview) and David Lea that 'I think there is a need for us to do more to demonstrate 
that what we are advocating is what the people of Kidderminster want rather than saying 
I've got 5 million block votes, you'd better listen to what I'm saying" (interview) - it did 
represent a move away from the tendency of the early 1980s, previously remarked upon 
(pp. 160-1) to primarily address union activists: Now we address members/the public and 
activists in different ways' (Poole, interview). The 'public' and union members were 
broadly equated, and were prioritised over 'activists'.
However, as with many of the themes examined in this Chapter, this tendency had
29 Note also Jordan's listing of 'the flesh and blood reasons for the reform of 
employment law - reasons for a charter of rights for people at work, reasons the public 
can see and sympathise with' (see p. 100).
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not been unambiguously settled by the time of Thatcher's demise. A number of union 
leaders continued to express their suspicion of this approach, some seeking to distinguish 
policies and language which would be appealing to their members and that which was 
acceptable to the public: 'What we fear is that in order to make trade unions and trade 
union activity acceptable to an electorate which probably will not be impressed, and 
certainly not convinced, will render us incapable of defending our members' interests 
industrially on the shop floor' (Hearn, D. TUC 1990: 302), while others voiced a 
'traditional' claim to protect working people as a whole, which seemingly did not admit 
of a role for the wider public: 'Our first responsibility is to represent our members... But 
we also have responsibilities to working people everywhere. Would it be meeting our 
responsibilities if we stood aside and said to a group of workers, 'Sorry, we would like to 
help, but we can’t because you work in the wrong firm or, indeed, the wrong occupation'? 
Is that being responsible? Of course not. On the contrary, it is to ignore all the best 
traditions of our Movement' (Christopher, C. TUC 1990: 296). These speakers appeared 
to demonstrate no particular concern for presentational issues or the adaptation of 
language to win public support, as the leader of the TGWU seemed to confirm: 'I am not 
interested in what we say to the press. I am not interested in what the press say to us. I 
am interested in what we say to our members, who have been slaughtered for eleven years 
under Thatcher1 (Todd, R. TUC 1990: 304). Such remarks, while ostensibly addressed to 
'members', more closely resembled the approach of the earlier period which gave 
precedence to activists, and therefore fitted with the more 'traditional' language used by 
many of these union leaders.30
In this Chapter, I have described a number of key themes in union language by 
which the philosophy and policies of'new realism' were projected. The moves towards 
addressing the public and 'ordinary' union members rather than activists, can thus be seen 
as a component of the response of the TUC leadership and other 'new realists' in the 
movement to the changing environment of the 1980s. Similarly, the conciliatory language 
of'fairness' and balance', the focus on 'partnership' and the vocabulary of'renewal' can be 
seen as designed to appeal to the public, in order to provide an atmosphere conducive to
30 Todd of the TGWU was something of an exception in that he supported 
Employment Law: A New Approach, but also Composite Motion 2 seeking the repeal of 
Conservative legislation.
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trade unionism and to counteract Conservative attempts to marginalise unions, as well as 
an aspect of the 'accommodative tendencies' towards employers and (to a much lesser 
extent) Government (Mcllroy 1995: 224).
In spite of these shifts in union language, my analysis of the various material has 
also led me to the conclusion that strong elements of the 'traditional' language of 
confrontation, collectivism and class remained, voiced explicitly by those who resisted the 
'new* approach, but also underpinning many of the developments in vocabulary. Moreover, 
the existence of conflicting definitions in political discourse of terms such as 'freedom' and 
'democracy1 meant that the apparent embrace by the unions of languages of individualism 
and 'democracy' may have been less than totally convincing to union members and the 
public, given the strength of alternative understandings. Accordingly, in the final Chapter 
of this thesis, I shall try to offer some conclusions on the nature and significance of the 
trends in union language which I have identified.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Conclusion
What conclusions can be drawn about patterns of trade union language during the 
period 1979-90 in the light of the interpretation offered in this thesis? I would argue that 
the general assessment of British trade unionism offered by Kelly is equally apposite in 
respect of the specific issue of union discourse - 'in certain areas it is self-evident that there 
have been major changes... in other areas it is just as clear that very little has changed' 
(1990: 29-30). Kelly goes on to urge industrial relations analysts to identify the particular 
areas of continuity and discontinuity, which I will now attempt to do in this context, 
briefly summing up the themes discussed above.
Union language: change and continuity
The first point to note is that there has been a developing acceptance by the trade 
unions of certain changes forced upon them by the policies of the Thatcher Governments 
which is evident in their language: 'if the question is 'have we had to swallow things to 
which we were opposed at the time', the answer is obviously *yes" (Lea, interview). In 
particular, the unions have come to acknowledge the place of law in industrial relations 
generally, thus moving away (at least from the time of the 1986 consultative document 
onward) from a traditional voluntarist stance, in stating that 'the fact is that the law is in 
industrial relations and cannot now be excluded - if it ever could' (TUC 1986a: 3). A 
similar response can be detected to the legislative provisions on union democracy: 
'certainly, balloting before the taking of official industrial action has become widely 
accepted' (Kessler and Bayliss 1995: 191; also Fredman 1992: 34), in large part 
conditioned by the apparent popularity of the measures with trade unionists: 'Balloting is 
here to stay because our members favour it' (Willis, N. TUC 1986: 451); 'I tell you bluntly 
that we will not get commitment [from members] if we imply that we want to take away 
their right to a ballot on crucial issues like strikes and the election of union leadership' 
(Willis, N. TUC 1990: 285). In this respect, the unions' responses can be seen as 
demonstrating realism in that they showed an adaptation to a changed political and legal 
environment, although compliance was also secured via the threat of injunctions, fines 
and sequestration (Undy et al 1996: 25).
Acceptance of the measures did not necessarily imply approval of them (as Lea's
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remark suggests) and the unions remained somewhat suspicious of the law and critical of 
elements of the Government's model of democracy (Undy et al 1996: 235 and above, 
pp.211-5). However, they were also able to incorporate the language of law and of 
'democracy' into their discourse and strategy, accusing the Government of denying rights 
to workers, labelling Government measures 'undemocratic' and using ballots to enhance 
the legitimacy of industrial action (Martin et al 1991: 207). In these senses, therefore there 
was validity in the claim that unions were 'keeping to the law and even turning it to 
advantage' (Christopher, C. TUC 1989: 302).
Accompanying these developments were certain shifts in objectives and policies. 
Perhaps the most notable of these was the move away from the traditional immunity-based 
approach to the law and towards a system of positive rights, expressed in calls for 
'charters' of individual and collective rights in statements such as Employment Law: A New 
Approach. This gradual shift in policy was reflected in an increased use of the language 
of 'rights' in the union movement in a manner which was very different from its use in 
Government discourse (see pp. 196-8). Another significant element of changing union 
strategy was the increased emphasis upon services, such as pensions, insurance and legal 
services, which could be offered to existing and potential members. This was also 
manifested in altering patterns of language, with some increased focus upon the individual, 
although collective discourses remained powerful, as I shall argue below.
I have also remarked upon distinct shifts in the tone of union responses to the 
legislation. The period 1979-83 was predominantly marked by a vocabulary of conflict and 
non-cooperation, a stridency of tone, a characterisation of Government as 'the enemy' and 
warnings to employers of the possible consequences which would await them if they used 
the laws, most powerfully expressed in the Wembley Conference of 1982 and the 
campaign against 'Tebbit's Law'. From 1983 onwards a more conciliatory vocabulary of 
'fairness' and 'balance', coupled with calls for cooperation and 'partnership' with employers 
and (particularly towards the end of the decade), a language of renewal came to the 
forefront of union discourse.
Closely linked to this were changes in the style of opposition to Conservative 
policies. The Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982 (especially the latter) prompted 
widespread political mobilisation (Kelly 1990: 58) in the form of organised campaigns and 
demonstrations coupled with policies of non-cooperation with the legislation. In contrast, 
the period from 1986/7 to the fall of Thatcher witnessed attempts by the TUC and unions
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to persuade employers, MPs and other organisations to oppose further measures on the 
grounds that they were 'unnecessary' and unsupported by evidence. Coordinated 
campaigns of opposition to the legislation had ceased to be viable in the light of the defeat 
of the miners, the disintegration of unified defiance within the TUC and the continued 
popularity of the Thatcher Government with many trade union members as evidenced by 
their support for its re-election in 1987. Indeed, Kelly characterises the union response 
during this period as emphasising membership recruitment, rather than opposition to 
Government policy (ibid). Also in this context one should note the increased attention 
paid to techniques of presentation, both in an attempt to gain public support for particular 
grievances (exemplified by the ambulance workers' dispute of 1989) and to attract new 
members; the latter objective also being reflected in an increasing tendency to address 
'ordinary* union members and the wider public rather than union activists.
However, while the changes which I have identified were undoubtedly of 
considerable significance, it is important not to underestimate the extent of continuity 
within union discourse. Several strands can be seen as being of continued relevance 
throughout the period studied.
Firstly, my analysis of TUC publications and Congress speeches has demonstrated 
the continued significance of several key collectivist themes which, despite being played 
down by the leadership of the TUC in the latter part of the decade, retained considerable 
potency amongst many union leaders, particularly those hostile to, or ambivalent towards, 
'new realism'. These included the repertoire of myths relating to the origins and history of 
the labour movement; the conception of industrial relations as 'struggle', which was linked 
to the language of 'class'; the 'keywords' of 'unity' and 'solidarity'; and a continued 
vocabulary of confrontation.
Secondly, in the light of the enduring failure of the TUC and unions to engage in 
any meaningful dialogue with the Thatcher administration, the Government continued to 
be portrayed in rhetoric as the 'enemy' of the trade unions, with its measures depicted as 
'malicious' and as an element of a wider strategy against working people (although the 
personalisation of opposition in the form of Tebbit was not maintained in respect of 
subsequent employment ministers). Similarly, certain 'rogue' employers and disaffected 
members retained a central position in union demonology.
Further, while there may have been, as I have argued, an increased emphasis upon 
individualistic discourses and strategies in union language, a powerful strain continued to
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stress the unequal relationship between employers and employees and the consequent need 
for collective representation to redress the imbalance. The individual was, on this analysis, 
fundamental to trade union existence; but the protection and representation which unions 
could offer functioned to enhance his/her condition and potential.
Tied in with this was the view of industrial relations as inherently based upon a 
conflict of interest between employers and employees, expressed in the notion that 'you 
cannot legislate away the clashes of interest that can occur at work' (Willis, N. TUC 1990: 
285). Thus, in spite of moves towards a more conciliatory language of'partnership' and 
cooperation with employers, I would contend that the unions continued to view industrial 
relations as underpinned *by the antagonistic interests of capital and labour and the balance 
of power between them' (Kelly 1990: 31). The pluralist view of industrial relations 
discussed in Chapter 5 had not fundamentally altered.
Two further points are of significance in the discussion of change and continuity 
in union language. Firstly, a number of the alterations in patterns of discourse which were 
taking place were not complete by the end of the period studied. This was particularly true 
of the move towards a language and policy of'rights' which met considerable opposition 
at the 1989 and 1990 Congresses; but the persistence of collectivist languages and values 
among many union leaders can also be understood in similar terms. This serves to 
reinforce a point made in Chapter 1; the trade union movement was not monolithic, and 
different Voices' could always be heard. It also demonstrates, however, that change is 
gradual and is unlikely to be irrevocable at a specific date, which inevitably forms a 
somewhat artificial cut-off point.1
Secondly, in Chapter 6 ,1 identified several elements of the developing language 
of 'new realism' that were not strictly new at all. The notion of 'partnership' with 
employers, the attempt to create a 'community of opposition' to the measures, the claim 
that the measures were unnecessary, the vocabulary of 'balance' and of'unfairness' based 
upon a comparison with the treatment of comparable institutions - all of these themes had 
to some extent been prefaced earlier in the decade.2 'New realism' may therefore have
1 One might argue that the division of the analysis of union language into two 
distinct time periods adopted in this thesis tends to exaggerate the impression of 
alterations being relatively sudden rather than gradual.
2 Indeed, Joyce points out that the language of'fairness' was an important element 
of union discourse in the late 19th Century (1991: 117).
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represented a change in tone, but it did not involve the use of forms of language 
previously unheard within the union movement. In this sense, many of the developments 
in language can be seen as ’recessive themes' in union discourse: 'new arguments... shaped 
in part out of themes which were previously, like latent genes, recessive or of secondary 
importance... themes which, like recessive genes, were present but relatively mute, 
[which] can from a different chronological vantage point be seen to have carried ways of 
talking about politics which provided some of the language of later years' (Barker 1996: 
14). The vocabulary of'new realism' was based around themes which were present, if not 
always dominant, in union language of the early 1980s and before.
This leads to an important question as to the relationship between changing 
patterns of union language and the policies of the Thatcher Governments. If a number of 
the developments which did take place can be understood as manifestations of 'latent 
themes' already present in union discourse, while in other areas there were substantial 
continuities in the language used, to what extent can Conservative/'New Right' language 
be said to have shaped and altered the terms of debate on labour legislation over the 
decade? In order to address this issue, I wish to explore the analysis of Thatcherism as a 
hegemonic project (see p. 12) in greater detail.
Thatcherite hegemony and the unions
The interpretation of Thatcherism as hegemonic project is most closely associated 
with the work of Stuart Hall. Following Gramsci, Hall claims that ''hegemony' implies: the 
struggle to contest and disorganise an exiting political formation; the taking of the 'leading 
position' (on however minority a basis) over a number of different spheres of society at 
once - economy, civil society, intellectual and moral life, culture; the conduct of a wide 
and differentiated type of struggle; the winning of a strategic measure of popular consent; 
and thus, the securing of a social authority sufficiently deep to conform society into a new 
historic project' (1988: 7). He argues that Thatcherism sought to challenge, and ultimately 
dismantle, the hegemony of the post-war social democratic settlement and in this sense 
could not be viewed as merely an attempt at a short-term electoral triumph; instead it 
sought a transformation and restructuring of the state and society {ibid\ 163; Hall and 
Jacques 1983: 11). The exponents of Thatcherism based their challenge around the 
concepts and vocabulary of'authoritarian populism' (Hall 1983: 31; Gamble 1994: 182)
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which drew upon popular discontents with social democracy and married these with the 
strengthening of the power of the state in order to achieve its goals. Its success lay, in 
large part, in what Hall calls ’the remaking of common sense' (1988: 8,163), such that the 
old understandings of social democracy and the welfare state were supplanted by those 
of the free market, and in so doing it managed to speak to substantial numbers of people 
outside the 'dominant classes': 'Thatcherism was grafted onto the resentment of the 'little 
non-political person in the street' against the big, corporate battalions - 'big government' 
and 'big unions' which characterised the statism of the social democratic era' (Hall and 
Jacques 1983: 10 - italics in original). Thatcherism also prevented the formation of 
effective and coherent counter-ideologies, functioning to delegitimate socialism (Levitas 
1986: 17), although Hall argues that this was partly due to the Left's failure to understand 
Thatcherism as a hegemonic project and thus to devise an alternative to it (1988: 11,170).
Hall's interpretation is not without its critics, perhaps the most notable of whom 
are Bob Jessop and colleagues (Jessop et al 1984, 1990). They argue that Hall 
exaggerates the significance of ideology as an element of the policies of the Thatcher 
Governments and as explaining support for them; instead they focus upon economic 
issues, arguing that Thatcherism represents a 'failed economic project’ (Leys 1990: 120). 
This criticism shades into one previously discussed (pp.33-4) - that Thatcherism was 
insufficiently coherent to amount to an 'ideology' and to treat it as such assumes a 
homogeneity in the pursuit of policies which was absent in practice (Hall 1988: 9). 
Additionally, Hall is criticised on the basis that he overstates the level of support which 
Thatcherism had among the electorate - that Thatcherism in fact achieved hegemony or, 
to use Levitas' phrase, that 'we are all Thatcherites now' (1986: 16; see also Hall ibid. 
154).
For his part, Hall acknowledges the criticisms, but rejects them. He states that his 
'foregrounding' of the political-ideological dimension is a 'deliberate strategy' intended to 
avoid a reduction to economism (ibid 3,170) and thus that authoritarian populism was 
only intended to be a partial explanation of Thatcherism; that Thatcherism represents a 
number of diffuse, sometimes contradictory ideas and languages (ibid 9, 166); and, 
perhaps most powerfully of all, he refutes the claim that a hegemonic position has once 
and for all been achieved, aiguing that hegemony 'should never be mistaken for a finished 
or settled project. It is always contested, always trying to secure itself, always 'in process" 
(ibid 7,91) - he points in particular to the disparity between its ideological advances and
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economic failures (ibid: 155). This issue is expanded upon both by Levitas, who argues 
that the hegemonic project of the 'New Right1 can be taken to have achieved success less 
in electoral terms and more on the basis of its propagation and support by the institutions 
of civil society and the state (1986: 17); and by Gamble, who considers hegemony to have 
electoral, ideological, state and economic dimensipns and concludes that the project was 
relatively successful in the first two categories (although certainly not complete), but 
considerably less so in the other two dimensions (1994: 226).
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to evaluate the accuracy or otherwise of these 
interpretations of Thatcherism or to seek to reach a definitive understanding of the 
concept of'hegemony'. However, Hall's concerns can be seen as extremely pertinent to 
this study.
The importance of the characterisation of Thatcherism as a hegemonic process lies 
in the centrality of political language to the project. Commenting upon the relationship 
between culture and languages of'nation' and 'race', Seidel remarks that 'any [hegemonic] 
project of this kind will seek to manipulate words and concepts as an integral part of 
cultural and political history. Language, particularly processes of renaming and 
redefinition, is a focus of struggle... ostensibly abstract disputes about the meanings of 
words have profound implications for public policy and people's lives' (1986: 107-8). 
Similarly, Hall adopts a discursive conception of ideology which views the forms of 
articulation as crucial - as Leys states, he develops 'a rich problematic of ideological 
themes, repertoires, articulations, terrains, condensations and the rest, through which, in 
his hands, the newly emerging linguistic and philosophical theories of signification became 
potent practical tools of ideological understanding and struggle' (1990: 125). In this 
respect, his approach strongly resembles that of writers such as Jones and Joyce (p. 8) in 
that it recognises that the core ideas and policies of Thatcherism must be constructed; they 
do not simply represent pre-existing needs, views and realities: 'I have tried to show how 
Thatcherism articulates and condenses different, often contradictory, discourses within the 
same ideological formation. It presupposes, not the installation of an already-formed and 
integral conception of the world, but the process o f formation by which 'a multiplicity of 
dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together" (Hall 1988: 10 - italics in 
original; Leys 1990: 126); however he stops short of a 'fully discursive position', arguing 
that material conditions of existence set limits on the validity and effectiveness of forms 
of political language. Thatcherism is thus 'constituted by, and constitutive of (Hall ibid. 5),
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changes in political, economic, social and cultural conditions.
Hall’s account does not focus specifically upon the issue of the language of 
Thatcherite legislative reform in industrial relations. However, there can be little question 
that measures to 'tame' the unions represented a key element of any hegemonic project 
pursued by the Thatcher Government, both in ideological terms, as part of a philosophy 
of anti-collectivism, and along the economic dimension, in an attempt to 'free' the labour 
market. As such, if Hall's interpretation is followed, one would expect language to play 
a crucial role in the policies, constituting the unions as an appropriate target for legislative 
control. The validity of this assessment has, I hope, been demonstrated by the analysis in 
Chapters 3 and 4 above. The discourses of the market, of individualism (themes brought 
together within the broader and politically potent vocabulary of 'freedom') and of 
'democracy functioned to construct British industrial relations in general and the trade 
unions in particular as in need of reform; the language of 'privilege' and of 'balance' 
operated as justifications for the adoption of legislative (rather than collectively 
negotiated) measures to regulate union behaviour and operations; while the discourses of 
'people1, 'nation' and 'community sought to delegitimate unions and collectivism - this 
being an example of Thatcherism's 'constant attempts to expel symbolically one sector of 
society after another from the imaginary community of the nation' (Hall 1988: 8). These 
were, therefore, crucial tools in the attempted construction of a new 'common sense' (to 
use Hall's phrase) which challenged the post-war voluntarist, collectivist, corporatist 
settlement in industrial relations in favour of a state-regulated, individual-oriented system 
which denied unions access to the policy-making process.
To what extent did the Conservative Government of 1979-90 succeed in building 
a new 'common sense' in industrial relations and on the role of the trade unions? If we 
view the Conservatives' labour legislative policies as part of an attempt to achieve 
hegemony over the union movement, the question (at least in respect of the ideological 
dimensions of the hegemonic project) then becomes: did Government articulations of key 
concepts and vocabularies achieve a dominant position in the industrial relations debate 
and successfully prevent the formation of a coherent counter-ideology? I will consider this 
problem by briefly discussing key shared but contested discourses, such as 'democracy', 
'freedom' and 'individual rights'.
In the case of'democracy, there was an acknowledgment on the part of several 
union leaders that there was some substance in Government accusations that unions'
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previous internal arrangements had been anti-democratic (pp.213-4), prompted, in large 
part, by the perceived popularity with union members of the balloting provisions which 
had been introduced by the legislation (p.225). The result was that a particular conception 
of democracy, which reflected the Government's atomistic, individualistic model (Fredman 
1992: 29) became dominant: 'it does not appear premature to note that the terrain of 
debate concerning democracy in trade unions has shifted. Discussions of alternative 
representative and participative forms of democracy now appear academic: the vocabulary 
has been captured and union democracy is in practice now firmly equated with a 
requirement for individual balloting' (Dickens and Hall 1995: 292). However, the unions 
did not fully embrace the Government's model and definition of'democracy'; rather, they 
reluctantly complied with it to avoid the imposition of legal sanctions (Undy et al 1996: 
236).
In similar manner, although perhaps less noticeably, the 'New Right'/Conservative 
language of 'freedom', based upon an individualised conception of competition between 
self-interested individuals in the absence of coercion from others or the state, lias lent 
strong persuasive power to Thatcherism and such slogans as the 'free market' and 'rolling 
back the boundaries of the state" (Fredman 1992: 38). In the area of labour legislation this 
can be seen as underpinning the Conservative discourses of economy and the market and 
of freedom from the collective pressure of trade unions (embodied in the proposals on 
democracy and the right not to be unjustifiably disciplined for refusing a strike call), in 
contrast to the unions' calls for freedom of association and freedom to regulate their own 
affairs, which were, by comparison, relatively unsuccessful in reshaping policy.
The language of individualism shaded into the language of'rights' (a right to work 
enforceable against unions, or a right not to belong to a union), which were 'used to 
legitimate an essentially individualistic, free market view of society1 (Fredman 1992: 37) 
and thus formed a central element in the Thatcherite assault on the 'common sense' 
collectivist understandings of the post-war settlement. The unions sought to counter this 
discourse by calling for 'charters' of rights for individual workers and, in so doing, 
emphasising that their task was (and always had been) to enhance the position of the 
individual vis-a-vis more powerful employers.
However, despite the apparent confidence with which union counter-claims were 
made, they faced considerable difficulties in challenging Government/New Right' 
discourse. The request for charters of 'rights' did not fit well with a legal system which
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had traditionally not been based around positive 'rights’ for individuals, particularly in the 
absence of a written constitution; further, the common law was powerfully underpinned 
by an individualist philosophy (Hendy 1993: 60 - see above, p.67) which tended to run 
counter to the type of'rights' (such as the right to strike and freedom to associate) which 
the unions sought, even when they couched these requests in the language of enhancement 
of the status of individuals.
Further, Taylor argues that the history of British state-union relations, underpinned 
by laissez-faire presumptions which prioritised union autonomy and kept government out 
of industrial relations, did not encourage a belief in state planning and corporatist policy­
making. The result was that 'the forces of individualism and the free market proved to be 
much stronger than the countervailing tendencies towards centralisation and planning' and 
that the labour movement tended to be characterised by 'self-regarding sectionalism':
'a strong class consciousness could not mask the real and complex social status and 
occupational divisions that separated workers from each other. The rhetoric of a Labour 
Movement - an industrial army of the working class of one mind - made little sense 
beyond the rostrum of union and party conferences. So did any real sense of discipline 
among workers to achieve a greater good. It is debatable whether social solidarity was 
ever strong across the working class as a whole... vague notions of social justice made 
little impact on the hallowed defence of established wage differentials and relativities' 
(1993: 343-4).
On this view, Conservative notions of the self-interested individual shifting for 
him/herself in a competitive, free market environment, may have been more persuasive to 
union members' 'deeper instinctive feelings and beliefs' (particularly their suspicion of 
authority (ibid: 344)) than the union 'mix' of language and strategies of individual rights 
and services coupled with the function of collective protection which emphasised the 
relative weakness of the individual. However, this conclusion can be questioned, as I shall 
presently discuss.
The pursuit of ideological hegemony, both in the debate on industrial relations and 
more generally was, of course, considerably assisted by the sympathy of much of the 
media towards Thatcherite values and projects. Gamble claims that 'the active support 
given to the Thatcher government by the great majority of the national press was very 
important in sustaining the momentum of Thatcherism and projecting its policies as the 
only right and possible ones. Under the Thatcher government the British press was more 
one-sided in its partisanship than at any time in the history of British mass democracy'
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(1994: 222), while Hall remarks that ’the colonisation of the popular press was a critical 
victory in this struggle to define the common sense of the times' (1983: 29). This was 
exacerbated by the tendency of the media, noted by the Glasgow Media Group - prior to 
Thatcher's election (1995:Vol.I: 160 - originally published 1980) - to use language 
indicative of an anti-union 'world view'.
A study of the language of the unions indicates their awareness of the persuasive 
potency of media presentation, both of union activity and of Government policies. There 
was a consciousness of a need to counter this, partly by 'debunking the myths' in TUC 
publications (eg TUC 1982c; TUC 1983); and partly by devoting greater attention to 
techniques of presentation (for example, the publication of TUC Bulletin and the methods 
used during the ambulance workers' dispute of 1989 - see pp.220-1). However, neither 
unions nor the Left in general were ever in a position to challenge the Conservative 
dominance of the media and it is perhaps instructive that a senior TUC official admitted 
to me that, even in 1996 *we do have a media problem' (Lea, interview).
This raises an important point, which relates both to the understanding of 
'hegemony' and the success of the Thatcherite project. Concepts such as 'democracy*, 
'freedom' and 'individual rights' were key terms in the political lexicon, and therefore 
vitally important for all sides to claim; but they were also the sites of considerable 
ideological contestation. The uniops were certainly not 'deprived' of these vocabularies, 
as Fredman claims of'democracy1 - (1992: 24 - see p.215); indeed, they made considerable 
attempts to use them against the Conservatives by claiming that they were anti­
democratic, opposed to freedom, had removed individual rights etc. The implication of 
her argument, however, seems to be that the Thatcherite 'definitions' of these terms 
achieved a degree of dominance in the industrial relations debate such that counter­
definitions put forward by the unions were regarded as invalid. In this sense, therefore, 
ConservativeANew Right' ideology could be said to have achieved a degree of hegemony: 
Hy capitalising on the shifting denotations of these ideas, the Thatcher Government has 
successfully engendered a wide measure of consensus supporting measures which are in 
reality highly restrictive of workers' rights and trade unionism' (ibid).
Two distinct but related elements of the hegemonic project require disentangling 
here. Firstly, how far did the Conservatives succeed in establishing consensus support for 
their legislative measures on trade unions? The evidence of success here is, at best, 
ambivalent, both at elite level and below. TUC and other union leaders, as argued above,
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continued to contest Conservative understandings of key themes; in particular, the type 
of 'rights’ and 'freedoms' which they emphasised differed from the individualistic 
conception of the 'New Right'; and although 'the individual' had a growing role in union 
discourse and strategy, the notion that he/she required collective protection to redress the 
imbalance of power in relations with employers remained fundamental. Moreover, where 
changes in language did take place, they often involved the rekindling of recessive themes 
within union discourse rather than the adoption of Thatcherite understandings. I would 
argue, therefore, that it is difficult to conclude that union leaders supported Thatcherite 
strategies or adopted its understandings of key themes.
This may not seem surprising; but the evidence of support from union members 
and the broader public is also somewhat thin. Although 'the early policy initiatives were 
popular with the electorate. Opinion polls showed that voters generally approved of 
Conservative union legislation. There was strong, positive support (even amongst union 
members) for legislation on ballots before strikes, postal elections for union leaders, and 
attacks on the closed shop' (Miller and Steele 1993: 228), this support seems to have 
diminished during the decade, with unions becoming more popular (Edwards and Bain 
1988: 313). Moreover, surveys of union members suggest that the major incentives for 
membership are support at work and the improvement of pay and conditions, rather than 
individualistic instrumental reasons for joining (eg benefits and services) (Waddington and 
Whitston 1995: 191; Taylor 1994: 23; Poole, interview). There seems, therefore, 'little 
evidence to suggest that... workers' fundamental loyalty to unions has been destroyed by 
the Conservatives' political project. Individualism was not central to union decline, and 
collective issues remain at the core of workers' demands of unions' (Waddington and 
Whitston, ibid: 197). The construction of an anti-collectivist, individualistic consensus 
therefore seems to be incomplete at best.
However, this does not preclude the possibility of Thatcherite hegemony in the 
debate on labour legislation, because the term can be understood in another way. Hall has 
drawn attention to hegemony as an ongoing, rather than a completed, project (see p.230), 
and therefore the failure to establish consensus does not prevent the existence of 
hegemony; while Leys remarks that the absence of an effective counter-ideology is a 
central feature of hegemony: 'for an ideology to be hegemonic, it is not necessary that it 
be loved. It is merely necessary that it have no serious rival' (1990: 127). If these 
understandings are combined, Thatcherism can be seen as hegemonic in the context of
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labour legislation. The Conservative/New Right' dominance of the media and the elite 
intellectual groupings discussed in Chapter 3 (see also Desai 1994) enabled their language 
to shape and control the debate on the reform of industrial relations legislation; the unions, 
reactive by nature (see p. 11-12) and excluded from corporatist policy-making processes 
which might have allowed them to influence the legislative measures, were forced to 
respond in similar terms,3 as they acknowledged throughout the decade: We have not 
chosen the ground for this fight, and I do not think we shall be able to choose the ground 
for particular fights' (Murray, L. TUC (Wembley) 1982: 408); Tor too long we have let 
Mrs. Thatcher choose the ground for this debate' (Young A., TUC 1990: 289). In 
addition, the potency of continued Conservative attempts to marginalise and delegitimise 
the unions rendered them 'outsiders' in the political debate, a position which their media 
presentational difficulties tended to reinforce. Accordingly, the unions were unable to 
challenge Government discourse and strategy at the level of policy-making, or to 
effectively construct a counter-hegemony which would have presented a coherent 
'alternative reality' on industrial relations and labour law to that put forward by the 
Conservatives; instead they were simply able to dissent to each measure as it was put 
forward.
Overall, therefore, the relationship between the notion of Thatcherite hegemony 
and labour legislative policies can be summarised as follows. Conservative/TNew Right' 
policies and discourse challenged the post-war collectivist consensus on state-union 
relations and the Government's language and understandings of key themes dominated and 
shaped the policy-making agenda during the 1980s. In the light of the support which the 
Government had from the media and important think-tanks and intellectuals, and 
continued Conservative attempts to marginalise them, the unions - conservative by 
impulse and facing difficulties of presentation - did not come close to constructing a 
coherent and effective counter-hegemony to challenge or supplant Conservative ideology. 
However, they remained strongly critical of Government measures, and there is relatively 
little evidence, either at an elite level or amongst 'ordinary' members and the wider public, 
of the 'transmission' of Thatcherite language and beliefs in the manner suggested by Green
3 Moher argues that both the provisions on balloting and on strengthening the 
rights of individual union members reflected developments which were actually occurring 
within unions at the time; however the fact that these changes were imposed by law and 
that the miners' strike of 1984-5 highlighted the reluctance to change 'meant that unions 
were thrown onto the defensive' (1995: 46-7).
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(p. 12), with the limited exception of the theme of'democracy1.
Thatcherism and the changing language of the Left
The debate, outlined briefly in Chapter 1, about the effect of Government law and 
policies upon trade union attitudes, behaviour and strategy, can now be returned to. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Government claimed that 'trade union law played an essential 
part in transforming Britain's industrial relations' (DE 1991: 6). This view has been 
partially endorsed by some academic commentators - for example Freeman and Pelletier 
(1990) attribute the decline in union membership to legislative policy, Evans (1987) points 
to the importance of injunctions in restraining industrial action, while Marsh (1992: 239) 
and Kessler and Bayliss (1995: 260) comment upon the considerable reduction in the 
political role of the unions. Elsewhere, however, the impact of the legislation is seen as 
questionable. Brown and Wadwhani (1990: 69) argue that declining membership and 
strike activity should not be linked too closely to legislation, while Kessler and Bayliss do 
not regard it as a 'major cause' of the reduction in the number of strikes (1995: 236). 
Many commentators conclude that the legislation had some impact upon trade unions, but 
that it cannot be disentangled from other influences such as macroeconomic factors and 
changes in industry composition (Kelly 1990: 56; Metcalf 1991: 23; Marsh 1992:242; 
Dunn and Metcalf 1994: 37).
The interpretation of union language offered in this thesis suggests that, even if we 
accept that the discourse has not become totally Thatcherite, and that it exhibited 
important continuities throughout the decade, the fact remains that there were shifts in 
patterns of union language during the 1980s. How far can these changes be attributed to 
the legislative and other policies of the Conservative Government?
This is a problematic issue not only in the context of developments in trade unions, 
but more broadly in relation to changes in British political language as a whole. Viewed 
from the perspective of the mid-1990s, it seems uncontroversial to claim that a redefinition 
of the terms of political debate has taken place. Barker (1996) has drawn attention to a 
number of recent changes in political argument, including the disappearance of socialism 
and conservatism, the replacement of policies with constitutions, the replacement of class 
with citizenship and the disappearance of enemies. Several of these developments can be 
seen being played out in union discourse of the 1980s - particularly the diminution in
238
importance of the language of class; growing attempts to win over employers and moves 
towards a vocabulary of'social partnership' and 'talking a language which employers find 
acceptable' (Poole, interview) which suggested they were not to be regarded as 'enemies' 
(although enmity continued to be expressed towards Government and 'rogue' employers); 
and the call for 'charters' of rights for workers and the use of decisions of the ILO, which 
resembled the demands for constitutional safeguards heard from groups such as Charter 
88 influenced by the growing presence within British politics of the European Union' 
(Barker ibid. 11). The gradual move to a less confrontational vocabulary within the union 
movement also corresponded with the observations of reformers such as Bogdanor (1983: 
197), who have been critical of the adversarial nature of British public life.
Changes in the terms of debate appear to have been particularly acute on the 
Left. In 1990, Leys remarked that 'perhaps the idea of formulating a socialist project, 
capable of being pursued in the context of the global market economy, with the long-term 
goal of recovering control over that market, and hence over our lives, now seems simply 
a fantastic dream' (1990: 128 - italics in original), while Gamble argues that, by 1992, 
certain policy changes had become irreversible and had forced Labour 'to recognise... that 
there could be no return to national economic management and welfare programmes based 
upon the Fordism of the postwar boom' (1994: 225). These changes have perhaps reached 
their zenith in the redefined 'New' Labour Party under the leadership of Tony Blair, with 
the revision of Clause Four of the party's constitution and recent calls to cut its historical 
ties with trade unions and to phase out the word 'socialism' from the party's vocabulary.4
There would appear, therefore, to be strong reasons for claiming that 'the Thatcher 
government succeeded in shifting the terms of the policy debate' (Gamble 1994: 224) and 
that 'the Conservatives have an unshakeable grip on the agenda: the language and 
philosophy of politics remains theirs, and theirs alone'.5 But how far have these changes 
been caused by Thatcherism (if indeed such a thing exists)? Barker observes that 'it is 
easier to see how different things have become, than to identify when or in what manner
4 For the revision of Clause Four, see Blair's October revolution', The Economist 
8th October 1994, Anderson, P.: Nearly there', New Statesman and Society, 28th April 
1995: 25. For ties with the unions and the language of'socialism', see Blair ready to cut 
links with unions', The Times 13th September 1996; What's in a name', The Times 16th 
September 1996.
5 'A triumph of conservatism', Independent on Sunday, 14th April 1996.
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the change took place' (1996: 7). The difficulty is that there are a number of'catalysts' or 
potential explanations for change - the collapse of state Marxism in 1989 (Gamble 1994: 
226; Barker ibid), and a long-term rise in the standard of living (Phelps Brown 1990: 7-8) 
may be at least as significant in encouraging change on the Left as the dominance of the 
policy agenda by the Conservatives/fNew Right'. Precisely the same can be argued in the 
narrower context of the changes in union language examined in this thesis. The legislation 
and policies of the Conservative Government may have caused some or all of the 
alterations in the nature and tone of union discourse which I have observed; but other 
factors such as declining membership, changing management strategies or new patterns 
of work may have been equally or more important.
Ultimately, therefore, the problem of causation identified in Chapter 1 remains. 
One can observe changes in political language and infer that certain consequences may 
have resulted or that these changes may themselves be the result of particular factors; but 
it is impossible to prove that this is the case. However, I do not believe that such 
difficulties should blind us to the importance of a study of changing political language such 
as this. Political language 'is not just one more kind of activity; it is... the key to the 
universe of speaker and audience' (Edelman 1964: 131); it is also a vital element in the 
construction and maintenance of identity by any political grouping (Belchem 1996: 11). 
The shifting patterns of language identified in this thesis thus tell us much about whether 
there have been changes in the British labour movement since 1979 and if so, how 
fundamental they are; they also demonstrate how it attempted to construct and define 
itself in a hostile legal environment and a political community from which the Government 
had sought to drive it. In an era when political identities and the terms of political debate 
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